S. HRG. 99-560

COMMITMENTS, CONSENSUS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 31, FEBRUARY 4, 5, 6, 7, 20, 25, 26, OCTOBER 31,
NOVEMBER 7 AND 12, 1985

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
45-004 WASHINGTON : 1986

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

S381-15

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, *Chairman*

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
PAULA HAWKINS, Florida
  Resigned February 21, 1985
PAUL S. TRIBLE, Jr., Virginia
  Appointed February 21, 1985
DANIEL J. EVANS, Washington
  Appointed February 21, 1985

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
  Resigned February 21, 1985
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
ALAN CRANSTON, California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, Missouri
  Appointed February 21, 1985
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
  Appointed February 21, 1985

Jeffrey T. Bergner, *Staff Director*
Geryld B. Christianson, *Minority Staff Director*

CONTENTS

Hearing day: Page
- January 31, 1985 1
- February 4, 1985 81
- February 5, 1985 117
- February 6, 1985 185
- February 7, 1985 217
- February 20, 1985 247
- February 25, 1985 309
- February 26, 1985 365
- October 31, 1985 407
- November 7, 1985 475
- November 12, 1985 535

OUTLINES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1985

Statement of—
- Shultz, Hon. George P., Secretary of State 4

AFTERNOON SESSION

Statement of—
- Weinberger, Hon. Caspar W., Secretary of Defense 45

Insertions for the record:
- State Department's responses to additional questions submitted by Senator Pell 76
- State Department's responses to additional questions submitted by Senator Murkowski 76
- State Department's response to an additional question submitted by Senator Zorinsky 78
- Defense Department's responses to additional questions submitted by Senator Murkowski 79
- Defense Department's response to an additional question by Senator Biden 79

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1985

Statement of—
- Vance, Hon. Cyrus P., former Secretary of State 82

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1985

Statement of—
- Allen, Hon. Richard V., former National Security Adviser 118

Insertions for the record:
- Prepared statement of Richard V. Allen 131

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1985

Statement of—
- Schlesinger, Hon. James R., former Secretary of Defense 186

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1985

Page
Statement of—
Haig, Hon. Alexander M., Jr., former Secretary of State 218

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1985

Statement of—
Eagleburger, Hon. Lawrence, Kissenger Associates, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, New York, NY 250
Pipes, Richard, Department of History, Harvard University, former Director, East European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council, 1981–82, Cambridge, MA 253
Shulman, Hon. Marshall D., director, Harriman Institute for Advanced Studies of the Soviet Union, Columbia University, New York, NY 255
Insertions for the record:
An Alternative Policy for Managing United States-Soviet Relations, by Marshall D. Shulman 258

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1985

Statement of—
Burt, Hon. Richard N., Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs 316
Perle, Hon. Richard N., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy 310
Insertions for the record:
Prepared statement of Richard N. Burt 321

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1985

Statement of—
Glitman, Hon. Maynard W., arms control negotiator-designate 392
Kampelman, Hon. Max M., arms control negotiator-designate 393
Nitze, Hon. Paul, special representative for arms control and disarmament negotiations 367
Tower, Hon. John G., arms control negotiator-designate 390
Insertions for the record:
Biographical data of Hon. John Goodwin Tower 390
Prepared statement of Hon. John G. Tower 391
Biographical data of Hon. Maynard W. Glitman 391
Prepared statement of Hon. Maynard W. Glitman 392
Biographical data of Hon. Max M. Kampelman 393

NUCLEAR STRATEGY, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, AND ARMS CONTROL

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1985

Statement of—
Weinberger, Hon. Caspar W., U.S. Secretary of Defense 409
Insertions for the record:
Prepared statement of Caspar W. Weinberger 417
Context of 30-second video on star wars 435

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1985

Statement of—
Schlesinger, Hon. James, counselor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, and former Secretary of Defense, former Secretary of Energy, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 477
Scowcroft, Gen. Brent, president, ISI, and former National Security Adviser under the Ford administration 476
Slocombe, Hon. Walter, partner, Kaplan & Drysdale, and former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and Director of the SALT task force under the Carter administration 480

Insertions for the record: | Page
Prepared statement of Walter B. Slocombe 484

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1985

Statement of—
Perle, Hon. Richard, Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, Department of Defense 601
Rhinelander, John B., partner, law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, DC 539
Smith, Hon. Gerard C., president, the Consultants International Group, Inc 536
Insertions for the record:
Soviet Military Chief Accuses U.S. of Distorting Terms of ABM Pact, by Philip Taubman, from the New York Times, October 19, 1985 543
Akhromeyev Compares U.S., Soviet Stands on Arms, from Daily Report, FBIS, Vol. III, No. 203, October 21, 1985 544
Six Former Secretaries of Defense Support ABM Treaty, from News from the National Campaign to Save The ABM Treaty 589
Prepared statement of John B. Rhinelander (with attachments) 555
Letter to Senator Lugar, chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, from Elliot L. Richardson, dated November 21, 1985 (with attachment) 623
Responses of Assistant Secretary Perle to questions asked by Senator Kerry 626
Soviet Violations, list of 627

OUTLINES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1985

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Helms, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Cranston, and Dodd.

Also present: Senator Trible.

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, this hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is now called to order.

Today the Foreign Relations Committee begins a comprehensive review of the foreign policy of the United States—its goals, its strategies, policy objectives, and the means employed over time to achieve those objectives and defend those interests. Where have we been, where are we today, where are we going?

In many respects, this is the first such comprehensive review of American foreign policy since the late Henry Jackson convened hearings in 1961 entitled "Organizing for National Security."

Much has changed in the past quarter century, and I believe the time to reexamine the bases of our policies is long overdue. Many of the international institutions of the immediate postwar period, in which our commitments were embodied and through which our interests were to be defended, remain in place. So, too, does the political reality which underlays these mechanisms and institutions—a world deeply divided between East and West, North and South.

The strategy which has guided U.S. policy for most of this period has been called containment and it enjoyed for a time the support of both political parties and a large majority of the American people. This doctrine found expression in the Berlin airlift, in support of Greece and Turkey, in combating aggression in Korea, and in affirmative economic assistance programs best exemplified by the Marshall plan.

But major changes, both internally and externally, have occurred since the 1960's. Soviet military power and its ability to project power and influence abroad has grown substantially. The utility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in deterring or counterbalancing Soviet efforts at expansion and subversion on the peripheries of the East-West conflict has become less credible.

Beyond this, the difficult and protracted war in Vietnam challenged not only the efficacy of the strategy of containment, but to a degree the consensus in the Congress to halt partisanship over foreign policy at the water's edge. There has emerged an uncertainty in the past two decades about the extent and character of U.S. commitments around the world. We have sought to implement a strategy of containment at minimum cost and sacrifice.

The need for a restoration of consensus behind American foreign policy is great. This is particularly the case as we enter a series of comprehensive arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. However, as the starting date for those talks draw near, we are experiencing both high hopes for the future of those negotiations, but also great doubts about the willingness of the Soviet Union to live up to the letter of existing treaties and obligations.

Moreover, as we begin negotiations we are faced with doubts about whether a major strategic weapons system, the MX, will be rejected unilaterally before our negotiators arrive in Geneva. Clearly, we need to secure a minimum level of understanding with regard to objectives if we are to pursue a negotiating course which offers some hope of success.

Perhaps nowhere is the need for coherence and consensus better illustrated than in regard to our policies in Central America. There is little doubt that the Government of Nicaragua has acted in a manner threatening to both U.S. interests and the stability of the region. Dealing with this problem has been particularly difficult for the United States. Scarcely has any foreign policy issue come before the Congress in recent years over which opinion has been more divided.

As a nation, we have not been prepared to employ force directly. But neither can we countenance the establishment of a Soviet or Cuban-style dependency in the Western Hemisphere inimical to our interests. Unable to muster and apply firm and open opposition to the actions of the Nicaraguan regime, yet unwilling to accept the consequences for our interests of the actions of the current regime, we have turned to a program of covert assistance to indigenous resistance forces.

This program, which is no longer covert, is itself in jeopardy. I am certain that it would be a tragedy were the United States compelled to resort to the use of U.S. forces in Central America, but I am equally certain that we can agree that it would serve no legitimate interest, including that of the people of Nicaragua, were we to acquiesce in the establishment of Soviet bases of operation in Nicaragua or in attempts by Nicaragua to destabilize the governments of its neighbors.

We simply must overcome our divisions on this issue in Congress if we are to assist in the development of peaceful and fundamental change in Nicaragua.

There are those who would argue that the major foreign policy challenge facing the administration is the U.S. Congress. I do not believe this is the case. There are areas of agreement and disagreement, but I do believe that there exists a greater degree of consensus behind the strategy pursued by successive administrations in foreign policy than meets the eye. Differences relate primarily to policy means rather than to objectives and strategy.

If a new consensus is to develop behind American foreign policy, we must go back to basics. We need to deal with first principles. We need to define vital interests with greater precision. We need to formulate our objectives more clearly. We need to work together in the development of a strategy for pursuing those objectives. And finally, we need to debate and consult over appropriate means for achieving foreign policy objectives. These are the prerequisites of forging a new foreign policy consensus.

We are privileged to have as our first witness in this series of hearings the Secretary of State, George Shultz. Secretary Shultz has been an active participant and a thoughtful observer of American foreign policy for many years. I can think of no stronger person to initiate this historic set of hearings.

Secretary Shultz, we welcome you to the committee today. But before I ask you for your testimony, I would like to ask the ranking minority member of the committee, Senator Claiborne Pell, if he has an opening statement.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I congratulate you, sir, on the assumption of your new responsibilities and underscore my own intent to work with you in a spirit of cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator PELL. With the advent of a new chairmanship and a Presidency with a renewed mandate, the hope does arise that we might be able to achieve in the future a greater degree of consensus in foreign policy along the lines you discussed Mr. Chairman.

This is a worthy aspiration which I think we all share. But on the subject of consensus, I think a few cautionary words are in order. With tongue in cheek, Disraeli once described his idea of an agreeable person as a person who agreed with him. I have often thought the same thing. The concept of a consensus in foreign policy is I believe subject to the same tendency.

As the President seeks agreement from Congress or as one political grouping finds itself opposed by another, there is often a temptation to label as disagreeable or irresponsible those from whom one cannot elicit concurrence. While such accusations arise in our political process, we ought to keep them in perspective.

It bears emphasis that the absence of consensus generally has very little to do with excessive partisanship. As a case in point, we can look at the current dispute between the Senate Republican leadership and the Defense Secretary over the national military budget, a question central to foreign policy.

Another topical example is the difference in view between the Republican-controlled Senate and the administration over aid to the Nicaraguan contras, whom I sometimes characterize as our terrorists. Historically, I recall vividly and personally the controversy over Vietnam, when opposition to the Johnson administration arose first among Democrats in this committee.

My second point about consensus concerns the role of Congress. Just as I believe no Senator should support or oppose the President for reasons of party, I believe also that no Member of Congress should feel compelled to support the President simply because he is President.

There is, I believe, a normal predisposition in Congress to support the President simply by reason of all his responsibilities as head of state, head of government, and Commander in Chief. But ultimately, Congress must judge the President's policy on its own merits.

I believe it was Carl Schurz some years ago who said: "My country, right or wrong; when right to keep her right, when wrong to correct her course and make her right."

And so, Mr. Chairman, as these hearings begin—and an excellent idea they are—I join with you in searching for areas of common ground on which we can base the future of our policy. But ultimately we must accept the truth about consensus that derives from the very meaning of the word, that we will achieve consensus when we reach agreement and we will lack consensus when we cannot.

So, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary of State Shultz here and congratulating him personally on the steady hand, firm conduct and positive tenor of his stewardship of foreign policy, particularly at Geneva at the recent talks.

The CHAIRMAN. We will proceed now with the testimony of the Secretary of State. Secretary Shultz, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary SHULTZ. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to lead off this important series of hearings on the future of American foreign policy. This is an auspicious moment: the beginning of a new Presidential term, of a new Congress, and of the term of a distinguished new chairman. It is for many reasons a time of great promise and opportunity for the United States in world affairs.

Therefore, I commend the chairman for focusing the attention of the Congress and the American people on the fundamental issues we will face—not just the day-to-day issues that make the news, but the underlying trends at work and the most important goals we pursue.

My presentation today, responsive to your invitation, Mr. Chairman, is thus of a special kind. I would like to step back a bit and look at the present situation in perspective—the perspective of recent history, the perspective of the intellectual currents of our time, and the perspective of America's ideals and their relevance to the world's future.

Mr. Chairman, as I go through my testimony I would make reference by asterisk* to various statements that I have made that amplify the points. So rather than develop them all in the testimony, I thought for your record I would just ask that these statements be inserted as an appendix to this statement; I would not refer to them further as I go along. If that's agreeable, I would like to proceed that way.

The CHAIRMAN. The appendix will be inserted.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you.

Soon after the dawn of the nuclear age, Albert Einstein observed that everything had changed except our ways of thinking. Even so dramatic a development as the nuclear revolution took a long time to be fully understood. How much longer has it usually taken to understand the implications of more subtle, intangible historical changes taking place around us.

---

*See appendix, p. 19.

Nineteen hundred and forty-five, everyone knows, marked a major turning point. An international system that had lasted for more than a century had broken down under the weight of two world wars and a great depression. An international order centered on Europe and dominated by Europe was replaced in the early postwar period by a new arrangement—a world dominated by two new superpowers, torn by ideological conflict, and overshadowed by nuclear weapons that made a new world war potentially suicidal.

At the same time, an integrated international economic system established by America's initiative, based on the dollar and on a strong commitment to the freest possible flow of trade and investment, replaced the unbridled economic nationalism that had helped undermine international peace between the wars.

But history never stops. The postwar order, too, evolved and changed its shape. The breakup of colonial empires brought scores of new states onto the world stage. The so-called Third World became the scene of a growing number of local and regional conflicts. America, after Vietnam, retreated for a time from its active role of leadership. Europe, China, and Japan came into their own again as important economic and political actors. The energy crisis dramatized both the diffusion of economic power and the vulnerability of the postwar economic system. The United States and the Soviet Union attempted a political dialog to stabilize relations and control nuclear arms. Then the dialog broke down under the weight of the Soviet military buildup and the Soviet geopolitical offensive.

Today, the cycle is turning again. Change is constant. America has recovered its strength and self-confidence. Power continues to be dispersed and the structure of political relations more complex, even as the interdependence of states increases.

As we head toward the 21st century, is a stable new pattern of international relations emerging? Einstein's observation takes on new relevance: Our ways of thinking must adapt to new realities. We must grasp the new trends and understand their implications.

But we are not just observers. We are participants and we are engaged. America is again in a position to have a major influence over the trend of events, and America's traditional goals and values have not changed. Our duty must be to help shape the evolving trends in accordance with our ideas and our interests; to help build a new structure of international stability that will ensure peace, prosperity, and freedom for coming generations. This is the real challenge of our foreign policy over the coming years.

What are the forces of change? What are the possible elements of a new and more secure international system?

Let me turn first to the relations between ourselves and the U.S.S.R.

Relations between the superpowers remain crucial, even though their political predominance is less than it was a few decades ago. Over 50 years experience of United States-Soviet relations has given us by now a mature understanding of what is possible and what is not possible in this relationship. Yet conditions are evolving and the problem remains a conceptual challenge.

True friendship and cooperation will remain out of reach so long as the Soviet system is driven by ideology and national ambition to seek to aggrandize its power and undermine the interests of the democracies. We must resist this Soviet power drive vigorously if there is to be any hope of lasting stability.

At the same time, in the thermonuclear age the common interest in survival gives both sides an incentive to moderate the rivalry and to seek, in particular, ways to control nuclear weapons and reduce the risks of war. We cannot know whether such a steady Western policy will over time lead to a mellowing of the Soviet system. Perhaps not. But the West has the same responsibility in either case: to resist Soviet encroachments firmly, while holding the door open to more constructive possibilities.

After the failure of their political campaign to divide NATO, their propaganda to thwart deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, and their boycott of talks, the Soviets have now returned to the arms control dialog. We welcome this. My meeting in Geneva with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was a constructive beginning of what the United States hopes will be a fruitful negotiation.

My able interlocutor Andrei Gromyko is, in a sense, the living embodiment of some of the Soviet Union's great advantages: continuity, patience, the ability to fashion a long-term strategy and stick to it. When the Soviets shift tactics, it is more often than not an adjustment to objective conditions without basic diversion from their long-term aims.

The democracies, in contrast, have long had difficulty maintaining the same consistency, coherence, discipline, and sense of strategy. And from your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, I think you were counseling that this is what we need—to have our eye clearly on the ball and to have the patience to stick with our aims.

Free societies are often impatient. Western attitudes have fluctuated between extremes of gloom and pessimism on the one hand, and susceptibility to a Soviet smile on the other. Our ways of thinking have tended too often to focus either on increasing our strength or on pursuing negotiations. We have found it hard to do both simultaneously, which is clearly the most sensible course and probably the only way we can sustain either our defense programs or our ability to negotiate.

It is vital, for example, to carry through with the modernization of our strategic forces, in particular the MX, to avoid undercutting our negotiators just as they begin the quest for real reductions in nuclear arms. The Soviets will have little incentive to negotiate seriously for reductions to lower, equal levels if we hand them on a silver platter their long-cherished goal of unilateral American reductions. Likewise, as we pursue such agreements, we are obliged to bear in mind the Soviets' record of violating previous accords and to insist on effective verification provisions in any new agreements.

In the last 4 years, the underlying conditions that affect United States-Soviet relations have changed dramatically. A decade or so ago, when the United States was beset by economic difficulties, neglecting its defenses, and hesitant about its role of leadership, the Soviets exploited these conditions.

They continued their relentless military buildup. They and their clients moved more boldly in the geopolitical arena, intervening in such places as Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, believing that the West was incapable of resisting. They had reason for confidence that what they call the global correlation of forces was shifting in their favor.

Today, the West is more united than ever before. The United States is restoring its military strength and economic vigor and has regained its self-assurance. We have a President with a fresh mandate from the people for an active role of leadership. There was never any question during the election campaign what the President stood for.

The Soviets, in contrast, face profound structural economic difficulties, a continuing succession problem, and restless allies. Its diplomacy and its clients are on the defensive in many parts of the world. We have reason to be confident that the correlation of forces is shifting back in our favor.

Nevertheless, history will not do our work for us. The Soviets can be counted upon periodically to do something, somewhere, that is abhorrent or inimical to our interests. The question is how the West can respond in a way that could help discipline Soviet international behavior, but does not leave our own strategy vulnerable to periodic disruption by such external shocks.

We must never let ourselves be so wedded to improving relations with the Soviets that we turn a blind eye to actions that undermine the very foundation of stable relations. Symbolic responses to outrageous Soviet behavior have their place, and so do penalties and sanctions. At the same time, experience shows that we cannot deter or undo Soviet geopolitical encroachments except by helping, in one way or another, those resisting directly on the ground. And many negotiations and endeavors we undertake with the Soviets serve mutual interests. Indeed, they all should.

This leaves us with tough choices. Whether important negotiations ought to be interrupted after some Soviet outrage will always be a complex calculation. When the Soviets shot down the Korean Air Lines passenger plane in 1983, President Reagan made sure the world knew the full unvarnished truth about the atrocity. Nevertheless, he also sent our arms control negotiators back to Geneva because he believed that a reduction in nuclear weapons was a critical priority.

In short, our "way of thinking" must seek a sustainable strategy geared to American goals and interests, in the light of Soviet behavior but not just a reaction to it. Such a strategy requires a continuing willingness to solve problems through negotiation where this serves our interests, and presumably mutual interests. Otherwise you don't have a negotiation.

Our leverage will come from creating objective realities that will give the Soviets a growing stake in better relations with us across the board: By modernizing our defenses, assisting our friends, and confronting Soviet challenges. We must learn to pursue a strategy geared to long-term thinking and based on both negotiation and strength simultaneously, if we are to build a stable United States-Soviet relationship for the next century.

The intellectual challenge of a new era faces us in a related dimension, namely arms control. The continuous revolution in technology means that the strategic balance, and the requirements of deterrence, are never static. Unfortunately, conventional ways of thinking about many of these questions continue to lag behind reality.

For decades, standard strategic doctrine in the West has ultimately relied on the balance of terror—the confrontation of offensive arsenals by which the two sides threaten each other with mass extermination. Certainly, deterrence has worked under these conditions.

Nevertheless, for political, strategic, and even moral reasons, we should seek to do better than the proposition that our defense strategy must rely on offensive threats, and must leave our people unprotected against attack. The Soviets, for their part, have always attached enormous importance to strategic defense, including not only air defense and civil defense, but a deployed and modernized antiballistic missile system around Moscow and intensive research into new defensive technologies.

The pace of technological advance now opens possibilities for new ways of strategic thinking, never an easy process. The vehemence of some of the criticism of the President's strategic defense initiative [SDI] seems to come less from the argument over technical feasibility—which future research will answer one way or another in an objective manner—than from the passionate defense of orthodox doctrine in the face of changing strategic realities.

We are proceeding with SDI research because we see a positive, and indeed revolutionary potential. Defensive measures may become available that could render obsolete the threat of an offensive nuclear first strike. A new strategic equilibrium based on defensive technologies and sharply reduced offensive deployments is likely to be the most stable and secure arrangement of all.

Our concept can be described as follows—I might say, I read this concept to Mr. Gromyko in Geneva, word for word: During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear weapons, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on Earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of nonnuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

As the political dominance of the superpowers began to erode in the last few decades, some saw a five-power world emerging, with the United States, Soviet Union, Western Europe, China, and Japan as the major players. After the energy crisis of the early 1970's, others emphasized the increasing importance of the North-South relationship. The fact is, none of these concepts adequately describes the evolving pattern of world politics.

In my view, the most striking trend is something else—the growing dynamism, cohesion, and cooperation of like-minded nations that share an important set of positive goals.

Equilibrium is not enough. American foreign policy is driven by positive goals—peace, democracy, liberty, and human rights; racial justice; economic and social progress; the strengthening of cooperation; and the rule of law. These are not Soviet goals. Yet they are at the core of any durable international system, because they are the goals that inspire peoples and nations around the world.

The new spirit and unity of peoples that share these goals is a new trend we can see in many regions of the world and in many dimensions of foreign policy. We see a new spirit of collaboration and friendship in our ties with our immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico, ties whose importance is self-evident and which are a priority interest of the President.

In the Atlantic community, our time is marked by a new degree of political harmony and intimate collaboration among the Western allies. Just as striking, Japan too has emerged as a partner on key political and security issues.

There is a new awareness, for example, of the importance of strengthening conventional defenses as a way of bolstering Europe's security while reducing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. A strong Western deterrence posture is the most solid basis for engaging the East in constructive negotiations. Under Lord Carrington's wise leadership, NATO is taking steps for the short run to improve its readiness and infrastructure. For the longer run, the Alliance is addressing other critical deficiencies, including the fundamental challenge of improving the efficiency of allied defense procurement.

Amid all the changes in the world, the security and well-being of Western Europe continue to be of vital interest to the United States. We have always supported Western European unity, knowing that a strong Europe, while it would be a competitor in some ways, was in the overall interest of the free world.

We wish the European Community well. We encourage our European friends to make further progress in developing a true European-wide market and in breaking down structural rigidities that impede both economic expansion and effective economic cooperation with us.

We see also, in Europe, new and creative thinking about the continuing pursuit of political unity and about strengthening Western European cooperation in the defense field. We support both these goals.

The West can only benefit from a major European role in world affairs, and the peoples of Western Europe should see defense as an endeavor they undertake for their own future, not as a favor to the United States. With statesmanship and a spirit of collaboration on both sides of the Atlantic, this evolution will strengthen the common defense and heighten the sense of common political purpose among the democracies.

As we think about Europe's evolution, we cannot forget Eastern Europe. Since the days of the Marshall plan, when the West invited the East to join, we have always wanted the success of Western Europe to be a beacon to all of Europe. The present political division of the continent is wholly artificial; it exists only because it has been imposed by brute Soviet power; the United States has never recognized it as legitimate or permanent. I do not say this questioning in any way boundaries as such, but rather what happens across boundaries or what does not happen across boundaries. Behind this cruel barrier of the division of Europe lie political repression and economic stagnation. In certain countries there are efforts at liberalization, but all the peoples of Eastern Europe are capable of something better, deserve something better, and yearn for something better. We have witnessed in recent years the powerful aspiration for free trade unions, for economic reform, for political and religious freedom, for true peace and security, for human rights as promised by the Helsinki accords.

We hope to see the day when the Soviet Union learns to think anew of its own security in terms compatible with the freedom, security, and independence of its neighbors.

In East Asia and the Pacific, another new reality is changing our thinking about the world. The economic dynamism of this region is taking on increasing importance, not only as a factor in America's foreign trade but as an economic model for the developing world and as a unique and attractive vision of the future.

We see the countries of free Asia growing at 7 percent a year over the past decade. For the past 5 years, our trade with East Asia and the Pacific has been greater than our trade with any other region and is expanding at an accelerating rate.

ASEAN has become one of the world's most impressive examples of economic development and regional political cooperation. The Republic of Korea is a spectacular economic success story. Japan is playing a larger role, responsibly, positively, and cooperatively, commensurate with its growing strength. Experience is proving that economic openness is the formula for prosperity.

Pragmatism is now the watchword in the People's Republic of China, where the hopes for economic modernization have been invested, wisely, in a bold program of reform. China's long march to the market is a truly historic event—a great nation throwing off outmoded economic doctrines and liberating the energies of a billion talented people. We wish China well in this exciting endeavor.

There are, of course, problems that pose dangers to this bright economic future: The Soviet military buildup in the region; aggression by the Soviet Union and its clients in Afghanistan and Cambodia; unresolved tensions on the Korean peninsula; internal problems in various countries.

East Asia has a rich heritage of civilization and also a turbulent history of bitter conflict. The tragedy that two of Asia's great ancient monuments, Angkor Wat and Borobudur, have suffered damage from modern violence is both a paradox and a warning.

The United States is conscious of its responsibility to contribute, in its way, to security and stability in East Asia and the Pacific. Our diplomacy seeks peaceful solutions to Asia's problems so that the fullest potential of its promise can be realized. We welcome in particular the role of ASEAN, including the front-line state of Thailand, which is working effectively to curb Vietnamese expansionism and aggression and to achieve a just settlement of the Cambodian conflict.

Overall, we are enormously encouraged by the new trend we see toward wider collaboration among many Asian nations with an extraordinary diversity of cultures, races, and political systems. A sense of Pacific community is emerging. There is an expanding practice of regional consultation and a developing sense of common interest in regional security.

In this sense, a decade after Vietnam, the United States has more than restored its position in Asia. We can be proud of the vitality of our alliances, friendships, and productive ties in this promising region. If nations act with wisdom and statesmanship, we may well be at the threshold of a new era in international relations in the Pacific basin.

In Latin America, another kind of trend is apparent: The steady advance of democracy. Democracy is hardly a new idea, but this new development is revising some earlier assumptions in some quarters about the world's political future. A few years back, pessimists maintained that the industrial democracies were doomed to permanent minority status in the world community.

Today, there is mounting evidence that the ideal of liberty is alive and well. In the Western Hemisphere, almost 95 percent of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean today live under governments that are either democratic or clearly on the road to democracy—in contrast to only one-third as recently as 1979. Over the last 5 years, popularly elected leaders have replaced military rulers or dictators in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and Grenada.

Brazil and Uruguay will inaugurate new civilian presidents in March. Guatemala is in transition to democracy. After a long twilight of dictatorship, the trend toward free elections and popular sovereignty in this hemisphere is something to cheer about.

The United States has always been a champion of democracy. Democratic institutions are the best guarantor of human rights and also the best long-term guarantor of stability. The National Endowment for Democracy, with bipartisan support, is one reflection of this American commitment.

On every continent, we see a trend toward democracy or else a yearning for democracy. Both are vivid demonstrations that the idea of liberty is far from a culture-bound aspiration or monopoly of the industrialized West. In fact, after years of guerrilla insurgencies led by Communists against pro-Western governments, we now see dramatic and heartening examples of popular insurgencies against Communist regimes.

Today, in a variety of different circumstances, in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in Africa, Marxist-Leninist rulers have found that the aspiration for representative government is not so easy to suppress. Americans have a long and honorable tradition of supporting the struggle of other peoples for freedom, democracy, independence, and liberation from tyranny. In the 19th century we supported Simon Bolivar, Polish patriots, and others seeking freedom—reciprocating, in a way, the aid given us in our own revolution by other nations like France.

As the President put it a week ago: "[W]e, who are committed to free government and democratic institutions, must maintain a sense of fraternity between ourselves and other freedom-loving peoples." This is a proud heritage and a moral responsibility, and it poses some practical questions that we must face up to early in the 99th Congress.

The future of democracy is precisely what is at stake in Central America. U.S. policy is to promote democracy, reform, and human rights; to support economic development; to help provide a security shield against those who seek to spread tyranny by force; and to support dialog and negotiation both within and among the countries of the region.

Acting directly and through Cuba, the Soviet Union is abetting the establishment of a new Communist dictatorship in Nicaragua. We are backing democratic governments and democratic political forces throughout Central America against extremists of both the left and the right. If we abandon those seeking democracy, the extremists will gain and the forces of moderation and decency will be the victims.

This is why the administration has worked so hard, and will continue to work hard, for effective negotiations, for economic and security assistance, and for the bipartisan plan that emerged from the Kissinger Commission. If the forces of dictatorship continue to feel free to aid and abet insurgencies in the name of "proletarian internationalism," it would be absurd if the democracies felt inhibited about promoting the cause of democracy, even by collective self-defense against such actions. Our Nation's vital interests and moral responsibility require us to stand by our friends in their struggle for freedom.

The process of change is inexorable. In southern Africa, we have a role to play in working for democratic change in South Africa. We are also key to efforts to help create a climate of regional security that will enable and encourage countries to get on with the priority of building decent and prosperous societies.

In short, U.S. policy must pursue the dual objectives of racial justice and regional security. These two goals are not in conflict. They reinforce each other. But achieving them requires responsible, prudent and dedicated diplomacy.

These twin challenges call for serious analysis and sober thinking, not emotional responses. We have already accomplished much, but our influence is not infinite. Today there is less cross-border violence in southern Africa than at any time in more than a decade. Progress is being made toward a Namibia settlement. We have strengthened ties with Mozambique and other regional states, and South Africa itself has developed cooperative relations with many of its neighbors.

President Reagan has made clear that we regard South African apartheid as repugnant. He spoke loud and clear on December 10 when he said:

> We * * * call upon the Government of South Africa to reach out to its black majority by ending the forced removal of blacks from their communities and the detention without trial and lengthy imprisonment of black leaders * * *. [W]e ask that the constructive changes of recent years be broadened to address the aspirations of all South Africans. * * * We urge both the government and the people of South Africa to move toward a more just society.

Within South Africa, a dynamic of change is already at work. More positive change is occurring now than in the seventies or sixties or fifties. The positive influence of our relationship, our diplomacy, our companies, our assistance programs for black South Africans, is helping to build the basis for further change.

Apartheid must go. But the only course consistent with American values is to engage ourselves as a force for constructive, peaceful change while there is still a chance. It cannot be our choice to cheer on from the sidelines the forces of polarization that could erupt in a race war. It is not our job to exacerbate hardship, which could lead to the same result.

Another region of change is the Middle East. Recent events have reminded us that the Arab-Israeli conflict is far from the only source of tension in that part of the world. There are other deep-seated national, ethnic, and religious conflicts, like the Iran-Iraq War. There are diverse sources of radical extremism, ranging from Marxist-Leninist ideology, to Islamic fundamentalism, to Qadhafi's bizarre personal brand of fanaticism. The Soviets seek to reinforce rejectionist elements and to exploit regional tensions for their own advantage.

The United States will continue its efforts to promote peaceful solutions in this vital area. This mediation is, of course, a traditional American role, but new conditions always call for new ways of thinking about how to pursue it. We are committed to the support of diplomatic efforts to end the conflicts in the Gulf, in Lebanon, and in the Sahara.

We are committed to the President's September 1 initiative as the most promising route to the solution of the Palestinian problem. We will be intensively engaged this year in consultations with our Arab and Israeli friends to explore opportunities for progress.

In the global economy, an important shift of another kind is taking place—an intellectual shift, reflecting some lessons from experience. Lord Keynes' point about practical men being in thrall to some defunct economist may be less true now than in the past. Or perhaps the views expressed by Adam Smith over two centuries ago on the creation of the "wealth of nations" are once again gaining practical prominence.

At any rate, reality is intruding on some long-held notions about economic policy. In both industrialized and developing countries, the economic difficulties of recent years are reminding us of some old truths about the real sources of economic progress. Some of us never forgot those truths. But recent experience has fueled a broad and long-overdue skepticism about statist solutions, central planning, and government direction.

This intellectual shift is partly the product of the extraordinary vigor of the American recovery. The United States has revised its tax system to provide real incentives to work, to save, to invest, to take risks, to be efficient. We have reduced Government regulation, intervention, and control. We have opened opportunities for freer competition in transportation, finance, communication, manufacturing, and distribution. Last year's real growth in GNP was the sharpest increase since 1951. Inflation was the lowest since 1967. The overall result has been the extraordinary creation of over 7 million jobs in 2 years.

Success inspires emulation. Not only in East Asia, as I noted, but on every continent—Europe, Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere in Asia—we see movement to decentralize, to deregulate, to denationalize, to reduce rigidity and to enlarge the scope for individual producers and consumers to cooperate freely through markets.

In Africa, for example, if there is to be a long-term solution to the problem of hunger, it will have to come not just from relief efforts but from training, productive investment, and liberalizing reforms in agriculture. Our aid policy is encouraging the efforts of African countries to move further in this direction. But it just has to be obvious that if you insist on keeping the price of food below the cost to produce it, production will fall and you only aggravate your problem of hunger in the long run.

A worldwide revolution in economic thought and economic policy is under way. And it is coming just in time, because it coincides with yet another revolution, a revolution in the technological base of the global economy. This is what Walter Wriston has called "the onrushing age of information technology"—the combination of microchip computers, advanced telecommunications, and continuing innovation that is transforming almost every aspect of human endeavor.

The implications of this revolution are not only economic. First of all, the very existence of these new technologies is yet another testimony to the crucial importance of entrepreneurship—and government policies that give free rein to entrepreneurship—as the wellspring of technological creativity and economic growth.

The closed societies of the East are likely to fall far behind in these areas, and Western societies that maintain too many restrictions on economic activity run the same risk.

Second, any government that resorts to heavy-handed measures to control or regulate or tax the flow of electronic information will find itself stifling the growth of the world economy as well as its own progress. This is one of the reasons why the United States is pressing for a new round of trade negotiations in these service fields of data processing and transfer of information.

Third, the advance of technology in this dimension is bound to challenge many cherished notions of sovereignty. But here too, the West has the advantage, because the free flow of information is inherently compatible with our political system and values.

The Communist States, in contrast, fear this information revolution perhaps even more than they fear Western military strength. If knowledge is power, then the communications revolution threatens to undermine their most important monopoly—their effort to stifle their people's information, thought, and independence of judgment.

We all remember the power of the Ayatollah's message disseminated on tape cassettes in Iran. What could have a more profound impact in the Soviet bloc than similar cassettes, outside radio broadcasting, direct broadcast satellites, personal computers, or Xerox machines?

Totalitarian societies face a dilemma. Either they try to stifle these technologies and thereby fall further behind in the new industrial revolution, or else they permit these technologies and see their totalitarian control inevitably eroded. In fact, they do not have a choice, because they will never be able entirely to block the tide of technological advance, however hard they try.

The march of technology also compels us to continue our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has long been the leader of an international effort to establish a regime of institutional arrangements, legal commitments, and technological safeguards to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.

This program has, in fact, had considerable success, in that the number of states that have acquired the means to produce nuclear explosives is far lower than doomsayers predicted 20 years ago. At the same time, the potential dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation remain as serious and menacing to international stability as has long been predicted.

The Reagan administration will pursue this essential endeavor with a realistic appreciation of its complexities. Our thinking on this issue takes account of the growing international reliance on peaceful nuclear energy, the security concerns that give rise to the incentive to seek nuclear weapons, and the need for broad multilateral cooperation among nuclear suppliers if a nonproliferation regime is to be effective.

We have made progress in restoring a relationship of confidence and a reputation for reliability with our nuclear trading partners. We have had fruitful talks with the Soviet Union on this subject. We have worked to promote comprehensive safeguards and stricter export controls.

Mr. Chairman, these broad trends I have described are mostly positive trends, but not all. We see social dislocation arising from economic change. We see urban alienation, political turbulence, and the many potential sources and forms of disorder I have mentioned. The changes in the international system will follow the positive trends only if we, the United States and the free world, meet our responsibility to defend our interests and seek to shape events in accordance with our own ideals and goals.

In at least one respect, the modern world, with its spreading technology and prosperity and democratic aspirations, is ironically becoming more and more vulnerable. I am thinking, of course, about terrorism. Even as the world becomes more secure from the danger of a major war, paradoxically, the democratic world now faces an increasing threat from this new form of warfare.

Terrorism these days is becoming less an isolated phenomenon of local fanatics and increasingly part of a new international strategy resorted to by the enemies of freedom. It is a vicious weapon used deliberately against democracies, against the interests, policies, and friends of the democracies, and against completely innocent people. There are disturbing links as well to international drug trafficking.

Terrorism is a problem that, more than many others, is forcing us into new ways of thinking about how to safeguard our future. During the year ahead, we must be prepared for serious terrorist threats in Western Europe, in the Middle East, and in Latin America, much of it supported by or encouraged by a handful of ruthless governments.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have been speaking out frequently on this subject, to stimulate public consideration and discussion of the complex issues involved. A counterstrategy for combating terrorism in my view must encompass many things.

We and our allies must work still harder to improve security, share information, coordinate police efforts, and collaborate in other ways to defeat international terrorism. Much has been done in the past year, but much more remains to be done.

We in this country must think hard about the moral stakes involved. If we truly believe in our democratic values and our way of life, we must be willing to defend them. Passive measures are unlikely to suffice. Means of more active defense and deterrence must be considered and given the necessary political support.

Finally, while working tirelessly to deny terrorists their opportunities and their means, we can and must be absolutely firm in denying them their goals. They seek to blackmail us into changing our foreign policies or to drive us out of countries and regions where we have important interests. This we cannot permit. We cannot yield position or abandon friends or responsibilities under this kind of pressure. If we allow terrorists even one such victory, we embolden them further, we demoralize all who rely on us, and we make the world an even more dangerous place.

There is, of course a broader issue here, which I have also been discussing in several public statements. This is the basic question of the use of American power in the defense of our interests and the relevance of our power as the backstop to our diplomacy.

It is reflected, for example, in what are often called gray-area challenges, namely, the kind of regional or local conflicts and crises that are likely to persist in a turbulent world, below the threshold of major war but nonetheless affecting important Western interests. Most of the major conflicts since 1945 indeed have originated in such conflicts in the developing world.

The end of the colonial order has not brought universal peace and justice. Much of the developing world is torn by the continuing struggle between the forces of moderation and the forces of radicalism—a struggle actively exploited and exacerbated by the Soviet Union.

It is absurd to think that America can walk away from such challenges. This is a world of great potential instability and many potential dangers. We live, as is commonly said, on a shrinking planet and in a world of increasing interdependence. We have an important stake in the health of the world economy and in the overall conditions of global security. The freedom and safety of our fellow human beings will always impinge on our moral consciousness.

Not all these challenges threaten vital interests, but at the same time an accumulation of successful challenges can add up to a major adverse change in the geopolitical balance.

We must be wise and prudent in deciding how and where to use our power. Economic and security assistance to allies and friends is clearly the preferred course and is of crucial importance to our foreign policy. The direct American use of force must always be a last resort. The United States will always seek political solutions to problems—but such solutions will never succeed unless aggression is resisted and diplomacy is backed by strength.

We are reasonably well prepared to deter all-out Soviet nuclear aggression, provided we continue with our strategic modernization.

But we must be sure we are as well prepared, physically and psychologically, for this intermediate range of challenges.

Mr. Chairman, I have touched on a wide variety of topics, but two very important and very basic conclusions can be drawn from them.

First, the agenda for the immediate future seems to me to be an agenda on which the American people are essentially united. These are goals that are widely shared and tasks that are likely to reinforce another important trend: namely, the reemergence of a national consensus on the main elements of our foreign policy.

This, indeed, may be the most important positive trend of all, because so many of our difficulties in recent decades have been very much the product of our own domestic divisions. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that our two parties and our two branches of Government will find ways to cooperate in this spirit, which would enormously strengthen our country in the face of the new opportunities and challenges I have described.

Second, Mr. Chairman, all the diverse topics I have touched upon are, in the end, closely interrelated. President Reagan made this point in his speech to the United Nations last September. The United States seeks peace and security. We seek economic progress. We seek to promote freedom, democracy, and human rights. The conventional way of thinking is to treat these as discrete categories of activity. In fact, as we have seen, it is now more and more widely recognized that there is a truly profound connection among them, and this has important implications for the future.

It is no accident, for example, that America's closest and most lasting relationships are its alliances with its fellow democracies. These ties with the Atlantic Community, Japan, and other democratic friends have an enduring quality precisely because they rest on a moral base, not only a base of strategic interest.

When George Washington advised his countrymen to steer clear of permanent alliances, his attitude was colored by the fact that there were hardly any other fellow democracies in those days. We were among the first, and we had good reason to be wary of entanglements with countries that did not share our democratic principles. In any case, we now define our strategic interests in terms that embrace the safety and well-being of the democratic world.

Similarly, as I have discussed, it is more and more understood that economic progress is related to a political environment of openness and freedom. It used to be thought in some quarters that socialism was the appropriate model for developing countries because central planning was better able to mobilize and allocate resources in conditions of scarcity. The historical experience of Western Europe and North America, which industrialized in an era of limited government, was not thought to be relevant.

Yet the more recent experience of the Third World shows that a dominant government role in developing economies has done more to stifle the natural forces of production and productivity and to distort the efficient allocation of resources.

The real engine of growth, in developing as well as industrialized countries, turns out to be the natural dynamism of societies that minimize central planning, open themselves to trade with the world, and give free rein to the talents and efforts and risk taking and investment decisions of individuals.

Finally, there is almost certainly a relationship between economic progress, freedom, and world peace. Andrei Sakharov has written:

> I am convinced that international trust, mutual understanding, disarmament, and international security are inconceivable without an open society with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to publish, and the right to travel and choose the country in which one wishes to live. I am also convinced that freedom of conscience, together with other civic rights, provides both the basis for scientific progress and a guarantee against its misuse to harm mankind.

The implication of all of this is profound. It is that the Western values of liberty and democracy, which some have been quick to write off as culture bound, or irrelevant, or passe, are not to be so easily dismissed. Their obituary is premature. These values are the source of our strength, economic as well as moral, and they turn out to be more central to the world's future than many have realized.

After more than a century of fashionable Marxist mythology about economic determinism and the crisis of capitalism, the key to human progress turns out to be those very Western concepts of political and economic freedom that Marxists claimed were obsolete. They were wrong. Today—the supreme irony—it is the Communist system that looks bankrupt, morally as well as economically. The West is resilient and resurgent.

And so, in the end, the most important new way of thinking that is called for in this decade is our way of thinking about ourselves. Civilizations thrive when they believe in themselves. They decline when they lose this faith. All civilizations confront massive problems, but a society is more likely to master its challenges, rather than be overwhelmed by them, if it retains this bedrock self-confidence that its values are worth defending. This is the essence of the Reagan revolution and of the leadership the President has sought to provide in America.

The West has been through a difficult period in the last decade or more. But now we see a new turn. The next phase of the industrial revolution, like all previous phases, comes from the democratic world, where innovation and creativity are allowed to spring from the unfettered human spirit. By working together, we can spread the benefit of the technological revolution to all.

And on every continent, from Nicaragua to Cambodia, from Poland, to South Africa, to Afghanistan, we see that the yearning for freedom is the most powerful political force all across the planet.

So, as we head toward the 21st century, it is time for the democracies to celebrate their system, their beliefs, and their success. We face challenges, but we are well poised to master them. Opinions are being revised about which system is the wave of the future. The free nations, if they maintain their unity and their faith in themselves, have the advantage—economically, technologically, morally.

History is on freedom's side.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Appendix to Secretary Shultz' statement is retained in the files of the Committee.]

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Shultz, we thank you for a truly masterful, comprehensive statement. The invitation to you asked for that and you have clearly responded generously.

There are now 11 Senators present and as many as 12 have appeared at some point during your testimony. I have consulted with the distinguished ranking minority member, Senator Pell, about our time situation, and so the Chair would try this idea on for size, without objection.

The Secretary would like to leave and we have given some assurance he might leave around 12:30. This means we will need to limit our questioning, and I would suggest that we try on for size 7 minutes today, which is not the conventional 5 or 10 minutes, but it will at least allow for some equity among those who are present and the odd Senator who may appear at some point. [Laughter.]

Secretary SHULTZ. I am glad the chairman did not choose 7½.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, if the strategy behind American foreign policy since the onset of the cold war can best be described as containment of Soviet power and influence, how do we address a problem that has bedeviled American postwar policy: namely, how can containment be applied in those situations in which vital U.S. interests are not threatened intrinsically and Soviet force is not directly involved?

This may have been the most troublesome and controversial aspect of Vietnam, and perhaps the most contemporary example I can point to is Nicaragua. Is there a logical solution to this disparity between America's inhibited approach to the use of force, and the basically unaltered national opposition on the part of our people to the establishment of a Soviet or Soviet satellite dependency in the Western Hemisphere or elsewhere on the fringes of the basic East-West competition with the Soviets?

Is there, more generally, a solution to the disparity between the objective of containment and the national will to implement this objective, directly or indirectly?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think it is obvious, first of all, that there are many problems in the world that do not have anything to do particularly with the United States-Soviet struggle. So not everything falls into that category.

It seems to me clear, too, and I tried to stress this in my testimony, that our interests derive not only from a sense of strategic geopolitical arrangements, but also from their connection with the moral base of our society. And it is to our advantage as freedom and democracy flourish in the world. It is to our disadvantage when the reverse takes place, wherever that is so.

Now, obviously our capacity to bring about what we want is not unlimited, and we have to recognize that fact. That is one reason why it is so important for us that we have allies—and allies who obviously see things more or less the way we do, although each country has its own particular set of interests and that has to be recognized. I believe it is also, in a sense, a statement about the rightness of our approach that we are able to have allies all around the world.

So I think, first of all, we have to recognize both our ideals and our interests. We have to develop our strength and our ability to defend those ideals and interests. That means what we do here at home in our own capacities, and also the way in which we extend those capacities—either through formal alliances or through arrangements with other countries with which we may have not a real alliance but nevertheless a commonality of interests, and which we support through various means of assistance, including security assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, to be specific, with respect to Central America generally and El Salvador and Nicaragua in particular, polls have indicated that the American people do not wish to see U.S. forces directly employed. As a matter of fact, with regard to El Salvador many polls showed a majority of persons even found disfavor with the idea of 55 advisers, and a fair number of people were not in favor of even humanitarian or economic aid.

At the same time, the American people were very much afraid that growing Soviet influence in Central America would be contrary the interests of our country and wanted the President to do something about it.

I suppose the question you have to face all the time and the one I am trying to focus on now is: How can we go about constructing a foreign policy consensus, not only in the Senate and the House, but among the American people, a consensus that recognizes that if we are in fact to keep Soviet bases out of Central America and prevent the subversion of friendly governments in the area, there may be occasions when force will have to be applied, or, if not force, economic leverage? How do we go about implementing our national will?

Secretary SHULTZ. The President has set out a very clear policy toward Central America, and we have had a considerable degree of success in implementing it. I think it is a question of what the American people will support, and it is always said in Washington that the American people will not support this, that, and the other thing. I do not think there was any ambiguity about the President's view of Central America, and he almost won Minnesota.

I am the one who came up to the Congress on the day of our rescue operation in Grenada. Those of you around the room, I think practically all of you, were present. And I gave a briefing to the Senate on what we were doing, and then I spent the afternoon doing the same thing in the House. And I had more scars on me from that day than any day I can remember. I do not remember a single voice that was raised in support of what the President was doing.

And I remember calling Howard Baker a day or so later and asking him how things were, and he said, oh, it has changed all around. And I said, you mean my persuasive talents were such that people changed their minds? He said, no, I don't think so. He said, I think they heard from the folks back home.

So my observation is that what the American people will support is not necessarily what the political climate in Washington reflects. We have to give some leadership, and we have to give that leadership in a way that is consistent with, as I have said, our ideals of what is right and our interests. And both are joined together in a supportive way in what we are trying to achieve in Central America.

We are on the right side in Central America, and we need to pursue our course there with steadiness and determination.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your judgment as to what the American people would support in terms of our relations with Nicaragua presently?

Secretary SHULTZ. Nicaragua, with support that it has from Cuba and the Soviet Union, is the center of the problem. It is the country through which destabilization of neighbors is taking place, not only now but as threatened in the future. So we have to address ourselves to that.

It is also true that the present Government of Nicaragua certainly has provoked a tremendous amount of opposition within its own country, in its attacks on the church—fundamental attacks—in its attacks on the Indians, in its suppression of the press, in its unwillingness to hold, as its head promised, a democratic election, and in many other ways.

It is forfeiting a lot of support, and so it is not any surprise and should not be any surprise to see the amount of dissent there is within that country. And as for me, it is very clear to me which side I am on in that argument.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, fair enough. But do you have a further comment as to what specific means the American people might support in making our policy clearer and more successful?

Secretary SHULTZ. We have tried to make our policy clear, and I think it has been increasingly understood around the country. My own sense of opinion polls, for what they are worth on this, is that if you go back 3 or 4 years and then continue on to today, there is a broadening of support.

And I think it comes first of all from an understanding that our interests are at stake, that we have a real problem here. I am always a believer that you cannot solve a problem until people recognize that there is one. That is the first step, and I think that basically perhaps we have taken that step, and now that we see that there really is a problem we are in a better position to do something about it.

And we have been doing a lot about it, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, you may ask your questions.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One question of procedure. If some of us still have questions and there is not enough time for the Secretary to reply, will there be a second round or should there be a second round, or what is your view?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, my view is that we do wish to visit with the Secretary, and he will make himself available frequently, but probably not beyond 12:30 today. If there are additional questions they might be submitted in writing to the Secretary. If an urgent answer is required, both you and I will try to work with the Secretary for additional consultation.

Senator PELL. So we will see where we are.

Secretary SHULTZ. I am always at the disposal of the committee, Mr. Chairman, not only in formal hearings but in the informal sessions that the committee has frequently arranged, in which we have had a kind of conversational atmosphere. I think those have been very constructive.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate that very much.

Senator PELL. We do appreciate that. Not only are we as individuals interested in your replies, I think the American people are. Private sessions do not permit that.

I congratulate you and commend you on your statement that the Communist system is bankrupt in many ways and is not on the march. I am struck by the fact that since I came to the Senate in 1961, the Soviets have lost far more people under their control than they have gained. I think the American perception is a big blob of red ink spreading over the world, but the statistics are very different.

And to be specific, and not including India or China, both of which were once under Soviet influence, you still find that twice as many people have left the Soviet sphere as have come under it since 1960. I do not like to see anybody come under it, but twice as many have left it.

Why do you think, Mr. Secretary, we have this vision of the growing blob of red ink when the statistics do not conform to that?

Secretary SHULTZ. Of course, as soon as you put China in your statistics and you measure it by numbers of people, you have quite a——

Senator PELL. I said I knocked out China and I knocked out India, and there are still more than twice as many.

Secretary SHULTZ. I would like to examine your statistics, but at any rate the reason is that the Soviet Union continues to preach expansion and it continues its military buildup. It continues to use its capacity to do things forcefully, as in Afghanistan, as in Cambodia quite currently, and in a different manner in Poland.

So we observe these things and we see places where they have expanded. But I think it is true that this has been stopped, and in fact turned back to some extent, and I think that is good and we welcome it.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much. I have several questions and I am trying to get them in quickly.

Why is it that when the NATO forces of men under arms exceed the Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces of men under arms this side of the Urals, that we still rely on the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons as our policy rather than relying on conventional means of stopping Soviet aggression?

Secretary SHULTZ. We say that we believe, first of all, we will not be the aggressor. Only the Soviet side will be the aggressor. So we will not be the first to use force in any way.

Senator PELL. First to use nuclear force.

Secretary SHULTZ. I am coming to that, Senator.

So we will not be the first to use force. However, as far as our response is concerned, we need to be flexible, among other things to keep them off balance, and to use the deterrent capability of all of our forces, not just an element in our forces.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Another subject, the genocide treaty, which interests some of us very acutely. Will the administration be vigorously supporting its ratification?

Secretary SHULTZ. We supported it in the last session of the Congress and we will support it again.

Senator **Pell**. Good. That is good news.

What in your view is the rationale for condemning terrorism—I agree with you on that—when we basically support it in Nicaragua with regard to the contras? I do not see the difference there. I am not saying consistency is a good idea. Emerson said it was the hobgoblin of small minds.

But should we not accept the fact that there are exceptions to this condemnation of terrorism?

Secretary **Shultz**. We do not think we are supporting terrorism in Nicaragua. We think we are supporting people, to the extent we can, who are fighting for freedom in their country and fighting to try to get their country to conform to the goals that were set out in the Sandinista revolution in the first place.

Senator **Pell**. But when a couple of thousands of people are killed, including noncombatants, and many buildings destroyed, is that not terrorism?

Secretary **Shultz**. The people who are fighting for freedom are trying to make a mark on that government, and they are not losing adherents, they are gaining adherents. Their only limitation is the amount of support that they can get, and I think that is an index of how people are reacting to what they are doing.

Senator **Pell**. I guess that just goes to show that one country's terrorist is another country's freedom fighter.

Secretary **Shultz**. I certainly do not accept that at all, and I have spoken on that subject directly and it is referred to in the appendixes here.

Senator **Pell**. Well, I join you in condemning terrorism.

In connection with Cyprus, is any thought being given to bringing further pressure on the Turks to withdraw their forces which are armed with American weapons in violation of their commitments?

Secretary **Shultz**. The negotiations over Cyprus that have been organized under the auspices of the Secretary General have progressed somewhat, but they are kind of in recession right now. My sense of it is that the Turkish side showed some considerable flexibility recently, and I welcome that.

I am not trying to say that the breakdown that occurred is something in which the Turkish side is entirely innocent, but they showed considerable flexibility. And I think it was in part attributable to the way the Turkish aid situation was handled in the last session, and I would encourage us to look at that lesson.

Senator **Pell**. Well, I would hope you would continue focusing on those problems there.

Secretary **Shultz**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Pell**. Moving back to Central America for a moment, I was struck by the fact that the Contadora group proposal, which we had supported, when the Nicaraguans said they would accept it and I believe the Cubans did, too, we then drew back from it.

Let us say that now a revised treaty comes along that accommodates our concerns over the verification and control features. Do you think that the American Government would be willing to abide by the Contadora nations' recommendation?

Secretary **Shultz**. First, speaking on behalf of the administration, I disagree with your characterization of what happened. We did not accept a certain draft and then, when Nicaragua accepted, change our minds. That is not what happened.

The four Contadora countries tabled that draft. Of course, it is for the Central American countries to decide what they are going to do, and it was examined with great care and was found faulty by them. And, as a matter of fact, by the end of that process, all of the Contadora countries, including the four countries that tabled it in the first place, said—and I refer you to a statement made by the four Foreign Ministers in Spain at a time when they accepted an award—that they agreed that the draft needed modification.

So the ~~fact~~ that there was a need for modification was well recognized. I think a proper kind of regional settlement would be very desirable and we support that. We supported the Contadora process from the beginning. But there has to be a settlement, if it is going to work, that touches all the bases, that is comprehensive, and that has the capacity to have the parts interact together and be verifiable.

And all of these things are very tricky and difficult, but they are struggling with them. And at least in our view, the statements put forward in Tegucigalpa by Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador constitute very constructive suggestions that were made.

Senator PELL. Thank you. My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me correct the record just a bit on Grenada. There were some of us who praised the President.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Senator. Perhaps I overgeneralized, but I certainly did not feel warmth up here when I came.

Senator HELMS. Well, some of us were in agreement. Of course, there was not enough time on the newscasts or comments in the newspapers for us to say to the American people that the President not only did the right thing, he did it the right way. And I think the reaction of the American people speaks for itself.

Now, you and the distinguished chairman in your equally eloquent statements spoke of aims of the United States, and inferentially, I suppose, the aims of the Soviet Union. Now, out in Phoenix not long ago, there was a question-and-answer period after a very dull, boring speech, and one gentleman got up and said:

"Senator, let me ask you something. You know what the goal of the Soviet Union is. It is to triumph over the world with socialism and communism." He said, "What is our goal?"

"Now," he said, "are we seeking to achieve a worldwide triumph for freedom and private enterprise?"

What would be your answer to that gentleman?

Secretary SHULTZ. I would say that we have, I hope, increasingly clear in our minds our ideals for how people can best live and our interests, and we seek to support those ideals and interests. And that means that we reach out to our allies and we reach out to people who are fighting for those same things and try to help them in various ways.

That does not mean that we are in a position to exert our military forces all over the place, but it does mean that we know where we stand on these various issues of what we will try to help resist and what we will try to help promote.

Senator **Helms**. With all due respect, and I do respect you, sir, I find myself wondering if that is enough. Vis-a-vis Afghanistan, the Soviets have a war going on against freedom there, and we have a great debate in this country about how much we should do, if anything, to help the freedom seekers in Afghanistan.

Let me phrase the question a little bit differently, so we can have a yes or no. Is there any question in your mind, for example, that if South Africa falls into Soviet hands—and that is what the Soviets are looking for—that it will be an unmitigated disaster for the free world?

Secretary **Shultz**. No.

Senator **Helms**. No doubt in your mind?

Secretary **Shultz**. No doubt in my mind.

Senator **Helms**. Do you think the American people understand that?

Secretary **Shultz**. Probably they have a much better understanding than they are given credit for.

Senator **Helms**. Well, I hope you are right.

Secretary **Shultz**. That does not mean, though, Senator, that we should accept whatever South Africa wants to do. We see where our interests are. We are very clear in our opposition to the nature of that society. But I think from the administration's standpoint we are also clear in our minds that, because, among other things, of the very factor you mention, but not limited to that consideration, we should not just walk away and say, we do not like the way you behave, so we are going to withdraw from everything.

We should be engaged and we should be part of the solution, not part of the problem.

Senator **Helms**. Well, I think the Reagan administration policy is good. I just do not think it is understood, because of a lot of the foofaraw that goes on in the media.

Now, there were 60 top presidents of corporations in the United States who went to Johannesburg, South Africa, and there was a seminar. Those persons head the leadership of every faction of every party, and there was unanimous agreement, Mr. Secretary, that it would be absolutely the wrong way to go to pull industry out of Africa.

They said, leave us alone, we are working this thing out. But we never hear anything about this. Now, this is not your responsibility. I am not suggesting that. But I think that the administration—and the President is a great communicator—needs to talk about both sides, what is at stake in South Africa, what is at stake in Central America. And I do not think the people really understand that.

At least that is the impression I get, because on the one hand they say, well, we do not want the Soviets taking over Central America, but they do not want us to do anything about it. And you cannot passively operate in a situation like that.

My time is limited. I have 2 minutes.

Are you familiar with this book, FSLN?

Secretary **Shultz**. I am not sure that I am.

Senator HELMS. It is written by a gentleman who is now Ambassador to Africa, David Nolan. It is an excellent study which details how the Sandinistas have been Marxist-Leninists all along, from the very beginning. David Nolan wrote this book years before Congress voted $75 million to help the Sandinistas, over the protests of some of us.

As I said, David Nolan is a Foreign Service officer. He knows Central America like the back of his hand. And yet, where is he stationed? He is stationed in Africa. And without any questioning of your judgment or the judgment of those who make the assignments, why is it, Mr. Secretary, that he is not being used in Central America?

Secretary SHULTZ. I am glad you did not put that as questioning my judgment or method of assignment, as you said.

First of all, I would say with respect to your earlier comment that it is undoubtedly true that some of the Sandinista revolutionaries were Marxists and so on, but others were not, and they joined forces and the effort succeeded. And as we all know, what tragically happened was that those who were the dedicated Marxists managed to take over, with the result that people who thought otherwise have left, have been persecuted, and really that is the basis for the great amount of dissidence in Nicaragua right now.

So I do not think it is fair to say that the Sandinistas broadly conceived in their original pattern were all Marxists-Leninists. Some were and those have prevailed in the present government.

As far as personnel assignments are concerned, obviously we try to develop expertise and use it. But I think we also have to have a sense of career development in our Foreign Service officers—and it is a problem. If somebody gets very good at one thing, then people say, gee, never change him around, because otherwise you lose that expertise.

But if you follow that all the time, what you wind up doing is producing a very narrow individual. If the person is really good and has real potential you want to give him or her a broader exposure. So that as a really good person advances, it is necessarily so as you rise in any pyramidal structure that the span of things you have to consider becomes broader. And if you just restrict people to a certain area, they do not have that ability as a career matter to develop breadth.

Now, I do not know the individual you are speaking about personally. I do not know anything about the particulars of the personnel decision. But one of the things I have tried to bring to the Department since I have been there—and I do not claim to have done it anywhere near adequately—is to bring to everyone the vital importance of the way we handle our career people.

We need to give them the breadth of experience and exposure that is going to allow them to develop, because over a period of time the quality of our foreign policy is going to be very much affected by the quality of this career cadre. And so I have pushed very hard on the idea that we have to think in career terms about personnel assignments, not just what suits an individual or suits his boss, most particularly.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, my time is up. I would like to follow it up, but maybe we can do that another time.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to compliment you on starting off your chairmanship with these hearings, although it is somewhat odd to have you as chairman. [Laughter.]

But seriously, I want to compliment you.

And I would also like to associate myself with the Senator from Rhode Island, whose comments I did not hear but read. Surely we are going to have to, Mr. Secretary, seek consensus, as the chairman is suggesting and has been since he has taken over this post, if there is going to be any real movement.

But I am concerned, as the ranking member indicated in his statement, assuming he delivered the statement that I read, that it could be a way of seeking silence.

Mr. Secretary, it appears to me that if we examine the issue of consensus on foreign policy, the spotlight today, as in the next several months and the last few months, the spotlight must inevitably fall not on the struggle between the Republican and Democratic Party, or between the Congress and the administration, which in the past 4 years has been relatively mild in my view, but rather on the struggle within the administration, which in the crucial area of arms control, from an outsider looking in, has appeared to be intense in the interaction of the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the NSC, and the President when he has directly involved himself.

We have witnessed one hell of a tussle, as an outsider looking in, and I could be wrong. But that tussle has yielded, up until your new efforts, nothing but nonnegotiable positions. Mr. Talbott's book would be a funny book if the subject matter were not so gravely serious to every person who is alive and has yet to live.

But we have now had an outpouring of optimism resulting from your trip to Geneva. I compliment you on your initiative and your trip, which was accompanied by all the high-priced talent from the networks.

But what is the real prospect that the Reagan administration in a second term will be able to conduct itself so as to produce a negotiable proposal which, if agreed upon, would enhance our strategic capability? Have you, in fact, arrived at consensus, the consensus that my colleague and chairman is seeking in the nation and between the parties?

Have you arrived at that consensus within the administration finally?

Secretary SHULTZ. First of all, I would take issue with the statement or at least an implication of your statement that the fact that there was not an agreement in the last 4 years on arms control is attributable to deficiencies of the President and the administration. I reject that totally.

The administration went into a very wide range of arms control discussions, from Stockholm to Geneva—chemical warfare, conventional confidence-building measures, intermediate, strategic. You name it, we have been having discussions about it.

It was not the administration, it was not the United States, that walked out of nuclear discussions. It was not the United States that failed to put interesting and imaginative proposals forward.

Senator BIDEN. I just want to say this, Mr. Secretary. I understand what you want to go through, but let me explain what I meant to say.

Secretary SHULTZ. I will get to your question, but I do not want to leave on the record unchallenged a statement——

Senator BIDEN. I did not make that statement. That is my one point I want to make to you. Let me say it again.

Are you suggesting that in the last 4 years there has been consensus on how to approach arms control within the administration?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes; there has been basic, broad consensus on fundamental things. The fundamental things are that what we are after are agreements that make major reductions in nuclear arms, not limitations on increases.

Now, when the President first proposed things like a zero-zero approach on intermediate-range weapons, and when he proposed in the initial START proposals major reductions—I was not here, but I gather that all of the people who were supposed to know everything about arms control threw up their arms and they said: Gee, this is unrealistic, it will not be acceptable.

But I think it is an interesting thing that now, in the agreement that we put forward in association with the Soviet Union in Geneva, there was agreement on radical reductions in nuclear armaments. That is an objective that we share. So, some of these things that were brushed aside—in the light of what has been happening—do not look the way they were originally described.

Now, certainly there has been a lot of disagreement and argument, and I agree with what you and Senator Pell have said. Agreement based on some sort of feeling that because the President says something we must agree—that is not agreement. What we want is agreement based on discussion of where the national interests are, and, on the basis of that, sharing a view about what we ought to do.

Senator BIDEN. What I want to know is, within the administration on the narrow issue of arms control are you, all the major players, in agreement? Not on what we want, that we all want peace, we all want fewer nuclear weapons. We all have common goals.

But have you arrived at within the administration a consensus on a detailed arms control proposal that you will make as a first step? I do not want to know what it is. I just want to know if you are all together.

Secretary SHULTZ. We are very unified within the administration. We went through an intensive, laborious process in the preparations for the Geneva meeting in January, in which the interagency process worked, developed positions, explored options, noted disagreements, and this worked its way up through the Senior Arms Control Group that Bud McFarlane chairs, that again sorted things out very helpfully.

We had innumerable meetings with the President, and in the end had detailed, very strong guidance from the President about what we were to do, and everybody supported it. And I felt that when I went to Geneva not only did I have the President and an administration unified behind what we were trying to do, but on the basis of discussions I had with those Senators who were in town before going and with those Members of the House that were here, I went there with very good support all around.

And I think because of that sense of unity which we have achieved—I will say within the administration, but actually I feel there is an awful lot of support from you and many other Senators, for what we are trying to do—it is in large part because of this sense of unity that we got somewhere.

And we intend to continue to present a unified, coherent picture, and it is essential.

Senator BIDEN. Good.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, on your comments on the global economy, you mentioned the very encouraging sign, of course, of the increase in the GNP and the decrease in inflation. But you failed to mention, I think, something that has international consequences, and that is our budget deficit.

Now, I can see why you might not want to get into that briar patch, but unfortunately we are all there. Being a member of the Budget Committee, I have strongly advocated an across-the-board functional budget freeze on budget authority.

Now, the State Department has not come under any real questioning in this area. Defense has taken the larger brunt and the entitlement programs about whether this is possible or realistic. But the budget for the State Department for our foreign aid, both economic and security assistance, has increased dramatically.

If we could freeze the budget authority for 1986 to the 1985 level, have you given any thought to the priorities of that action? Do you feel that this is something that you can live with? Because if we are having to do it in all other areas of the budget, will we not have to make some decisions on priorities in our foreign aid assistance?

Secretary SHULTZ. We feel that we have participated fully in the axe treatment that David Stockman has rendered on behalf of the President, and with which we agree.

We have to look, in the security and economic assistance areas, at what we are trying to achieve and what it takes to do it; and, if we decide we are not going to spend the money, then we had better decide that we are going to forgo that objective. And we have to do our allocations on that basis, and we have tried to do it very carefully.

There are some big needs out there, some of which will probably not be stated in the budget as such, but which we will be needing to get into.

Insofar as the State Department budget is concerned, small as it is, it certainly needs to be examined. It is so tiny in comparison with the whole budget that if it were eliminated it would not make much of a dent. But that does not mean it should not be examined, and we have examined it very carefully.

We have some important needs that we must serve, and I am prepared to go into them in great detail in the budget hearing. But just to take an example, we received toward the end of the last session—and before that, but very dramatically toward the end of the last session—very strong support for improving the security arrangements at our embassies around the world.

And it costs a lot of money. In some cases we have to change the location, because the whole culture of this is changing as a result of the exposure that we have. We used to locate embassies in the place where there would be the greatest flow, and we purposely designed them to encourage people to come in. We have to change our way of thinking somewhat on that, and so we have to spend that money and do those things. And there are a lot of other examples.

But we also have to tighten our belts, and I think we have. And I am prepared to go into it in as much detail as you want in the hearings.

Senator KASSEBAUM. As you say, it is not the largest part of the budget, but it is one that has grown significantly as we are increasing in a major way both security assistance and economic assistance.

Certainly the deficit is reflected, as I say, in the international relationships, because the strength of the dollar, those of us who are from farm States realize the impact that it has had on exports, and that is true as far as the impact that it has had in many other areas as well.

But I think as we get into this budget argument, I just wondered if you had given some thought, because we are asked here for increased aid to one country, then increased aid to another. It becomes a game of almost how much we are going to parcel out. And I sometimes wonder if there is a structure of a plan there, with the priorities that we can follow as we try to make these decisions, rather than just balancing off the giving game.

I would like to make one more comment if I have the time. When you stated that we have to see that there is a problem in Nicaragua, I really would say to you, Mr. Secretary, that I think the American public realizes there is a problem in Nicaragua. I think there is consensus on that. I think many have grave concerns about the Sandinista government.

I think there is some uncertainty, however, about the best pressure that can be applied against the Sandinista government, and I wonder if you have any alternatives—I am sure you have, I know you have looked at—other than support for the Contras. Have you given any weight to economic sanctions?

And second, let me ask you if you could briefly evaluate where you think the Contadora efforts are at this point.

Secretary SHULTZ. We have, of course, considered all manner of things and we are trying to do all of those things that are at our disposal to do to support the objectives of the President and that—I agree with you—I think that the American people generally support.

As far as the Contadora process is concerned, there is a draft, and there are suggestions about the draft by various parties. We particularly have focused on the ones made by Honduras, Costa

Rica, and El Salvador. There is a meeting that probably will be held in the middle of February. I think it is the 14th and 15th, but do not hold me to those dates. It has been scheduled, although it has not been firmly set.

And it is a little hard to estimate just how far people will get in trying to work out the details of it. Ambassador Shlaudeman has been very active in the region and, for that matter, until recently in our direct discussions with Nicaragua. But those have proven fruitless, so for the moment we are not doing any more of those.

But nevertheless, we have been extremely active and tried to be helpful in the region. I hope the Contadora process succeeds, but it may not.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow up on Senator Kassebaum's concerns here a little bit, Mr. Secretary. Economics drives international relations. When one country wanted to conquer another, it was usually for economic reasons, and it is still the single biggest driving force in international relations.

Your statement about the glowing account of our economy concerns me. Two weeks ago on TV, David Stockman predicted our deficit at $220 billion this year and $240 billion next year. We cannot go on this way for very long. We have a trade deficit of $123 billion. The strength of the dollar has cut back on foreign purchases of material in this country. One-sixth of our labor force, the industrial labor force, depends on exports. One-third of our farm produce, that Senator Kassebaum has mentioned, is usually exported. That has gone down by about a quarter over the last couple of years.

I do not think budget cuts alone will do it. I do not think the freeze will do it. We have challenged the President for the last 3 years to submit a balanced budget. He refuses to do it, and he is now talking about band-aid remedies for an upcoming $240 billion deficit.

Now, I see the deficit as our biggest Achilles heel in foreign policy. You say that you want other nations to emulate us. You say success inspires emulation. I hope you are talking about decentralization and deregulating, because surely you would not propose that Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina increase their debts on a comparable basis.

I just do not see how we can continue on this course without having a dire effect on international relations. We are not going to be in a favorable position forever.

I agree with you on the idea of decentralization and deregulation. But, the enormity of this deficit and the impact it can have on our international relations is to me just fraught with tremendous hazards. And I am sure you must share those concerns. You have broad experience in international business.

I am very much concerned about this, and I do not see that the things we are doing right now will, in any way, shape or form, even begin to approach the problems that we are faced with.

I would appreciate your comments on that and your concerns about it.

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree fully with your concern about our budget deficit and its potential for very undesirable consequences. Unfortunately, it is also the case that if you express Government deficit, most countries have a single calculation for all forms of government, State, local, and Federal. You can cumulate it that way, and unfortunately, a great many other countries have a far greater deficit in proportion to GNP than we do. That does not make it right. It just shows it is a hard problem these days. When the President sat around a summit table in London with the leaders of the other industrialized democracies he said, and it is true, there was only one country around that table that had a smaller proportion of deficit to GNP than we did. So it is a major problem.

Now, the way I look at it is that we have four interrelated problems. And I underline the word "interrelated" because I think they are. One is the big budget deficit.

A second and related problem is the very large deficit in our trade account, although fortuitously for the last 2 or 3 years it has been the engine that has helped economic growth in the rest of the world. So it has had a certain plus, but it cannot last. So the second is the big deficit in our trade account.

The third is the huge flow of money into the United States, I think on the order of $115 to $120 billion in this year that just passed.

And finally, the very strong dollar in relation to other currencies. This is not an artificial strength, but it is also not a relative value of the dollar based on trade relationships. Lord Rothschild 100 years or so ago remarked, as I understand it: Water may flow downhill, but money flows to the right. And to a certain extent, I think what we're seeing is money flowing to an island of stability and profitability.

But nevertheless, these four things represent interrelated problems and we have to do something about it. And the thing for us to start on, the key, is the budget deficit. I do not have the slightest doubt in my mind about the importance of that.

Now, I think, more importantly, the President believes, but I agree, that the worst way in the world to approach that kind of a deficit is by raising taxes. That will not do the job for you. All that will do is have an impact on your capacity to grow.

So we have to get at the spending side, and the President, in his budget, will be proposing very difficult, very tough cuts in spending. I know that you are all aware that there is lots of discussion, and I think healthy discussion, about it. But that is what we have to confront and try and get this thing beaten back into shape again, and it is an urgent task.

Senator GLENN. Well, I just see that as being critical. I do not look at it as a tax rise. I look at it as a lessening of the one-fourth reduction in tax revenue that the President wanted, and we gave him. It has not worked, and it is getting worse. We just reduced too much. We unbalanced things too far, as I see it.

Thank you.

Secretary SHULTZ. It always makes me uneasy, Senator, to disagree with you, because I consider you so wise and thoughtful. But I do not agree.

Senator BIDEN. You never say that to anyone else up here.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, you are wise and thoughtful too.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Senator GLENN. I am not sure I agree with your last statement, Mr. Secretary. Let me say that I made some very strong tax proposals when I was running for President, because I believe so strongly in this, and you can see where those proposals got me.

I believe just as strongly now as I did at that time, that the way to approach the deficit is with the fiscal policies that I was suggesting then. I see our deficit building to a head one of these days, and it will have a cataclysmic effect on international relations.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir, Senator Glenn.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You were doing fine, Mr. Secretary, until you said that Senator Biden was wise and thoughtful. He had to push a little bit to get that, too, I note. [Laughter.]

But in any event, I want to ask three questions, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary SHULTZ. If I could just interrupt, I had found that I had to change the standard way that people write testimony. They always say, "Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee." I have consistently tried to change it to say, "Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this distinguished committee." [Laughter.]

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You are on the right track.

Secretary SHULTZ. I know which side my bread is buttered on.

Senator BIDEN. You notice he did not mention Boschwitz yet.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. He is casting for it, though.

In any case, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to say that I very much agree with the thrust of your statement, particularly that part that talks about the confidence that you have in our system when compared to the other systems which we find ourselves principally in opposition to, and that pragmatically our system is stronger. In terms of productivity it is certainly a great deal stronger.

And I think the thrust is a very positive long term note that you touched upon often in your statement, which I very much appreciated.

In your statement, Mr. Secretary, you talked about Japan as emerging as our partner on key security issues, and also about NATO. I do not want to touch on the budget issues that Senator Kassebaum and Senator Glenn have touched upon. I think that Japan would be the country sitting around the table that has a lower percentage of gross national product to its deficit than we do.

Am I mistaken in that? Which country was it, West Germany?

Secretary SHULTZ. Germany. United Kingdom was about the same. The others were all higher.

Now, there is a catch in this, of course. Let us take Japan. Japan has an astonishing rate of savings among private individuals that makes their governmental management a different kind of a problem than ours.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I know that for some years they have been up and down. But in any event, they spend 1 percent of their gross national product on defense and they contribute little to the maintenance of a large force that we have there and in the Pacific in general, where we create an umbrella, just as we do in Europe.

As I watch our own defense expenditures rise, and as we try to put a lid on expenditures in general, I wonder how successful have we been in getting Japan and the NATO countries to increase their share, particularly Japan which is our principal economic competitor and spends about 1 percent of its gross national product on defense? We would balance our budget if we did that.

We are subsidizing, in effect, our largest economic competitor. What are the chances and what efforts have we made to get them to participate in the cost of our forces there, and the cost of our forces in that general region?

Secretary SHULTZ. There has been a great deal of discussion with the Japanese Government, most particularly since Prime Minister Nakasone has been in office. And we have seen the Japanese accept responsibility for the defense of the waters around Japan, as well as, obviously, their own territory, extending out 1,000 miles.

I might say that when that statement was made it made a lot of people in the Pacific nervous, because they remember World War II and before, and the fact that Japan's defense spending and capability is as low as it is is a reflection of the self-denying ordinances that we and others helped to impose on Japan.

But nevertheless, we have been urging them to do more and they have been doing more, not only in spending but in terms of attitudes. I think the signature of Prime Minister Nakasone on the Williamsburg security declaration a year and a half or so ago was a momentous event that has been little noted.

I would call your attention—you said that they give little support to our forces that are stationed in Japan. They support them to the tune of over $1 billion. Now, that is in contrast to many countries, where we pay for bases and develop them. The Japanese give tremendous support to those bases. So the picture is not all one way.

But yet I agree with you that they ought to do more, and so should our NATO allies, and for that matter so should we. It is a difficult, difficult problem.

I feel it is encouraging, in the NATO setting, that there was agreement at the last defense ministers meeting for a step-up in support of conventional defenses, resupply capability, and infrastructure and things like that, which are the kind of nuts and bolts of what you have to do. So that was an encouraging sign.

Every country is facing a big difficulty in its defense budget, but the picture has also got some other sides to it.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. We spend an enormous amount of money in those countries, and certainly one way of seeking some economy would be to enhance and enlarge their participation with respect to our presence. I understand the constraint upon the Japanese, but they could expand their participation in our presence.

In your testimony you talk about the Middle East, and I would like you to assess what kind of progress you see Israel making with respect to containing its runaway inflation and economy.

And then, if you would, the second part of that question, comment on the possibility of another arms package coming before this committee.

Secretary SHULTZ. Another what?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Another arms package, particularly for the Saudis. Every 4 years we seem to have one coming before this committee. It would be my hope, with the consensus of Senator Biden and others who talked about it, the chairman and you as well, that some type of—that we not see that package.

I do not think it is warranted. I think it is going to encounter substantial difficulties, and it certainly will not lead toward the consensus that we need in general in our foreign policy.

So if you could comment on Israel and then also on that arms package.

Secretary SHULTZ. They are big subjects. But I will just say that Israel has some very difficult economic problems, and I think we are all familiar with that fact. They have been struggling to deal with them. They have made some important decisions, I believe, or are in the process of making them.

They are approaching decisions on the basis that they have to develop consensus and agreement, that they cannot just impose them by governmental decree in these difficult matters, and I respect that. And we are working very closely with the Government of Israel, and sympathetically, in an effort to define how in the economic sphere we can be most helpful to them in conquering that problem that they have and getting themselves on the path of real growth with inflation contained. That is the object.

So they are making some headway, but it is difficult and the struggle goes on. But we are supporting the Government, and I think the Government has taken some very important and difficult steps.

As far as our strategic interests in the Middle East more broadly are concerned, of course we are constantly examining those and we are doing so again right now. I think that our interests are arguably served by the strength of countries in the Middle East in addition to Israel.

A good example in recent history has to do with the tanker war in the gulf, a matter of importance to us and to our allies. And I think that on the whole that has been kept under control, in part because some of our friends—and most particularly because Saudi Arabia does have the equipment and capability to use it in a manner that it was able to challenge Iranian efforts in the gulf area. And that was a contribution not only to their stability in their area, but also to our stability and our security. Here is an example of where the arms sales of the past played an important role in the present.

And as we study this question, I do not have much doubt in my mind that we will find that continued developments of that sort are warranted. But I cannot say at this time especially what, but I certainly would not sit here and say that you can expect to have no proposals made, because I think that would probably be wrong. But it remains to be seen just what. We will have to justify them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Secretary, first, I think you made a superb statement in your review of foreign policy generally, and I think your responses to the questions have been superb. I do not agree with every position and every nuance, but I have great respect for your grasp of all these issues and they way you report them.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Senator. So far I will say you are superb, too.

Senator CRANSTON. In your capacity as leader of our Foreign Service, I also applaud your emphasis on the use of Foreign Service professionals, and your concept of career development is a very great one, I think.

It is a tragic comment on our times that nearly as many American diplomats have been killed in the last 17 years as were lost in the previous 192 years of our Republic. We are losing diplomats more rapidly than generals presently. I simply want to pay tribute to those who serve and a tribute to your leadership of them, and I am sure we will do our best to respond to any requests you make for further security measures to aid them.

Secretary SHULTZ. I appreciate that very much, and I know that your comments will echo around the world in our missions abroad where people are serving, and in many cases at very considerable personal risk.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes. Thank you very much.

I also am delighted by the emphasis that you were placing and the personal time and attention you were giving and the leadership you are giving to the need for arms control and arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union. Could you clarify one point?

Assistant Secretary Murphy testified yesterday on the House side that the administration has formally deferred consideration right now for the new Saudi arms request. Is that the case?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. Good.

One of the issues that is of great concern to you and me and many other members of this committee is how best to use American resources to advance our national interests in the Middle East. We are faced now with two pressing requests, one from Israel, the other from Saudi Arabia, for more assistance.

I am glad the administration decided to defer consideration of the Saudi request. I think that deferral should last as long as the Saudis keep on doing daily harm to the American interest in a strong Israel. Saudi Arabia is using oil blackmail to enforce an Arab-led boycott of Israel. Enforcement of that boycott extends to nations way beyond the Middle East and has been a significant contributing factor in Israel's current economic crisis.

So I ask this: Should we not press the Saudis to ease off on their economic strangulation of Israel as we consider their request, since the Saudi action is necessitating increasing expenditures by American taxpayers to maintain Israel's economic and military stability and security?

Secretary SHULTZ. Certainly as we approach a study of our security interests and strategic interests in the Middle East there are many dimensions of it having to do with Saudi Arabian policies and behavior. And as I said in response to Senator Boschwitz, I think the capacity that Saudi Arabia now has has served both them and us in good stead recently.

How to evaluate all of the complicated economic, political, strategic, security interests is difficult, and that is why we are trying to examine all of this with great care.

I would say, with respect to the economic difficulties that Israel is having right now, I do not think you can attribute them particularly to the Arab boycott of Israel. They are, I believe, largely self-induced in the sense that I think that there is a lot of room for better management of the Israeli economy, and that it is perfectly possible to have a thriving, prosperous economy, given the quality of the people there and their capabilities, when things are put together right.

And we are doing everything we can to help the Government of Israel in its efforts to do that, and I assure you that we will be prepared to recommend whatever is necessary—given the fundamental willingness of the Government of Israel to face up to its own problems. There is nothing we can do until they take the initiative.

Senator CRANSTON. Both we and Israel obviously have need for better management of our economies.

Secretary SHULTZ. Correct.

Senator CRANSTON. I do wish that you would consider what part the boycott does play in their economic woes, and also, of course, the action of Arab nations in maintaining a state of war with them, which leads to their making heavy defense expenditures, as we make heavy defense expenditures, which upset our economy to the degree that they did.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think the more able we are to move in the peace process, the better off everyone is going to be, ourselves and the countries in the area.

Senator CRANSTON. I would just like briefly to follow up on your discussion with Senator Helms on South Africa; do we not need to do much more to convince the white authorities in Pretoria, who monopolize the political and economic power, that swift change is the best way to avert the danger of a race war and/or a Marxist insurgency?

We agree that a Marxist takeover there would be to our disadvantage. We do not want it to come. But if there is not progress toward change, we are creating the troubled waters where Communists often fish most successfully.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think there has been more progress in recent years than in past decades, and that it probably comes about in part from a growing recognition in South Africa of the merits of change from their own standpoint and in part from international pressure, including pressure from the United States.

And we are unequivocal in our opposition to apartheid, and we have urged on them all kinds of things and will continue to do so. How swift change can come about remains to be seen, but I think at some point people have to bite the bullet and make the drastic change.

I remember vividly in my own experience here, back when I was Secretary of Labor and then Director of the Office of Management and Budget, for some reason the President put me in charge of helping manage the change—I remember this as 1970—in the

United States from legally established segregated school systems to integrated school systems. And I can remember the trauma, but I also remember that I believed it came about and came about peacefully, because one could say, and I said, that it is not a question of whether this change will come about; that is decided. The only question is how it will come about; will it come about peacefully or will it come about with a lot of debilitating violence?

So I think as people get a sense that the change is inevitable, then they focus on what I would call the managerial problems involved. Once the people start doing that, then you start getting someplace.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cranston.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Secretary, I want to compliment you on the job you are doing as Secretary of State. I was recently in South Asia, and from a management point of view and from what Ambassadors and DCM's and Foreign Service officers feel, from their morale and sense of direction, it is one of the best. Apparently the State Department can be managed and you are doing a good job of it.

When I was in South Asia and talking with Indian leaders—and I talked to probably 20 of them, ranging from the Prime Minister to several of their cabinet officers—there were statements very critical of the United States, pro-Soviet statements. Maybe they spring from our position on Pakistan or maybe from an intellectual position, like the intellectual Mexicans criticize the United States.

But in the small countries around India—Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and elsewhere—you find a very pro-American spirit. Would it not be in our interest to upgrade the treatment of the small countries surrounding India? I am suggesting that we be friends with all, but it seems as though we have diverted a lot of our attention to India.

Whereas we have some real allies in those small countries surrounding India, I think it would be in our interest to upgrade the treatment of those countries.

Secretary SHULTZ. Your observation is very interesting and important, and of course we are trying to develop our relationships with the countries of that region.

Pakistan, of course, has a particular security problem because of the Soviet invasion and presence in Afghanistan and the huge number of refugees there in Pakistan and the threat to Pakistan. So we pay a lot of attention to that.

I do think it is of great importance to us that we see our relationship with India improve and flower. India has the world's largest democracy. It is a country of great potential and importance. I had the privilege of leading the U.S. delegation to the cremation of Indira Gandhi and in the process spent some time with Rajiv Gandhi, and I hope that as time passes we will find with his leadership and influence, and our own reactions to that, an ability to work in a stronger way with the Government of India, because it is of such importance.

One of the interesting things that has been happening around the world is the emergence here and there of little regional organizations. ASEAN is the one that comes to mind most strongly, but there is an organization of the countries in Southeast Asia and I hope that it flourishes. It includes all the countries you mentioned, including India and the others.

Senator PRESSLER. On another subject, the strategic defense initiative, what have you heard from our European allies and what has been your response?

Secretary SHULTZ. I would say the response is something like the response here. At first, people were puzzled and the experts were largely opposed. But as people have thought it over, as they have learned more about it and seen the potential of it, they have been changing their minds.

And it is quite perceptible in the United States, even among the experts, that they are shifting their view of the importance of this initiative, and I think that is true of our allies as well. Different ones have different views, depending somewhat on their situation. But I think that the President's program is getting now a lot of support and increasing support.

Senator PRESSLER. There has been some fear that the cost of the SDI would reduce our traditional commitment to Europe, and with the talk in Congress already of things such as the Nunn amendment and so forth, have our European allies expressed concern in this area?

Secretary SHULTZ. Everybody is concerned about something that might cost a lot of money. We are, you are. But at the same time, we have to be even more concerned about our security and about the quality of the deterrent capability that we have.

And so I believe, and I think in Europe we are increasingly supported, that this research program is of vital importance for us to pursue. Not to do so would be to lose a potential major opportunity, and not to do so might well leave us holding the bag, because it is clear that the Soviet Union is and has been pursuing it very strongly.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pressler.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let me commend you for these hearings.

One quick suggestion. This is a very good statement, Mr. Secretary, but a lengthy one. We used an hour of the time of the committee to hear it. I might suggest that whenever possible in the future, we might have the testimony even an hour or two before, and then you could abbreviate the statement and give us more opportunity for the kind of give and take question period which I think is helpful in these matters.

One quick question. I regret Senator Helms is not here. During the past campaign he received endorsements from a number of ambassadors. In my own view—and I would say this whether he was a Democrat or a Republican—I do not fault him for requesting them. I fault the ambassadors for signing on. It was one of the most unprofessional things I have seen in a long time.

Have you issued a directive to suggest that this not ever occur again or suggested any disciplinary action for anyone who does engage in that kind of political behavior?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir.

Senator DODD. Do you think it ought to be done?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think individuals, particularly noncareer ambassadors, have a right to engage in political activity. We do not expect our career ambassadors to do that at all, although from the standpoint of the Department we made it clear before the campaign started in a statement that went to all our ambassadors and which was fully endorsed by the President that their job was at their post and it was a full-time job.

And obviously, you cannot tell a free American taxpayer that he cannot express publicly his support for a particular individual. So I am not in the position to, nor would I, give an order to anybody of the kind you mentioned. But I made the department's position as a Department clear in advance.

Senator DODD. Based on the assumption that you think it is unbecoming behavior?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, people express themselves, and I would not want to characterize it. I think that to censor people who are expressing a political view is a step that I would not want to take.

Senator DODD. Mr. Secretary, Senator Pell asked you about the administration's support for the Genocide Convention. As I am sure you are aware, in the closing session of the last Congress a resolution was passed by a vote of 87 to 2 on the floor of the Senate calling for early consideration of the Genocide Treaty and endorsing the basic principles of the Genocide Convention.

You indicated at the outset that the administration still supported ratification of that treaty. May I ask you to go a step further and ask you whether the administration will strongly support ratification of that treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. We support it. We support it strongly. What strong support means—there are lots of things that we support strongly.

Senator DODD. Will you work for its ratification?

Secretary SHULTZ. I will work for its ratification.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

There was a headline in many of the Nation's newspapers a week or so ago—in fact, a statement from the President that Nicaragua was now receiving support from Iran. What support is Nicaragua receiving from Iran or what support militarily are they receiving from Iran or will they be receiving from Iran, if any?

If you care, at some point maybe in the not too distant future, we could have a closed briefing and you could describe it if it is sensitive. But I think the basic question of whether or not they are, or will be, receiving military assistance from Iran is a question I would like to have you answer.

Secretary SHULTZ. As far as the details are concerned, I am not in a position to provide them in this hearing. We have seen publicly the visit to Nicaragua and the public statement of Iran that it is intending to send military equipment to Nicaragua. So that is all assertions that they have made.

In terms of the direct knowledge we have from our intelligence sources, I am not in a position to talk about that. But those are not needed, given statements that Iran has made itself.

Senator **Dodd**. We are convinced at this point there will be military assistance coming?

Secretary **Shultz**. That is what they have said.

Senator **Dodd**. Have we had any information that there has been any military assistance so far?

Secretary **Shultz**. This is what I do not want to discuss here. We ought to take people at their word. They say they are supporting Nicaragua, they say they are going to send arms. So why would we not believe them?

Senator **Dodd**. Well, I would like to request that, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary **Shultz**. What we see is the Soviet Union, Cuba, Iran, Libya, the PLO, supporting Nicaragua—all our great friends.

Senator **Dodd**. Mr. Secretary, Iran was a new twist, and I gather even some people at the State Department were somewhat surprised that the President added that particular name to the litany. We have known about aid in regard to Libya, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

Secretary **Shultz**. I believe what you have to keep in mind here is the terrorist dimension.

Senator **Dodd**. Let me move quickly because I have just 2 minutes.

The Philippines. Again, in this particular arena I presume we might have the chance to get into a general discussion over the next couple of days. But I would like to suggest, Mr. Secretary, that we have such a briefing. I would like to know what the administration is thinking at this stage, the early stage of what is developing into a very serious situation in the Philippines.

Secretary **Shultz**. Yes. Well, it is and we are thinking and working on it very actively. I might note that Ambassador Bosworth has just returned to Washington for consultations, and I am sure if the chairman wants to arrange a session of those who are interested in a private consultation or otherwise with Ambassador Bosworth, he will welcome a chance to talk to you about it.

Senator **Dodd**. One more quick question. I apologize for moving very fast here. Third-party assistance to the Contras. Have we made any request to any of our allies with whom we have a present relationship of military sales, grants of military equipment. Have we either asked them: One, to supply the Contras; or has the decision been made to avoid existing legislation which would prohibit such behavior? Has such a decision been considered or made?

Secretary **Shultz**. We have not made any such request. We have considered all sorts of ways of supporting people in Nicaragua who are fighting for the freedom of their country.

Senator **Dodd**. But no such formal request has been made and no decision has been made to allow that kind of transaction to occur?

Secretary **Shultz**. I do not want to get into a discussion of this kind of program here in a public hearing.

Senator **Dodd**. But the answer is not no?

Secretary **Shultz**. I will just have to say that I am not in a position to make a comment on the program. I have stated it as a comment about requests to other countries. I made a definitive statement to you about that.

Senator **Dodd**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to compliment you, Mr. Secretary, for what I think is an extraordinary statement in its all-encompassing application to our foreign policy. I recognize your time constraints and as a consequence I will limit myself to two questions.

You were very bullish on the American economy. I would certainly not suggest that is not the case in actuality. However, at the same time, we have some very significant underlying problems associated not only with our farming industry, but our textile industry, our steel industry, our copper industry. We see many of our basic industries that are represented by the utilization of our natural resources indeed being in very dire straits.

And we are faced now with the reality that we have a $123 billion trade deficit. We reflect on a situation in Japan where 2 years ago, the trade deficit was $21 billion, this year it closes at $32 billion. Testimony before this committee has indicated that next year that trade deficit with Japan will be in the area of $45 billion.

Mr. Secretary, we Do not seem to be able to establish any accountability within our trade policy in this country. We have the Department of State involved in trade, the Department of Commerce, we have our Special Trade Ambassador Brock. But no one agency appears to have accountability for this tremendous trade imbalance.

My question to you is, Do you see any significant change in the direction that the trade imbalance with Japan, for example, is taking, or for that matter the workability, since so much of our industry base is dependent on exports, of how we can possibly coordinate and get this going the other way without establishing accountability within an appropriate Government agency?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think that from the standpoint of the intragovernmental operation, while things are not perfect on the whole, they go along pretty well. And the fact of the matter is that the interests in trade issues are very widespread, so it should not be surprising that there are many Departments that have views they want to express on that subject. There is nothing wrong with that.

I do think that the trade deficit is not primarily to be attributed to what you might call trade policy, narrowly defined. It is attributable to the fact that the dollar is so strong. It is attributable to the fact that we have such a strong economy relative to other economies. It is attributable to the fact that so many other countries got in very serious debt problems and have had to have austerity-type programs to get a hold of themselves, and factors like that.

So I do not think whatever organizational arrangements you made in the Government, you would have any appreciable effect on the trade balance, because that comes from broader and deeper causes.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, I would not disagree with you by any means. But I think that the pattern that we are seeing established is one that obviously has to be turned around for the very salvation, if you will, of many of our basic industry groups that are dependent on production of our resources.

And I certainly do not, nor do you, agree with those who would suggest that we institute protectionism. But something has to be done, and I think the situation with Japan, while it has received a great deal of attention, has not resulted in any reduction in the momentum of going the wrong way. It is increasing by a larger percentage each year.

My second question, Mr. Secretary, concerns figures that have been developed from time to time with reference to the total value of munitions of various kinds in the Mideast area. Between the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, it has been estimated that close to $83 billion worth of various munitions are in existence in the Mideast. Obviously, that is an explosive situation and a tinderbox.

The question I have is, because of that, if there were another outbreak involving Israel and some of the Arab nations, would it not be mandatory that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately intervene to ensure that that situation would not get out of control and bring in a confiltration of the major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Could you expand a little bit?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think if a war broke out today, Israel would give a very good account of itself, and we would support them.

Senator MURKOWSKI. My question is specifically the exposure we would have and the Soviet Union would have, with this tremendous resource of armaments. We cannot ignore that that exposure exists.

Secretary SHULTZ. It would create great tension, and obviously we would be discussing it with the Soviet Union, at a minimum for the sake of damage control. But we do not foresee any development that would lead us to want to come together with the Soviet Union for some sort of condominium about the Middle East.

The way to get at the problem of the tensions in the Middle East is for particularly the Arab States around Israel to sit down with Israel and negotiate a peaceful arrangement. That is the way to go about it and that is what we have been trying to bring about.

Senator MURKOWSKI. But you would claim, of course, that you would begin communicating with the Soviet Union immediately if there ever were a situation of great exposure?

Secretary SHULTZ. We are in communication with the Soviet Union all the time about all kinds of things. And any time there is a big event around the world and both of us are related to it in one way or another, we discuss it.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.

The Chair would like to recognize the distinguished junior Senator from Virginia, Paul Trible, who is with us today. He is an observer for the moment, but he has been nominated by the Republican Party in the Senate to be a member of this committee. We hope very shortly he will be joining us with full-fledged status along with Senator Evans from Washington.

Mr. Secretary, we are indebted to you for the time you have given us and the extraordinary testimony. We look forward to seeing you return soon.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, Glenn, Zorinsky, Dodd, and Cranston.

Also present: Senator Evans.

Senator LUGAR. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. We resume this afternoon the series of hearings by the Foreign Relations Committee on the future of American foreign policy.

We had a good, constructive exchange this morning with the Secretary of State. Secretary Shultz emphasized that America's traditional values and goals have not changed, and that the real challenge to American foreign policy is to help shape the evolving trends and forces of change in accordance with our ideals and our interests.

But the Secretary also noted that democracies have long had difficulty in maintaining consistency, coherence, discipline and a sense of strategy, and that our ways of thinking have tended too often to focus on increasing our strength or on pursuing negotiations. He concluded that we have found it hard to do both simultaneously, which is clearly the most sensible course and probably the only way we can sustain either our defense programs or our ability to negotiate.

If, as Secretary Shultz noted this morning, we are witnessing the reemergence of a national consensus on the main elements of our foreign policy, there remains nonetheless a lingering perception in the country that the United States is overcommitted in the world, a perception that the country suffers a disparity between vital interests it is committed to support and the force it is willing and able to muster and apply in order to sustain those interests.

The restoration of coherence to the U.S. approach to the world requires construction of a bipartisan consensus on the extent of and the means to close any perceived gap between commitments and power in national security policy, some agreement on how best to balance the power resources with commitments and security interests.

A central requirement of any great power's successful foreign policy is the balancing of foreign interests and commitments with commensurate power to support them. Every administration in the postwar period has had to grapple with the issue of how to bridge any perceived commitment or power gap.

We are pleased to have with us this afternoon the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, one of the major architects of the administration's national security policy, a man who is all too well aware these days of the difficulties of matching America's global security interests with the resources necessary to sustain them.

Secretary Weinberger, we welcome you to the committee today. But before I ask you to commence your testimony, I would like to call upon the distinguished ranking minority member, Senator Claiborne Pell, for his opening remarks.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I commend you, too, for this beginning of the committee's review of American foreign policy and the initiative of yours to hold these hearings. No assessment of foreign policy, Mr. Secretary, can be complete if it is not conscious of the interaction between the Defense Department and State Department. If our Nation is to be secure and prosperous, defense and foreign policy must be mutually supportive, and if they cannot work toward a common goal, even the best intentioned efforts of our President will be in vain.

A good point in case is in arms control. It is clear that this administration's first 4 years were marked by deep internal disagreements, some of which I believe remain unresolved until today. Against this background and the intransigence of the Soviets, the administration was able to accomplish nothing, nothing in the field of arms control in 4 long years.

I am one Senator who is now prepared to take the President at his word and his stated commitment to arms control. I would only hope that his bureaucracy would be responsive to his expressed desire and support him in achieving this elusive goal.

We know that in any bureaucracy it is a lot harder to accomplish something good and positive than it is to scuttle the initiatives of others. It is so clear now that we need to regain momentum in arms control that I would hope that you, Mr. Secretary, would ensure that your bureaucracy joins in the effort to succeed at Geneva.

I suspect that you and some of us might disagree as to the best way to achieve arms control. But your party and the President won the election, and the ball is very much in your court. I assure you this committee and the Senate will greet results in any of the three sets of arms control negotiations with an open mind.

I think, too, we must all see that there is now a clear and splendid opportunity for arms control. Such a great opportunity may not occur again for a long time. I do hope we put aside partisan differences and move ahead in this most compelling task of our time—the forging of a new world free from the threat of a nuclear Armageddon. We owe this to our children and our children's children.

Senator **Lugar**. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Secretary Weinberger, would you please proceed with your testimony?

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary **Weinberger**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, Senator Pell.

I appreciate very much the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the national security principles and goals of our country.

I would like first to commend the committee for convening these hearings to strengthen the consensus on American foreign policy, because in any nation founded on the consent of the governed, the backing of an informed people is essential to the long-term success of our foreign affairs.

It is also necessary to keep the public support for the investments that we must make to secure stronger defenses. So by working to secure and forge a greater national consensus, your committee, Mr. Chairman, helps bolster the political commitment which, in combination with our military capabilities, forms the whole basis of our national strength.

The strongest foundation on which to build a consensus on foreign policy is the American character: our values, our traits, and our spirit. And as you review the Reagan administration's foreign policy, I believe you will find that it does indeed reflect the best of our American character, in particular a continuing quest for peace with freedom.

America's national security and defense policies support our overall foreign policy by safeguarding our Nation and by preserving our vital interests. Our basic national interests have remained constant during the postwar period. Broadly speaking, we seek to survive as a nation, to be free to pursue our way of life, preserve and strengthen the democratic community of nations, and to live in a stable and peaceful world.

If our national interests have remained unchanged, then so, too, has the fundamental challenge of these interests posed by the aims and ambitions of the Soviet Union and the military power that gives them force. People whose business is the news naturally enjoy speculating about how dramatically our relationship with the Soviet Union may be changing. At any given time they like to take its temperature on a daily basis and pronounce on chills and thaws, new eras of cold war or détente.

But this committee has deliberately and I think properly chosen to look away from today's headlines to the underlying principles and the enduring dilemmas of America's foreign policy. As you look, I think you will see that the most important elements of our relations with the Soviet Union have been constant or have changed very slowly over the postwar years. Soviet repression has become more sophisticated, as have their weapons, but life has not, as Stalin once promised them, become better and gayer for the Soviet people.

The ambition of Soviet leaders to extend the sway of Marxism, Leninism, if lacking in their ideological fervor, is nevertheless today supported by enormous military force. The 1977 Brezhnev constitution reiterates that it is Soviet Russia's aim, indeed its duty, to spread the Communist system to all the countries of the world. And this long-held doctrine of Soviet domination is backed up with the full force of the Red army.

The peoples of Czechoslovakia, Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Poland, to name just a few, can bear eloquent witness to the Soviets' willingness to use their force directly or indirectly through proxies and to use it mercilessly. President Reagan has not shrunk from stating the truth about these harsh realities of Soviet behavior.

At the same time he has actively sought out new opportunities for negotiation and cooperation and laid the ground work for a realistic long-term peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union. He has demonstrated that we can be businesslike without being morally blind, vigilant without being belligerent, and that we can negotiate without surrendering our principles or our interests. Above all, President Reagan has refused to shut his eyes to the fruits of an ambitious and sustained Soviet program of military investment.

Coupled with U.S. restraint during the 1970's which produced a decline in defense investment and spending of 20 percent during the decade of the 1970's, the expanding military power of the Soviets enabled Moscow to shift the critical components of the overall global military balance in its favor. While building on their superiority in numbers, the Soviets are also dramatically improving the quality of their military systems in closing the West's technological edge.

We are now in the 12th year of debate over the MX missile, and while we debate, they deploy. They continue to test and field new and more accurate missiles and to improve all of their strategic nuclear forces. Since the mid-1970's the Soviets have widened their conventional advantage in nearly every force category by producing major weapons at rates that are much greater than those of the United States and our NATO allies combined.

To exert its military power around the world, the Soviet Union is also expanding the geographic reach of its forces. We are seeing growth in the Soviet airlift, the emergence of a strong blue water Soviet Navy, the development of overseas bases and the opportunistic expansion of Soviet presence and influence worldwide.

Today, the Soviets have bases and ports near the world's major trade routes and energy resources, and these threaten our interests as well as those of our friends and our allies.

Further complicating America's security challenge is the increased political turmoil and the rise in international terrorism in many regions of the world. The Soviets have demonstrated their ability and their willingness to exploit that turmoil whenever it advances their goals.

While the Soviets have an offensive oriented strategy, the United States, of course, has a defensive strategy that reflects our values as a nation. We might just pause for a moment and think what a tremendous burden this puts on American strategy.

As Secretary of Defense I am often asked what is our strategy, and not infrequently it turns out that what I am really being asked is for an explicit account of just where, when and how we would use our military power under any and all conceivable circumstances. And if the questioner does not hear precisely what he wants to hear, why then he says that we have no coherent strategy.

Coherent plans for the first uses of military forces are the luxury of aggressors. It is the fate of defenders that we cannot choose the time and place and the method of attack. It is the responsibility, however, of defenders to be prepared to meet a very wide range of contingencies from terrorism to global conflict. Our position as a defensive nation necessarily means that we must live with an element of uncertainty in our military strategy. Since we do not seek territorial gains from the use of military power, we must maintain our forces and our reactive posture.

We will use our military forces only in response to clear threats to our security and our interests. And when those threats come from many quarters, as is the case with the Soviets widely dispersed force in strength, then our defensive forces must be strong and capable of responding in more than one area and perhaps simultaneously. Only if we have this strength will we be able to deter attack from a worldwide military power as strong as the U.S.S.R.

Meanwhile, we seek to reduce the causes of conflict—political, economic and social—before they lead to armed conflict. Our goal is to deter, not to fight, but if deterrence fails, then we must still be ready and able to defend ourselves and our allies.

The keystone of our military strategy since World War II has been deterrence. Deterrence provides security by convincing our potential adversaries that the risks and costs of aggression will exceed any conceivable gains.

The United States seeks credible deterrence through our military strength, political resolve and diplomacy. Our military strength and strategy deter by making a potential aggressor's assessment of war outcomes so uncertain and dangerous that any incentive for attacking is removed.

A potential aggressor would face and know that he faces the possibility of three types of responses that are inextricably linked. First, of course, is defense. If we have a robust military capability to defend against aggression, then a potential adversary would realize that his aggression would fail on its own terms. Facing such a credible defense, he should be deterred.

Second, an adequate response. An adversary must know that even if his aggression should succeed in achieving its immediate target, an attack on our vital interests would not be accepted by us without response, and that response might include escalation. The aggressor will know that even if he wins the battle, he must face the likelihood that he will lose the war.

Third, retaliation. If an adversary confronts a credible threat that his aggression will trigger a response that imposes losses exceeding any possible gains, then he should understand that he could gain nothing from an attack.

Of these three sources of deterrence, the most preferable and reassuring, of course, is defense, because it is likely to be more credible, and because it provides protection should deterrence fail. Credible and prudent deterrence requires strong military capability. Mere threats by us are not enough.

For example, when President Carter declared that continued access to Persian Gulf oil was a vital U.S. interest, our ability to deter attacks in that area clearly of vital interest to the West was weak. The United States then had the capability neither to defend the oil fields of the Middle East at the point of attack, nor to threaten adequate responses in that theater.

Therefore, a major objective of the Reagan administration has been to strengthen our ability to deter aggression against our interests in that volatile area. We have enhanced American power projection capabilities, so that if the Soviet leadership contemplated threatening our interests, they would be deterred by the prospect that American troops who could fight with conventional weapons at the point of attack.

I will be returning, as you know, to the Congress next week to discuss the 1986 defense budget, so here I am just going to emphasize briefly how the priorities of the Reagan administration in our defense program are directly related to our strategy.

I emphasize that each of these priorities is deemed vital to give us the strength to deter attacks; in short, to be sure that we never have to use our strong forces. Readiness to maintain the capability of the forces we now have, to respond quickly and effectively to aggression at the point of attack and defeat it. This has been one of our top priorities since I have first arrived. Sustainability to have the ammunition and equipment to fight with conventional arms long enough to make it clear that a Soviet attack could neither achieve a bold fait accompli nor force the President to face the choice between defeat or instant escalation. Mobility to enable U.S. forces to get to the point of attack in time and to be supported until the attack is defeated.

Conventional modernization to provide effective weapons systems capable of defeating numerically superior Soviet forces. Strategic modernization to assure that we maintain a balanced triad of survivable nuclear forces—land, sea, and air—and convince the Soviets that we can retaliate to a first strike and therefore deter such an attack.

While our entire defense program is designed to support our strategy of deterrence and defense, the United States cannot unilaterally protect our worldwide interests, nor can we hide between the isolationist delusions of a fortress America that never was and never will be. We must have strong allies and friends. We must work closely with nations that share our goals based on the strategic foundations of the past four decades, and our administration has strengthened its ties with our friends and our allies around the world in pursuing a strategy of global deterrence—the same strategy pursued by previous administrations running all the way back to World War II. A strong system of alliances and regional cooperation is indispensable to help America and its allies and friends preserve peace with freedom.

Cooperating nations share common security challenges and achieve a division of labor capitalizing on the relative strengths of each state. The Reagan administration is determined to keep our alliances strong and to encourage our partners and ourselves to shoulder a fair share of the security burden.

The U.S. strategy derives great benefit from the security assistance and arms sales programs. These efficient and comparatively low-cost programs help friendly countries make better use of their own limited resources and cope with security threats within or on their borders. Security also reduces the likelihood that the U.S. forces will be called upon to intervene in defense of a nation that would otherwise not be able to take care of its own defense.

Secretary Schultz and I are in complete accord on the importance of security assistance and arms sales. I hope this committee will continue to support these essential tools of foreign policy, and I hope also that you will continue to hold an open mind on all questions of arms sales until the administration has made its proposal and presented our rationale.

The U.S. strategy must also continue to depend on our forward deployed forces. The proximity of Soviet forces to our allies and our overseas interests imposes severe demands on the timeliness of response. Territory, once lost, would be very difficult to regain. Strong forward deployed forces enable us to deter more credibly, defend more effectively, and reassure our allies more convincingly. Our deployments worldwide are the visible evidence that we are prepared and committed to defend our interests and back the policies we espouse.

The American character has always depended on the strength of our ideals, not only as a force to spread our vision of a better world, and in that spirit the United States has, since the dawn of the nuclear age, worked for controls on these awesome weapons. Unfortunately, our noble quest has yet to succeed.

More than a decade of SALT negotiations, 3 years in SALT I, 7 years for SALT II, neither one of them achieved any genuine reduction, and none of them prevented an unprecedented Soviet buildup that continues to this day. Moreover, the Soviets have violated major arms control obligations and political commitments.

Because arms agreements can increase our security, President Reagan has committed this administration to the achievement of far-reaching, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions. America's quest for nuclear arms reductions provides us the opportunity to improve our deterrence and enhance international stability. To achieve these aims we must proceed with toughness and with patience with full knowledge that Soviet leaders do not share the values of our American character.

We have learned from the failures of the past and the record of Soviet violations that it is essential that future accords be precisely drafted and verifiable to ensure compliance by all parties.

Now we go to Geneva with improved prospects for genuine arms reductions. To achieve success we must continue our strategic modernization program and demonstrate our resolve to stay strong. It was that resolve that brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table, and that resolve that now gives us a critical opportunity to achieve those arms reductions goals that have eluded mankind for far too long.

In this regard I must tell you frankly that cancellation of key programs such as the MX or reductions in the defense budget will prolong negotiations, not facilitate them; will reduce our ability to achieve arms reductions and really take away Soviet incentives to agree to any reduction.

Earlier I emphasized the key role of defense in deterring conflict. Strong defenses can strengthen deterrence as well as conventional deterrents. Through the strategic defense initiative of the President we seek to explore a defensive alternative to the traditional strategic deterrence policy which has been based on mutual vulnerability.

In a speech to the American people in March 1983, President Reagan introduced his vision of a world freed from the terror of nuclear ballistic missiles. Since then we have studied both the technological feasibility and the strategic implications of pursuing strategic defense.

We have concluded that we should embark on a program to explore the potential of advanced emerging defensive technologies to support a thoroughly reliable defense against nuclear ballistic missiles. Strategic defense can both strengthen deterrence and enhance our opportunities for arms reduction. By increasing significantly the uncertainty of success of a Soviet first strike, strategic defense will enhance deterrence.

If the Soviet leaders ever contemplated initiating a nuclear attack, their purpose would be to destroy the United States or allied military forces that would be able to oppose their aggression. So effective defenses that could deny the Soviet missiles the military objectives of their attack, or deny the Soviets confidence in the achievement of these objectives would discourage them from seriously considering such an attack.

Unlike our current approach to deterrence based on retaliation, defenses would permit us to deter war by destroying weapons and not people by nonnuclear means before these missiles reach the atmosphere. Our strategic defense initiative furthers our arms reduction efforts. It is a research program entirely consistent with the ABM Treaty. But what better way to encourage bold reductions in nuclear ballistic missiles than by devaluing their military usefulness. So in addition to enhancing deterrence and stability, the strategic defense initiative could increase our chances to achieve a safer world through genuine arms reductions.

I think few people, Mr. Chairman, have understood more clearly the need for a powerful military hand within the glove of diplomacy than President Reagan. This administration is guided by the principle that military power should be used only as a last resort. We should be willing to use all sources of national power short of direct U.S. military intervention; yet, we should never rule out the use of force if deterrence fails. There is a deterrent value in never saying never.

The United States has erred in the past by being unwilling to use sufficient force to achieve our objectives, adhering to misguided notions about gradual applications of force, when a last resort decision is made to use force because it is vital to our national interest to do so. So it is necessary that if we use force, we use sufficient force to win; that is, to achieve a clearly defined objective as speedily as possible.

If we ever decide to commit our forces to combat, we must support those forces to the fullest extent of our national will for as long as it takes to win. That means we must maintain the necessary military force to achieve a clearly defined diplomatic objective, and that is necessary to our vital interests and cannot be achieved without the use of military force.

As I stated earlier, the single most critical element of a successful democracy is a strong consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes. Following from this I developed and explained six tests for the use of military power around which I hope public consensus can be formed. Following that forming of a public consensus, then we would proceed, but this does not imply the necessity of having full public support before we use force or, as some unkind interpreters of my speech suggested, that we have to take a poll before we act.

It does mean that before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. Just as we require public and congressional support for employing military force in war, we also require that support to build the defenses necessary to preserve the peace.

That essential public support depends upon a clear understanding of the strategic underpinnings of our defense program, it depends upon a sober and realistic assessment of the challenges we face, and finally, on a vision of the opportunities for a more secure peace with freedom.

It is for that reason, Mr. Chairman, that I support fully the efforts of this committee to review the goals of the strategic purposes and premises of U.S. foreign policy and to build a bipartisan commitment to pursue our strategy for realizing these opportunities for the United States, for our friends and our allies and, indeed, for all mankind.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Weinberger.

Before we proceed further, the Chair would like to recognize the presence of the distinguished junior Senator from the State of Washington, Dan Evans. He has been nominated by the Republican Committee on Committees and hopefully in a very short time will be elected by the body as a whole to membership on this committee. We are delighted that he is here as an observer to our proceedings today, along with Senator Paul Trible of Virginia, whom I introduced this morning, our new Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Welcome.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will proceed this afternoon, without objection, with a 10-minute questioning period.

Secretary Weinberger, please try to apply the principles that you have enunciated very clearly and succinctly in your testimony today to the situation that the United States faces in Nicaragua. This could be described as a clash between the United States and the Soviet Union; others would say that they are less certain that is the true nature of that clash.

In any event, how would you define our vital interests with respect to that country and how might our diplomacy and the use or threat of use of force be combined for a successful promotion and defense of our interests?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, we have said many times, Secretary Shultz and I, that military force should be the last resort. Our interest in Nicaragua is obvious. We cannot afford another Cuba in the Caribbean area so close to the continental United States, and our goals, our objectives, have been stated many times.

They are essentially to secure a genuine implementation of the democracy that the Sandinista revolution promised when it first took over. We think there should be a verified end to the export of subversion by that government. We think that there should be a verified removal of Cuban and Soviet bloc personnel and verified reduction of the enormous increase in Nicaraguan military forces down to regional parity so as to remove the threat and the dangers that clearly exist to Nicaragua's neighbors and, ultimately, of course, to ourselves.

We have tried to secure that through diplomatic negotiations, and I am sure that with any indication of the possibility of those negotiations proceeding with any hope they would be continued.

The important thing, we think, is to make sure that Nicaragua's neighbors are able to help themselves and defend themselves. And we support, of course, the process by which those neighbors are trying to secure some of these same objectives in Nicaragua itself.

The CHAIRMAN. When you suggest that any agreement or understanding involving the removal of Soviet advisers from Nicaragua should be verified, by whom should it be verified? How diplomatically, can you promote a political solution in which you have a degree of confidence?

Secretary WEINBERGER. You have a number of ways in which you could certainly get far better insurance than you have now. You could have some of the neighboring nations constitute visiting teams. You could have onsite visits by the United States. You could have in general reports of the departure, verified reports of the departure of those personnel.

If you are suggesting that no system would be perfect, I would agree with you completely because Soviet military personnel can turn into regional farmers overnight and there would have to be some opportunity to make a rather thorough examination. But I would think that while there are a number of methods and there is not any particular one of choice, an effective one would be inspection groups of the neighbors of Nicaragua, who have an even greater interest than we do in ensuring that such an agreement would be carried out.

The CHAIRMAN. What problems under international law might arise if, as a result of such verification regimes, Nicaragua were to argue that its sovereignty was being impuned by a group of nations or onsite observers from the United States and elsewhere?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I was speaking about a situation in which there has been an agreement to such an arrangement.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that Nicaragua agreed to this?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Oh, yes. I was not suggesting that any kind of arrangement of that sort would be effective in the absence of an agreement and as part of a general agreement to secure and carry out some of these objectives which we have, which I have mentioned, and which I understand our friends to the south and the Nicaraguan neighbors very fully share.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I understood from Secretary Shultz that for the moment the Nicaraguan Government does not wish to proceed with talks with Mr. Shlaudeman and indeed seems to have contempt for the whole Contadora group and process in toto. Given that situation, how might negotiations proceed and what, in your judgment, could lead to a warming up of these negotiations or some affection by Nicaragua for the Contadora group?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I would agree completely with Secretary Shultz' assessment. The prospects at the moment are not very bright and they have indeed treated the process with what I think he has correctly described as contempt. However, this does not mean that we should walk away from the situation or conclude that nothing could be done to improve it.

Our feeling is that we need to exert patience. We need to bring home to the Nicaraguan neighbors the information we have with respect to the very rapid growth and the enormous oversize of the Nicaraguan military compared to any defensive needs of their own within the region and to other countries within the region, and try in every way we can, including particularly encouraging negotiations between their neighbors and the Nicaraguans themselves, to achieve a situation in which they are not only recognized but that cordial business and economic and other relationships are resumed.

I think the neighbors of Nicaragua are properly very disturbed by the prospects they see of this ever-increasing military, and I think they should be. I think that that would be one of the ways in which that combined effort could perhaps bring a different Nicaraguan attitude to the negotiating table.

The **Chairman**. In your judgment, does the United States have too many Armed Forces committed abroad? Is the extent of, as well as the expense of, these commitments abnormally high? Should we not only look to our allies to do more but should we also contemplate a reduction of our commitments and forces abroad?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No; I do not think we have too many deployed abroad, Mr. Chairman. I think the forward deployment of American troops is one of the very best safeguards we have for protecting our own peace and freedom.

If anything, I think we should probably have a somewhat larger force deployed abroad, but I think I agree with you fully on burden-sharing, and we are trying, I think with some degree of success, to secure an increase in burden-sharing

We had last year the first time that the 3-percent goal was achieved on a general sort of weighted-average basis by NATO. The total was actually 3.1 percent, and there was a very major increase in the infrastructure funding at the last NATO meeting, in December, I believe it was, when we agreed to an $8 billion increase for the next 5 years.

That is about a 60-percent real increase in annual levels of investment over the entire past period of 5 years. It was a very important, significant decision. I do not have any doubt whatever, as I tried to say in the statement, that we all, ourselves and our allies, should do and have to do more in the face of the threat that we all face.

I think NATO is making a major effort, and I think that is an extremely important thing. I think one of the worst ways to secure a better effort would be to threaten or try to intimidate our allies by threatening to pull out our troops. Not only would that not work and be ineffective, in my opinion, but it would be very much against our own interest. I do not see any way that we could survive in a world in which Europe is overrun.

So I think we are not only practicing what appears to some to be just altruism by having troops in Europe; I think we are also practicing a very enlightened and proper self interest in having them there. We help ourselves when we help NATO.

In Japan, in the Pacific region, which is again an area growing in importance and enormously growing as far as trade is concerned, it is vital that we do what we are trying to do, and it is vital that we continue to try to persuade the Japanese to do more. They are doing more. Their budget for 1985 is now over 5 percent larger in real terms than it was the previous year.

And all that they do is not contained just within their defense budget. They spend about $1 billion taking various forms of financial support for our forces in Japan. That helps both countries. And we think that they should do more. We have pointed that out many times. But they are doing more. It takes a long time for a consensus to form there, and they have various sensitivities including a constitutional one as does Germany, but I think all things considered they are making serious efforts.

So I think one of the worst things we could do from our own point of view would be to diminish our commitment abroad. From the military point of view, it would weaken us substantially to bring home or reduce the number of forward-deployed forces.

In this kind of a world, where you are going to have to respond very quickly, having forward-deployed forces can save you hours, days, weeks that you could never regain. So by every measure we are quite clear that we should at least keep what we have and in some situations be able to increase the number of forward-deployed forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the 10 minutes? All right. My 10 minutes is up.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we have a pretty impressive group of forces, including bombers, land-based missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and I believe I am correct in saying that one Trident submarine alone has enough warheads on board to destroy about 200 major targets, installations and industries, and millions of people throughout the Soviet Union.

Since we have so much and they have so much, what is the point of the massive new nuclear deployments in prospect for us and the Soviet Union? I am wondering what the arguments are in your mind and what the arguments are presumably of your opposite numbers in the Soviet Union.

Since we can each destroy each other several times over, what difference does it make if, as Khrushchev said, we make the rubble bounce?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, of course this opens up the whole argument of deterrence and our desire to get and ability to maintain deterrence at much lower levels than we have now. We have not been able to secure that yet, and the agreements that we have signed have permitted the expansion of the Soviet forces.

One of the problems with having to rely on deterrence is that you do have to maintain a credible response and ability to balance sufficiently their perception of the damage they could do by a first strike so that they will be deterred from ever making that first strike.

Deterrent strategic forces are there never to be used, and the precise number that is required at any given moment is obviously a matter of a number of different estimates. It is not a field in which I thought that we should underestimate the need. A deterrent capability is the way in which we can keep the peace and we balance each other on, if you like, a balance of terror.

It is why the President has suggested and has urged so strongly that we find a better way—the strategic defense initiative—but as long as the Soviets keep improving their capability, their ability to destroy our targets, hardening their own targets, spending billions of dollars on defensive measures—more on defense than on offense, actually—underground shelters, and areas for the continuation of their government, all that give the impression that they believe that they could make a first strike and continue on.

We must have an ability to persuade them that that kind of a first strike on the United States would not render us incapable of making a response, and therefore we have to have the submarines that you mentioned. We would have to have a more accurate missile that has the thrust and the ability to destroy targets they have now hardened.

And if you believe in the triad, as I do strongly—not only redundant but of mutually reinforcing forces—then we have to have modern missiles such as the MX, with far greater accuracy than the Minuteman, far greater hard-target kill capability yield than the Minuteman, and we need to have a system of manned bombers that can penetrate increasingly strong Soviet defenses.

It is not a course that any of us, I think, particularly want to follow. But allowing deterrent capability to corrode to the point where we have no response that we can make to the Soviets except to agree to whatever demand they might make—subjecting ourselves to nuclear blackmail, if you will—is a response we also do not want to have to make.

So that is why we work to modernize what we have and strengthen it. At the same time, we work for a better way, a way of making these nuclear missiles impotent and obsolete and be able to destroy them before they get near any target.

Senator **Pell**. But just for the moment presume that we have a scenario that each side has half the weapons we have now—strategic weapons. Would that not be enough to destroy the other? Why do we need to have it doubled and tripled and quadrupled?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, if we had that scenario, I would consider we had had a very successful arms reduction negotiation and I would be delighted. But the problem is we have never obtained that. The only thing we have obtained are agreements which permit them to expand by thousands of warheads and leave us in the position that we feel we have to modernize.

If we could get an agreement that had both sides reducing down to equality at half the levels we have now, I would be delighted.

Senator **Pell**. Let me put it another way. Let us say that they could destroy us with the weapons they have several or three times over, and we can destroy them two times over with half the weapons we have. Would we be in an inferior position?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The question at that point is how it appears to them, what they perceive. Deterrence is not what would deter us. Deterrence is what they perceive would be the situation if they launched an attack, and that involves some difficult calculations in which you cannot afford to be very wrong.

I am not allowed the privilege of making very many mathematical errors in these daily computations and equations that we have to cast up. I do not know the answer to your specific question. All I know is that we cannot allow ourselves to get in the position where they might feel that they have a sufficient offensive ability to launch a first strike without a sufficient retaliatory capability left on our side, and that is why we need the redundancy of the triad and to do the things we are doing now, which are not particularly things that any of us want to do, except that we have the responsibility at the moment for advising you and the people and the President as to what is necessary for the safeguarding of our security.

Senator PELL. Somewhat removed from the subject, but not entirely, as you know better than we do, the Warsaw Pact's men under arms this side of the Urals is less than NATO's men under arms. Why is it, in view of that fact that we have more conventional manpower, more conventional forces, that we depend on the first strike nuclear response that we now have in Europe?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I would have to disagree with you on that. The Soviets have under arms a substantially larger military force than is true in the NATO countries, including the American reinforcements planned. Some of them they station permanently on the NATO front; some of them they keep within easy reach in Central Russia; some of them they keep in other parts, and some of them they keep in the Warsaw Pact nations.

But their total ability, active forces in the field against NATO, they have not only a greater ability to do that, they are much greater numbers.

Senator PELL. I think you misheard my question. I said the Soviet forces—Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces west of the Urals. Obviously those that are east of the Urals have their attention drawn to China.

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; I did not hear that.

Senator PELL. And that was my question.

Secretary WEINBERGER. What was the point of the question?

Senator PELL. The point of the question was that since we have more men under arms in NATO than they do this side of the Urals, why do we have to depend on the first use of nuclear weapons as being our basic strategy to stop a Soviet attack?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Maybe I did not misunderstand it. If you are asking if we have more than they do in the areas opposite the Western front, I would have to say they have more there, but they also have an ability to get even more there very quickly, far more quickly than we do, because ours are reserves, not mobilized; theirs are active duty forces.

Senator PELL. But their attention is also directed toward China, and those forces east of the Urals would obviously not be thrown in a war in the West.

Secretary WEINBERGER. They have a number opposite China, indeed they do, and they have a large number available for use in the Mideast. In fact, that is the point of my statement, that they have now a very large capability of requiring us to have the international commitments that are larger than any of us would like to have, because we have to be able to respond, as I said a few moments ago, in different areas of the world and perhaps simultaneously.

Senator PELL. But the first use of the nuclear weapon remains our basic defense strategy in the European theater, does it not?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Our policy is not to be the first to use any force. As I say, our first strategy, our first goal, our first priority is defense, a strong enough defense to deter an attack. And then we have to have an adequate response should they launch an attack, and adequate flexible response would have to include the possibility of escalation.

But it is not the strategy that we want to pursue. It is a strategy for which we have to be capable.

Senator PELL. Turning to the SDI for a moment, the arguments for it are the arguments that were advanced for the Maginot Line prior to World War II. Everybody thought the Maginot Line would protect France from attack, and then the German tanks proved that that was incorrect.

The same way as Senator Moynihan has pointed out, cruise missiles can go under the Brooklyn Bridge. So the SDI would protect us from ballistic missiles, if it worked, but it would offer no protection still from cruise missiles; is that not correct?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir. The SDI is designed to destroy incoming Soviet ballistic missiles of both intermediate and intercontinental range, but there are other defenses against cruise missiles which we are working on and which the Soviets are working on.

The Soviets demonstrated their defense against cruise missiles a couple of days ago when they shot down one of their errant missiles that was on its way at least into Finland.[1]

Senator PELL. Thank you.

One other subject, the question of the negotiations, let us say that in the three areas, in strategic, INF, and the SDI or space, let us say an agreement is reached in one of those areas. Can you see us going ahead with an agreement there, or do you think that we have to wait until there is an overall agreement?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would be delighted if we could get agreement of the kind the President has described, a good agreement. If we could get that earlier, we would sign that and go on to the next subject. I urged that very strongly when we had the old START and INF talks going.

We tried in the START talks to break out of the negotiations something on which we all agreed, that is, something to improve the hot line and bring a more modern technology to that. The Soviets did not want to break that out. Later they did agree on a totally separate negotiation to sign that, but I would think it would be very desirable if we are able to reach the kind of agreement we want, to genuinely reduce armaments in any particular area, to try and sign that agreement and then go on and continue discussions in other areas.

---

[1] In subsequent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 4, 1985, the Secretary said: "That was not a correct statement. . . . (The Soviets) may have some of that capability. They did not exercise it with respect to that particular incident."

Senator PELL. Speaking of signing agreements, and I am thinking of SALT II. Do you believe that the Soviets are continuing to avoid undercutting SALT II, just as we are?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think there is some evidence. There is also evidence that they have committed some violations and we would expect that there would be a report up to you on that.

Senator PELL. But as a general thesis would you believe that it would be in our national interest to avoid undercutting SALT II?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, we will not have to face that specific issue for some months, and the President said that we are continuing in our planning and our budgeting to preserve our options with respect to continued adherence to the undercutting policy.

There is no decision required now, but we are taking the actions that will preserve our options to take any one of a number of courses.

Senator PELL. Thank you. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I apologize for arriving late and missing your opening statement.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I will be glad to repeat it. [Laughter.]

Senator KASSEBAUM. I promise I will not ask you about the importance of freezing the defense budget, however.

I would like to follow up on Senator Pell's comment on the SDI. Your statement in your opening comments that the SDI could increase our chances to achieve a stable world through genuine arms reduction.

I am a supporter of research and development for SDI. I think it is important for us to continue to develop the technology, in which we certainly have superiority at this point. I would like to ask you if you feel that the Soviets are genuinely concerned about this, enough so that they would make significant reductions in the offensive weapons.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think they are concerned about it in the sense that they are doing it themselves. They have worked on it a long time, on defensive systems. As I said, they are spending more or at least as much, and we think a bit more, on defense than they are on offense, and they are doing it in a number of ways.

They are looking at what we might call standard or traditional ABM ground-based systems, improving and strengthening the one around Moscow now. They are doing it from the point of view of a major network of radar defensive facilities around a large part of the Soviet Union. And they are increasing their defensive air power and they are also working on the space-based defense and the general physics and other matters associated with that.

So they are concerned about defense in the sense that they are trying their very best, so far as we know, to secure that kind of a system and to secure it early. They have been working on all of these aspects of it, well, ever since they signed the ABM Treaty.

I have no way of estimating what they would offer in return for our giving up the research we are doing on the strategic defense initiative, but the President has said very clearly that we would not give that up, and Secretary Shultz has said very clearly we would not give that up, and we should not.

It is not only not verifiable, but it offers the hope of giving us a far better way of maintaining deterrence than by this balance of terror that I spoke about to Senator Pell. Until we get it, we would have to maintain that kind of deterrent capability.

But I have to tell you, Senator, I am a true believer in strategic defense. I really think it is the thing that offers more hope and more possibility for a better future than anything that we have worked on yet.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Well, I had two thrusts to this question. One, does their concern regarding our defensive missile system make them willing to offer significant reductions in offensive weapons systems? Second, would you have any concerns about the Soviet's apparent worry about the defensive system, particularly in light of the fact that several of our NATO allies have expressed concerns?

It works well for us, but perhaps this is what you were trying to say to Senator Pell.

Secretary **Weinberger**. If I may say so, Senator, it does a great deal for the NATO allies. Actually our preliminary research on it indicates that it would be somewhat easier to develop this kind of a system for intermediate range than for the longer range missiles.

Senator **Kassebaum**. So the SS-20's, you are saying, could be deterred?

Secretary **Weinberger**. It would be designed to try to destroy SS-20's in flight, or the SS-4's and SS-5's if they still continue to use those, as well as other intermediate range follow-ons and new weapons beyond the SS-20. So this is a very common feeling among some Europeans, and it is one of the reasons why a lot of them have expressed some concern and some unhappiness about the concept of a strategic defense.

They continuously and very erroneously think it means we might decouple ourselves from Europe, and it absolutely, emphatically, does not. It means that we would continue to provide the kind of defense we are now providing with deterrence with a defensive system that would protect Europe as well as the United States. And the same would be true for allies in other areas of the world.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Along a little bit different line, you gave a speech last fall in which you outlined six conditions that you felt were important for the involvement of our troops, and I thought that it was a very interesting outline. One part of it, though, I must say, is puzzling a bit. Maybe you could amplify on it. It is only with a guarantee of popular and congressional support.

It would seem to me that you would realize, above all people, that this is not easy to obtain. Maybe a larger philosophical part of the whole question is that with the communications system that we have developed today and other nations have developed, we are an interdependent world that almost communicates instantaneously.

This has significantly changed responses and how we respond to them. Is it possible to shape events with a perspective that allows the time to develop support for an issue, or have we almost reached the point where we have to leap from event to event?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, you tempt me again to reread part of my opening statement, because I tried to clear this point that many have asked. I said to our chairman that some unkind critics of that talk have said that I demanded that we take a public opinion poll before we go to war, and that what I was trying to say in the speech was—and I have the absolute original text here—that there must be some reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people and the elected representatives in the Congress before we commit our combat forces abroad.

I think that can be obtained in a number of ways. It is another way of saying that we cannot and should not fight a war which is strongly opposed by the majority of the American people and you determine that in a large number of ways, one of which we had before us just a few years ago in Vietnam. But you need to have, and I think there are many ways of determining whether or not there is a course that will have some reasonable assurance that you will have, that kind of support.

We have, for example, the situation in which we had to move very rapidly in Grenada because American citizens lives were threatened, and we felt that it was the proper thing to do. We did move very quickly and we took as many steps as we could to ensure that people would know what we were doing and why we had to do it, and why we had to move so quickly.

I think there was in that situation reasonable assurance before that we would have the support of the American people and the Congress, and indeed it turned out that way. But my point in the talk and my point now is that there is no way you can or you should in our kind of government commit troops, which is the last resort action, as I have said also in that talk and here today, without some assurance or some continued support of the American people and their representatives in Congress.

We cannot and should not get ourselves in a situation where what you are doing and a policy a government is following are bitterly and strongly opposed by a large number of people.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Well, I would certainly agree with that. But I do believe that mentioning the communications has caused an entirely different factor to enter into it in the last 10 or 15 years, and being able to, with the perspective that it allows, to determine a molding of opinion. And support comes from a clear understanding, I think, of what the goals are.

Secretary **Weinberger**. That is the principal thing. We have to know what we want to do and why we have to do it.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I think that perhaps the confusion regarding the Nicaragua issue at this point—it came up this morning—may be that the American public does not see that there is a problem. I believe that the American public does understand the problem, but there is confusion about what kind of leverage should be used.

Again, I think it is that the public lacks an understanding of where we are going. I am not sure that we have clearly spelled out exactly that plan in its fullest extent.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, if we have not, we should certainly do so at greater length. We certainly have endeavored to do that, and I responded again to the chairman's question just a few moments ago as to why it does seem essential to us to follow the basic course we are following, which is primarily trying to help our neighbors and friends in the region to defend themselves against what appears to be the gathering of a military potential of enormous size that could be used against them.

You are absolutely right, Senator, if I might say so, about the changes in conditions and the speed in communications. There has also, as you know, been a great change in the military capabilities of a great many armies of the world to move very rapidly and in ways that can be decisive in a very short time.

We had about 1 year, actually 2 or 3 years, if anybody wanted to notice what was happening, to get ready for World War II. We may never again have that much luxury of time, and so we have to be far more ready well in advance of anything happening if we want to prevent it happening.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum. Senator Glenn.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to digress from your statement for just a couple of minutes. You did speak repeatedly in your testimony about the need to build a bipartisan national consensus on U.S. foreign and defense policy, and I could not agree with you more.

I have been a supporter of strong defense, although we have disagreed on some of the systems and some of the elements. But frankly, Mr. Secretary, I do not see how you are really going to build that consensus by impugning the motives and patriotism of those who may disagree with your ideas about defense spending.

I am specifically referring to a remark made 1 week ago tomorrow by your chief spokesman, Michael Burch, quoted on the front page of last Saturday's Washington Post. Mr. Burch was asked for your reaction to Senator Dole's belief that we must hold down defense spending. Mr. Burch replied, and I quote: "Secretary Weinberger feels that those who hope for success in bringing down the defense budget really mean success in weakening the security of the country."

Mr. Secretary, I find that remark offensive, ill-considered, and totally unacceptable. I am sure I need not remind you of the magnitude of Senator Dole's wartime sacrifices for this Nation. He was awarded a Purple Heart for a wounded arm, an arm that does not function properly to this day. Others in this Chamber, in this House, have distinguished records of service to this country and all deserve better than to have their loyalty challenged if they happen to disagree, by you or those speaking in your name.

There is still such a thing as the loyal opposition in the country and, Mr. Secretary, I hope you respect their right to disagree with you. We still do have a Government of shared responsibilities, judgment, and powers.

I thought perhaps this was all some mistake, Mr. Secretary, but the reporters have queried your office in the Pentagon and have been told that you would have no comment on this. So I would like to ask the following question: Do you really believe that those who question your estimates of what Pentagon spending should be in 1986 are actually hoping to weaken the security of this Nation?

If you do, I would like to find out why and if you do not, then I think you ought to do two things. First, I think you should retract the statement that was made in your name last Friday and, second, I think you ought to apologize to those whose motives and patriotism were so callously called into question, specifically Senator Dole.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. Senator, there was no suggestion of anybody calling anybody's patriotism into question or anything of the kind. I did not see the precise statement and none of the reporters you referred to bothered to call me, and I urge them all to do that whenever they want a statement of what I think.

Senator **GLENN**. A number have said they tried, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. May I just finish my response? I frequently pick up the paper and read what I am thinking some morning, although it happens to be quite divergent from what I am actually thinking. There is not the slightest suggestion that anybody who opposes the defense budget has any evil motives or anything of the kind.

What is the suggestion is the budget that is required for the security of the Nation in our opinion. In keeping with my responsibilities, I have to advise you and the President and the people what I think is the proper level. You are perfectly free to disagree with that, and nobody who disagrees with that has their patriotism impugned or anything of the kind.

The security of the Nation is something in which we are all equally interested, although I have certain responsibilities in connection with trying to preserve that to the utmost of my ability. And I think the statement simply was to the general effect that if we had a drastic cut of the kind that has been talked about, going all the way back to less than last year, it would make it very difficult for us to carry out the responsibilities that we see and feel are necessary to try to maintain the security of the Nation against the kind of threat we face.

Others are perfectly free to disagree with that, and I have never said anything other than that, and I would never say anything other than that. I do feel that people who want to make drastic cuts of that kind are wrong as to policy, but I do not challenge their motives, and I never have, and certainly no one ever challenged your motives or your patriotism.

Senator **GLENN**. Do you retract the statement, then, that was made in your name?

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. I did not make the statement, Senator, and I have seen so many misquotations that I am not going to go around retracting something that may never have been said. I have told you exactly how I feel about the situation, and that is how I feel about it—and I am not going to get into whether a particular quotation was rightly written up or not.

Senator **GLENN**. The statement was made by your chief spokesman, Mr. Secretary, and I think that is hardly the answer I had hoped for. The statement was that Secretary Weinberger feels that those who hope for success in bringing down the defense budget really mean success in weakening the security of the country, and that was made by your chief spokesman. I would think you would retract that statement.

Secretary **Weinberger**. That is not a statement I made. It is not a statement that I heard, and I do not have any basis for retracting a statement that may never have been correctly written up. I think if you are interested in my feelings about it, Senator, as you are entitled to be, you should take my statement as my feeling on the subject. I always have thought that the best guide to what I think is what I say myself.

Senator **Glenn**. Well, the Washington Post tomorrow morning should represent your true views and not Mr. Burch speaking on your behalf.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I would hope that the Washington Post would reflect my views. I would be delighted if they did. [Laughter.]

Senator **Glenn**. I do not know whether Mr. Burch is here or not, but it seems to me Mr. Burch, if he was not speaking on your behalf, owes Senator Dole an apology, because that is what his response was to Senator Dole's views that there could be some defense cuts of unspecified amounts.

Mr. Secretary, on the upcoming arms control talks, I presume you will have someone from your staff or from the Pentagon, closely monitoring those talks. Or will you be acting as participants.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We will work on a joint administration basis in Geneva with people from the Defense Department, from ACDA, from the National Security Council, from the State Department. Of course they will all be together as a unified group trying to do their best to assist the negotiators who will be there.

Senator **Glenn**. I would like to know if you feel that the conventional weapons should also be included in these talks.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I think conventional weapons should be reduced. There are a number of other fora that are proceeding to consider that. They have been considering it in some situations for over 12 years. I think these talks are limited to the agreement that was reached in Geneva, but I would be delighted if we could get an agreement somewhere that would reduce conventional arms, by all means.

Senator **Glenn**. This committee was involved some years ago in the SALT II talks, of course—not the talks, but the treaty. I played a very active role in that debate at that time. I became firmly convinced at that time that attempts at arms agreement just involving nuclear weapons were virtually impossible or useless because we use our nuclear weapons to balance off against Soviet conventional power. They do the same thing against us.

I think it highly unlikely that we will be able to develop any consensus on nuclear weapons without considering the conventional armaments. I told Secretary Shultz the other day in one of our meetings, that I see this as a fatal flaw. Unless we can consider conventional armaments at the same time—and I know that raises huge complexities, we are very unlikely to get a meaningful nuclear arms agreement.

I would solicit your view.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, again what was agreed to at Geneva was the agenda for these particular talks that begin in March. I do not disagree at all with the necessity of considering both together, and I certainly do not disagree with the idea of trying our best to get major reductions in conventional forces.

The mutual balanced force reduction negotiation, as I say, has been going on I think for at least 12 years. I would very much hope that it would succeed ultimately in securing a treaty that provided for that kind of reduction down to equal terms at much lower levels, just as I hope the nuclear arms talks will result in that kind of agreement.

If your point is that it would be better to consolidate there, I certainly would not argue with that. But we are limited, as I understand it, at the talks starting in March to the areas agreed on at Geneva.

Senator GLENN. My problem is I think we are unlikely to get any real agreement in nuclear arms unless we do the conventional arms right along with the nuclear arms. I cannot imagine that we are going to agree to take our nuclear weapons down to zero in Europe, let us say a theoretical zero, as long as the Soviets have such a huge preponderance of conventional power beyond the Fulda Gap.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We are trying to counter that enormous imbalance in their favor in conventional by different types of tactics, different types of weapons of a nonnuclear nature, obviously, and follow-on forces attack and air-land battle, that we are trying to develop in the NATO strategies.

But I would not disagree that we do need to consider sharp reductions and I hope conclude agreements on sharp reductions in conventional either at the same time or in a separate negotiation, or indeed all as part of the larger negotiation.

The result I would like to achieve would be to get deterrence at both conventional and strategic levels, be able to maintain it at far lower levels than we can now, and I think this requires sharp reduction, which we have never been able to get yet, and it requires verifiability and it requires rough equality.

Senator GLENN. Verifiability has to be an item going in on all these arms control discussions.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Indeed yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. It cannot come after the fact, after the agreement is drawn.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I agree with you exactly, and that Senator, is one of the real problems. There has been a tendency to spend a lot of time working on an agreement and then in a final paragraph before you get to the protocol clauses we say now we have to say something about verifiability. I agree with you it ought to be way up at the top of any agenda.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Secretary, another area, on the SDI. I took the initiative on my own last summer to visit some of the best scientists in our country, in fact the best scientists in the world, who are working on lasers and particle beams, neutral particle beam projectors, and microwave projections to see what the exact state of our technology is in that area.

Without exception, those people said that it would be at least 10 years, in their best estimate, even if we were lucky, before we would have the technological problems solved.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Ten years?

Senator GLENN. Ten years. Some parts of it might be here a little sooner, but the earliest for any part of it was 8 years.

So I wondered whether we are not overselling this whole thing to the people of this country, because one of the polls indicated that 51 percent of the people in the country think that we already have some of this system already up there, which we do not.

Secretary WEINBERGER. No.

Senator GLENN. In one of the briefings by a gentleman from the Department of Defense, when I brought up some of the questions of how much it would cost to deploy the system, we were told we are going to be able to reduce our stockpiles of nuclear weapons and thereby help pay SDI.

Well, eventually that can happen. But when General Abrahamson was here one day he was talking about how we are going to zap them in the boost phase, in the post-boost phrase, and in the terminal phase and so on. He had all this drawn up. I told him at that time that it was a little bit like Julius Caesar stockpiling 12-gauge shotguns. The only problem was he had not invented gunpowder yet.

And that is sort of where we stand with this thing. I have supported the research. I will continue to support the research, but I think all this rhetoric from the administration leads people to believe that SDI is here and now, and almost ready to go. It is still in the future somewhere, and it still is a great big "if" as to whether this can even be invented. There are serious difficulties.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I do not disagree with you on the basic premise that we do not have it now. I would disagree a little bit on any idea that anybody has said that we do. I have tried to be very explicit that what we are doing is a research program, that we do not now have the capabilities that we would like to have.

We have, as you know, destroyed one missile with a single shot on an experiment, and we have thereby proved that we could at least do one, but we have to do a great deal more than that, and we do not now have that capability. That is why this program is so essential.

I do not disagree with the report of the general estimate about 10 years. That emphasizes to my mind the importance of regaining our deterrent capability through the offensive systems now. But I do hold out the hope that we could do this because we have done so many things that a great many people have told us were totally impossible to do.

I think we can do it. I agree with you absolutely we do not have it now, and that what we need to do is exactly what we are doing—that is, a research program to see if it is feasible and if it can be done. But I am certainly not aware of anybody who is going around saying that we have it.

I have said only that we have to do what we are doing now in order to see if we can get it, but that it is more than worth the effort.

Senator GLENN. My time is well up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Secretary, I missed your opening statement, too, but I have skimmed it since I came in. The questions that I had were partially addressed by Senator Glenn in his last question.

I recently read the article that appeared in the New York Times on Sunday by Dr. Jastrow, Mr. Brzezinski, and Mr. Kampelman. They certainly gave a very optimistic viewpoint of the capabilities of the SDI.

Secretary WEINBERGER. They are strongly in favor of it, as I understand it from reading that article, and I know that Dr. Jastrow is one of the major scientists that we have consulted as to setting up some of the studies, helping us with the research program, and I know that I think it is fair to describe him also as one of the true believers.

So there are a number of people with very distinguished records in many fields who certainly want us to try to see if we cannot develop this thing, which offers much more hope than anything we have at present.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I agree with that assessment, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Jastrow also wrote a very interesting article that appeared in Commentary magazine, I think in December. As a result of his article I spoke to him at quite some length, and there he evaluated the Union of Concerned Scientists and their assessment of how much it would take, how much it would cost, how large——

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is a mystery to me as to how anybody could say what it would cost since we do not know what we are going to have to do.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, as you saw in the Sunday article, the cost would be rather low with respect to taking it to stage 1 and stage 2, and that there would be a measure of effectiveness even in those stages. But certainly, if for no other reason than the anxiety of the Russians to want to negotiate about it—to negotiate about that and nothing else—it would seem to me to be something worth pursuing.

Also, at least they think it must have a certain amount of effectiveness. I would assume they would want to negotiate about it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The President has described this whole approach very well by reporting a cartoon which he saw in which the television set is blaring something about how expensive the strategic defense initiative is and how it clearly will not work, and the husband and wife are listening to this, and the wife is, in the last panel of the cartoon, leaving the room and talking back over her shoulder just as the television says it is too expensive and it will never work, and she says, "Then why are the Soviets so much against it?"

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That is right. I understand that verification even of the testing, because the testing is rather quick and occurs rather rapidly, is very hard to verify; is that correct?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, the verification of any research program or agreement to determine whether a research program is guided a particular way is virtually impossible.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. But I understand that even the testing, while testing of most nuclear weapons is a commonly verifiable item, it becomes more difficult, as I understand it.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, I think that may be the case because you have, at least in some of the forms discussed, the projection of directed energy beams that move quite rapidly.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Senator Jackson, when he was with us, and subsequently Senators Warner and Nunn, have suggested some confidence-building measures with the Russians. Over the Christmas vacation I read a report by the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, "Living With Nuclear Weapons."

They talked about the importance, and I agree about the importance, of the so-called confidence-building measures, particularly the establishment in Moscow and in the United States of centers where there would be both American and Russian military and civilians.

In the SALT I negotiations, where the civilians on their side did not appear to know everything about the weapons that were being negotiated about, I believe that there would be confidence-building centers, one in each capital, so that in the event an airliner strays off course or in the event that due to nuclear proliferation or other things that an event occurs around the world, there would be immediate and perhaps more established communications between the superpowers so that accidents between us will not happen.

Is that part of the negotiations at this time?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I do not know it is part of those negotiations. It is a very important thing to negotiate, however, Senator. I agree completely with you and with Senator Jackson and Senator Nunn and others, Senator Warner, who have proposed this. We did manage to get an agreement on the first of those measures, which was the improvement of the hot line, and improving the data and the speed of exchange of data.

But there are a number of others, and I have also supported those very strongly. At the same time we opened negotiations on the improvement of the hot line, we mentioned two or three of those other things and thus far have not received much evidence of Soviet interest in pursuing them. But I believe that confidence-building measures of that kind could be very helpful but again they would involve, at least in the one instance you cited, of an American presence in the Soviet Union, which with respect to such things as onsite verification, has always been rather strongly resisted in the past.

This is not a reason not to try again, I agree.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Well, this, of course, would be a little different than onsite verification.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes. This is the continued presence of people so that any information or anything that could lead to a misunderstanding could be examined before a fatal action was taken, and things of that kind, plus greater notification, more detailed notification of maneuvers. All things of that kind are very useful and I believe they should be pursued.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Boschwitz.

Senator Zorinsky.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, from the comments that I heard you actually make, would I be correct in my assumption that you lean against any deep cuts in the defense budget? [Laughter.]

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have tended to take that position, sir, because we have made such deep cuts already before the budget has come up, and indeed it has not even come up yet. But we have made very substantial cuts. I would be glad to identify those briefly for you.

We started out in January a year ago with projections for 1986 and the projected figure published in the budget last year for defense for 1986 has been reduced by us by about $25 billion in output. Since that same time, domestic spending went up about $49 billion, and the efforts that we have been reading about that have been taking place have brought the domestic spending down to a point where it's about $6 billion above the January estimates, if several pieces of legislation and other assumptions actually occur.

Defense spending is now still down $25 billion below last January's estimate. It is $2.5 billion below the amount set by Congress in the joint budget resolution 4 months ago. Under those circumstances, I think that it is wrong and quite a big myth to continue to read, as I do every day, that the Defense Department feels that it is exempt from participating in a budget reduction attempt or that the Department has not made any reductions in its estimate.

We have, and we think that reductions below that would be very unwise.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you.

When you answered the question pertaining to the Manzanillo talks posed to you by our chairman, was it your understanding that the Nicaraguans, or our side had broken off the negotiations?

Secretary WEINBERGER. My understanding is that the whole approach and attitude and responses of the Nicaraguan delegation at the final meeting, I think in a town in Mexico, indicated that there was no further point in resuming. And my understanding is that under those circumstances they were the ones who ended the negotiations.

Senator ZORINSKY. The Nicaraguans?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; I think as far as I know, if there is any suggestion that there would be any effective use of resuming or anything of that kind, we would be delighted. But we do not see anything of that kind at all.

Senator ZORINSKY. The reason I attempt to set the record straight or ascertain the validity of your statement is that in the New York Times the 19th of this month, an article by Philip Taubman states:

> Senior Reagan Administration officials, asserting that Nicaragua is not showing interest in a serious exchange, said today that the United States had suspended negotiations with the Managua government.

Further on, the article reads "The decision to suspend the talks was made at the White House, administration officials said." These officials said it was advocated by the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency and was accepted with some reluctance by the State Department.

Now, that would indicate that definitely we were the ones that took the initiative.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, it also indicates, if I may say so, Senator, the danger of relying on stories that are attributed to people who do not want to be named.

I think the fact is that there was, first of all, a general consensus and I know of no dispute about it or any reluctance or anything of the kind, nor do I know of any formal decision. It was just very apparent that there was no progress being made and it had not been made for many months. And there was a quite consistent refusal on the part of the Nicaraguans to address even the issues that we had presented in many previous sessions.

I do not think anybody had picked up their hat and walked out or there had been any decision remotely resembling the kind of action that the Soviets took at both the START and the INF talks. But what was concluded was that there was virtually no point in continuing negotiations when the points that we made were not even being addressed.

But I would say that a very large portion of the other material that you read does not actually reflect what happened.

Senator ZORINSKY. I would just like to give you a direct quote, inasmuch as I am not going to be an unnamed source. I met directly with the Ambassador from Nicaragua in my office yesterday for an hour and 20 minutes.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States?

Senator ZORINSKY. Yes, sir. And he indicated that they have pleaded to continue the negotiations, that they did not want to break off the negotiations, that they are very concerned, as they should be because I gave some Nicaraguan officials an underground tour of SAC Headquarters several years ago, and they want to find some way of being able to continue these negotiations.

And they assured me that they want to discuss exactly what you were saying are our concerns, and that is: verification of the cessation of arms flow by a combination of countries through onsite inspection teams; sending the Russians home, the Cubans home, the East Germans home, everybody that we want them to send home, including their desire to have some of our people go home, and letting an inspection team on a multinational basis, including the United States and all the Central American countries you named, verify the fact that they were in compliance with whatever agreement has been made.

Now, it disturbs me and concerns me, that I have one side telling me one thing and the other side saying the opposite. And if there is no effort to bring these negotiations back together, a lot of people are going to be killed unnecessarily, while we resolve who said what and who means what.

Ultimately we are going to end up at the bottom line whether we want to be there or not. I believe it would be much more meaningful if you would, Mr. Secretary, come to my office and meet with the Nicaraguan Ambassador, so we can get this matter resolved.

You know, not too long ago I had a dispute with the State Department. There was a Nicaraguan communique in Spanish and the Department misinterpreted a word which could be interpreted three different ways, without calling the Nicaraguans and saying, which way did you mean. I think that is a horrendous mistake to make, and as a consequence we did not follow up on a serious offer which was made.

I would hope, with your support and your ability to communicate, as I have seen you do very articulately that we could resolve this matter.

You know that I strongly support probably 95 percent of the things that you stand for, and certainly suppport the strongest defense this country possibly can have. Yet, at the same time I would hate to have miscommunication or some lack of understanding be the reason that we are ultimately driven into a military confrontation.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, all I can say is that this is a totally different version. I do not challenge your account of it for one moment, but it is a totally different version than I have ever heard of the posture taken by the Nicaraguan Government.

But I am sure the State Department will be delighted to talk with the Ambassador, and if he is still willing to convey sentiments of that kind, I am sure they would be most interested in working out the next best most proper step to take.

Certainly, as I say, it is 180 degrees away from the reports that I received of the conduct of the Nicaraguans at the negotiations. But I am also positive that the State Department may be able to get a hold of a transcript of today's hearing and that they will without any question be very interested in talking to you to try to see if there is some way in which this totally new position of the Nicaraguans could be translated into effective action.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you. I would not have brought this up except for the fact that your answer to the first question posed by the chairman was, as you point out, 180 degrees from what I had heard yesterday.

Secretary WEINBERGER. If I may ask, Senator, how many of them got to see the underground rooms at Offutt?

Senator ZORINSKY. They saw what the SAC commander wanted them to see, and this was several years ago. We have changed it.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Zorinsky.

Just for the record, since the Senator mentioned my earlier question, I would point out I have received a letter this month also from the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States expressing essentially the same things he told Senator Zorinsky. So I suspect the State Department will probably get a transcript of the record.

But maybe there are more direct means. I think it would be useful for both Senator Zorinsky's and my edification to try to find out what we are missing in this respect and whether the Ambassador has a new message that may have been missed by our negotiators.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, the Ambassador has certainly been busy and we certainly must get to him. That is not the telephone number of the State Department.

Senator ZORINSKY. Would the Senator from South Dakota just yield for a followup?

Senator PRESSLER. I do not want to yield on my time.

The CHAIRMAN. We will withhold starting your time, Senator Pressler.

Senator CRANSTON. I will yield a little bit of time that I have coming to me.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will recognize Senator Zorinsky for about 30 seconds, not on Senator Pressler's time.

Senator ZORINSKY. When you said he must not be very busy if he has not got the State Department's number——

Secretary WEINBERGER. I said he has been very busy, talking to you and talking to the chairman. Now we want to get him the telephone number of the State Department so he can talk to them.

Senator ZORINSKY. I just misunderstood your answer. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Secretary, I have some questions. First of all, let me say that I very much admire your tenacity and articulateness. In fact, today at lunch, a group of Senators were talking about how you tirelessly advocate what you believe in, and I admire that very much. There are some areas that we disagree on, although I agree with most of what you are advocating.

One area where I have some questions, very frankly, regards the SDI, and I want to just cover a couple of points on that. The Sunday article in the New York Times estimated a $60 billion cost. Former Secretary Schlesinger has estimated $1 trillion. But as you said, we do not really know what it is, so I will not get into that, although I have written to the New York Times asking where they arrived at $60 billion.

But even in that article, they said at best the shield would probably allow at least 10 percent to get through. Previously, I have seen arguments that maybe it could stop 60 percent. And the Soviets, even on their SS–18, if they loaded 30 or 40 warheads or even if they only had 10, if that many got through, it would probably mean virtually total destruction.

But let us concede, for argument's sake that we could do research and we could stop about 100 percent of the ICBM's. A nuclear attack probably would come from a cruise missile off a ship offshore. An atomic bomb could come in a diplomat pouch. It could come by bomber.

Even if we built this system, however expensive or inexpensive, what do we do about the real possibility, the greater possibility, that a nuclear attack will not come by ICBM? If such an attack would come, could we identify immediately where it came from—could we retaliate, and so forth?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, there are defenses being developed by the Soviet Union and by ourselves against cruise missiles. The cruise missile takes a different kind of defense and the strategic defense initiative is not, of course, designed to destroy low, comparatively slow-flying cruise missiles.

But it is possible to work out an effective defense to them and, as I mentioned I think before you came in, the Soviets have already demonstrated one method by shooting down their cruise missile that somehow got away from them and was starting to work its way across Norway and Finland. So there are methods of defending against those.

The strategic defense initiative is designed to destroy incoming Soviet intercontinental or intermediate-range nuclear missiles, to destroy them out of the atmosphere by nonnuclear means before they get near any target. Because the strategic defense initiative is not designed to work against every single possible threat does not mean that it is not something that should not be pursued. I think it should be pursued, and I think we can get, if we can do what we believe can be done, better than the 90 percent that you mentioned.

But in any event, whatever it does, it tends to devalue the offensive nuclear weapons because it adds to the uncertainty, which is of course a critically important part of deterrence. And it also is a vital thing because we have been in all of our calculations and most of the public calculations, most people have been talking about Soviet nuclear missiles or ours, and it is even conceivable that we might get some agreements with the Soviet Union that would provide for major reductions.

But there are other countries in the world and there are other countries in the world that have the means ultimately to construct something of this kind. And should one of those then be launched without any reference to an agreement that we might have with the Soviet Union, it would be a very comforting thing to have a reliable defense and thereby in effect deter the value, or devalue the use and effectiveness of any of these nuclear missiles.

But the fact that the strategic defense initiative is not designed to work against a cruise missile does not mean we should not pursue it, because there are other means of dealing with cruise missiles.

Senator **Pressler**. Following that a bit, in terms of cost or related to it, we had the Nunn amendment here last year, and I noted that the NATO allies recently agreed to increase spending for conventional force modernization by almost $8 billion.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes.

Senator **Pressler**. So now there is a recent report that suggests this commitment may have less substance than was originally believed; rather than increase NATO contributions, the allies intend to meet this commitment by taking funds away from other NATO accounts rather than increasing real spending for the common defense. Have you heard those reports?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No; I have not. There are an awful lot of reports around. We have a very basic rule at the Pentagon. It is never believe a first report. And I would like to know a great deal more about it.

The $8 billion that was added, which was an enormous increase, an increase of 55 percent over previous levels, annual levels of funding for that purpose, was a major achievement. Each of these nations is sovereign and each of them will have the same arguments that we hear here in the United States, that too much is being proposed for defense spending. Without regard really to what the amount is, it is always too much.

So that there will undoubtedly be voices in those countries that will argue for lower defense spending, just as there are here. I have to say I think they would be as wrong there as they are here. But we have to try to do what we can to increase the burden that is borne by the NATO allies, and I think we are doing that. We have done it really quite well.

Last year was the first year in which on an average basis all the NATO countries exceeded 3 percent of real growth, and our proposal for real growth is about 5.8 percent in the budget that will be before you. These are all things we have to do because, as I said, we cannot carry the burdens that we have of maintaining our security and our safety without help from our allies and without interdependence on them. We cannot exist in the world alone.

Senator PRESSLER. Do we have any specific plans for changing the number of troops in our German bases?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; I have none. Continued deployment of the ground-launched cruise missile program in the normal course will require additional troops as more of these units are activated and more of the missiles are delivered. But that is the only immediate proposal.

What we are most worried about are proposals to go the other way, to take some of our forces out of NATO in Europe, which we think would be very wrong.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. I welcome you to the committee. I am sorry I was not here for all of your testimony, but I read most of it and will read all of it. So I just have a few questions.

I feel like tearing out my few remaining hairs when I hear allegations that we are trying to cut the defense budget, because as I understand it what we are talking about when we debate the budget are cuts in proposed increases in defense spending. Is it not true that this year we have spent more than last year, and last year we spent more than the year before?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is indeed, Senator. The Congress has generally been very generous in recognizing the needs of the country, and those are totally correct facts. What worries us are the variety of proposals that are floating around this year that range all the way from ours, which we feel is the best, to others which talk about freezes or modified freezes or subfreezes.

And we are trying to present the basic facts that I mentioned to Senator Zorinsky, that we have made major reductions and we believe now we have a budget in the proper form. But there are all varieties of proposals, and we certainly do appreciate and feel the Congress has properly recognized the needs that we have had in the past.

Senator CRANSTON. Again, the discussions about reductions have been reductions in the rate of growth, not reduction in the overall budget?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Some have, but some of the more wildly irresponsible, if I may say so, have talked about reducing the total amount below this year, which we think would be ruinous.

Senator CRANSTON. I have not heard any such suggestion in the Senate. I have heard of a freeze at the present level.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, you travel in better circles than I do.

Senator CRANSTON. One other question. There were a lot of reports of controversy within the Reagan administration during most of the first term on what basis we should negotiate with the Soviet Union on arms control, what we should precisely offer.

Regardless of what happened in the past, is there now an agreed basic negotiating position supported throughout the Government, not in the broad general terms that we are going to seek reductions, not just limits on growth in nuclear arsenals, but in terms of the negotiating position that we feel would lead or could lead, hopefully, to fruitful negotiations with the Soviet Union?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; I think there is. There was full agreement on the instructions that resulted in the negotiations at Geneva in January, and that produced an agreement to have negotiations on the terms that are widely known now, starting in March.

We have basically developed policies for the START and the INF portions of that, and we are working on additional instructions to the negotiators for the third part. But there is a process, a procedure in place which has resulted in agreement and which I know will result in agreement and a decision by the President as to what the instructions will be. And that decision will of course be respected by the entire administration.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cranston.

Do other members wish to raise additional questions of the Secretary? Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I have no additional questions, but I would ask that the record be left open for any of our colleagues who might have questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be done.

Senator Kassebaum, do you have additional questions?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. I might just make one comment. I might say that even though I have questioned the SDI, at least it seems to have the Soviets worried. Why would the Soviets be so concerned about this, in your judgment?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think it is a good question. It is something that leads me to confirm the feeling that I have that it is a vital thing for us to have. I think that they have expressed great worry about it, as they did about the Pershing II, and I think it is an essential thing for us to have and something, as I say, that offers more hope than anything else that we have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

For the record, we will note that 10 Senators attended the hearing, 9 raised questions of the Secretary, and that he is still smiling at the end of this procedure.

We are grateful to you for your opening statement—it was most helpful—and for being so forthcoming in your responses.

The hearing is adjourned.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you very much, sir.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PELL

In 1982 the Administration decided that it wanted to seek expanded verification provisions before seeking Senate consent to ratification of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The Administration has broached the subject with the Soviets and been rebuffed.

Essentially, the Administration is asking changes before ratification, and the Soviets are saying discussions following ratification.

Question 1. We have been adhering to these treaties since mid-1976. Has that adherence caused any significant harm to our national security?

If so, please give us full details. If not, can you conclude that ratification, even without verification changes, would harm our national security?

Answer. The United States has fully complied with the 150-kt yield limit for underground nuclear tests set by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty since mid-1976. We judge, however, that while ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continue, evidence available through 1984 confirms the finding in the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements issued in January 1984 that Soviet testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligation under the TTBT.

Any such tests above 150 kt could permit the Soviets military advantages in the testing of nuclear devices. Further details in that regard are contained in the classified January 1984 report to the Congress.

Even if we were to ratify the TTB and PNE Treaties and implement their current verification provisions, there is no assurance that our verification concerns would be resolved. That is why we have approached the Soviets on several occasions seeking to engage them in discussions about verification improvements to the twin accords. The President's proposal last fall for visits by United States and Soviet experts to each other's test sites for direct measurement of test yields is another example of our commitment to make progress in the area of nuclear testing limitations.

Question 2. What would be wrong with proceeding toward ratification with a full understanding with the Congress and notice to the Soviets that you intend to seek broader verification and that failure to gain agreement would jeopardize the treaties?

Answer. Proceeding toward ratification of the TTBT with the understanding mentioned might well jeopardize Soviet ratification. Ratification, regardless of any announced unilateral understandings, and even with implementation of the current verification provisions of the TTBT and PNET, would bring no assurance of improvements in our ability to monitor the threshold limit, improvements with the United States believes are necessary for effective verification.

Question 3. What is the Administration doing now to move things beyond the current impasse?

Answer. The President proposed at the U.N. General Assembly last September 24 that the United States and U.S.S.R. find a way to exchange visits of experts to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests at each other's test sites. The hope was that the U.S.S.R. would cooperate in such an undertaking and reciprocate in a manner that would enable the two countries to establish the basis for verification for effective limits on underground nuclear testing. Although the initial public Soviet response was not encouraging, we await an official response.

Question 4. Will the United States continue to rely on the Standing Consultative Commission as the mechanism for handling compliance issues with the Soviets?

Answer. The United States has relied primarily, but not exclusively, on the Standing Consultative Commission as a mechanism for discussing compliance issues with the U.S.S.R. This pattern will probably continue, with adjustments as deemed appropriate.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MURKOWSKI

Question 1. The Reagan Administration has just sent to the Congress another report addressing the issue of Soviet treaty violations. What relationship do you see between Soviet treaty violations and the upcoming arms control negotiations that are to begin in March?

Answer. The Administration is taking the Soviet compliance record into account as we develop the U.S. positions for the upcoming talks. We are seeking to ensure that new accords contain effective verification provisions which raise the cost and risks of cheating. The Administration believes that effective verification and full compliance are critical components of an arms control agreement. At Geneva we will be seeking, among other things, to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty.

Question 2. Can we afford to enter into further agreements with the Soviets while the issue of treaty violations remains unresolved?

Answer. The Administration is trying to negotiate new agreements with the Soviets for several reasons: First, new arms control agreements, if soundly formulated and fully adhered to, can serve U.S. interests. We should not abandon efforts to achieve agreements that can increase United States and Allied security and reduce the risk of war, provided that such agreements are effective and verifiable. Second, entering new negotiations does not in any way condone or ignore past Soviet behavior. Third, continuing to negotiate can give us leverage and is another way for trying to get the Soviets to abide by existing agreements.

Question 3. The Reagan Administration's "no undercut" SALT II interim restraint policy is predicated upon equal restraint by the Soviet Union. Yet, Soviet testing of two new ICBMs and high levels of telemetry encryption are in contravention of the SALT II accord. Has the United States been successful during SCC meeting in resolving these matters of Soviet noncompliance? If not, what bearing does that have on U.S. policy not to undercut SALT II, either this year or beyond the agreement's expiration date of December 1985?

Answer. With regard to the issues in the January 1984 Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, which included the two issues mentioned in the question, the Soviet Union has thus far not provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our concerns. The United States will continue to raise its compliance concerns with the U.S.S.R. in diplomatic channels and insist on clarifications and corrective actions. Clearly, any decisions about our no-undercut policy would take fully into account the actions of the U.S.S.R. in this regard.

Question 4. Would you agree that there is a serious need for the United States to formulate an arms control compliance policy in order to help deter future Soviet violations, as well as respond to instances of noncompliance? If you agree, how does the Reagan Administration intend to proceed in formulating a compliance policy?

Answer. The United States vigorously pressed, and will continue to press these compliance issues with the U.S.S.R. through diplomatic channels. Our approach in pursuing these issues with the U.S.S.R. is to ensure that both the letter and intent of treaty obligations and commitments will be fulfilled. To this end, the Administration is:

Analyzing further issues of possible noncompliance;

As noted above, seeking from the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels explanations, clarifications and, where necessary, corrective actions;

Reporting on such issues to the Congress; and,

Taking into account in our defense modernization plans the security implication of arms control violations.

In the future, the patient and careful negotiation of unambiguous agreements with provisions that permit effective verification, combined with insistence on strict compliance with agreements and the willingness to take actions to protect our security if necessary, can help deter violations.

Question 5. What strategic objectives are the United States pursuing in developing relations with the PRC? How far should the United States go in providing military equipment or technology in support of these objectives?

Answer. We consider China to be a friendly non-allied nation. Our aim is to build an enduring relationship with China on this basis, one which takes fully into account our common interests as well as our differences. In our view, a strong, secure and successfully modernizing China can be a force for peace and stability.

We believe that it is in our interest and that of world peace to cooperate in the modernization of China's self-defense capability by authorizing sales of selected military equipment and technology. In this context we have conducted a dialogue over the past 18 months between our respective military leaderships, most recently during the visit by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Vessey to China, and we have agreed to explore areas where we might enhance China's legitimate self-defense capability. As we carry on discussions with China, we are keenly aware of the concerns of other friends and allies in the Asia and Pacific region, and we have made clear to all concerned that any defensive military cooperation we ultimately undertake with China will not threaten these friends and allies but rather enhance their security and regional stability. In other words, our discussions on military cooperation focus on upgrading China's defensive capability and do not entail transfer of equipment or technologies that could pose an offensive threat to China's neighbors. In sum, neither China nor the United States anticipates dramatic moves in our military cooperative relationship, which must evolve gradually in the broader context of a stable and enduring relationship based on a wide range of shared international and bilateral interests.

I would make two other points about our policies. First, China's emphasis on economic modernization—an emphasis which is bearing fruit—gives Beijing a strong stake in a stable and secure international environment and dictates that it pursue policies of domestic and external moderation. Indeed, over the past several years, China has embarked on an effort to improve state-to-state relations with all its Asian neighbors—excluding Vietnam, of course. This is very much in our larger strategic interest, and the success of these policies to date bodes well for policy continuity in China after the current leadership passes from the scene.

Second, while there is a need on our part to exercise due prudence against the possibility of a different Chinese orientation over the long term, we must also recognize that China's future mix of policies will in some degree be influenced by our own. Thus, on the principles of mutual benefit and safeguarding our own national security, we have liberalized our export restrictions and begun a dialogue concerning modernization of China's defense capability. We hope, and anticipate, that this approach will not only reassure China regarding our own long-term friendly intentions but will also give China incentives to continue along the pragmatic, moderate, and outward-looking modernization course it has charted.

Question 6. What are the near-term prospects for real improvement in United States-Japanese trade relations as a consequence of Prime Minister Nakasone's meeting with President Reagan? What steps has Japan taken to formulate and/or implement market-opening measures?

Answer. During his January 2 meeting in Los Angeles with Prime Minister Nakasone, the President underscored the great importance of United States-Japan relations and the danger to that relationship of mounting protectionist pressures stemming from the lack of full access to Japan's markets. The two leaders agreed on the need to deal effectively with the trade issue and to resist protectionist pressures. They charged Foreign Minister Abe and me to oversee an intensified cooperative effort to make significant progress in improving our trade relations in the months ahead, including special urgent efforts in key sectors, specifically electronics, telecommunications, forest products and medical suppliers and pharmaceuticals. These sectors were chosen because of their size, Japan's potential market, and our competitive advantage on the basis of price, quality, reliability and technological excellence.

Under Secretary Wallis led a delegation of senior Administration officials to Tokyo January 28–29 to launch this effort. These sectoral talks will focus on working cooperatively with Japan in removing its trade barriers to the benefit of all countries. All barriers to trade will be on the table, embracing the full range of laws, regulations, institutions, and practices that could impede market access. Our goal will be not just market access but results; we will measure success by the growth of imports into Japan, especially manufactures, and by the satisfaction of U.S. businessmen that market opportunities in Japan are equivalent to those in the United States. Foreign Minister Abe and I will closely monitor this process, and the President intends to review its progress when he sees Prime Minister Nakasone in Bonn in May.

Question 7. Can you assure the committee that any arms control agreement involving the SS–20 missiles will not result in a shift of the SS–20 threat from west to east?

Answer. United States policy on this issue was clearly enunciated by President Reagan in February 1983 when he stated that in any INF agreement there must be global limits on LRINF missiles and no exportation of the security threat from Europe to Asia. United States policy in this regard has not changed since the President's statement.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ZORINSKY

Question. Who is responsible for the breakdown of the Manzanillo talks?

Answer. We would not describe the talks as having broken down. Rather, we have not scheduled any further meetings at the present time pending an evaluation of the talks to date and further evolution of the Contadora process.

From its inception 2 years ago we have strongly supported the Contadora process as the best available means to achieve the comprehensive regional settlement we believe is necessary to bring peace to Central America. Last year the Mexicans suggested to us on behalf of the Contadora group that the United States could assist the Contadora process by entering into talks with the Sandinistas. When Secretary Shultz proposed such talks to Daniel Ortega last June, he made clear both privately and publicly that our objective was to support the Contadora process, to reach understandings that could be directly channeled into that process.

Ambassador Shlaudeman and Vice Minister Tinoco have now held nine meetings, eight in Manzanillo and one in Atlanta. These talks have been useful in allowing each side to present fully its position, but they have made no substantive progress.

Meanwhile, the Contadora process has moved ahead. There have now been three drafts of a comprehensive regional treaty, two prepared by the Contadora countries and one by Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador. The remaining issues, though important, are relatively few in number. As Mexican Under Secretary Valero recently stated, the process is now entering a new and critical phase of negotiation.

A meeting of plenipotentiaries of the nine Contadora participants is scheduled for February 14-15. The foreign ministers of the Contadora countries are currently lending their good offices in an effort to resolve a dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over a political asylum case which has threatened to prevent the meeting. We very much hope their effort will succeed.

After a thorough review of the Manzanillo talks, and in light of the importance of the next Contadora meeting, we decided it would be best to put off the Manzanillo session tentatively scheduled for late January until we could evaluate the results of the coming Contadora round.

We were concerned that the Manzanillo exercise was being increasingly perceived in the region as somehow replacing Contadora. That perception was fed by Sandinista statements, public and private, suggesting that the negotiating focus in Central America had shifted to Manzanillo where sufficient progress had been achieved to hold out the hope of a breakthrough. Such a suggestion was, of course, seriously misleading.

The United States has not closed the door on Manzanillo. We are prepared to resume these bilateral talks if developments in Contadora indicate that they could make a positive contribution to the process. In the meantime, we intend to keep to the agreement we reached with the Nicaraguans on maintaining confidentiality with respect to the specific content of the talks.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MURKOWSKI

Question 1. What is your view with respect to the restraining effect SALT II has had on Soviet strategic nuclear programs?

Answer. SALT II has had no significant effect on Soviet nuclear programs. There has been almost an 80-percent increase in Soviet nuclear warheads aimed at the United States since the treaty was signed in 1979. This amounts to almost 4,000 warheads and substantial throw-weight that have been added to the Soviet arsenal under the "restraints" of SALT II. In addition, the Soviets have violated the SALT II limitation of one "new type" by developing the SS-X-25 as well as the SS-24 which they declared to be their one new type. Our intelligence projections indicate that the Soviet missile development program may soon violate the new type rule a second time.

Question 2. What bearing does or should Soviet treaty violations have on the U.S. policy not to undercut SALT II? If the United States is unable to resolve the issue of Soviet treaty violations, should the United States continue its interim restraint SALT II policy beyond the treaty's December 1985 expiration date?

Answer. The Soviet arms control violations are very serious and involve serious implications for national security. This compliance record must be taken into account as we study the upcoming decision on our interim restraints policy. Violations are even more significant than the immediate military consequences of the acts themselves. They raise questions about the integrity of the arms control process that may be far more significant than the short-term military impact.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Question. Mr. Secretary, in December, the Wall Street Journal quoted you as having said at the Foreign Press Center: "Since (the ABM Treaty), the Soviet Union has spent more on strategic defensive forces than on strategic offensive forces. Clearly the Soviets do not share the MAD philosophy that defenses are bad." It would be helpful to have the information upon which you based that statement. Accordingly, please provide a full list of Soviet offensive and defensive programs with a complete breakdown of costs within the two major categories on an annual basis since 1972.

Answer.

Cumulative Soviet military costs (May 1972–83)

[All data in billion 1982 dollars]

Category:	*Amount*
Total Soviet military costs	$2,685
Strategic forces	510
Offensive	250
Intercontinental	175
Peripheral	75
Defensive	260
Interceptor	100
SAM	55
ABM	10
Other[1]	95

[1] The major component of "strategic other" is the cost of strategic control and surveillance.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Monday, February 4, 1985.]

OUTLINES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1985

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Kassebaum, Evans, Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, and Dodd.

The Chairman. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. We resume this morning the series of hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the future of American foreign policy.

Our initial witnesses this last Thursday were Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. The committee has set forth a rather ambitious agenda. We have also asked our witnesses to deal with some profound and basic questions of central importance to American foreign policy.

The Secretaries of State and Defense addressed in a most sincere way the committee agenda. Having read the prepared statement of our witness this morning, I know that he has dealt with the committee issues put to him in a most constructive manner, displaying in his preparation a great deal of time and thought.

To take a moment to reset the stage for these hearings, the committee has initiated a comprehensive review of the foreign policy of the United States, its goals and strategy, its policy objectives, and the means employed over time to achieve those objectives and defend those interests. The committee believes that it is time to reexamine the bases of our policies.

Last week the committee dwelled at length on two issues: The challenges to the continued efficacy of the postwar strategy of containment, as well as to the postwar consensus to halt partisanship at the water's edge, and a growing inhibition to the use of force, particularly when employed by U.S. forces in those gray or fringe areas of the Third World where "less-than-vital" American interests seem to be involved.

As I noted at the outset of these hearings, if a new consensus is to be forged in American foreign policy we need to deal with first principles. We need to define our vital interests and resulting commitments with greater precision. We need to formulate our objectives more clearly. We need to work together in the development of a strategy for pursuing those objectives, and we need to debate and consult over appropriate means for achieving those policy objectives.

We are pleased to have before the committee this morning former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, an active participant and thoughtful observer of American foreign policy in many capacities over many years.

Secretary Vance, we are grateful to you for coming before the committee this morning to share with us your thoughts and observations. Before I ask you to commence your testimony, I would ask Senator Pell, the ranking minority member of the committee, if he has an opening statement.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join you in welcoming Secretary Vance to our committee. He is an old friend, one who has been with us many times before, and I look forward very much to hearing what he has to say.

I also admire him, as I think we all do, as being a man of very real principle indeed, one of those very few people in Government who resigned over principle, and a man whom I have long admired and wish well.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Secretary Vance, would you proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. CYRUS P. VANCE, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary **Vance**. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this distinguished body again and to join with you in looking beyond immediate events to America's overall and future position in the world. I hope and believe that these hearings can help to crystallize broader agreement on the general course that best suits our interests and needs in the coming years.

I do not believe that the development of a full consensus on a foreign policy is possible. In a world of growing complexity in which our interests are diverse, foreign policy is likely to remain the stuff of controversy. Nonetheless, I do believe that, despite differences on decisions that have been and will be taken during the 1980's, our Nation can shape a foreign policy consensus on our goals and the essential strands of a strategy to pursue them.

Mr. Chairman, our challenge in developing such a strategy is twofold: First, to find ways to conduct debate of our foreign policy in a way that encourages rather than destroys a sense of national purpose and confidence; and second, to recognize the full range of enduring American interests which must be pursued in a world of rapid change. While these interests remain constant, the pace of change requires policies of flexibility and pragmatism.

Defining such an approach is no easy task in our Nation. It is self-evident that a democracy faces a dilemma in fashioning its foreign policies. On one hand, successful diplomacy, especially the flexible diplomacy suited to a world of rapid change, often requires strong leadership that can decide on a course of action, pursue it consistently, and change course when necessary. There are many times, therefore, when a President must act swiftly to promote the best interests of the United States.

On the other hand, there can be no lasting support for a foreign policy unless, through free and open debate, it meets the concerns and values of the American people. Thus, the sometimes unsystematic and disorderly process of public debate and congressional review seems to work against Presidential leadership.

Not surprisingly, then, administration leaders sometimes wish there were no Congress to consult, no barriers to overcome on Capitol Hill. How do we deal with this dilemma? Some suggest that a return to full consensus, such as existed during the cold war, should be our goal.

To be sure, where we as a people do agree on such a basic course—as we do, for example, in seeking to protect the security of this Nation—we gain enormous strength. But as an encompassing principle, the search for full consensus is neither desirable nor possible.

There are several problems in trying to reach such a consensus. As foreign policy increasingly affects what happens here at home, the pulling and hauling of political debate is a natural, indeed necessary, part of the process of decision. Equally important, a consensus behind a single approach to foreign policy not only gives a blank check to an administration. It also withdraws legitimacy from those dissenting voices that should be heard.

They must be heard not only because this is a democracy, but also because they may well be pointing out serious, burgeoning errors. Moreover, given the state of public opinion and the complexity of foreign policy, it is doubtful that a blanket approval of an administration's policy can be achieved.

What then can we do? I believe it is this: We can work first to achieve a broad national agreement on goals and basic national interests. We can also accept and even encourage debate about the best policies to achieve those goals, and we can pursue such debates with greater civility, less jockeying for partisan advantage, and more mutual trust, between the legislative and the executive branches of Government and among political viewpoints.

To do this will require us to start by taking a step backward. We need to stop caricaturing each other. For instance, to emphasize the need to spend more on defense does not mean that one craves war or is indifferent to its costs. To emphasize arms control does not mean that one is softheaded or soft on the Soviets.

Both points of view flow from a common concern for national security. To question the patriotism or principles of one another is to substitute name calling for needed thought.

Quite clearly, the United States is a strong and powerful nation. Indeed, the combination of U.S. political, economic, and military power is unequaled by any other nation. And the stewardship of that power has been important to every post-World War II administration, Republican and Democratic alike.

But the fact is that the United States now faces an international landscape in which our challenges are more varied and the power of others to affect our lives more evident than at any time since the early days of our history. This development cannot be ascribed to any basic failure of the United States. Other factors are involved.

For example, many other nations have increased their capability to project military force. One, the Soviet Union, has developed military forces that overall are roughly equal to our own. That power can now be projected to many parts of the world that were once physically unreachable.

Many nations have significantly increased their economic strength. Many countries, especially in the Third World, are now asserting a presence and demanding a role unheard of a generation ago.

Forces of change in the world are also leading to greater strife and turmoil. Low-level conflict is increasing, especially terrorism that spreads across borders. Political, cultural, economic, even religious currents are eroding old assumptions and posing new challenges.

So simply in terms of the relative power, position, and presence of other nations, the United States is now living in a vastly different world than it was only a few decades ago. At the same time, many other factors are changing. The pace of technology places extraordinary demands on the conduct of foreign affairs.

Television brings us face to face with distant events. The speed of development of nuclear weapons outstrips our ability to control them. And what is called information management in the exploding age of the computer, whether on the battlefield or in the integration of world financial markets, changes the basic ways in which we have to think about the world.

The United States, meanwhile, has become vulnerable to the workings of the global economy in ways virtually without precedent. Our balance of trade, budget deficits, interest rates, the value of our dollar, the world prices of oil and agricultural goods are no longer topics confined to the business pages of our newspapers. They now appear on the front page, because they vitally affect both what happens at home and abroad.

The United States has become a debtor nation and we are finding that the management of our economic and foreign policies are increasingly linked.

In addition, there has been a decline in the perception and effectiveness of international institutions. The promise Americans once saw in the United Nations is increasingly questioned. Support for the U.N. specialized agencies is declining, and various aid institutions, partly because of inadequate funding, play a less effective role than they once did.

Mr. Chairman, I have sketched this litany of change not to suggest that we should be passive in the face of developments that threaten our interests or broader global needs. Nor do I suggest that we cannot or should not nurture American strengths.

The issue is not whether we are strong. We are. The challenge is to use these unquestioned strengths appropriately and effectively to advance our interests in a world undergoing rapid and profound change. In short, our policy must be one of strength, flexibility, and a willingness to adapt to change.

We must understand that we are called upon to be wise as well as strong. And in such a world, the beginning of wisdom is to define and agree upon our basic enduring national interests.

I believe they are to be found in seven major areas that most command our attention. They are national defense, arms control, East-West relations, an active diplomacy for peace, human rights, the domestic economy, and the international economy.

First, we must have a strong national defense. On this point there is today broad understanding. In recent years, we have seen the growth in Soviet military power and the ability to project that power. The demands of defense in areas of U.S. commitment, especially Western Europe, Japan, and parts of Asia and the Pacific basin, have, if anything, been increasing.

In some other areas, like the Persian Gulf, we have learned that there may be circumstances in which the use of United States or allied military power would be essential for the protection of Western interests. And the steady increase in low-level intensity conflict is requiring us to adapt to a changing military environment with new skills and new techniques.

What we most need, however, is not a defense budget of a particular size or preordained composition. More important is a method for deciding what we need, how much we need, and how it will be used. These criteria should be the essence of the debate.

In assessing both the size and composition of the defense budget, we need continually to ask ourselves several pertinent questions:

How does U.S. military power relate directly to our interests and responsibilities abroad?

What strategies should we pursue to protect those interests and meet those responsibilities? What is the role of military power within these strategies, perhaps coupled with political, economic, and other instruments? What other countries will be with us, and what will they contribute?

In the area of nuclear weapons, will a new program increase the stability of the arms balance, or will it risk destabilizing that balance and increasing the risks of war? In the area of conventional weapons, will a new program be cost effective? Is it the best use of our resources? Will it meet the needs of the next decade, rather than just today's?

These are key questions. Posing them can take us beyond sterile and arbitrary debate when we seek to determine how much is enough. It can help us to understand the relationship between military strength and the realistic requirements of our security. Posing these questions leads to several important conclusions, and I would like to single out four of them:

First is the greater need for increased attention to conventional arms. This is the area of greatest deficiency. It is also the area in which a future challenge to our security is most likely to come. At the same time, the most important deficiencies lie less in equipment than in the stocks, ammunition, infrastructure, and training needed to make our conventional military forces more effective. Our fighting men and women demand no less of us.

Second, I believe we need to increase our ability to cope with unconventional warfare, with low-intensity conflict. This includes further development of capabilities like the delta force, further improvements in the collection and use of intelligence, and the greater integration of political and military efforts. This is a key lesson of our recent involvement in Lebanon.

Third, I support continued research at its present level into the possibility of defense against strategic nuclear attack. I do so because research is not prohibited by the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, because the Russians have been engaged in such research for a long time, as we have, because such research is not verifiable, and because sheer prudence requires us to do so.

But I am strongly opposed to committing ourselves to pursuing the strategic defense initiative [SDI] beyond research. Technically, a leakproof defense is an unrealizable dream. The means for defeating any defense of cities are too numerous, and the relative advangage between offense and defense overwhelmingly favors the offense.

The Soviet reaction to the development and deployment of such a system will almost certainly be large increases in the number of their offensive missiles, which we then will be compelled to match, and the arms spiral will be ratcheted upward.

Further, the SDI concept does not come to grips with either the problem of attack by sea-launched cruise missiles or the deep concern of our allies about the decoupling effect of such a system. I have seen no evidence to suggest that the situation will change in the future. Moreover, the cost of pursuing such a course would run in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

Finally, proceeding with anything beyond research would raise huge obstacles to reaching agreements on plausible approaches to strategic offensive weapons in the upcoming negotiations.

In any event, I believe that before we begin to modify today's strategic doctrines we must be absolutely certain that what we put in their place will not make nuclear war more likely. It would be folly at this time to abandon an approach that has helped to keep the peace in favor of one that seems at first glance to be less morally repugnant, if the upshot would be to increase the chances of nuclear Armageddon. There is no moral advantage in that.

Fourth, we should adopt a very clear test to judge whether to deploy new weapons systems that bear on the strategic nuclear balance; namely, do these weapons systems increase stability or decrease it?

In addition, I should state that I do not believe in bargaining chips in the sense of building weapons that would not be in our interest to deploy if they could not be traded away, weapons, that is, that could decrease stability. A true bargaining chip is one whose deployment would, in the absence of some agreed limit on Soviet weapons, increase our security, but which in an appropriate trade with the Soviets would increase our security more through eschewal than deployment.

In my judgment, the test of stability argues for our pursuing the so-called Midgetman missile, with its mobility and single warhead, instead of the silo-bound MX with its 10 warheads. It argues for continued deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe while arms control negotiations continue.

But this test of stability also argues against the deployment of nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles. These cannot be distinguished from conventionally armed sea-launched cruise missiles, thus degrading the conventional option and making the control of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles virtually impossible.

I also believe that our best interest lies in imposing an immediate bilateral moratorium on the further testing of antisatellite weapons. Since we depend more than do the Soviets on these satellites, helping to foster a competition in satellite killers cannot be to our advantage.

I further believe that we should consider a bilateral moratorium on all nuclear testing, for a clearly defined period of time, coupled with the resumption of the tripartite comprehensive test ban negotiations.

Let me turn now to the pursuit of arms control. Mr. Chairman, a second fundamental national interest is arms control. At a time when the United States and the Soviet Union are poised to begin a new round of nuclear arms control negotiations, it is useful to remind ourselves why these talks are important. They grow out of a number of pertinent facts.

The fact is that today there are more than 50,000 nuclear warheads in the world. Most of them are far more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb that killed some 100,000 people. Together, they have many hundred times the explosive force of all the weapons used in all the wars in history. In strategic weapons alone, the United States and the Soviet Union will soon each have more than 10,000 nuclear warheads that could devastate one another's societies.

The fact is that there can be no victory in a nuclear war. No development even remotely on the horizon could make the pursue of nuclear victory a rational act of policy for anyone.

The fact is that there is no plausible way to begin a nuclear war and then to bring it under control, to wage a so-called limited nuclear war, without inflicting destruction unprecedented in all of human history.

The basic lesson is that the two superpowers, and all other nations, are in this together. We are in the same boat, and we will survive or founder together. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can provide for its security against a nuclear holocaust unless it also helps to provide that security for the other. Neither can seek a decisive nuclear advantage over the other without the risk of provoking an attack in which both could be destroyed. Neither can use nuclear weapons without being devastated in return.

And both face new tasks and new imperatives with the prospect that new compilations, not the least the strategic defense initiative, will make stopping the arms race that much more difficult. In short, the most basic security for all the superpowers, security from nuclear war, cannot be found in competitive buildups. Their security must be mutual. It must be common.

I believe that those facts provide the basic principles for the negotiations that are soon to begin. I compliment President Reagan and Secretary Shultz for their concept of the umbrella talks and for achieving a single negotiating forum with three subgroups.

No one who has ever been involved in negotiating arms control agreements can be oblivious to their difficulties. The negotiations will be long and arduous. For the complexities of arms control are growing daily. The tradeoffs required will demand great diligence and ingenuity on both sides. Issues like verification pose significant hurdles before agreements can be reached.

Some basic political principles should be followed:

We should not pursue agreements for agreement's sake, but we must recognize that agreement without fair compromise is unavailing, nay bootless.

We must negotiate seriously even if we cannot easily reach agreement. The American people rightly demand it, and the strength and cohesion of the Western alliance depends upon it.

We recognize that arms control negotiations cannot and do not take place in a political vacuum. This fact argues for a broadening of the United States-Soviet dialog in order to help create the essential political underpinnings for arms control.

At the same time, however, if United States-Soviet political difficulties arise elsewhere in the world, we must be exceedingly cautious in attempting to link Soviet political behavior to the pursuit of arms control agreements. There is no merit in our trying to impose such linkage. Any particular arms control agreement is either in our interest and should be pursued or it is not and should not.

Finally, we must be patient and deliberate in our efforts to move the talks forward. Presidential leadership and control will be essential. Our arms control goals must be intimately related to the arms that we build and the doctrine we adopt. We must also beware—and urge the Soviets to be aware—of taking unilateral steps that could make arms control agreements more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

Some of the debate we face today concerns whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about these impending talks, about arms control itself. I am neither. I do, however, count myself among those who feel there is no more important task than pursuing these negotiations with the utmost seriousness and perseverance.

But to validate this view, both the United States and the Soviet Union must be prepared to put first things first. They must place stability, reduced tensions, and human survival itself ahead of possible short-term gain. In domestic terms, no President for the last 12 years has been in a stronger position to make progress on this issue than is President Reagan.

The fact of a common strategic security emphasizes the importance of a third fundamental American interest, the successful management of East-West relations. As we fulfill the needs of defense and deterrence, we have an important interest in fashioning a relationship with the Soviet Union in which our fundamental competition is bounded by restraint.

In so doing, we should avoid framing our discussions of East-West relations in ways that suggest a false choice between extremes: between a utopian state of détente on one hand and a condition of implacable hostility on the other. Both realism and safety require that we conduct relations in the continuum between those two poles.

We have a basic interest in the containment of Soviet power and ideology. We also have a basic interest in world peace. Any policy must reconcile and promote both. At times there will be greater progress in finding areas of mutual restraint. At others, the adversarial elements in our relations will predominate. But there must always be elements of both. What then should the elements of Western policy toward the Soviet Union be?

The first element of our policy must be its durability, the capacity of successive U.S. and allied governments to follow a more consistent expression of Western interests, extending beyond national elections or changes in the public mood. If we want Soviet leaders to understand what we expect of them in mutual relations, they must be able to predict our attitudes and behavior.

A second element must be the closeness of our partnership with like-minded states, beginning with those in Western Europe, on the course we seek for East-West relations. None of us will profit if we permit divisions to open up between our respective views of the Soviet Union and of the best policy toward it, as happened in the Afghanistan and Poland crises.

Within the West, we will disagree on some particulars because our interests are similar but not congruent. Yet we must demonstrate that we can work together on these issues so that our actions will have more political impact and will demonstrate that there is no advantage for Soviet leaders in trying to separate us from our allies.

Third, we and our allies must maintain the military force required to meet Soviet challenges, both in Europe and elsewhere, as need be. The Soviet Union must have no opportunity to test us militarily or to exploit military advantages politically.

It is never easy to define the line between sufficient military power and excessive reliance on military instruments, but collectively the Western allies must be able to make those judgments. And the Soviet leadership must know that we are prepared to pay the price necessary for security. At the same time, we must seriously pursue fair and verifiable arms control agreements.

Fourth, we in the West collectively must distinguish those areas of East-West relations where there is no room for compromise from those where mutual agreement is possible. We must lead a new generation of Soviet leaders to understand Western determination to defend our vital interests, while seeking to expand those fields in which East and West can cooperate.

Fifth, during the last decade a major factor in the determination of East-West relations was the Soviets' lack of restraint in exploiting local conflicts in the hope of expanding their influence. When an opportunity does come for more sensible management of East-West relations, it will be important to find ways to increase that restraint. While it is not feasible to develop across-the-board codes of conduct, we can seek practical limitations in specific regions of the world where both have an interest in keeping political competition from reaching explosive levels.

Sixth, we should adopt a policy of sustained engagement toward the Soviet bloc, as suggested in the recent "Statement of the Aspen International Group," namely, a consistent and long-term policy which would protect Western interests, reduce the competition, and over time influence Soviet policy for the better.

Sustained engagement should rest on the twin pillars of Western strength and flexibility. To effect these objectives, there must be an increase of Western points of contact with the East in all fields: Political, military, economic, scientific, and cultural. This means that the West should keep its powder dry while emphasizing its seriousness in cooperating with the East where possible. Such an overall Western policy requires not only increased dialog among the Western nations, but also greater European participation, collective and unified where possible, in Western decisionmaking.

We and our allies must continue talking with the Soviet Union in order to make our concerns clear. There can be no excuse for halting communication in times of tension, when clarity about each other's intentions is vital to stability and peace.

Finally, we must think of our relations with the Soviet Union in terms of decades, not simply from year to year. Our long-term position must make clear to present and future Soviet leaders that we are prepared to have a positive relationship with a Soviet Union that does not seek to dominate other countries and that accepts a constructive and responsible role in the world.

A fourth American interest lies in the pursuit of an active diplomacy for peace. We have already talked about the need for strong U.S. military defenses. But we cannot rely on military strength alone to deter, prevent, or cope with trouble.

We must continue to place special emphasis on strengthening our alliances, not just militarily but politically and economically as well. We need to continue developing constructive relations with the world's largest nation, the People's Republic of China. We need to continue working with other nations in reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation.

We also need to be more active in helping to resolve Third World conflicts in key parts of the world, if we are to avoid being drawn into them. Prudence points to peacemaking as a first step, and the use of military power, where necessary, as a last resort.

At the same time, timely and effective peacemaking by the United States can decrease the chances that the Soviet Union will benefit from turmoil, especially in the developing world. Peacemaking can dry up the troubled waters in which Moscow is often inclined to fish.

We know the record of successful U.S. peacemaking in recent years in areas of vital interest to this Nation. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations all had notable successes, especially in the Middle East. In addition, southern Africa is less threatened by instability because of our joint efforts with Great Britain in Zimbabwe. We hear little or nothing about the Panama Canal today because of the existence of the once-controversial treaties that were hammered out by the joint efforts of Republican and Democratic administrations.

And in a related field of flexible diplomacy, bipartisan successes in normalizing and strengthening relations with China have presented us with a far more hopeful future in East Asia than could otherwise have been possible.

The challenge to American peacemaking continues unabated. In the Middle East, we have learned over the years that U.S. disengagement from the role of mediator leads more often to conflict than to peace. The United States now faces critical choices in Central America: Do we have both the will and the ability to reach sensible arrangements for regional security, or will we slide into military conflict in Nicaragua or El Salvador?

We continue to have an interest, if too little opportunity to act, in seeing an end to fighting in the Persian Gulf. We must continue to pursue diplomatic efforts to end Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. And we must continue our efforts to bring about a peaceful solution in Namibia and an end to the evils of apartheid in South Africa.

With its renewed popular mandate, and now that it has met its first priority of beginning talks with the Soviet Union on arms control, the Reagan administration has the chance to pursue active U.S. efforts to resolve some of the underlying conflicts that threaten our interests. Precisely when and how to go about this diplomacy is a matter of tactics that goes beyond the scope of my testimony today. But it is important that the United States recommit itself to its role as peacemaker in areas of the world important to us. I for one would welcome and applaud that recommitment.

Fifth, I believe the United States must rekindle its commitment to human rights. I reject the idea that the pursuit of human rights and the pursuit of national self-interest are incompatible. Of course, we cannot escape those difficult decisions that sometimes are required. We must consistently weigh how best to advance human rights while conducting essential business with governments, even unpopular ones, in countries where we have important security interests.

But the fact remains that over the long term our pursuit of human rights is not only compatible with our national security, but contributes to it. In country after country, we have learned that views divergent from those of repressive regimes cannot be long repressed without sowing the seeds of violence.

Once ties are broken between a government and its people, outside intervention cannot secure its long-term survival. Thus, it is profoundly in our national interest to support constructive change before such ties erode and the alternatives of radicalism or repression drive out moderate elements.

Each society must decide for itself how to manage change. We cannot and should not write social contracts for others. But we can encourage and help others to promote peaceful and orderly reform. In the process, we will be true to ourselves.

In short, we pursue our human rights objectives not only because they are right, but because we have a stake in the stability that comes when people can express their hopes and find their futures freely. Our ideals and our interests thus coincide.

Sixth, we clearly have a vital interest in a sound national economy. It is the cornerstone on which all else is based. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the economic foundations of our national security are every bit as important as the defense component.

Creating viable military defenses requires that we have the requisite economic wherewithal, trained work force, advanced technology, and high standards of economic performance. There is also no doubt that the quality of the U.S. economy affects the way we project ourselves to others, the degree of confidence we have as we pursue our foreign policy goals.

During the past several years, we have achieved significant successes in our domestic economy. Under President Carter, we made substantial progress in coming to grips with the energy problem. Under President Reagan, inflation has decreased dramatically and economic investment and output have increased.

I believe all of us would agree that we cannot ignore the imperatives of sound economic policy for the next several years. Our unprecedented budget and trade deficits must be confronted now. Our hard-hit export industries, as well as our domestic industries competing with low-price imports, need relief from the overvalued dollar. Our capacity to use economic instruments like foreign aid, often a substitute for later security actions, must be resuscitated.

As we look to the next few years, we know that we are facing a time of economic choice without precedent in recent decades. This will require us to take a fresh and harder look at defense spending. In this connection, we must eschew unnecessary duplication of weapons systems, cut waste, better rationalize our weapons procurement with the types of conflict and missions our forces may face, and recognize the substantial economic benefits of arms control.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I believe that American foreign policy will be tested in terms of our ability to help preserve and develop a strong international economy in the years ahead. The depth of our ties to the global economy is beyond dispute, and so is the impact of our domestic economic health on the prosperity of others, including allies on whose strength we depend.

In recent years, we have come to understand better the demands placed upon us in keeping the global economy functioning in ways that can benefit us and others. We have seen the oil shocks, the debt crises, the stagflation exported from one country to another.

Today, we face a particular need to avoid protectionism, which will inevitably grow unless we and other developed countries are quick to contain it. Here, American leadership is again required. I do not agree with those in either political party who argue that we should lead the way to raising the barriers. As in other times of global economic difficulty, the United States should lead in the direction of a more open international trading system. As in the past, that course offers the best promise for both ourselves and others.

Yet, the United States must also insist that other countries join us in playing by the rules. The multilateral trading system can only work if it is just that: respected by all economies for the benefit of all. I believe in fair as well as free trade. Indeed, if it does not become more fair, I fear that it will become less free than it is today.

In reviewing the agenda of international economic problems, I am particularly concerned by what is happening in the Third World. In recent years, as we have faced our own economic problems we have paid less and less attention to burgeoning economic threats to the vast majority of mankind. This myopia will severely damage our interests, even as it stifles hope in country after country in the Third World. It has merely put off the day of reckoning. It has increased the chances of strife and turmoil that we will then be tempted to meet through noneconomic means.

What we have seen recently on television in Ethiopia was not the exception. It risks becoming the rule, certainly in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa and potentially in other forms elsewhere.

Yet, by postponing our effective involvement in the overarching economic problem of Third World development, we saddle ourselves with future trouble of staggering size. By too often letting short-term political criteria, rather than economic need, determine both whether and how we will provide assistance, we risk distorting our aid efforts to our ultimate disadvantage.

It is not popular to emphasize development assistance at a time of national economic stringency in the face of budget deficits. But if we compare what we can spend today on foreign assistance with what we may have to spend tomorrow on military weapons, then this emphasis is clearly placed correctly.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, these are seven areas of foreign policy that in my judgment must command our attention at this time. I have focused on them, not because they exhaust all of our responsibilities to ourselves and to others, but because each represents a basic national interest.

Poll after poll shows that the American public understands the importance of each to the future. Thus, any American foreign policy, if it is to succeed abroad and gain support at home, must include the pursuit of all of these interests.

Of course, these goals often compete for our attention and for our resources, requiring decisions whose difficulties all of this committee understands only too well, as when judging the effects of military spending on our domestic economy. But there can be no alternative to striking a balance among them and to understanding how they combine as well as collide; for example, how arms control agreements, by constraining the Soviets' strategic posture, make our own defense planning easier.

And to have an effective foreign policy, our society must do more than define its interests and carefully debate the proper balance among them. While we discuss specific policies designed to protect and promote these interests, let us dedicate ourselves to two actions of comity.

First, on those most important of decisions, when we must send young Americans into the danger of combat abroad, let us act together. Because the road we then choose to take is likely to be hard, it is essential that our system work, that all voices be heard, and a near consensus reached before we act.

If not, as we have learned, divisions at home can lead to devastating inconstancies abroad. That is why I believe the Congress must not weaken the War Powers Act. Rather, for the sake of cohesion and constancy when we commit ourselves to military action or into imminent hostilities, it should, if anything, be strengthened.

Second, as we debate, let us remember the importance of pragmatic compromise. It is the necessary lubricant in the complicated, wonderful machinery of our political system. Compromise is less exciting than controversy. It works its way less easily into the headlines and may, in times of heated debate, find a narrow place in our hearts. But it is essential to democracy no less than to diplomacy.

I thus applaud the spirit, Mr. Chairman, in which you and your committee have called these hearings. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Vance.

We will now have questions by members of the committee. Without objection, we will have a 10-minute limit in the first round of questioning, with additional questioning if members wich it and Secretary Vance is available to us.

Secretary Vance, in those passages of your testimony dealing with peacemaking you have pointed out correctly that the United States now faces critical choices in Central America, and you raise the question: Do we have both the will and the ability to reach sensible arrangements for regional security or will we slide into military conflict in Nicaragua or El Salvador?

Would you please expand your concept of regional security and the ways in which we might promote stability and security not only for the region but for the United States, both in El Salvador and in Nicaragua?

Do the armed forces of Nicaragua represent a potential threat to other nations? Should any potential security arrangement in the area include some provisions for verification that alien influences in Nicaragua are not persisting in their efforts at regional destabilization? Should some kind of overall political settlement in the region perhaps involve a commitment of American economic assistance in the restructuring and building of the Nicaraguan economy?

Secretary VANCE. First, I would emphasize, as I did at the outset of my statement, that we must remain militarily strong, and I am confident that we will do that.

In terms of finding lasting political security in Central America, I believe it can be found only by a political settlement of the problems in that region. I believe, further, that the best road to achieving such a political settlement is through the Contadora process. They have made up to this point in their work—and by "they" I mean the Contadora group—major strides in achieving a framework which could lead to a political settlement.

I believe it is incumbent upon us to do everything within our power to bring to a successful conclusion the development of that framework which they have been fashioning and to put our full support behind it, because if it does not have the full support of the United States it is unlikely that it will succeed.

Having achieved a political settlement, which is not easy but which I think can be done, we can then turn our minds to other ways of helping to ensure that the settlement endures. It also behooves us to give more thought to what kind of economic assistance we will provide in the area.

But I come back to the underlying fact that a successful conclusion of the work of that body is very much in our national interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Last week we had testimony from Secretary Weinberger that at present the Nicaraguan Government is not prepared to continue a useful negotiation with our Government, quite apart from the Contadora group; that essentially Nicaragua had pursued a bilateral course with us, but for the moment—and I think Secretary Shultz reinforced this—we are back to square 1 in terms of making any headway.

Do you have any additional knowledge about that situation or a different point of view as to how we might proceed?

Secretary VANCE. I have no additional knowledge about the state of discussions or negotiations between the United States and Nicaragua. I think it is unfortunate, to say the least, that those discussions have been broken off, but I do not think that that means that we cannot work to continue to bring about an overall settlement of the regional problems, as I suggested, through support of the Contadora process.

The CHAIRMAN. Also in the section in your testimony on peacemaking, you mentioned the need to work toward solutions in Namibia and an end to the evils of apartheid in South Africa. I suspect fairly shortly many suggestions will come before this committee and before the Senate as a whole, maybe even pieces of legislation, which are designed to try to stop apartheid in South Africa and influence the South African Government in that direction.

In your judgment, having surveyed this problem for many years, would you be in favor of economic sanctions or measures that go beyond diplomatic encouragement? Specifically would you favor measures such as a halt to further American investment, a ban on the sale of krugerrands, application of the Sullivan principles on a mandatory basis?

Some of these are not new concepts to you, but how would passage of any or all of these measures affect apartheid or progress, at least as we see it, in the South African Government toward ending it?

Secretary VANCE. Let me say first that all of us, no matter what our political persuasions may be, share an abhorrence of the evils of apartheid. The more difficult problem you pose is what can we do to try and change that situation? I think we have to make it very clear where we stand in this matter and to use our diplomatic weight with their government to urge them to begin to dismantle the bantu system, the system of pass laws, and all of the other elements of the bantu system which are so reprehensible.

I am interested to see that a flux or change within the business community in South Africa is taking place at this time on this issue. This is a matter which I have followed with great interest, because I am deeply concerned about it. I was very interested to see that during the month of January the Federated Chambers of Commerce, one of the largest South African groupings of business organizations, together with a number of other similar institutions, including the South African Chamber of Mines and the politically influential Afrikaanza Handel Institute, endorsed a plan which would lead to the dismantling of the bantu system.

Indeed, in addition to that, many of the business leaders in South Africa are beginning or have spoken out on this issue. We even see such startling things as the editorial, which I have in front of me, from the Sunday Star in Johannesburg, which reads: "Influx control needs to be scrapped," and then goes on to say why it must be scrapped.

We have not seen anything like this before. It is up to us in this country to encourage the South Africans to move forward on these bold initiatives that they are now putting forward. We can do this in two ways: First, by what we do diplomatically in dealing with their government; and second, by how we deal with the other questions which you have raised.

On disinvestment, I am opposed to it at this time. I think we should hang in there for the time being and see if we can use our influence, coupled with the influence of the leaders of the business community in South Africa who are calling for change, to bring about: Dismantling of the pass laws; forced removal; depriving the blacks of their citizenship; and all of the other reprehensible elements of the bantu system.

American corporations ought to lend their support to the kinds of change that the South African business leaders are suggesting. I hope they will do so. Insofar as the Sullivan principles are concerned, they have provided important but limited help because they do not attack "grand apartheid." But the principles have been useful and I would urge that we continue to press our corporations, to adopt and abide by those principles.

I have no problem at all with the kind of action that the Congress proposed in the Solarz amendment with respect to krugerrands. I think it would be useful if that was done again to show that we are serious.

In short, if your question is, is there some kind of legislation that could be passed that would be helpful, I think responsible legislation should be considered, but I would not include within that legislation disinvestment. I think it is too early to come to the conclusion that disinvestment is a sanction that should be applied.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Vance.

If members of the committee will note, our timing device today is located immediately to my right. At the end of 10 minutes a rather piercing noise occurs, accompanied by a flashing red light. I just want to warn members so they would not be startled, and to warn witnesses likewise that this is not an unguided missile that is taking off.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The past 4 years have been a period of extraordinary bitterness in American and Soviet relations, characterized by some very, very strong rhetoric—evil empire, et cetera—and a severe lessening of contacts at all levels, and no progress until the last couple of weeks in arms control. To what do you attribute the deterioration in the relationship in general and the breakdown of arms control in particular, because it has been so striking and so abrupt.

Secretary VANCE. I attribute the deterioration of relations to a process which started a number of years ago. The invasion of Afghanistan was a major step along the way to a deterioration in our relations. The fact that no progress was made in arms control discussions for a period of 4 years, the fact that the rhetoric on both sides was sharp and shrill. All of these were factors which, when added to basic differences that we have, both in terms of our value systems and in terms of our objectives on many issues, have led to understandable tensions between our two nations. That, however, does not mean that we should not try to reverse that course of events and to get ourselves back on a track where we are beginning to talk with each other again, and where we are beginning to negotiate on serious matters such as arms control.

But I think we should also, as I indicated, go beyond merely military negotiations. We should begin again to expand the reach of our discussions to include economic matters, cultural matters, human matters, and above all to see if the political climate can be improved.

It is going to be a long hard road and I do not underestimate the difficulty of walking that road, but it is absolutely essential for us and for the peace of the world that we and the Soviets approach these matters in a wise and thoughtful way. That is why I tried to outline in the East-West section of my remarks this morning some of the steps that I think we could take—some of the steps that might help us to begin to move back toward a better relationship between the two of us, so that we could begin to at least work together.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The Carter administration undertook an expansion in American defense spending and urged other NATO nations to expand spending as well. But in the past 4 years the pace of American defense spending has accelerated into the biggest peacetime buildup in our history.

I am interested in what your view would be, your judgment as to the effect of this buildup on the Soviets. Would it be to intimidate them into accommodation or frighten them into further defense spending on their own, or would it have no effect?

Secretary VANCE. I do not think that it will frighten them into changing their position. Indeed, I think the result will be for them to spend more and more on defense. I think that neither we nor they are going to permit the other to gain a meaningful advantage over the other.

Senator PELL. Perhaps the best term is the one that Kosygin used, as I remember, some years ago with former Senator Gore and me when Kosygin said: "What is needed here is sufficiency, that we each have sufficient weapons, without getting into the question of superiority or inferiority."

I was wondering if you thought greater use should be made of that word.

Secretary VANCE. Yes; sufficiency, rough equality, whichever you wish to call it. There have been a number of words used to describe the relationship.

Senator PELL. Sufficiency and rough equality are very different, though. Rough equality can go up to a huge level. Sufficiency means each side has enough to deter the other.

Secretary VANCE. I understand that, and I wish to add to what I had said in that I think that we must have rough equality, but we must also have as a goal the objective of reducing over time the number of weapons each of us possesses. In SALT II we were able to put a cap on nuclear weapons, with the exception of some of the qualitative improvements arising out of technological advances. But we did put a top cap on the number of launchers, warheads, et cetera.

We also achieved a small first step in reducing the number of nuclear weapons. I think the time has come when we must now take that next step in the upcoming negotiations and reach agreement upon further substantial cuts such as those we proposed in March

1977 but which the Soviets were not then prepared to accept. Interestingly, the Soviets have now have come around to agreeing to such deep cuts as the objective of the negotiations relating to strategic offensive weapons.

Senator PELL. This is somewhat along the lines of President Reagan, too, where he wants deep cuts. To my mind it is kind of interesting that his proposal for really deep cuts is very similar to the specific proposal that President Carter made at the beginning of his term.

Secretary VANCE. Very similar, you are quite right.

Senator PELL. When President Carter proposed deep cuts, I think from a diplomatic viewpoint he neglected to sensitize the Soviets ahead of time to the proposal. Do you see a similarity here with President Reagan's proposal?

Secretary VANCE. It is clear that the proposals of President Carter and President Reagan as to deep cuts are similar. At the time of the Carter proposal, it was impossible to get the Soviets to go that far, because they had recently been through the Vladivostok negotiations which produced a very big internal political battle within the Politboro on how large the cuts in offensive missiles could be. It was primarily because of that bitter internal struggle that the turndown of the Carter proposals took place.

Fortunately, now that is in the past and they as well as we recognize the need for deep cuts and therefore we should be able to agree on deep cuts as a mutually acceptable objective.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

One of the perennial questions of United States-Soviet relations concerns the holding of summits and the circumstances that should surround a summit meeting. Based upon your experience and your own reflections upon the history of superpower relations, do you believe a summit should only occur when the agenda has been fixed and rough agreements arrived at, or do you think summits can be useful if they are done on a regular basis, somewhat along the lines that our former Chairman Senator Percy proposed?

Secretary VANCE. I also believe that summits do serve a useful purpose. I believe that they should be carefully prepared. I do not believe that it is necessary that each summit produce a very important result. I think there is much merit in having regular summits between ourselves and the Soviet Union so that the public does not expect that each time there is a summit meeting a great achievement will be produced.

It is important that the heads of our two governments deal with each other face to face. That cannot be done adequately if they are going to meet only once every several years. Therefore, I support very strongly a regularizing of the summits between the two heads of government on a yearly basis. I think we would all benefit from that.

Senator PELL. I know I for one would very much concur with you on that. And yet, the reasons on each side for not doing it are rather similar. I remember I pressed Mr. Andropov on this when I was with him 1½ years ago, and the answers that he gave were very similar to the answers our administration gives, the mirror image, that they did not want to go unless there was something specific arrived at.

In any case, I would like to return to your paper for a moment. In your testimony you mention that we need to increase our ability—excuse me. My time has just expired. I will wait for the next round.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to start with a suggestion that you made; that is the greater integration of political and military efforts in our formulation of policy. Following on the thoughtful opening statement of the chairman on trying to shape a consensus, the first principles that have to be established and how do we shape a consensus today, while it never could or, as you mentioned, should be total, I wonder if it is not something that we need to look at institutionally and then also be very cognizant of outside forces, such as television, which have changed it to diplomacy by television.

We have, I think, a very different concept that has come into being. It troubles me that we do have a fragmentation. We have a fragmentation of intelligence, we have a fragmentation between the executive and the legislative branch, a fragmentation really within even State and Defense.

How do you see this as being pulled together, or should it be? Should we have more clearly defined what the State Department should do? Should there be a greater effort to coordinate trade through the Commerce Department, the Special Trade Representative, and the sections in those Departments that also work within diplomacy?

It just seems to me that as we sort through all the different voices that we hear it gets very frustrating to try and formulate some thoughtful perceptions. Should this be a troubling aspect to us, and is there anything we can do about it?

Secretary VANCE. As I said in my statement, I do not think it is going to be possible to have a full overall consensus. However, I do think it is going to be possible to have a consensus on what our goals should be and some degree of consensus on what our strategy should be in seeking to reach those goals.

Insofar as the operations of our Government are concerned, I think that on the political-military level that can best be achieved through the existing mechanisms that we have within the Government, through the exchanges between the Secretaries of the two Departments and their associates and through the National Security Council. There I think you can coordinate the various elements required to come to a satisfactory conclusion.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you think that is being done now as effectively as it should be?

Secretary VANCE. It can be done better than it is being done now. We ought to be able to debate matters within the Government without having those discussions spill out in the newspapers as an internal battle within the administration. There is no need for that. There ought to be more discipline within our own organizations.

To prevent that, it is awfully hard to do, I know from hard experience. We have seen it in administration after administration. But it is wrong because it gives a perception of a house divided. It confuses our people, it confuses our allies, and misleads our potential adversaries.

On the issues of trade and agriculture and food policies for example, I do think we have institutional problems. We have many elements of the Government which have legitimate interests in the development of trade policy and agriculture and food policy, and we do not in my judgment at this point have adequate institutional mechanisms to coordinate those various views so as to permit a comprehensive and cohesive set of policies which can then be brought to and discussed with the Members of the Congress.

There I think we have clear institutional structural problems.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Do you have any suggestion for improving it?

Secretary **Vance**. Yes, I have, but it would take a long time to go into them. There is a report coming out later this month on agriculture and food policies in which there are some suggestions on how to improve our policy formulation which I think may be helpful.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I was interested in your answer on sanctions toward South Africa. I have tended to feel that same way regarding divestment. But it brings up the whole question of what leverage one can use to change internal policies. Can it be applied to all countries when one questions how effective sanctions are? Certainly at the time when you were Secretary, the grain embargo against the Soviets did not change the Soviet position in Afghanistan at all.

Is there any possibility that economic sanctions in your view would have any place in our relationship with trying to change the policies of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua? Do you feel that there could be an approach that we could take that would be a more constructive effort than the contra effort has seemed to be so far?

Secretary **Vance**. First let me say a word about sanctions in South Africa. I do not rule out sanctions at some point in time, if what is happening now does not result in appropriate change. I do not think we are at that point yet, because I think there is enough ferment taking place that perhaps it will be possible to bring about the needed change.

Insofar as sanctions are concerned, I think sanctions, as you indicate, are of questionable usefulness. Sometimes, however, sanctions can be useful. They are not necessarily going to cure the problem entirely, but they can have a positive effect.

My own view, of the grain embargo is that to have done nothing at that time would have been an unacceptable course of action for the United States. The grain embargo was, I believe, a necessary and sensible step to take. I know others in our country believed differently, but I have heard Soviets say subsequently that they cannot understand why we lifted the embargo when it was hurting them.

But going on beyond that to the question of sanctions in Nicaragua, I think we should first see if we cannot bring to a satisfactory conclusion the Contadora effort, which I would hope will either succeed or not succeed within a few months. If it does not, then it depends on what it is we are trying to achieve at that point in time and what we are trying to stop.

If one were to use sanctions, in my judgment they would have to be political and economic sanctions. But for us to apply sanctions without doing it in coordination with others would be fruitless. The imposing of sanctions is something that should be done working with others on a regional basis. This will make the sanctions effective and meaningful.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would be interested in your observations on what would appear to be some interesting changes that are slowly evolving in a number of the Eastern bloc countries. Do you see this as being anything of significance as far as the Soviets' own security and what we could or should be doing, in relation to changing winds that seem to be going through the Eastern bloc?

Secretary VANCE. I think we ought to deal with the Eastern bloc countries country by country. That is the wisest course for us to follow. Each nation has to be dealt with individually on its own facts and on the basis of what is best for our bilateral relations with each such country.

I do not think that it is in our interest to try to develop an approach that would strike against the whole bloc. I don't think that that is realistic. I think it would be counterproductive if we were to do that.

We can encourage them as they take new and constructive steps. We have seen a good deal more independence in a number of nations in the bloc. Some simply do not have, because of a variety of reasons, the capacity to do more than they a limited amount. Others are able to act with greater freedom and independence, and we should encourage that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I want to join my colleagues in welcoming you back before the committee.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you.

Senator SARBANES. There was an interview with David Owen in the London Observer a couple of weeks ago, now the head of the SDP, and formerly the British Foreign Secretary, and in the course of that interview they asked him, do you have any particular heroes? He mentioned Harry Truman, and then he mentioned Lloyd George, and then he went on to say—and I am now quoting him:

> Of political figures I have had personal dealings with, the one I like easily the most was Cyrus Vance. I thought he was one of the straightest men I have ever had to deal with.

And I just want to say that I would like to associate myself with David Owen's remarks in welcoming you before the committee.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you, sir.

Senator SARBANES. I was struck in your statement by two quotes. One was on the human rights question, where you concluded by saying that our ideals and our interests thus coincide, and I could not agree more. I am reminded of the Jefferson quotation that the interests of a nation, when well understood, will be found to coincide with their moral duties.

The other was, I think, your warning at the outset about consensus, and the fact that full consensus is neither desirable nor possible. I have sat on this committee and watched these differences over the Panama Canal Treaties, for example, which I think in retrospect have clearly served our Nation's interests, and served them very well. Over Zimbabwe—I can remember when you were before the committee on that very issue—and it seems to me the most important point that you made there was that these differences must be approached with a sense of civility, a sense of mutual respect and a strong sense of responsibility. That at least offers the best chance for arriving at government, and if not, at least keeps the divisions on the high road rather than having them deteriorate into partisan squabbling.

I wanted to ask you a somewhat broad question. We are trying to explore the making of our foreign policy and do it in a way that I guess serves educational purposes as well. When Secretary Shultz was here, he talked about the importance of political values, democratic values, the rule of law. He talked about economic arrangements in other countries as we regarded them. He, of course, talked about a nation's alignment in the East-West framework if, in fact, it aligns itself, and finally, a nation's role as it deals in its region or perhaps even more broadly than its region.

I was wondering, as the United States interrelates with other countries, how you rank or mesh together these considerations; in other words, a nation's political values, democracy, totalitarianism, the rule of law, a nation's economic arrangements, its alignment in the East-West framework and the role that it plays in its region. How do we blend those together and balance them out as the United States approaches other countries?

Secretary VANCE. Insofar as our political values are concerned, our belief in democracy, our belief in the rule of law, I feel these are very important values that have been part of the woof and warp of the fabric of our country's foreign policy since the beginning of the Nation. I think it is imperative that we preserve and protect those values.

This does not mean, however, that we will automatically become the policemen of the world. This debate, you will recall, took place in 1953 when Secretary Dulles believed that we have an obligation to take whatever action was necessary, including military action, depending on perceived Communist threats big and small across the whole globe. That did not end up being our policy because it was not accepted by President Eisenhower.

I think in most cases we must deal with the particular problems that we face on a regional basis, and in dealing with a particular problem, we must look at all of the various elements, including those which you must examine in deciding what are the most effective instruments to use in dealing with that particular problem.

We also have to consider who will be with us in dealing with those problems; and what are our friends and allies are prepared to do.

If you are dealing with our vital interests and threats to those interests truly endanger them, then in my judgment we should be prepared to use military force to protect and preserve them. By extension, I would say the same applies to the emperiling of the vital interests of our allies, for example, in Western Europe. But as a general practice, we should use all of the other instruments which we have, including diplomacy, before resorting to the use of military force.

Senator SARBANES. To what extent do you think we have fueled an arms race in a region on the theory that we were creating a shield vis-a-vis the Soviets when in fact the arms were utilized by the nations in the region to heighten tensions as between or amongst themselves?

Secretary VANCE. I think that quite often we have tended to exacerbate the situation by providing military equipment to Third World countries. This is a very difficult problem to handle because all of us understand the need to provide allies and friends with military equipment to protect themselves and their freedom. On the other hand, it must be done with great care and with great thought because otherwise we will simply fuel potential conflict between the parties involved.

This is a subject which we have not given sufficient attention to in the past. It involves not only the political problems that we are talking about, but also problems with other arms suppliers, including some of our allies and the Soviet Union. I think you will remember that we started discussions with the Soviet Union directed to developing a model for restraint on arms sales to regions composed of developing nations. We were making quite good progress on those talks until the relationship between us soured and we had to shelve the negotiations.

I think those discussions ought to be picked up again, and should be expanded to include other major arms suppliers, many of whom are our allies in Europe.

If we could do something to lessen the flow of those arms, it would be very positive. If you talk to the outstanding Third World leaders, they will say that we tend to complicate their problems by the amount of weapons we pour into their countries.

Senator SARBANES. My colleagues asked you about South Africa, and I would just like to follow up on that.

First, would it be your view that the business groups in South Africa were moved to take the positions they articulated recently, and perhaps even now some of the statements the Prime Minister is making because of the growing movement in this country with respect to the repudiation of the apartheid policy?

Second, I am struck by the extent to which American policy toward South Africa is always viewed only in the dimension of its impact on the internal situation in South Africa. What about the dimension of the costs we are paying elsewhere in Africa because of the perception by the other African nations that the U.S. policy essentially amounts to indulging the South African regime's apartheid policy?

Secretary VANCE. First, I do believe that the actions taken in this country make an impact on the South Africans and on what they will and will not do in dealing with the problems and evils of apartheid. Therefore, it is important that thought be given whether some legislation, responsible legislation, ought to be passed by the Congress in this regard.

On the cost elsewhere, I believe that it is indisputable that we pay a heavy cost for being seen as not sufficiently sensitive to the problems of the blacks in South Africa, and I think the so-called constructive engagement policy has hurt us in the Third World generally, and particularly in Africa.

Senator **Sarbanes**. My time is up.

I take it we will have another round.

I would just like to add that I think we are going to start paying a higher and higher cost for it here at home as well in our perception of ourselves. That is yet another dimension that I think is insufficiently appreciated.

Secretary **Vance**. I would agree with that.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Secretary Vance, you noted in the final page of your prepared statement this morning that with respect to the most important of policy decisions—wherein we must send young Americans into combat abroad—we must act together, all voices must be heard, and a near consensus reached before we act. This led you to suggest that we ought to strengthen rather than weaken the War Powers Act.

In addition, you have noted in your response to Senator Sarbanes that there are occasions when our vital interests are put at risk and that we must be prepared to use military force, if necessary, in those situations.

As a craftsman of policy, how do we arrive at a situation in which both the executive and legislative branches come to some agreement on what constitute "vital interests" as a prerequisite to seeking near consensus on when and how to employ military force? If the "vitalness" of various commitments, be they explicit or implicit, is continually called into question, does that not undermine the credibility of those commitments, particularly if military force is ruled out in advance as a means of promoting or defending those commitments, and thereby invite potential aggressors to act with a relatively high degree of impunity?

Secretary **Vance**. I feel very strongly that it is critically important that we preserve the War Powers Act.

I believe, secondly, that there has not been—and I draw no distinction between Republican and Democratic Presidents, in the failure to abide by the basic instruction of the War Powers Act, namely, that there should be consultation between the Congress, or Members of the Congress, and the Chief Executive before troops are sent into hostilities or imminent hostilities.

When you look at the record, it is a pretty sorry one. In my view it was the intent of the Founding Fathers that in commiting military forces into situations of imminent hostility, there would be a twilight zone, where the power to take action would not be given exclusively the executive branch or the Congress, and that the power to act would be shared between the two. And where you have shared powers, you must have consultation.

We have not been doing this. What usually happens—and I have seen it during my service in Government, and in the history books—is that the President acts or is in the process of acting when some Members of the Congress are called in and notified that the action is under way. In these circumstances there really is not much that can be done about stopping the contemplated action.

I feel it would be very useful for the President if he were to sit down with a small group representative of the leadership of the Congress, a group from each of the two Houses, and say this is what I plan to do; may I hear your views? I think a lot of good questions would be asked at that time. I underscore the importance of discussion before the action is taken.

And if the Congress were really in at the takeoff, you would not have the problems we have seen so often when there is a crash landing.

I do not think this is that hard to do, quite frankly. I think you could have a group in each House which consisted—if you take the House, for example—of the Speaker, the majority and minority leader, and the two seniors on both the Foreign Relations or Foreign Affairs Committees, and the Armed Services Committee, and the same thing in the Senate. You might not get all of them together in every emergency, but most of these situations develop in a way that does not require the President to act immediately.

If you are facing a missile attack, obviously the President has to act at once if missiles are raining down on the country, but that is not the way most of these situations arise. I think that steps should be taken to strengthen the War Powers Act to make it clear that consultation means consultation so that there really is a chance for the President to discuss with the leaders of the Congress what is being done and to seek their advice before he acts.

The **Chairman**. Secretary Vance, this is a matter of historical interest. You have touched upon reasons why conditions might be different now in terms of prospects for deep cuts of nuclear weapons than they were at the time you went to Moscow at the beginning of the Carter administration. Your suggestion was, at least in terms of Soviet internal politics that things were not ripe in 1977, and therefore there was absolute rejection at the outset.

Is this essentially your analysis as the years have passed? What sort of sense did you have as you approached those negotiations? What was in fact the Soviet reaction? What was reported at the time was just an absolute rejection and your departure from Moscow earlier than you had anticipated, and a good deal of desolation back here, as people wondered what was going on.

Secretary **Vance**. Yes; it was a sharp rejection. I believe it was, as I have said, because of the political situation in the Politburo at that particular time. On the other hand, this does not mean it was not a sound idea to suggest deep cuts because as time has shown, both parties have now come to that conclusion.

I have not only reached this conclusion from analysis, but also have heard this over the years since from a number of Soviets who have indicated to me that that was the basic problem at that time.

The **Chairman**. So at least a proposal now for deep cuts might receive a different reaction?

Secretary **Vance**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. And you therefore are not pessimistic with regard to current arms control prospects on the basis of your experience in 1977?

Secretary VANCE. No; I think if you are talking about cuts, approximately the same as were suggested in 1977, you would probably find that that is a negotiable objective that one might reach.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. The Senator from Connecticut has arrived and has not been heard from yet.

The CHAIRMAN. I would be happy to recognize the Senator from Connecticut, Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me apologize to you and to our distinguished witness for being a little bit late in getting over here this morning.

I understand you have already covered a great deal of territory, so if I raise anything that you have already covered, let me know and I will take the time to review your remarks in the record.

I do not know if the Genocide Convention has come up at all.

Secretary VANCE. No; it has not.

Senator DODD. Well, we passed a resolution on it at the close of the last session. The vote, I think, was 87 to 2. Obviously one Congress cannot commit another Congress to a course of action, but the resolution at least endorsed the broad principles included in the Genocide Convention, and it was suggested that this would be something we should take up at the earliest possible date, with it having been endorsed by the Reagan administration. In fact, the Secretary of State said, when he testified here last week that not only does he support ratification but also will work for ratification, which I think is very good news.

I know you have talked a bit about human rights in general. I wonder if you might take a couple of minutes to discuss how important you think the Genocide Convention is to this country, aside from just the 40 years that it has been kicked around here without approval, having been endorsed I think by every administration except one, and the Eisenhower administration just did not take a position on it for whatever reason, but every other administration has supported it.

How important is the Genocide Convention to U.S. foreign policy interests, if at all?

Secretary VANCE. I think it is immensely important to our foreign policy interests. As you say, it has been languishing for decades without anything being done about it. I feel very strongly about the importance of human rights, and this seems to me to be one of the cardinal issues that has to be dealt with in the field of human rights. Therefore, I believe we should act very promptly on the ratification of this treaty.

If we do so it will give a very important signal around the world indicating that not only the Congress but also this administration cares about the problem of genocide, and it feels it important to deal with it.

Such action will be seen as a very positive step by the United States and by the administration. It should be given a high priority within this committee and sent to the floor for action.

Senator DODD. Let me ask you this. One of the complaints by those who have opposed it is that this would allow the United States to be drawn into international tribunals and be taken advantage of for political purposes. They cite the most recent case of the Nicaraguans bringing us into the International Court of Justice, and our subsequent refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of that body.

I wonder if you might comment on that decision by the administration, whether or not that kind of action is the kind of action which should be dealt with somehow either by making modifications to the Convention itself, and whether or not that argument has any merit in terms of support for ratification.

Secretary VANCE. I do not believe that it has any merit. I believe deeply that it is critical for us as a country that holds itself out as a believer in the rule of law, to put acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court very much at the center of our international relations, and to abide by decisions of that body. I thought it was regrettable that we took the decision not to continue in the World Court deliberations on the Nicaragua issue.

I remember when we went to the World Court during the Iranian crisis, that there were many people who said you cannot get a fair hearing, you are going to lose your case. The Court rendered two decisions in that matter. The first was unanimous preliminary injunction calling for the return of the hostages. And then finally, by a large majority, the Court voted in favor of the United States in the Courts ultimate decision on the matter.

So I do not think you can prejudge what is going to happen.

But in any event, it is an important international body. We have subscribed to its creation and accepted its compulsory jurisdiction in 1946. For us not to participate in it when we think a decision may go against us is neither a wise or proper step for us to take.

Senator DODD. Let me ask you one other question in a similar vein.

Putting aside—and obviously you really cannot put aside the political questions associated with the Contra operation. Questions have been raised about the legality of the United States supporting the Contras, suggestions made that it may be in violation of the U.N. charter, the OAS charter, just to mention two.

Do you think it is illegal for the United States to be funding the Contras?

I am asking you this to try to take advantage of your legal expertise as well, and to look at it from that standpoint.

Secretary VANCE. Yes, I do believe that it is. If it were to be done, at least I would think it would have to be approved by the Congress, and I think even in such circumstances there are legal questions as to whether under various treaties to which we are party it would be lawful for us to support the contras.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would first like to say, Secretary Vance, that it was extraordinarily thoughtful testimony, and I think it was an important one for us in this foreign policy overview

You said that you support a moratorium on all testing for a certain period of time.

Secretary VANCE. A bilateral moratorium, yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Right.

About a year and a half ago, I guess, Senator Levin and I had an amendment on the floor that failed by nine votes that was a bilateral moratorium on flight tests of new ICBM's which we felt one could be easily agreed to without long negotiations, and easily verifiable.

Do you have any problem with verification and with the ability to work out verification if you would apply a halt on all tests?

Secretary VANCE. What I was talking about in my testimony was a moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons related to the comprehensive test ban negotiations. What you were talking about goes further than that and talks about a moratorium with respect to flight testing of new weapons systems, and let me answer the letter.

I think that a moratorium of flight testing of new missile systems for a limited period of time could be productive. I would not, however, want to make the moratorium indefinite because I would like to see whether any progress was made. Moreover, the moratorium would have to be bilateral. I would not want to take unilateral action.

Insofar as verification is concerned, verification of flight testing, the answer is yes, it could be verified.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But verification still poses a real problem, does it not? Or do you feel that advances have been made now so that that can be detected?

Secretary VANCE. I think if you were doing it for a limited period of time, with the technical advances that have been made, we would be able to pick up all tests of major importance.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Second, I would like to ask this. You mentioned that there could be areas of accommodation with the Soviet Union and mutual restraint, if, I suppose, it were to our mutual self-interest.

Do you see that developing in the Mideast?

Secretary VANCE. The Mideast is a much more complicated problem because if you are going to make progress in the Middle East, you first have to have a willingness on the part of the parties, Arab and Israeli alike, to be willing to come to the table and to negotiate seriously. Further, if the parties are seeking mediation I have grave doubt that you could get the agreement from both sides for the Soviets to act as the mediator. I just do not think it could be done.

Therefore, I think the United States is the only country that can play a mediating role. Despite differences and criticisms that the parties may have with respect to the United States, they still believe—and I am convinced of this—that the only country that really can play an effective mediating role is the United States.

You hear increasing voices raised in the Middle East, in Arab countries as well as Israel, suggesting that the time is here when we should again be playing a more active mediating role.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You do not see either the Soviet Union or ourselves attempting to find some avenue by which we would agree to moderate arms shipments into the Middle East?

Secretary VANCE. I think that is something that could be discussed again. As I indicated, we had discussions that went on for well over a year on that before. I think that would be a positive thing to do.

I thought your question dealt with the broader question of a mediating role.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, there has been some comment in the press recently about whether there would be any effort to get back to a discussion of arms, and that is what I meant as far as mutual restraint, largely from that side.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would add that I strongly share your thoughts with regard to the Genocide Convention and very much hope that we will take action on it soon.

I was very struck, in following up on a question from my chairman in connection with the War Powers Act, with your thought that the President should consult with the Congress or a group from the Congress prior to takeoff is a valid one, but I wondered how you would actually improve or strengthen the act as you suggest because the act already says that that will be done.

Just to read specifically, "The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing U.S. forces."

Secretary VANCE. I would describe more specifically what consultation means. I would define it, as along the lines Senator Eagleton once did. I think it can be done and it ought to be done so there is no question that consultation means true consultation.

Senator PELL. Your thought, then, is the emphasis should be put on the defining of the word "consultation" because already it says in every possible instance he will consult. Presumably the reason for the word "possible" is as you suggested earlier, if a horde of missiles are raining down on us, then it obviously would not be possible, but in Grenada, for example, it was possible.

Secretary VANCE. Yes; I think in most cases it is possible.

I did a study of and a paper on this during this last year, so I feel I am familiar with all the various instances, going back to the founding of our country, in which the President deployed U.S. forces outside the United States into hostilities or where hostilities were imminent.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

On another subject, speaking to you as a former Secretary of State and one much interested in the administration of our diplomatic relations abroad, I am wondering if you had an opinion or a view about the newly set-up American Academy on Diplomacy which will offer its view on the advisability of confirming chiefs of mission abroad. It is made up, as you know, of both former career and noncareer diplomats.

The thought is it might be a little bit akin to the ABA saying that a man is qualified, very qualified or not qualified.

I was curious what you thought about this.

Secretary VANCE. I think it is useful. I have been consulted in connection with that mechanism because as you know, the former Secretaries of State are honorary members of that group. I think it can only be advisory, obviously, but I believe that both the Congress and the executive branch would benefit from hearing the views of a body like the Academy of Diplomacy which is made up of thoughtful and experienced individuals who have served as Ambassadors or senior positions in the State Department.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

There is one other subject that was not touched upon today, and that is the subject of Cuba. My own view has been that we tend always to look at these things from our viewpoint and very rarely from our adversary's viewpoint.

From Cuba's viewpoint we have sought for 24 years to economically strangle her and have mounted one major invasion, the Bay of Pigs, and Lord knows how many minor invasions, and we have sought to assassinate her chief of government, and so forth, therefore she is obviously full of hate and bitterness toward us.

If that situation could be corrected, it might remove the hate that spews forth from her, and hence, the level of violence in Latin America.

I was wondering if you felt that the time might be opportune when one could move in that direction and normalize relations, not necessarily friendly relations, but the same relations we have with other Communist countries like Bulgaria or the Soviet Union or Hungary, and have correct relations and lower the level of confrontation.

What would be your reaction?

Secretary VANCE. I believe that we ought to explore with the Cubans whether or not there is a basis for opening discussions again. As you know, we did have such discussions in the early part of the Carter administration because we thought that in the end it would be in our interest if we could have correct relationships with them.

We did go so far as opening up an interest section in Havana, which I think has served our interests. I have noted recently that Castro had indicated that there is some interest on his part in talking to us again. He also said he did not believe that one could successfully export revolution. I have not heard him say that before.

I think that we should not rule out serious discussions with the Cubans on what Castro has in mind, and what would we require from Cuba in order to establish more normal relations. It would not be an easy set of discussions, but we ought not let it go without further study and pursuit.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I concur with you on that.

Finally, you mention in your statement:

> I believe we need to increase our ability to cope with unconventional warfare, with low intensity conflict. This includes further development of capabilities like the Delta Force.

Would you enlarge on what you mean by low intensity conflict?

Secretary VANCE. Basically terrorist type actions. I think terrorism is one of the most difficult problems we face. It is so hard to get your hands around it, and it is terribly difficult to define the sanctions that one can use once there has been a terrorist act.

We must improve our understanding of the kinds of options that are available to us in dealing with terrorism including joint actions with other nations. I believe that an international convention dealing with the problem of terrorism would be helpful because one has to mobilize world opinion more effectively than has been possible up to now.

This will not be easy to do because political problems spring to the fore and complicate the issue immensely. However, I do think it is possible to enact a convention which would require the signing members to take action in the case of terrorist acts along the lines of the conventions relating to airplane hijackings.

Senator PELL. Would we not be in a very embarrassing position, then, from a legal viewpoint, in our support of the Contras, who are really our terrorists?

Secretary VANCE. I read your exchange with Secretary Shultz on this subject the other day. I do think our support of the Contras presents a very serious problem.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, what is your view of the strains that the Western alliance is under? You talk about the closeness of our partnership with like minded states, beginning with those in Western Europe, but what is your perception of the current status of that partnership?

Secretary VANCE. I think we hit one of the recurrent low points, as we do from time to time, at the time of the pipeline crisis. I think since then it has improved, and there has been a bettering of relationships between us. But basically there have been two problems that have caused a large part of the strains between ourselves and our allies in Europe. One is the fact that our allies have been insensitive to our concern that in dealing with problems that extend beyond Europe but which affect all of us as individual nations, problems such as the Middle East. Many of us feel that our allies have not been willing to share the burden of dealing with such problems with us and have really expected us to take all of the burden upon our shoulders, or virtually all of it.

That is wrong, and I think that they understand that we think it is wrong, but they are really not doing enough about it, and that is an exacerbating factor in our relationship.

Second, I think that we have had a tendency over the years—and it goes back many years—to make up our minds on an issue, then go to our allies and tell them what we intend to do, listen to what they have to say, let it go in one ear and out the other, and then go and do exactly what we wanted to do all along despite what was said in the consultation.

I think we should make a greater effort to not only listen but also focus on what they have to say and be prepared to change our position so as to try to get a better consensus between us so that when we act we can act more effectively as partners.

That certainly would have been useful in the case of Poland and some of the other crises which we have faced. Afghanistan was another.

So, I think that there is a real need to do something about these two issues. Moreover, I think that the SDI concept is potentially a divisive issue between us and our allies. In my conversations with leaders from European countries, I sense a great fear of decoupling if we should proceed to development and deployment of the SDI system. A problem then lies on the horizon, and we ought to be sensitive to that problem.

We ought to engage in more serious and more genuine consultations with our allies and they with us because we both will benefit from such discussions.

Senator SARBANES. To pursue that last point, do you regard SDI as a fundamental shift in nuclear strategy?

Secretary VANCE. I do. I think it is a fundamental shift in nuclear strategy, and inasmuch as it is a fundamental shift, I think we should proceed with the greatest of caution.

As I indicated in my statement, I am not persuaded that it is in our interest to go beyond research at its present level of funding. I think increasing the research to the degree now being suggested in the new budget is not wise. We really are faced with two kinds of problems. The first are technical problems, the second are operational problems.

On the technical side, we still are basically dealing with research on problems of basic physics, and we have not yet established that we can do what we hope to do. We have to do a lot more in that area.

Second, there are all kinds of operational problems. The operational problems include such things as how can you protect the kind of systems which you would have to use, which are based outside of the boundaries of the United States, how can you protect the platforms that would be needed which would have to carry the sensors and the killing mechanisms that are required?

There is a serious technical question, or there are many serious technical questions as to whether we can indeed develop adequate sensors, the necessary optical systems, the necessary killing and battle management systems. There are a whole lot of immensely difficult problems yet to be resolved, and I think we ought to proceed very cautiously because once we cross that line from basic research and get over into development or deployment, then I think we will have very radically changed strategic doctrine.

Senator SARBANES. Even beyond the technical and operational problems—and in my review of them, I think they appear to be insurmountable—would you not be committing yourself to an escalating arms race in both offensive and defensive weapons for time immemorial?

Secretary VANCE. My belief is that you would, and that is why I think we must go so slowly, because I think then you would be changing strategic doctrine by adding the defensive to the offensive and the combination of the two would lead to an arms spiral which would ratchet us upward.

Senator SARBANES. The final question I wanted to touch on is this. If you see America's effort to shape the international environment as involving a military dimension, a political or diplomatic dimension, an economic dimension, and I guess something you could call values or principles, human rights, the rule of law and so forth, I am struck by, as important as it is, how much of the thinking seems to be focused on that dimension at the expense——

Secretary VANCE. On which dimension?

Senator **Sarbanes**. The military dimension, at the expense of the political, diplomatic, the economic and the values and principles, and the latter three areas, it seems to me, are all areas in which we have far greater advantages over the Soviet Union in terms of trying to influence and shape the international environment.

Now, first of all, do you agree with that perception of imbalance, and if you do, what can we do to get a better balance in our foreign policy as we address international issues?

Secretary **Vance**. I do agree wholeheartedly with what you have said about the need for a balance. I do not think that strength is only military. I believe that strength includes economic strength, it includes political strength, it includes moral strength, and that all of these are important.

As I said in my statement, I think that one has to strike a proper balance, and this is obviously a very difficult thing to do. All one can do is lay down certain general principles and then deal with the matters at hand item by item as I tried to do in outlining the seven items which I refer to in my statement.

I think to do anything more than that is not only very difficult but also not a fruitful way to proceed.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Dodd.

Senator **Dodd**. Mr. Secretary, I should have mentioned as well earlier that I think your statement is an excellent one. It is very clear and offers some very wise suggestions.

You and I just missed each other late this fall. You were in China just before I was. I spent a little over 3 weeks there, and about a week in the Philippines and a week in Japan. I had a good visit in the Philippines, and I would like to ask your thoughts about U.S. policy with regard to the Philippines.

It is an issue area that I think is already upon us, but the critical mass has not quite occurred as yet. It is not unlike what we saw, it seems to me, at this juncture in the earlier days in Iran and in Nicaragua, to some extent. There are a lot of positive things about the Philippines which were not present in either of those two countries, so I do not want to draw the similarity too closely. I think that is dangerous.

My own view is the two worst conclusions would be for Marcos to leave this evening, or to stay around forever. I am not suggesting there is an easy answer. In fact, I do not have any at all.

What I would like to ask you is have you given it some thought, and what do you suggest the foreign policy of the United States ought to be at this juncture with regard to the Philippines? How important are Subic Bay and Clark Air Base to U.S. foreign policy interests in the Pacific Basin?

Secretary **Vance**. First, I agree that there are distinctions between what is happening in the Philippines and Iran, and we would make a mistake to equate the two.

Senator **Dodd**. I agree.

Secretary **Vance**. Second, I believe that the situation in the Philippines is a very dangerous one and that the danger and problems are continuing to accumulate.

Third, on dealing with the Philippines, it seems to me that one of the options that should be considered is seeing whether they could be persuaded to push up the time for holding elections to a period earlier than the time currently set. I believe this might be a useful step for us to consider.

Insofar as Subic and Clark are concerned, I think they are important, but I believe we could get along without them if other factors in the overall balance led us to the conclusion that in our broader interest we might have to forgo the use of these bases.

I would not like to see that happen. But we could live without them.

Senator **DODD**. Well, there have been some suggestions, and I asked President Marcos about whether or not he would run in 1987, and he indicated that he would. Since I met with him, either he or people close to him have suggested that the election date ought to be moved up, but I presume they have also suggested that he be a candidate if that date is moved up. At this juncture there does not seem to be any viable candidate among moderate opposition groups who could challenge Marcos successfully in that kind of a contest.

Do you mean to suggest that he be a candidate, or do you think he ought to remove himself from consideration?

Secretary **VANCE**. I really have not come to a conclusion on what is the best way to do that, and I really do not feel that I ought to speculate on it without having thought it through.

Senator **DODD**. Let me just, lastly—and I do not expect any in-depth discussion, but it is very important here. Someone suggested that when the history of 1985 is written, the most important event will have been the changes in China, and I agree with that. I think 50 years from now, when we look back upon 1985, the most important event will be this change in direction, assuming it continues.

Are the Chinese moving too rapidly, in your mind, in this area? Is Deng Shiao-peng overpromising, do you think, in terms of the success of these economic reforms in the industrial and commercial arena?

Secretary **VANCE**. I do not think they have moved too rapidly. Although the speed with which they have moved is extraordinary, I think the Chinese have moved with a great deal of care and thought. They thought a long while before they took the decision to launch the rural reforms some 5 years ago, and as we all know, those have succeeded in a really spectacular fashion.

The decision to move forward with the urban reforms is, in a way, a much bolder step because it involves problems which are much more complicated than the ones that are raised by the reforms in the rural economy.

Before deciding to go forward with the urban reforms, they studied the matter very carefully, they looked at all kinds of models including first, I believe, models in the socialist world. I believe that the model they found most interesting was that of Hungary, but having come to that conclusion, they felt that it ought to be looked at further, and they reexamined the Japanese and American models, and parts of those were also included to come up with what they call a Chinese model, which is really a grafting of a free market economy on a planned economy. They think it will work for them. They believe, as I understand it, that they have moved with sufficient care and preparation that at this point a majority of not only the senior officials but the bureaucracy as well is supportive of their actions. If they move with sufficient caution in seeking to implement their program, I believe they have a better than 50 percent chance of succeeding.

And if they do, as you indicated, this is one of the most extraordinary steps that we have seen in decades and decades.

Senator DODD. I agree.

I think there is some strong opposition obviously within China as well about this.

Secretary VANCE. Oh, yes, I agree, there are people who don't like it and who are still in the bureaucracy, but I think you have strong leadership in the Premier, in the General Secretary of the Party, and in the overall guiding advice from Deng Shiao-peng. If enough time passes and then the roots of their new programs are sunk deeply enough and they proceed carefully, I believe they will so firmly have established their course that it will be very hard for those who are opposed to turn it around.

Senator DODD. Did you see anything while you were there?

I think rhetorically being supportive is not insignificant, and certainly the visit by the President I think helps tremendously, and they were very proud of that visit.

Are there other things that we might be considering here in the Congress to underpin that particular effort which I think most people see as being very advantageous, not only for the Chinese, but also for the United States.

Have you given any thought to some things we might do?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; there will be some bilateral treaties and agreements that will be coming before you. These matters are either in the process of being negotiated or that have already been completed. Prompt action on these matters by this committee and by the Congress are very important. Prompt action will signal that we want to do what we can to help advance the course on which they are moving.

Senator DODD. One of the things, of course, is that we have some existing laws which prohibit the U.S. Government from providing any direct financial assistance because of the nature of the political system in that country.

One of the problems, having met with some of the American business community there, is the access to markets there and the cost of doing business in the People's Republic of China on some of these joint ventures and so forth.

I am wondering if you have given any thought to any assistance in that particular arena outside of the diplomatic support. I think your suggestion is a good one with regard to the treaties, but how about in the economic, commercial side of this thing? Are there some things that we might do which would help underpin this goal?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; I think there are, and one of the problems, as undoubtedly you know, that they complain most about is the difficulty in getting decisions with respect to export licenses from the United States. They get hung up for months and months. It is an irritant that should be dealt with more promptly. I also think that the specific issue which you discussed is one that ought to be examined, and as far as I am concerned, I think you can make changes necessary to permit financial assistance without doing any harm.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Before thanking Secretary Vance, I want to remind members of the committee that we will be here tomorrow morning again at 10 o'clock when our witness will be former National Security Advisor, Richard Allen. On Wednesday morning at 10 o'clock we will hear from former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger; and on Thursday we will have as our witness former Secretary of State Alexander Haig. We would ask members to put those times and dates on their calendars.

We are deeply indebted to Secretary Vance this morning for a very important statement and for your forthcoming answers, as always, to questions of members.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was a great pleasure to be back.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, February 5, 1985.]

OUTLINES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1985

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Helms, Pressler, Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, and Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

The committee has now had the opportunity to hear from three witnesses on the theme of the future of American foreign policy: Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and yesterday the committee had a very useful and spirited exchange with former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

Mr. Vance presented the committee with a thoughtful and comprehensive review of America's basic, enduring national interests. And he noted the need to strike a balance in the pursuit of goals that often compete for our attention and our resources. He also emphasized that as we discuss specific policies designed to protect and promote these national interests, it is essential with respect to the most important of decisions, namely, when a commitment of U.S. Forces is involved, our system must be allowed to work, that all voices be heard and a near consensus reached before we act. And for that reason, Secretary Vance called for a strengthening of the War Powers Act.

As the committee continues its deliberations, we are pleased to welcome this morning Richard Allen, former National Security Adviser to President Ronald Reagan and an active participant in American foreign policy in many capacities over many years.

Mr. Allen, we are grateful to you for coming before the committee this morning to share with us your thoughts and observations. Before I ask you to commence your testimony, I would like to ask Senator Pell, the ranking minority member, to make an opening statement.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I associate myself with your thoughts and words, and am very glad indeed to join in welcoming Richard Allen here with us again.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Allen, would you commence with your testimony?

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD V. ALLEN, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

Mr. ALLEN. Senator Lugar, it is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to appear before this committee this morning. I would like to hand over to you one of the few extant copies of a 1,000-page study entitled "National Security, Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead," published in 1963 as the first publication of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies series of conference.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is very grateful for this gift.

Mr. ALLEN. I will not ask that it be incorporated in the record in its entirety, Senator Lugar. As you can see, it is sort of a lap crusher. But at the time, in 1963, the effort of that volume and the conference preceding it represented as an attempt to look ahead 10 years into the future. And reading it 20 years later, or more than 20 years later is a very instructive experience indeed.

And so I hope that as you begin your deliberations, why, from time to time you can use it as a compendium of reference about what people were thinking 22 years ago.

Mr. Chairman, it is of course a pleasure to appear once again before this committee to discuss a subject in which the Congress as well as the executive branch must play a truly critical role, the future of American foreign policy. The committee deserves high praise for undertaking this comprehensive review and overview of American foreign policy.

This meticulous, long-headed approach to U.S. foreign policy reminds me of the late Senator Henry Jackson's extraordinary examination of U.S. security and defense policies and the machinery used in the formulation and implementation of those policies. His committee's work was of great value in shaping the way we evaluate our long-term objectives, and it certainly helped consolidate the intellectual infrastructure for a bipartisan spirit of consensus in support of unified goals for American foreign policy.

Scoop Jackson's contribution had a deep and lasting impact on me and upon many of my contemporaries. His was a serious effort that carried with it an air of excitement, a sense that despite obvious differences of outlook and a little partisan wrangling at the edges, Democrats and Republicans of all persuasions could find broad areas of agreement on which to unite in defense of the national interest.

I liked that approach then, and I like it now, and that is why the areas of inquiries outlined in your letter, Mr. Chairman, and the methodical and the very rigorous approach to a complex subject area such as this can lead to the restoration of bipartisan dialog about our Nation's future security.

None of this will be achieved quickly, and there will be inevitable frustrations and unseen obstacles as you pursue your work. But pursue it you must.

The conclusions to which the members of this distinguished committee will come will not be easily or quickly translated into policy choices, but you will leave a lasting record of value and a clear trail of consensus about the need for return to bipartisanship in foreign policy. The Nation needs that, and the Nation is ready to give its support.

The American people are tired of partisan bickering about foreign and national security policies, and they want firm, visible cooperation between the responsible branches of Government.

Your questions in this first phase of the hearings raise issues of steadiness of purpose, predictability, continuity, clarity of objectives, coordination, capabilities, consensus. In later stages you will go into more detail about specific policy options.

I would like to spend the first few moments of my remarks to you this morning addressing some broad foreign policy goals that had been a part of our postwar foreign policy history. For most of that period there was indeed a bipartisan consensus on what American foreign policy goals ought to be. Americans in general, and their Representatives in Congress as well as in the executive branch, agreed that the United States should maintain its strength for the preservation of peace and freedom. We did not always succeed, but our motives and our methods were right. The Berlin airlift, the Korean war, actions in Lebanon in 1958, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and the Dominican Republic crisis in 1965 all occurred with broad support and public understanding.

As the war-torn nations of Asia and Europe recovered, we tried to find ways to share more equitably the responsibilities and burdens for preserving peace and freedom. In our relationship with the Soviet Union, we recognized the significance of the threat to peace and the need for an appropriate deterrent, and in order to preserve the peace, we have maintained a military capability to counter conventional and strategic threats. Indeed, we have been called upon from time to time to take decisive action to make clear that the United States would not countenance aggression against our friends and our allies, much less against our own basic interests and territory.

For a long time there was essential unity between the executive and legislative branches on these actions, a unity desperately needed today.

We have learned the interrelationship between domestic economic strength and foreign policy, and we have learned the interrelationship between international economic stability and political coordination and unity among allies. More recently, we have learned to accept the limits of our power without shrinking from the responsibility of exercising it when clearly defined U.S. national and international interests are at stake.

Another lesson is that our system, which depends primarily upon private sector initiatives and growth, is measurably more successful in providing the essential conditions in the achievement of human dignity, liberty, personal freedom, and indeed, an equitable distribution of wealth than is a system dependent on central planning which leads only toward corruption, inefficiency, stagnation, failure, and frustration.

The developing countries of the world, one-time advocates of the idea of socialism, are no longer enamored of a Socialist model for their development, and one after another, they are shedding their Socialist baggage.

In narrower terms of our relationship with the Soviet Union, a relationship that has influenced virtually every aspect of our overall foreign policy since the end of World War II, we have followed a policy of containment. The creation of NATO, the growth of Alliance, all of this has been the formidable shield of deterrence to outright Soviet aggression. Containment has not worked as well at the margins or in the remote areas of the world, and we will forever be challenged in such locations not so much by the potential spread of Soviet military power, and hence the threat of Soviet takeover, as by the growth of indigenous forces hostile to the United States and protected by the growing global reach of Soviet military assistance and outright military power.

In broad terms, the strategy of containment is the best strategy for the United States and should remain an essential ingredient of our thinking and of our policy. We cannot contain everywhere, and I know of no one who suggests that we should try. To do so would stretch us dangerously thin and would quickly engulf us in a bitter internal debate. In my opinion, the most effective form of containment is to remain strong and united, politically, economically, and militarily. Our task is not to try to react to each Soviet advance in the world but to project a level of confidence and determination based on our strength sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from committing aggression.

In areas of the world remote from the Soviet Union, we should seek to deflect Soviet inspired incursions by strengthening governments in their own capability to resist. This is not easy, as we see at this moment in the case of our ally, the Republic of the Philippines, where threats to the political stability of the government of President Marcos are being mounted by the Communist New People's Army.

With the bitter examples of Iran and Nicaragua fresh in our minds, any actions we take to deflect a Communist threat there must be balanced by delicate considerations of national interest and basic loyalty toward an old and valued friend. Would we be prepared, for example, to commit American forces to preserve the chances for democracy in the Philippines in the face of an imminent Communist takeover? What about the considerations of the vitally important military installations at Clark Field and Subic Bay, irreplaceable assets to protect not just the interests of the United States and the people of the Philippines, but also all of Southeast Asia and the People's Republic of China as well.

Or to take another example in that region, what would be our reaction to an attempt by the People's Republic of China to take by force the territory of the Republic of China on Taiwan? The Taiwan Relations Act, the product of this committee and the Congress as a whole, states that the United States would regard such an attempt as a grave threat to peace in the region but does not specify what measures would be taken to respond.

Certainly the American people would react strongly to such an eventuality, but would our understanding of the principle of containment require us to act with our assets? Do Europeans believe that we will respond by coming to their aid at a time of outright Soviet aggression? What should be the limits of containment, and with what types of weapons and deployment should we react?

In fact, it is difficult to predict precisely how we will respond in any given instance, but one thing is certain: As long as we are perceived by the potential aggressor to have the capability and the will to respond, he will think twice about his actions.

You asked an important question about the efficacy of doctrines in foreign policy and whether some overall consensus on a single policy approach or doctrine could be fashioned, and if so, would it serve U.S. national interests? My answer is that it would not, and that the best and most effective doctrines in American history evolved not by the conscious decision of a statesman to etch a place for himself in the monument of American history, but as a pragmatic and effective response to an important challenge to the interests of our country.

Hence, the Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine, declarations that had enormous impact on the world and on our history, were more successful than other attempts, such as the Nixon Doctrine or the Carter Doctrine. President Reagan has fortunately spared us from a similar attempt, and if I know his way of thinking about such things, he will decline the pleasure of attempting to link his name with a doctrine.

This does not mean that we should not resolutely adhere to certain basic principles as the basis for our foreign policy, but doctrines and the like, including elaborate constructs and theories about international relations and the behavior of our adversaries, are likely to be unrelated to the real world at best, and even misleading and disastrous in the worst case. When saying this I have in mind the concept of détente in its recent form.

Now, détente means simply relaxation of tensions, and it should be beyond debate that the effect of all our policies ought to be the relaxation of international tensions, whether with allies or adversaries. As an operating principle of American foreign policy, détente should be a key ingredient of our diplomacy. But when we discuss the state of American-Soviet relations today and ask whether we should return to the détente of the 1970's, we suddenly find ourselves talking about something else. That kind of détente was an elaborated theory about how we could influence the behavior of the Soviet Union and enhance our own security through material incentives, through trade, credits and increased human contacts. The Soviets benefitted enormously by this policy and simply did not modify their behavior in any important way.

There were learned disquisitions about how détente was not divisible and how the Soviet Union could not simply expect to accrue the benefits accorded under this policy and at the same time undermine American and Western interests in peripheral places such as Angola, Ethiopia, and other distant locations.

Clearly, for me, the earnest or the harvest of détente was for us some shattered illusions, while for the Soviets it meant an important step forward both economically and militarily. In this form, elevated from a tactic which ought to be a component part of our diplomacy and foreign policy to a theology, détente was an utter failure. Its last gasp came during the administration of President Carter when the remaining shreds of credibility surrounding this doctrine were ripped away as Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan.

The victory of President Reagan in 1980 and again in 1984 underscored the low esteem of the American public for anything resembling that policy of détente.

Mr. Chairman, this committee begins its inquiry at the outset of the 11th national administration and the 8th Presidency since the end of World War II. All our Presidents in the postwar period have sought to enhance the security of the American people, our allies, and our friends. The basic goals are simple and straightforward and ought not to be freighted with elaborate hypotheses. As Secretary of State Shultz said last week in his splendid statement, equilibrium is not enough; American foreign policy is driven by positive goals: Peace, democracy, liberty and human rights, racial justice, economic and social progress, the strengthening of cooperation, and the rule of law.

Clearly, the conclusion is that there is more continuity in our policy over the course of the last 40 years than would appear to be the case at first glance. If this is so, then the bipartisan consensus that you are looking for and which we so badly needed was not lost or destroyed but remains embedded, although perhaps hidden from view, in our policy process and in the policy decisions themselves. The job is to find it and to bring it out again in the open and to see if we can do that without tripping over the formidable obstacles of ideological zeal and maneuvering for short-term political advantage.

And these hearings, in my mind, are an important first step in that direction.

In 40 years, since the end of World War II, we have had, when you stop to think about it, a large number of foreign policy successes. As we recall the administration of Mr. Truman, we are persuaded to remember the courageous and decisive actions he took, basing his decisions not on complicated theories but on common sense and his perception of morality and the common good. His early recognition of Stalin and the Soviet Union for what they truly were led him to respond to the systematic subjugation of Eastern Europe and to send the Soviets stern, purposeful messages about Iran, Greece, and Turkey, with the Marshall plan and point 4, with the Berlin airlift, NATO, and the dispatch of American troops to Korea.

In taking these actions of monumental importance, he enjoyed the broad support of the American people and the steady assistance of the Congress.

But there were indeed failures of that era. We were or seemed to be powerless to do anything about Poland, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and China. Despite all that we did to reassure the Soviet Union, including generous offers to participate in Marshall plan reconstruction aid, overtures for peace from the West were rejected, and a deep chill set in.

The administration of Dwight Eisenhower, both administrations of Dwight Eisenhower, were dedicated to the maintenance of peace and freedom by the combined increase of strength and U.S. military capabilities and the introduction of the doctrine of massive retaliation.

Before the Soviets could adjust to the new Eisenhower administration, Stalin died, and a new era in Soviet-American relations was at hand. The emergence of Khrushchev and Bulganin, the summitry of the fifties, the open skies proposal, and hopes for some reasonable accommodations with the Soviets literally vanished in the wake of the Soviet Union's actions to throttle popular resistance and uprisings in Poland and Hungary.

The doctrine of liberation of Eastern Europe, and in the eyes of some, the Soviet Union itself, evaporated in the helplessness of the United States to do anything significant to assist communism's bitter opponents in what were then called the satellite states.

While the West was significantly strengthened in its political will, as well as its military capability to resist the Soviet Union during the Eisenhower years, the containment policies of the past remained as the centerpiece of U.S. and allied strategy.

It was in the Kennedy-Johnson years that things began to change rapidly. The Bay of Pigs and its successor crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, resulted in a form of guarantee of the permanent inviolability of the newly installed Communist regime in Cuba. We pay for that on the installment plan today.

The military strategic outcome of the missile crisis was, for the time being, very satisfactory, and was reflected in the congressional elections of November 1962. But containment had, for the first time, in Cuba failed in an area of true, vital importance to the United States, on an island redoubt just 90 miles from our shores.

At the same time, relieved by the apparent peaceful resolution of the most serious military crisis in postwar history, our analysis of Soviet motives and objectives underwent an important change. Many were convinced that the Soviet Union, having had the brief and unpleasant experience of staring down the nuclear gun barrel in a direct confrontation with the United States, would henceforth seek peaceful avenues of competition.

In fact, this and other policy assumptions were wrong. The Soviet Union had a taste of what it was like to engage a superpower in every respect and vowed that it would never again be the case. In other words, the Soviet Union would never again approach a crisis with the United States from a position of overall inferiority much less strategic inferiority. And accordingly, Nikita Khrushchev embarked upon a period of military growth that continues to this day. The objective has been and continues to be not just equality with the United States but all around superiority in every measurable category of military power.

It is, in short, Mr. Chairman, the most important and impressive military buildup in the history of mankind with which we are confronted today.

The Vietnam war, that unhappy period whose most serious consequence may well turn out to be the submergence of bipartisanship in American foreign policy, ushered in an era of bitter debate, of suspicion, of recrimination, deception, and divisiveness in foreign policy.

By the time Richard Nixon took office in January 1969, an administration which I joined from the outset, the crisis had moved to new levels. Literally within weeks of taking office, there was an important and highly underrated challenge from a newly created subcommittee of this committee on U.S. commitments, a part of this distinguished committee, and for its part, the new administration undertook a radical shift in the methodology and the structure of foreign policymaking, a shift that brought to the White House and to the National Security Council system unprecedented power.

I thought then, and I still believe today, that this single act was unfortunate and unwise, and that it contributed in a direct way to exacerbating the growing struggle between Congress and the administration. Apart from having a disastrous effect on the morale of the Nation's traditional foreign policy machinery which was manned by professionals, it had the additional undesirable effect of excluding the Congress and coopting the press.

The concentration of power in the executive branch led to further misunderstandings, and the leaking of national security information, previously only an episodic problem, reached epidemic proportions. This unfortunate development was but a further corrosive step undermining cooperation between the two responsible branches of government, and I believe a case can be made that obsession, indeed, paranoia with leaks ultimately contributed to the downfall of the Nixon administration.

All through this debate we seemed progressively to lose sight of our objectives. Goals were enunciated by the administration and immediately challenged by opponents in all quarters. It seemed as if every announced goal carried with it a burden of suspicion, and in such a climate, it was easy to slip into what could easily be construed as crass partisanship. Often it was just that and nothing more.

I have never believed that there is or ought to be a Republican or Democratic foreign policy. Although I am a Republican and am proud of it, especially under the Reagan-Bush administrations, in whose campaigns I have had a part, I have always sought to make common cause with members of the Democratic Party in pursuit of what I consider to be sound foreign policy and national security objectives.

As one of the founding members and a member of the executive committee of the organization I consider to have been one of the most effective of all time, the Committee on the Present Danger, I can testify to the effectiveness of bipartisan cooperation in pursuit of broad national goals. The membership of the Committee on the Present Danger was composed of about 60 percent Democrats and the remainder Republicans and Independents. We have met since 1976 to debate the central issues of foreign policy and national security without ever losing our individual identities or forsaking loyalty to our respective parties.

Sixty members of the Committee on the Present Danger have served in the Reagan administration in various capacities, including one as President of the United States, and I can never recall an incident of partisanship or political considerations having affected our deliberations.

To the dismay and sometimes the consternation of some, the Committee on the Present Danger has had a profound impact on the shape of the debate regarding our Nation's defense and foreign policies, but for the Members of this body, our joint accomplishments are a source of great pride.

Why should there not be many more truly bipartisan organizations with a similar motivation, to work for better policies?

And if I may digress for a moment, Senators, I would like to mention another transnational, nearly bipartisan undertaking that has been the object of attention of the Republican Party for the past 3 years. We have, along with 22 other parties throughout the world, moderate and conservative parties, created an organization called the International Democrat Union. These 23 parties represent more than 150 million voters or party members in as many countries. Our purpose is to share information, to support one another, to, so to speak, spread bipartisanship across the Atlantic and the Pacific. We will be blessed with a meeting of party leaders this summer. Chancellor Kohl, Mrs. Thatcher, Prime Minister Malroney, President Reagan, certainly Prime Minister Willoch of Norway, Prime Minister Schluter of Denmark, we hope Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan, will all be in the United States for the first time in their capacity as party leaders.

Our function is to help each other come to power, if you will, and stay in power. But more important, ours is an effort to promote good policies, good policies on an international basis. This sort of broad transnational effort is of exceptional importance and reflects in an important way the initiatives taken by President Reagan to support democracy, democracy as a cause.

If we set aside the disastrous consequences for our foreign policy of Watergate and its bitter aftermath, there remain some real accomplishments of the Nixon-Ford years. For example, President Nixon took the important step of creating within the White House structure the office of an Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. I had the opportunity to serve in that office as the Deputy to the President for International Economic Affairs under Peter Peterson, the first occupant of the office.

This was a step which was long overdue and which assigned a position of central importance to the fields of international economic and trade policy. This office and the Council on International Economic Policy, whose work it directed, was designed to function as the equivalent of the National Security Council, and was charged with the task of coordinating the work of more than 65 agencies throughout the Government engaged in international economic activity and policymaking.

As luck would have it, and bad luck at that, both the State Department and the Treasury Department wanted no part of such an agency at the President's elbow, and with the onset of Watergate the CIEP began to wither away. Incredibly, and as a reflection of the priorities of the incoming Carter administration, both the Council on International Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board were abolished as economy measures. At the very time when such bodies were needed, they were simply wished out of existence.

However, even as the Vietnam war and its aftermath took their tolls on American foreign policy, our image abroad, and our credibility among friends and adversaries alike, the heart of our policy toward the Soviet Union remained the basic doctrine of containment. Negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve arms control were an expression of that basic doctrine, as were the successful attempts to establish communications with the People's Republic of China.

It was during the Carter years, an administration that could count among its own diplomatic successes the historic accord between Israel and Egypt, that things began to unravel rapidly. Years of underfunding, not alone the fault of the Carter administration, of our military forces, combined with a general decline in our inner confidence and the credibility of our staying power, culminated in a series of historic foreign policy reverses.

With our willingness as well as our ability to contain now in doubt, the NATO alliance underwent its most serious crisis since its establishment. The impact of Iran, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan, not to mention other regional problems, had a profoundly upsetting effect on the global position of the United States.

The administration of President Carter negotiated an arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, SALT II, that was severely attacked in this body. It was deemed a treaty "not in the national security interest of the United States" by the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the debate in this committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which had primary jurisdiction at the time, was hardly conclusive or persuasive.

As a result of the deep concern reflected by the Senate, the Carter administration did not even formally submit the treaty to the Senate for debate. I consider that unfortunate because, while I was a critic and an opponent of that treaty, I had hoped that its submission would be the focal point for a great debate on national strategy, something like overdue and something that only the U.S. Senate can conduct effectively.

Since you have assigned to future sessions of these hearings the examination of specific policies, I will not comment in great detail on what I consider to be a successful record of the first Reagan-Bush administration. But I would like to observe that, in contrast to his predecessor, he has taken steps to restore American defenses and has directed important efforts to restore the strategic balance with the Soviet Union.

As we know, he is not yet there. A study of the Committee of the Present Danger which I have provided for each Senator, Senator Lugar, entitled "Can America Catch Up: The U.S.-Soviet Military Balance," clearly shows that there are problems. I hope that you will have the opportunity to read and study this report, and I hope that it can be incorporated as one of the appendices to these important hearings.

I would like to point out, too, that the necessary strengthening of our defenses initiated by President Reagan continues to enjoy wide public support, as polls show, although this fact is seldom reflected in the media. I have also included for your later deliberation copies of two exhaustive polls taken by the Committee on the Present Danger, which were published and which demonstrate rather dramatically that the level of misinformation on the part of the American people concerning defense spending and its various components is startling.

I think there is a great deal to be learned by pouring through the data of these sophisticated and exhaustive polls. I think it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the level of public support for the necessary restoration of the military balance with the Soviet Union or, to put it another way, in the terms of a phrase that was coined in the 1980 campaign in which I had a proud part, the restoration of the margin of safety is deemed by the American people to be an important assignment.

I believe that the Reagan-Bush administration has taken very important steps, with the support of the Congress—not always the willing support of every Member of Congress, but with general support, to close the gap.

Just a few weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, I spoke at length at a symposium in Germany at the Hanns Seidel Foundation of the Christian Social Union. I spoke on the topic, "The Second Reagan Administration: Europe, East-West Relations, and National Security." I have provided each member of the committee with a copy, and I respectfully request that it be incorporated as a part of my major statement to you today, since its themes are precisely those that you will be addressing in your future deliberations.

In broad terms, President Reagan has accomplished very much. Together with the Congress, he has strengthened our economy at home and has secured our key alliances in Europe and Asia. He has restored a sense of dignity to the Presidency and, appropriately I think, he has supported the freedom fighters in Afghanistan and Nicaragua despite severe criticism.

When the accumulated impediments I have described this morning threatened success in working together with the Congress, he wisely utilized bipartisan commissions to lay the groundwork for consensus on such key issues as the MX missile and Central America.

I travel abroad frequently and I can remember no other time since that of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy when I lived abroad when foreigners, political leaders, businessmen, scholars, ordinary citizens, have stood in greater admiration of the United States as a leader. The credit for this fortunate condition reflects not just on the President and his administration, but upon all Members of Congress, regardless of party, and upon the Nation as a whole. This is good for the United States.

I suppose if this administration had it to do all over again, the dispatch of Marines to Lebanon would have been handled differently. The rationale for the use of the Marines shifted during their presence in Lebanon, and we did not take steps to assure their protection. The result was a disaster. So with this tragic incident we are reminded that it has not been a case of all successes for President Reagan.

The United States-Soviet relationship is a subject you are going to probe in considerable detail, and since I have addressed it in my recent address in Germany which I asked be incorporated, I will limit my remarks to the observation that the United States-Soviet relation is about as good as it can be expected to be in overall terms, and shows signs of getting better from our perspective.

The Soviet leadership is in a profound systemic crisis. This is a crisis aggravated by political instability. It is combined with deeply rooted economic problems and widespread unease among the many nationalities of the Soviet Union, not to mention the mounting anti-Soviet tendencies in Eastern Europe.

So the Soviet Union desperately needs a "peredyshka" or a breathing space. This is a classic Soviet tactic, especially when the

Soviet Union is in trouble. This is going to be a delicate period, one requiring a great deal of care and not a little caution.

But I am as certain as I have ever been that the United States enjoys great strength and confidence in handling this relationship, and my confidence derives as much from the solidity of the players, the President, the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence Casey, and National Security Adviser McFarlane, as it does from the correctness of the policy itself.

You have asked the question, Mr. Chairman, as to whether we are overcommitted or underpowered. I would like to address a few words to the matter and the question of how far American commitments should go and whether or not we have the capability to fulfil those commitments.

It is true, as you have pointed out, that some believe the United States is committed well beyond its means and beyond the bounds of common sense. Those who share this view believe that we should sharply limit these responsibilities, shifting the implied burden to those directly affected or to other nations.

But these critics have not made the case for the wisdom of dropping any specific commitments, and they certainly have not demonstrated convincingly just how this is to be accomplished.

Many think that the United States seeks to be the world's policeman, but there are more countries in the world unprotected by American commitments than are actually protected, and since the late 1960's there have been no attempts to expand, either qualitatively or quantitatively, U.S. commitments, if only because the Congress has kept its watchful eye on this process.

Moreover, we have sought to spread the burden, that is, the burden of defending the West and defending our interests. The question of sharing the cost of maintaining NATO, for example, is a recurrent and often very troublesome topic among our allies. Or take the persistent United States persuasion directed at Japan, an ally that spends only 1 percent of its gross national product on defense, to assume even greater responsibility for the defense of the Pacific region.

We maintain extensive commitments to defend vital interests, and not every interest counts as a vital interest. It is certainly time for us to review again what are our vital interests.

I would argue that we are not overcommitted in terms of worthy objectives, but that we may indeed be underpowered to meet all of them at once. It is not reasonable, I think, to expect that all the chickens would come home to roost at the same time, in the sense that all of our commitments would be activated simultaneously, and therefore I consider that to be a fairly sterile area for discussion.

But there is disagreement over what constitutes a vital commitment. We do not have a standard, all-encompassing definition, but it is clear to me that we can reason our way to defining each commitment with sufficient precision so as to be able to come to a judgment about how vital it actually is.

As you proceed with your deliberations here, the degree of vitalness of each commitment will become increasingly clear. At the same time, in examining the nature of threats to our vital interests, it will become clear to you and to the nation at large that the common thread is indeed the Soviet Union.

In the final analysis, there is little doubt that the Soviet Union remains our principal adversary and that it seeks to advance its own interests and influence to the detriment of ours. Having said this, I think it is important to note that I do not share the opinion held by some that the United States and the Soviet Union are two peas in a pod, sharing equal guilt for the tensions and challenges that make the world such a difficult place.

There are indeed qualitative and moral differences separating us from the Soviet Union, and these differences are profound. They are, above all, recognized by the American people. We are for democracy, equality, peace, freedom—all the goals described by Secretary Shultz in his testimony to you last week. The Soviet Union represents the antithesis of these objectives, and no amount of debate or sophistry will change this fundamental fact.

Hence it follows that platitudinous appeals for good will on both sides to resolve fundamental differences will net us very little in concrete terms. Of course, we should have good will, but the differences are so stark, so fundamental, that they cannot be bridged. Those who doubt this should remember that any occupant of a Soviet gulag could easily demonstrate the difference between the two systems.

This does not mean that we cannot live with the Soviet Union. As much as a problem as it is for us and as beset as it is with internal difficulties, contradictions, corruption, and uncertainty, it is a fact of life. And of course, we will continue to discuss and negotiate with this unusual entity, only because it possesses the means of annihilation, modern weapons of mass destruction. That it is a totalitarian tyranny in every respect does not invalidate its existence, nor does it give us the right to ignore it.

My reading of the events of the past 40 years yields a few lessons worth remembering:

First, the United States has an historic mission to preserve peace. This can be done only by remaining strong at home and faithful to a system of alliances abroad that involve shared burdens and responsibilities.

Second, this strategy of containment, deficient and vague in many respects, has served the United States and its allies well in one form or another for nearly four decades, and it should remain the essential ingredient of our strategy.

Third, we do have vital commitments. They can be defined and defended most effectively by matching our capabilities with them.

Fourth, foreign policy goals must be clearly defined and effectively communicated.

Fifth, we should never undercut or pull the plug on friends and allies, nor should we subject them to scorn or abuse.

Sixth, the Soviet Union respects a strong, purposeful and confident America, and will take advantage of perceived weakness or vacillation.

Seventh, the effective coordination of all elements of our foreign policy—political, economic, moral, strategic—must be assigned an urgent priority, and the mechanism for implementing this coordination under the rubric of grand strategy should be established.

Eighth, a way must be found to coordinate and consult with the Congress, without impairing the separation of powers and without placing intolerable restraint upon the executive branch's freedom of action. For its part, Congress should seek to consolidate and streamline its own complicated committee system, which inhibits effective and constructive cooperation.

Ninth, confidentiality and trust must again become the norm between the two branches of Government responsible for our foreign policy. Important gains in recent years should be consolidated by greater efforts to resolve differences between representatives of the branches, and not by carrying disputes to the media.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that we are confronted now with an extraordinary opportunity to overhaul and modernize the way we conduct our foreign affairs. Talking about bipartisanship, the essential condition for national success, is enjoyable and useful. Implementing it is considerably harder.

I cannot help but think that the time has come for decisive steps. I think the time is now. This Congress, this President, have this opportunity. In this presentation today, I have given you merely some opinions concerning why I think it can and ought to be done now. I look forward to discussing it with you in detail.

[Mr. Allen's prepared statement follows:]

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

STATEMENT OF RICHARD V. ALLEN

Distinguished Fellow and Chairman, Asian Studies Center
The Heritage Foundation

and

Senior Counsellor for Foreign Policy and
National Security Affairs,
The Republican National Committee

Before the

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

February 5, 1985

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

It is indeed a pleasure to appear once again before this Committee to discuss a subject in which the Congress, as well as the Executive Branch, must play a critical role--"The Future of American Foreign Policy."

The Committee deserves high praise for undertaking this comprehensive review and overview of American Foreign Policy. This meticulous, long-headed approach to United States foreign policy reminds me of the late Senator Henry Jackson's extraordinary examination of U.S. security and defense policies and the machinery used in the formulation and implementation of those policies. His Committee's work was of great value in shaping the way we evaluate our long-term objectives, and helped consolidate the intellectual infrastructure for a bipartisan spirit of consensus in support of unified goals for American foreign policy. "Scoop" Jackson's contribution had a deep and lasting impact on me and upon many of my contemporaries; his was a serious effort that carried with it an air of excitement, a sense that--despite obvious differences of outlook and a little partisan wrangling at the edges--Democrats and Republicans of all persuasions could find broad areas of agreement on which to unite in defense of the national interest.

I liked that approach then, and I like it now. That is why the areas of inquiry outlined in your letters, Mr. Chairman, and the methodical and rigorous approach to a complex subject area that these hearings promise can lead to the restoration of bipartisan dialogue about our nation's future security. It certainly won't be achieved quickly, and there will be inevitable frustrations and unseen obstacles as you pursue your work.

The conclusions to which the Members of this distinguished Committee will come will not be easily or quickly translated into policy choices, but you will leave a lasting record of value and a clear trail of consensus about the need for a return to bipartisanship. The nation needs that and is ready to give its support; the American people are tired of partisan bickering about foreign and national security policies and want firm, visible cooperation between the responsible branches of Government.

Your questions in this first phase of the hearings raise issues of steadiness of purpose, predictability, continuity, clarity of objectives, coordination, capabilities and consensus. Later stages will take the committee into more specific questions relating to policy choices for the future, and I certainly hope that the opportunity to comment on these later and more detailed matters will be given to all who have the privilege of exchanging views with you in this early stage.

DEFINING FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

For most of the postwar period there was indeed a bipartisan consensus on what American Foreign Policy goals ought to be. Americans in general, and their representatives in Congress as well as in the Executive Branch, agreed that the United States should maintain its strength for the preservation of peace and freedom; we recognized the need to extend a hand to the less fortunate through our aid and trade programs, and through our military and supporting assistance programs to provide necessary and appropriate "shields" to preserve the peace and, in most cases, the democratic option.

We didn't always succeed, but our motives and our methods were rght. The Berlin Airlift, the Korean War, actions in Lebanon in 1958, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the Dominican Republic in 1965 all occurred with broad support and public understanding. As the war-torn nations of Asia and Europe recovered, we sought ways to share more equitably the responsibilities and burdens for the preservation of peace and human freedoms.

In our relationship to the Soviet Union, we recognize the significance of the threat to peace and the need for an appropriate deterrent. In order to preserve the peace, we have maintained a military capability to counter conventional and strategic threats. Indeed, we were called upon from time to time to take decisive actions to make clear that the United

States would not countenance aggression against our friends and allies. For a long time there was essential unity between the Executive and Legislative Branches on these actions, a unity desperately needed today in our more complex world in which structural and political changes have made formulation and execution of a consistent foregn policy more challenging and difficult.

We have learned the interrelationship between *domestic* economic strength and foreign policy; we have learned the interrelationship between *international* economic stability and political coordination and unity among allies. And, I think, more recently we have learned to accept the limits of our power without shrinking from the responsibility of exercising it when clearly defined U.S. national and international interests are at stake.

We have also learned another lesson--one I think the world has begun to appreciate--and that is the lesson that our system, which depends primarily on private sector initiatives and growth, is measurably more successful providing the essential conditions in the achievement of human dignity, liberty, personal freedom and, indeed, an equitable distribution of wealth, than is a system dependent on central planning, which leads only toward corruption, inefficiency, stagnation, failure and frustration. The developing countries of the world, once advocates of the idea of "socialism," are no longer enamored of a "socialist model" for their development, and one after another they are shedding their socialist baggage. Increasingly, the abject failures of Socialist regimes and so-called People's Democracies are apparent to all.

In narrower terms of our relationship with the Soviet Union, a relationship that has influenced virtually every aspect of our overall foreign policy since the end of Word War II, we have essentially followed a policy of containment. The creation of NATO in 1949, and the successful growth of the Alliance to this day, has been the formidable shield of deterrence to outright Soviet aggression. Containment has not worked as well at the margins, or in remote areas, and we will forever be challenged in such locations not so much by the potential spread of Soviet military power as by the the growth of indigenous forces hostile to the United States and protected by the growing global reach of Soviet military assistance and outright military power.

In broad terms, the strategy of containment is the best strategy for the United States, and should remain an essential ingredient of our thinking and our policy. We cannot contain everywhere, and I know of no one who suggests we should try; to do so would stretch us dangerously thin and would soon engulf us in a bitter internal debate.

In my opinion, the most effective form of containment is to remain strong and united, politically, economically and militarily. Our task is not to try to react to each Soviet advance in the world, but to project a level of confidence and determination, based on our strength, sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from committing aggression.

In areas of the world remote from the Soviet Union, we should seek to deflect Soviet-inspired incursions by strengthening governments in their own capability to resist. This is not easy, as we see at this moment in the case of our ally, the Republic of the Philippines, where threats to the political stability of the government of President Marcos are being mounted by the Communist New People's Army. With the bitter examples of Iran and Nicaragua fresh in our minds, any actions we take to deflect a communist thrust there must be balanced by delicate considerations of national interest and basic loyalty toward an old and valued friend.

Would we be prepared, for example, to commit American forces to preserve the chances for democracy in the Philippines in the face of an imminent communist takeover? What about the considerations of the vitally important military installations at Clark Field and Subic Bay, irreplaceable assets to protect not just the interests of the United States and the people of the Philippines, but also all of the South East Asian nations and the People's Republic of China as well, nations with whom we have no formal military arrangements but who depend on our presence?

Or, to take another example in that region, what would be our reaction to an attempt by the People's Republic of China to take by force the territory of the Republic of China or Taiwan? The Taiwan Relations Act, the product of this Committee and the Congress as a whole, states that the United States would regard such an attempt as a grave threat to peace in the region, but does not specify what specific measures would be taken to respond. Certainly the American peope would react strongly to such an eventuality, but would our understanding of the principle of containment require us to act with our assets?

Do Europeans believe that we will respond by coming to their aid at a time of outright Soviet aggression? What should be the limits of containment, and with what types of weapons and deployments should we react?

In fact, it is difficult to predict precisely how we will respond in any given instance, but one thing is certain: As long as we are perceived by the potential aggressor to have the capability and the will to respond, he will think twice about his actions. We will not always have the power and the means to respond to each crisis with the same degree of effectiveness, but remaining strong and determied--and visibly, credibly so--will be a major component of the strategy of containment.

You asked an important question about the efficacy of "doctrines" in foreign policy and if "some overall consensus on a single policy approach or doctrine could be fashioned, would it serve U.S. national interests?" My answer is that it would not, and that the best and most effective "doctrines" in American history evolved not by the conscious decision of a statesman to etch a place for himself in the monument of American history, but as a pragmatic and effective response to an important challenge to the interests of our country. Hence the Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctine, declarations that had enormous impact on the world and on our history, were more successful than other attempts, such as the "Nixon Doctrine" or the "Carter Doctrine." President Reagan has, fortunately, spared us from a similar attempt, and if I know his way of thinking about such things, he will decline the pleasure of attempting to link his name with a "doctrine."

This does not mean that we should not resolutely adhere to certain basic principles as the basis for our foreign policy. But "doctrines" and the like, including elaborate constructs and theories about international relations and the behavior of our adversaries are likely to be unrelated to the real world at best, and even misleading and disastrous in the worst case. When saying this, I have in mind the concept of "detente" in its recent form.

Now, detente means simply "relaxation of tensions," and it should be beyond debate that the effect of all our policies ought to be the relaxation of international tensions, whether with allies or adversaries. As an operating principle of American foreign policy, "detente" should be a key ingredient of our diplomacy. But when we discuss the state of American-Soviet relations today and ask whether we should "return to the detente" of the 1970s, we suddenly find ourselves talking about something else. That kind of detente was an elaborated theory about how we could influence the behavior of the Soviet Union and enhance our own security through material incentives, trade, credits and increased human contacts. The Soviets benefitted enormously by this policy, and simply did not modify their behavior in any important way.

There were learned disquisitions about how "detente" was not divisible, and how the Soviet Union could not simply expect to accrue the benefits accorded under this policy and at the same time undermine American and Western interests in peripheral places such as Angola, Ethiopia and other distant locations. The Soviets simply ignored these warnings and continued to enjoy what was for them an extraordinay windfall of trade, credits and technology, while at the same time relentlessly continuing the military buildup which had been their highest priority since the days following the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. Clearly, the earnest of detente was for us some shattered illusions, while for the Soviets it meant an important step forward, both economically and militarily. It's not that they didn't like the relaxed tensions that went along with our version of detente; after all, such thinking is a classic part of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice.

In this form, elevated from a tactic to a theology, "detente" was an utter failure. Its last gasp came during the Administration of President Carter, when the remaining shreds of credibility surrounding this "doctrine" were ripped away as Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. The victory of President Reagan in 1980, and again in 1984, underscored the low esteem of the American public for anything resembling that policy of "detente."

This Committee begins its inquiry at the outset of the eleventh national Administration and the eighth President since the end of World War II. All our Presidents in the postwar period have sought to enhance the security of the American people, our Allies and our friends. The basic goals are simple and straightforward, and ought not be freighted with elaborate hypotheses. As Secretary of State George Shultz put it here last week in his spendid statement,

> Equilibrium is not enough. American foreign policy is driven by positive goals--peace, democracy, liberty, and human rights; racial justice, economic and social progress; the strengthening of cooperation and the rule of law.

He correctly estimated that our nation is once again "in a position to have a major influence over the trend of events" in the world, and he put it as eloquently as anyone can: Our traditional goals and values have not changed.

This argues for the conclusion, then, that there is more continuity in our policy over the course of the last forty years than would appear to be the case at first glance. If this is so, then the bipartisan consensus that you are looking for and which we so badly need was not lost or destroyed, but remains imbedded--although perhaps hidden from view--in our policy process and in the policy decisions themselves. The task is to find it and bring it out in the open again, and to see if we can do that without tripping over the formidable obstacles of ideological zeal and maneuvering for short-term political advantage. These hearings are an important first step.

SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

In forty years since the end of World War II we have had, when you stop to think about it, a large number of foreign policy successes. The failures and disappointments are also easily identified, and we still argue over why they occurred and whether the lessons they taught us have been learned. In a way, President Truman's belief that there is nothing new in human behavior that is not contained in two books, the Bible and Plutarch's Lives, makes a great deal of sense; we ought to study carefully the lessons of the past, ancient and modern, to be informed about a future of which we know only that it will bring challenges and surprises.

As we recall the Administrations of Mr. Truman, we are persuaded to remember the courageous and decisive actions he took, basing his decisions not on complicated theories, but on common sense and his perception of morality and the common good.

His early recognition of Stalin and the Soviet Union for what they truly were led him to respond to the systematic subjugation of Eastern Europe and to send the Soviets sterm, purposeful messages about Iran, Greece and Turkey; with the Marshall Plan and Point Four; with the Berlin Airlift, NATO and the dispatch of American troops to Korea. In taking these actions of monumental importance, he enjoyed the broad support of the American people and the steady assistance of the Congress. What he did to generate this support thrust this country to the very center of the stage; we had accepted leadership of the non-communist world, and we were expected to lead wisely. The decisions taken in the seven years of President Truman's stewardship were of historic importance, and affect what we do today in a world grown infinitely more complex.

But there were, indeed, failures of that era: We were, or seemed to be, powerless to do anything about Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and China. Despite all that we did to reassure the Soviet Union, including generous offers to participate in Marshall Plan recostruction aid, overtures for peace from the West were rejected and the deep chill began.

The Administrations of Dwight Eisenhower were dedicated to the maintenance of peace and freedom by the combined increase of strength in U.S. military capabilities and the introduction of the doctrine of massive retaliation. Before the Soviets could adjust to the new Eisenhower Administration, Stalin died and a new era in Soviet-American relations was at hand. The emergence of Krushchev and Bulganin, the summitry of the 1950s, the Open Skies proposal and hopes for some reasonable accommodation with the Soviets vanished in the wake of the Soviet Union's actions to throttle popular resistance and uprisings in Poland and Hungary. The doctrine of "liberation" of Eastern Europe and, in the eyes of some, the Soviet Union itself, evaporated in the helplessness of the United States to do anything significant to assist communism's bitter opponents in what were then called the "satellite states."

While the West was significantly strengthened in its political will as well as its military capability to resist the Soviet Union during the Eisenhower years, the containment policies of the past remained as the centerpiece of U.S. and allied strategy. Real strides in the development and deployment of modern weapons maintained the strategic superiority of the United States, and with it the continuing confidence of our friends in Europe and elsewhere.

It was in the Kennedy-Johnson years that things began to change rapidly. The Bay of Pigs and its successor crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, resulted in a form of guarantee of the permanent inviolability of the newly installed communist regime in Cuba. The military-strategic outcome of the Missile Crisis was, for the time being, satisfactory, and was reflected in the Congressional elections of November 1962. But containment had for the first time failed in an area of true vital importance to the United States, on an island redoubt just 90 miles from our shores.

At the same time, relieved by the apparent "peaceful" resolution of the most serious military crisis in postwar history, our analysis of Soviet motives and objectives underwent an important change. Many in the United States were convinced that the Soviet Union, having had a brief experience of staring down the nuclear gunbarrel in a direct confrontation with the United States, would henceforth seek peaceful avenues of competition. In fact, this and other policy assumptions were wrong; the lesson the Soviets drew was far more ominous for the future: They had had a taste of what it was like to engage a power superior in every respect, and vowed that it would never again be the case. Accordingly, Nikita Khrushchev embarked upon a period of military growth that continues to this day. The objective has been, and continues to be, not just equality with the United States, but all-around superiority in every measurable category of military power.

The Vietnam War--that unhappy period whose most serious consequence may well turn out to be the submergence of bipartisanship in American foreign policy--ushered in an era of bitter debate, suspicion, recrimination, deception and divisiveness in foreign policy. It is safe to say that the split between President Johnson and the then Chairman of this Committee, Senator Fulbright, was the precursor of an epic struggle to gain control of the nation's foreign policy agenda.

I can well remember this period; it was complex and unpleasant for everyone, and especially so for the main actors, and it is a wonder that damage was not done to the relations of the United States with our traditional allies. As the campuses were radicalized and divided, the intellectual consensus that for so long had characterized and sustained the civilized debate about foreign policy objectives disappeared along with its political counterpart. By any measurement, that was a long, dark chapter in the history of our foreign policymaking.

By the time Richard Nixon took office in January 1969 the crisis had moved to new levels. Literally within weeks of taking office there was an important and highly underrated challenge from a newly created Subcommittee on U.S. Commitments, a part of this distinguished Committee. And, for its part, the new Administration undertook a radical shift in the methodology and structure of foreign policymaking, a shift that brought to the White House and to the National Security Council system unprecedented power. I thought then, and still believe today, that this single act was unfortunate and unwise, and that it contributed in a direct way to exacerbating the growing struggle between Congress and the Administration.

Apart from having a disastrous effect on the morale of the nation's traditional foreign policy machinery, which was manned by professionals, it had the additional undesirable effect of excluding the Congress and co-opting the press. The concentration of power in the Executive Branch led to further misunderstandings, and the leaking of national security information, previously only an episodic problem, reached epidemic proportions. This unfortunate development was but a further corrosive step undermining cooperation between the two responsible branches of government.

All through this debate we seemed progressively to lose sight of our objectives; goals were enunciated by the Administration and immediately challenged by opponents in all quarters. It seemed as if every announced goal carried with it a burden of suspicion, and in such a climate it was easy to slip into what could easily be construed as crass partisanship. Often it was just that, and nothing more.

I have never believed that there is, or ought to be, a "Republican" or a "Democratic" foreign policy. Although I am a Republican and am proud of it, especially under the Reagan-Bush Administration in whose campaigns I have had a part, I have always sought to make common cause with members of the Democratic party in pursuit of what I considered to be sound foreign and national security policies.

As one of the founding members and a Member of the Executive Committee of the organization I consider to have been one of the most effective of all time, The Committee on the Present Danger, I can testify to the effectiveness of bipartisan cooperation in pursuit of broad national goals. As a matter of fact, the membership of the Committee on the Present Danger was composed of about 60 percent Democrats, and the remainder Independents and Republicans. We have met since 1976 to debate the central issues of foreign policy and national security without ever losing our individual identities or forsaking loyalty to our respective parties. Sixty members of the CPD have served in the Reagan Administration in various capacitites (including one as President of the United States) and I can never recall an incident of partisanship of political considerations having affected our deliberations. To the dismay and sometimes the consternation of some, the Committee on the Present Danger has had a profound impact on the shape of the debate regarding our nation's defense and foreign policies, but for the Members of this body our joint accomplishments are a source of great pride. Why shouldn't there be many more truly bipartisan organizations with a similar motivation to work for better policies?

If we set aside the disastrous consequences for our foreign policy of Watergate and its bitter aftermath, there remain some real accomplishments of the Nixon-Ford years.

For example, President Nixon took the important step of creating within the White House structure the office of an Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, a step long overdue which assigned a position of central importance to the fields of international economic and trade policies. This office and the Council on International Economic Policy whose work it directed, was designed to function as the equivalent of the National Security Council, and was charged with the task of coordinating the work of more than 65 agencies throughout the Government engaged in international economic activity and policymaking.

As luck would have it, both the State Department and the Treasury Department wanted no part of such an agency at the President's elbow, and with the onset of Watergate, CIEP began to wither. Incredibly, and as a reflection of the priorities of the incoming Carter Administration, both the Council on International Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board were abolished as "economy measures!"

However, even as the Vietnam War and its aftermath took their toll on American foreign policy, our image abroad and our credibility among friends and adversaries alike, the heart of our policy toward the Soviet Union remained the basic doctrine of containment. Negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve arms control were an expression of that basic doctrine, as were the successful attempts to establish communication with the People's Republic of China. Indeed, even today an essential (and perhaps the most important) component of our policy toward China is the expectation that its distrust of the Soviet Union will serve to contain Soviet expansionism in Asia.

It was during the Carter years--an Administration that could count among its own diplomatic successes the historic accord between Israel and Egypt--that things began to unravel rapidly. Years of underfunding of our military forces, combined with a general decline in our inner confidence and the credibilty of our staying power, culminated in a series of historic foreign policy reverses. With our willingness as well as our ability to contain now in doubt, the NATO Alliance underwent its most serious crisis since its establishment. The impact of Iran, Nicaragua and Afghanistan, not to mention other regional problems, had a profoundly upsetting effect on the global position of the United States. Our intelligence services, criticized and cut, entered a period of low morale and, as a result, impaired capability to serve the nation as Congress and the nation intended.

The Carter Administration negotiated an arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, SALT II, that was severly attacked in this body; it was deemed a treaty "not in the national security interest of the United States" by the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the debate in this Committee, which had primary jurisdiction, was hardly conclusive or persuasive. As a result of the deep concern reflected by the Senate, the Carter Administration did not even formally submit the treaty to the Senate for debate. I consider that unfortunate because, while a critic and opponent of the treaty, I had hoped that its submission would be the focal point for a "great debate" on national strategy, something long overdue and something that only the United States Senate can conduct.

As it turned out, the debate took place in the context of the 1980 Presidential campaign, and the verdict of the American people was decisive.

Since you have assigned to future sessions of these hearings the examination of specific policies, I will not comment in great detail on what I consider to be a successful record of the first Reagan-Bush Administration. But I would like to observe that, in contrast to his predecessor, he has strengthened American defenses and has directed important efforts to restore the strategic balance with the Soviet Union. He is not there yet, as the latest study of the Committee on the Present Danger, clearly shows. I take the liberty of presenting each Member of this Committee with a copy of this disturbing analysis, and strongly recommend that it be incorporated as a part of the record of these hearings. Additionally, I must point out that the necessary strengthening of our defenses initiated by President Reagan continues to enjoy wide public support, as polls show, although this fact is seldom reflected in the media. I believe it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the level of public support for the necessary restoration of a military balance with the Soviet Union.

Just a few weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, I spoke at length at a Symposium on Policy and Strategy of the Hanns Seidel Foundation of the Christian Social Union (CSU) of Germany on **"The Second Reagan Administration: Europe, East-West Relations and National Security."** I have provided each Member of this Committee with a copy, and respectfully request that it be incorporated as part of my statement to you today, since its themes are precisely those that you will be addressing in your deliberations.

In broad terms, President Reagan has accomplished much of what seems to have eluded his predecessors: Together with the Congress he has strengthened our economy at home and secured our key alliances in Europe and Asia; he has restored a sense of dignity to the Presidency, which is an essential condition for the quality of leadership demanded of this nation. Appropriately, I think, the President has supported the freedom fighters in Afghanistan and Nicaragua despite severe criticism. When the accumulated impediments I have described this morning threatened success in working together with the Congress, he wisely utilized bipartisan commissions to lay the groundwork for consensus on such key issues as the MX missile and Central America.

It is my habit to travel abroad frequently for business reasons, on behalf of The Heritage Foundation or in my capacity as Senior Counsellor for Foreign Policy and National Security Affairs to the Republican National Committee, and I can remember no other time since that of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy when foreigners--political leaders, businessmen, scholars, ordinary citizens--have stood in greater admiration of the United States as a leader. The credit for this fortunate condition reflects not just on the President, but upon all Members of Congress, regardless of party, and upon the nation as a whole.

I suppose if the Administration had it to do over again, the dispatch of Marines to Lebanon would have been handled differently. The rationale for the use of the Marines shifted during their presence in Lebanon, and we did not take steps to assure their protection; the result was a disaster at the hands of suicidal terrorists sent by the fanatics in Iran. With this tragic incident we are reminded that it has not been a case of all successes for the President.

The U.S.-Soviet relationship is a subject you will probe in considerable detail, and since I have addressed it in detail in my recent address in Germany, I will limit my remarks to the observation that it is about as good as can be expected in overall terms, and shows signs of getting better from our perspective. The Soviet leadership is in the throes of a profound systemic crisis, one aggravated by political instability brought on by an apparently permanent succession crisis. Combined with deeply rooted (some would say ineradicable) economic problems and widespread unease among the many nationalities of the Soviet Union, not to mention the mounting anti-Sovietism in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union desperately needs a "peredyshka," or "breathing space."

This will be a delicate period, one requiring great care and not a little caution. I am as certain as I have ever been that the United States enjoys great strength and confidence in handling the relationship in its present and future condition, and this confidence derives as much from the solidity of the players -- The President, the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence Casey and National Security Advisor McFarlane -- as it does from the correctness of the policy itself.

OVERCOMMITTED OR UNDERPOWERED? PROTECTING "VITAL INTERESTS"

One of the most important questions this Committee has to consider is the extent of American committments and our capability to fulfill those commitments. It is true, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that some believe the United States to be committed well beyond its means and the bounds of common sense. Those who share this view believe we should sharply delimit these responsibilities, shifting the implied burden to those directly affected or to other nations.

In fact, these critics have not made the case for the wisdom of dropping commitments, and they certainly have not demonstrated convincingly **just how this ought to be accomplished**.

Many think the United States seeks to be the world's policeman, and that we spare no effort in the attempt to spread our influence and power. But there are more countries in the world unprotected by American commitments than are actually protected, and since the late 1960s there have been no attempts to expand, either qualitatively or quantitatively, U. S. commitments, if only because the Congress has kept its watchful eye on this process.

Moreover, even within the context of our existing commitments we have made great efforts to increase their "local content" by seeking a more equitable distribution of risks and burdens. The question of sharing the cost of maintaining NATO, for example, is a recurrent and often troublesome topic among the Allies. Or take the persistent United States persuasion directed at Japan, an ally that spends but one percent of its Gross National Product on defense, to assume greater responsibility for the defense of the Pacific region. Even in the Middle East, an area of special concern, the United States has sought to shift the burden of defense to those nations in the region that can afford it and have the greatest need, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Council states.

We maintain extensive commitments to defend vital interests. Not every interest counts as "vital," and it is certainly time for us to review again the scope of our commitments. I am sure that your subsequent hearings will examine this matter in great detail.

I would argue that we are not overcommitted in terms of worthy objectives, but that we may be "underpowered" to meet all of them at one time. Is it reasonable to expect that we would be so tested by a combination of adversaries, or even by the Soviet Union, that all the chickens would, so to speak, come home to roost at once by activating all of these commitments simultaneously? This is a doubtful proposition; such a condition would certainly mean the equivalent of all-out-war, and hardly anyone thinks that to be a likely prospect.

There is disagreement over what constitutes a "vital" commitment. I am unaware of any standard, all-encompassing definition, but it is clear to me that we can reason our way to defining each commitment with sufficient precision so as to be able to come to a judgement about how vital it actually may be. As the Committee proceeds with its review of our global foreign policy, the degree of "vital-ness" of each commitment ought to become clear.

At the same time, in examining the nature of threats to each vital interest, it will become clear that the common thread is the Soviet Union. In the final analysis, there is little doubt that the Soviet Union remains our principal adversary, and that it seeks to advance its own interests and influence to the detriment of ours.

Having said this, I think it is important to note that I do not share the opinion held by some that the United States and the Soviet Union are two peas in a pod, sharing equal guilt for the tensions and challenges that make the world such a difficult place. There are indeed _qualitative_ and _moral_ differences separating us from the Soviet Union, and these differences are profound. We are for democracy, equality, peace, freedom -- all the goals described by George Shultz in his testimony to you last week. The Soviet Union represents the antithesis of these objectives, and no amount of debate or sophistry will change this fundamental fact.

Hence, it follows that platitudinous appeals for "good will on both sides" to resolve fundamental differences will net us very little in concrete terms; the differences are so stark, so fundamental that they cannot be bridged. Those who doubt this should remember that any occupant of a Soviet gulag could easily demonstrate the difference between the two systems.

This does not mean that we cannot live with the Soviet Union; as much of a problem as it is for us, and as beset as it is with internal difficulties, contradictions, corruption and uncertainty, it is a fact of life. And of course we will continue to discuss and negotiate with this unusual entity, if only because it possesses the means of annihilation, modern weapons of mass destruction. That it is a totalitarian tyranny in every respect does not invalidate its existence or give us the right to ignore it.

THE LESSONS

My reading of the events of the past forty years yields some lessons worth remembering:

First, the United States has an historic mission to preserve peace; this can be done only by remaining strong at home and faithful to a system of alliances abroad that involve shared burdens and responsibilities;

Second, the strategy of containment, deficient and vague in many respects, has served the United States and its allies well, in one form or another, for nearly four decades, and it should remain the essential ingredient of our strategy;

THIRD, we do have vital commitments; they can be defined and defended most effectively by matching our capabilities with them;

FOURTH, foreign policy goals must be clearly defined and effectively communicated;

FIFTH, we should never undercut or "pull the plug" on friends and allies, nor should we subject them to scorn or abuse;

SIXTH, the Soviet Union respects a strong, purposeful and confident America, and will take advantage of perceived weakness or vacillation;

SEVENTH, the effective coordination of all elements of our foreign policy -- political, economic, moral, strategic -- must be assigned an urgent priority, and the mechanism for implementing this coordination under the rubric of "grand strategy" should be established;

EIGHTH, a way must be found to coordinate and consult with the Congress, without impairing the separation of powers and without placing intolerable restraint upon the

Executive Branch's freedom of action; for its part, Congress should seek to consolidate and streamline its own complicated Committee system, which inhibits effective and constructive cooperation;

NINTH, confidentiality and trust must again become the norm between the two branches of Government responsible for our foreign policy; important gains in recent years should be consolidated by greater efforts to resolve differences between representatives of the branches and not by carrying disputes to the media.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that we are confronted with an extraordinary opportunity to overhaul and modernize the way we conduct our foreign affairs. I believe that President Reagan, secure and confident as he begins this second term of office, is in an unusually strong position to forge a new partnership with the Congress to pursue our broad national interests. Further, I believe that he is, by temperament and disposition, inclined to seek a working partnership without regard to assigning the political "credit" that will flow from such an effort.

He understands his constituency is the nation and that his highest obligation is to provide for the wellbeing and security of its inhabitants. The proper response for the Congress is to come half way; and the Congress need not be concerned about its stature or its independence of action by giving it a try.

Talking about bipartisanship -- the essential condition for national success -- is enjoyable and useful; implementing it is considerably harder.

I can't help but think that the time has come for decisive steps. In this presentation today I have given you some opinions concerning why I think it can be done now, and I look forward to discussing it with you in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Allen.

The committee will conduct questioning now of the witness, with a 10-minute time limit on this first round, and if we have additional time we will proceed, as we did yesterday, into a second round.

Mr. Allen, in your testimony you describe the problems of foreign policymaking at the beginning of President Nixon's administration. You have made an important point about the shift to the White House of the focus of foreign policymaking, and you describe what you believe were some negative consequences of that shift.

Granted that this may have been true in 1969, what advice would you have for the administration or for the Congress in terms of unraveling the current difficulties on policymaking? In other words, what should be the proper relationship between the National Security Council and the Department of State?

Mr. ALLEN. Senator, I guess you would not expect that, as the former occupant of the job—that I would propose its abolition, and I do not. The National Security Council system is absolutely invaluable. It should serve, ideally, as a coordinating body for the rivulets of information that flow in from the various Departments concerned with foreign and national security policy.

It should be an objective and balanced, if you will, advisory group to the President of the United States. After all, even in the NSC system, the President himself is charged with ultimately making the decisions.

The role of the Secretary of State and the foreign policy bureaucracy, the role of the Secretary of Defense, the function of intelligence in that mix, the growing importance of considerations of international trade and economic policy, must be brought together in one place.

But the essential mistake that I think was made at the time—and I must say that at the time I did think it was a mistake—was to operate on the assumption that the bureaucracy could never be trusted and to take into the White House at the President's elbow as a consequence all of the elements of decisionmaking.

Now, I have been extensive in my own criticism of the bureaucracy. I have not served in the Foreign Service bureaucracy or in the Defense Department, but after three tours in the White House and having been around Washington mostly since 1957, I have some idea of how things work and how they do not work.

And I do not believe that any incoming administration should seek to replace the bureaucracy that it inherits, nor should it ever seek to isolate that bureaucracy. It seems to me that the task of leadership is to draw from that bureaucracy the best, and even if that bureaucracy happens not to agree with your agenda as President or as one of the key members of the President's Cabinet, even if it decides that it wants to obstruct it, leadership consists in getting the bureaucracy to implement one's agenda.

Therefore, it represents an important asset. Of course, from time to time there are virulent opponents of a President's policy in place in the bureaucracy, and of course they leak and obstruct from time to time. But in reality, if we are going to make use of this enormous corporate memory that exists in the bureaucracy, the task has to be to bend it to the will of the President, if you will, not the arbitrary will but the general will as expressed in his foreign policy objectives.

So I would advise any administration, particularly with respect to the delicate machinery of the National Security Council system, to make it as open as it possibly can in cooperation with the Congress. I do not believe that the National Security Council and its staff should be utilized as a focal point for the concentration of power. Of course, power does derive from coordination, and it is necessary to keep a delicate balance.

When President Reagan entered office, we tried to take steps precisely to achieve that, to lower the profile, to reduce the bickering and the important squabbling that had gone on for years between National Security Advisers and Secretaries of State.

We did not always succeed, but one of the ways in which we attempted to do that was to move the National Security Adviser's office back to the basement, where it belonged, in a symbolic step reflecting the very first days of the existence of the National Security Adviser inside the White House itself. They were moved over after the Cuban missile crisis by President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy was, as I recall. The press reacted—and the press plays an important role in this—with the notion that by moving to the basement it was relegated to the basement, and there were of course concomitant conclusions that could be drawn.

I would suggest that right now we have about as fine an equilibrium as we can expect and hope for. I think that Mr. McFarlane is doing the job perfectly. I think that he is conducting the Nation's business in service to the President in a low-key way.

He is cooperating with the Secretary of State. We may disagree with certain policy decisions, we may disagree with certain personnel decisions, but in fact he is doing it in a way that most nearly resembles, in my view, the way the job ought to be done. It was done that way by General Scowcroft for a period of time, but then extraordinary conditions prevailed in the Nation and in the Cabinet and the balance of power had again shifted outward to the Department of State.

It was a mistake to bring it in, inside the White House, this powerful machinery inside the White House. It was a mistake to make it the locus of power because I believe that it has ignited the suspicions of which I spoke. I believe that it removed accountability from the Department of State and took it into an area of the Government that is not accountable, except to the President of the United States. I find that a mistake, and I think that it contributed to misunderstanding during that unfortunate period.

Then a chain reaction took place and, as I mentioned, the level of suspicion mounted to an all-time high. I can remember being in this room when you could feel the tension between a witness and the members of this distinguished committee so strongly that it could be cut with a knife. The leakage and the recriminations, the press responses utilized by members of the committee and by members of the administration continuously exacerbated the problem.

So my advice is to the Congress, seek ways to cooperate with the President. Seek ways to penetrate in a beneficial way, and keep sacrosanct the relationship that you enjoy with the President. Never seek to exploit it for any political purpose, short or long term. And recognize that we only have one President at a time and it is he who must make those fateful decisions. They can be criticized later, of course, and often are—or I should say always are.

But for the President's part, I would suggest a more formal system of briefing and consultation with Members. A lot of sensitive information is available in the world today, and that sensitive information must remain secret and confidential. I think that the administration would be willing to enter a new relationship with the Congress if it had some assurances that what it would share with the Congress could in fact remain, if even an area of disagreement, at least a matter of common cause between the two bodies.

I have no criticism about the system as it exists today. I understand that you are being briefed regularly, or at least periodically, by the National Security Adviser and the senior staff. I think that is a good action. I think it is a good practice, and I hope that we will see it as a long-term future potential for restoring that essential bipartisan consensus.

The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, in his discussion of the War Powers Act, answered questions as to how consultation might occur prior to the use of military force with a suggestion that perhaps the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate, the chairmen and the ranking members of the Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee—he had counterparts on the House side—ought to be visiting with the President prior to the use of force.

When we raised the question as to whether such consultation has actually occurred, he said that in administrations in which he had served, the answer was probably not, but it probably should have occurred.

It was an interesting colloquy and, without involving you in a discussion on the War Powers Act per se, the question still remains as to how a decision to employ force, in instances other than global war, should be reached with proper consultation and therefore consensus of the American people? Do you have any thoughts on that?

Mr. ALLEN. I think I have some opinions. I must say, from the newspaper account that I read of Mr. Vance's testimony yesterday, one line remains in my mind and that is, if Congress were present at the takeoff we would not have so many crash landings, or something to that effect. I think that makes a great deal of sense.

From my point of view, I believe that members of the relevant committees dealing with foreign policy and national security—and it is hard to make the separation, of course—should be meeting with the President on a regular basis. I believe there ought to be in existence a mechanism. Of course, every Senator and every Member of Congress would like to meet with the President on a regular basis, and he has only so much time.

But these are the issues of war and peace. These are the issues of truly vital national interest, and I think meeting with the President on a regular basis would be an excellent idea, because it would put into place a mechanism. One would not have to go out and roust out Senators and Congressmen from farflung places and bring them to the table where in a period of consultation there are inevitable—I will not say misunderstandings or tensions, but there is a certain quality of estrangement to be introduced to a crisis, to be brought on board, not when it is too late but when it is almost nearly too late and when a decision has to be taken.

Part of the reason for the breakdown of communication, even on an informal basis, between Presidents and Senators and Members of Congress has been that the administration could not rely on the confidentiality of information once submitted. In an era of Xerox machines, which of course must be secrecy's worst enemy, in an era when so many staff people have access to so much, when the need to know is not really tightly defined any longer, and in an era when, as I mentioned, the leakage of national security information has become rampant, an administration has a legitimate hesitation to provide such information.

However, if the members of the relevant committees—in this case the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, at least representation from the respective Intelligence Committees and the Armed Service Committees of the Senate and the House—were to meet periodically with the President for an open-ended discussion, which would include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser, and the DCI, I think that at a time of crisis these men and women, when brought on board to be consulted, to be questioned, to be tapped for their wisdom and advice and for their assistance and support in selling something to the Nation and to their colleagues in their House, would be in a far better position, a much more advantageous position than they would if they were simply, as I say, brought in off the street on a crisis basis.

I do believe that the President, however, must have the right to deploy American forces in defense of what he perceives to be a vital interest, even in the absence of such consultation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Allen.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to correct for the record one point. As ranking member, I do not recall being briefed on a regular basis by the National Security Council or Mr. McFarlane. I think it is a good idea and an excellent idea, and I also think so about being briefed by the President.

I have been on this committee now for 20 years and my observation or perception through both Democratic and Republican administrations has been that the majority of leaks came from what we call downtown, the administration, not from the Hill. And I think this is often lost sight of. I would hope some enterprising journalist would make a compendium some time of the leaks that have occurred and then give his estimate of where they actually came from.

I was also struck with your thought—and I agree with you, incidentally—we only have one President. But it is not the duty of Congress to go along with that President ipso facto. I think it was Carl Schurz who said: "My country, right or wrong; when she is right to keep her right, when she is wrong to put her right."

But by the same token, we would certainly be negligent in our duty if we disagreed with the President and kept our mouths shut. I am sure you would agree with me on that.

You mentioned that the American people are tired of partisan bickering. In that regard, it seems to me, if we talk about consensus regarding the Vietnam war, that the main opposition to the Vietnam war came from the Democratic Party and we had a Democratic President. I think the so-called bickering arises not from a difference in party, but a difference in ideology.

I was wondering what your comments would be on this thought or if you really thought the bickering comes from partisanship?

Mr. ALLEN. As to the problem of leakage, you understand, Senator Pell, that I was not saying that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee leaks. However, I can cite experiences from my own past, very interesting experiences that would at least cast doubt on the notion that leaks with which I was concerned at the time came from downtown. I know precisely where they came from.

If you will permit me a moment of reflection, in one way in my personal viewpoint Watergate, a symbol that stands for so much, was the direct outgrowth of the problem of leaks and how to deal with those leaks. And I will tell you precisely how, because I was, so to speak, on first base at the time.

In my testimony I referred to a subcommittee of this committee chaired by then Senator Symington on U.S. commitments. This was a little noticed action, the establishment of the committee was a little noticed action while the Nixon administration was coming into office in January 1969.

I saw the announcement of the subcommittee and then, as Deputy National Security Adviser designate, thought that this little 1-inch insertion, the announcement of the establishment of this subcommittee, was going to spell a big problem for the Nixon administration if it were not handled right. I was correct beyond my wildest dream that this was the case.

The subcommittee went into business with two or three very effective staff people. At that time there was an exhaustive compendium of American commitments, known as the Woods-McClintock study. The study, the Woods-McClintock study was, if I recall correctly, in five volumes, with each volume assuming a greater degree of sensitivity, so that I believe volume 5 was so secret that even the name of the classification of the document was secret. Tightly held and very few copies, because it had to do with the installations, American, U.S. military and other installations around the world, those that were known and those that were not so well known.

Now, it occurred to me at the time that it would be possible to make a case that the administration in power, that is the Nixon administration, would be held accountable for these commitments. After all, we were in the midst of the Vietnam war. And it struck me as a particularly bad idea that accountability for commitments that had been made by Presidents other than Richard Nixon ought to be laid at his doorstep.

And so I began studying very carefully the actions of the subcommittee. There was an attempt made to obstruct the subcommittee from having copies of all of the volumes of the Woods-McClintock study, so an agreement was reached whereby the investigators could go to the Pentagon and take notes.

Now, whether by accident or by design, over the course of the next 7 or 8 months a lot of information about these commitments began to emerge in the press, more often than not under the name of one or two very competent reporters. And so it was almost routine when I would open the newspaper and begin to read a story that I would know that one other aspect of these American commitments was being displayed before the American people.

Just before I left the White House at the end of 1969 to go into private business, I wrote a 75-page memorandum to President Nixon which I entitled "The Coming Constitutional Crisis," I believe it was, on the doctrine of executive privilege. Nobody paid any attention to a 75-page memorandum, nor should they, I guess.

But in June 1971, as I was preparing to come back to the White House as Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, I got a call asking me what my reaction was to the Pentagon Papers that had been deposited on the doorstep of the Soviet Embassy. It was from the Chief of Staff of the President. I was in New Jersey at my summer home with my family.

And I said: The reaction should be nothing whatsoever. The Pentagon Papers are not the product of this administration They are a highly stylized account of the Vietnam war. But it was the principle of the thing, I was told, and something needed to be done.

I was asked to write a memorandum the following week about what we should do concerning the problem of leakage. I submitted that memorandum and I suggested that, rather than worry about the leakage of such documents, rather than to be obsessed by them, that the Nixon administration should go back in history and time, examine the documents of Yalta, of Potsdam, of the Berlin crisis, of the Lebanon crisis of 1958, of the Dominican crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, all of these documents, study them carefully and declassify them and release them to the American public.

I was then asked if I would take on the job of doing that, instead of becoming the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and I politely declined, for a whole variety of reasons.

I am convinced to this day that the overwrought concern about leakage led to the important collapse of confidence and trust between the two branches and led to the plumbers unit, the establishment of the plumbers unit. That is all it was set up to do, was to declassify those papers according to the memorandum that had been written. But it went beyond that.

Now, I am convinced that if we had not had the problem of leakage that the administration of Richard Nixon would have served its term, so to speak, and we would have had an orderly transition of Government and there would not have been the trauma that was visited upon the United States.

Now, I am not assigning blame for this, because the question of leakage is one that will always be with governments everywhere. But I am concerned, based on that very vivid and important experience that I had, I am concerned that the problem must be got under control.

Political leakage is one thing. I would say that within the last 4 years the art of political leakage may have been raised to a high science at the other end of the avenue. I know because I have had some firsthand experience with that as well.

But I can tell you that unless we get a handle, in the name of our national security, unless we can get a handle on the matter of leakage, we will be in very deep trouble for years to come and we can forget about the notion of bipartisanship ever again in forming our policies.

I would certainly concur, Senator, in the imprecise language assigning the word "partisan" to what in fact are frequently ideological disputes. That is true, and I think that I will go back and correct that in my testimony, because it is true that ideological disputes are no respecter of party.

I am sorry that is the case, but of course you are a Senate elected with 100 Members and it is not to be expected that you would share the same views about the way the world ought to be organized. Nonetheless, the elimination of partisanship should be the goal, and if we can reduce ideological rancor in an effort to restore bipartisanship, it is my view that we should.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Allen, it is not necessary to agree with everything you have said to acknowledge that you have provided an overview which is very valuable. I happen to agree with just about everything you said, though.

I was sitting here thinking while you were delivering your prepared statement, and your answers to the two Senators, that I do not believe Franklin Roosevelt as President would have been able to lead this Nation to victory in World War II under the circumstances that exist in this city today. I include all of us, also the media.

Most of the people in the media do not recall that when Franklin Roosevelt held news conferences they came in and stood by his desk, and they were not even allowed to quote him by name, let alone violate a confidence, because once a confidence was violated that was the end of that reporter.

It seems that there is an adversary relationship in about 10 different ways in this city, on this committee, in the Senate, between the Congress and the White House. There are so many problems that defy solution that I wonder if we can really accomplish a bipartisanship such as you have urged and recommended.

Certainly we have to try, because the difficulties are growing around the world. I listened to the radio this morning and I heard a series of items, including one outrageous statement by a prominent U.S. Senator about Nicaragua. Now, I do not think there is anybody, short of somebody who needs a white cane or a seeing eye dog, who does not understand what is going on in Nicaragua.

The same thing is true in South Africa. I asked the Secretary of State the other day if he doubted, if he questioned the statement that if South Africa fell into the Soviet Union's hands that it would be an unmitigated disaster for the free world, and he said no, he agreed absolutely.

And yet we have all of this foo-faraw confusing the issues. I think probably it stems from insufficient communication with the American people. I wonder how many people percentagewise understand the resources that we must have from South Africa. I wonder how many recognize the absolute imperative need of those shipping lanes and that sort of thing. These are questions that are so profound that it bothers me in terms of the survival of freedom in this world.

Let me get specific. You made a brief reference to Taiwan. On January 12, the Washington Post reported on an agreement—and I do not have a formal notification of that agreement—an agreement reached between the People's Republic of China and the United States on a military sales package. This package, according to the newspaper story, includes modern towed sonars, Mark 46 torpedoes, and the Phalanx close-in weapon system, which I gather is a rapid firing gun that the Navy uses to shoot down missiles in sea trials.

Now, as one who has been identified in the top levels of defense matters, would such sales, Mr. Allen, to the People's Republic of China change the defense posture between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China?

Mr. **Allen**. The short answer is yes, Senator Helms. And I think the U.S. Congress has reason to be concerned about such sales.

However, from the standpoint of the Defense Department and the administration these sales will enhance, as I understand it, the capability of the Navy of the People's Republic of China to patrol the region and to be able to detect Soviet ships and particularly submarines. So that from one point of view the notion that we should assist the People's Republic of China to enhance its military capabilities makes good sense, when seen through the prism of United States-Soviet relations and the growing Soviet threat in the Pacific, because that is a very important threat.

On the other hand, it raises the question of what we ought to be doing to enforce in detail, in letter and in spirit, the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act. I think that that act—I know that that act is unique. No other nation in the world has its relationship with the United States governed by legislation, legislation that emerged principally from this committee, and of course which bore no resemblance to the legislation Mr. Carter sent down.

The United States is obligated to provide the Republic of China on Taiwan with adequate defensive equipment so as to provide a balance, and once that balance begins to shift then, of course, we are obliged to act or to take some remedy.

So under the theory that you should have a floating equality, as it were, on both sides, it is going to be necessary in the wake of this sale—and it will not happen overnight and its impact will not be felt overnight—to examine again what needs to be done to augment the defensive capabilities of the Republic of China on Taiwan. And while those capabilities are not counted as a military asset for the United States, in fact they are, and they are an asset—that is, the assets of Taiwan—are an asset for all of Asia, particularly in the face of growing Soviet activities in the Pacific basin.

Senator HELMS. So you surmise, based on the information available to you, that this will create an imbalance in contradiction to the Taiwan Relations Act then, would it not?

Mr. ALLEN. I believe that this will not create a glaring imbalance. It is difficult to measure that balance with any precision, but the whole purpose of the Taiwan Relations Act was to take a look ahead. And what is really important, Senator Helms, in my view is that we cannot wait too long to correct an imbalance, because if you wait until the last minute it is already too late.

So my concern is not to exacerbate relations with the People's Republic of China. We are in a status of friendly relations with the PRC today. It is not an ally of the United States. Taiwan is a long valued, trusted friend, and has been our ally.

Senator HELMS. To whom we have commitments.

Mr. ALLEN. To whom we have very specific commitments.

So my concern is the long-range balance, and I might say that President Reagan has done a very good job in implementing the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act. He has looked after this problem himself. He is concerned about it. He watches the military balance and the political balance in the region. And he has visited the PRC. His views are well known on this subject. He will not abandon the Republic of China on Taiwan under any circumstance.

The question that we have to ask is, what will happen to the military balance in that region 4, 8, 12 years out, because, as I just indicated, a sale of whatever that you have listed, this small sale will not show up in terms of effectiveness immediately. So we have to be concerned about the future of that region and the future of those two entities.

Senator HELMS. I agree that Ronald Reagan is not knowingly and intentionally going to abandon Taiwan, and I say that as one who is strongly pro Republic of China. The other day when the Secretary of State was here, he and I got into a brief discussion and I was interested in his responses about what I alluded to earlier in my observations.

The people of this country understand what the goals of the Soviet Union are. But as I go around the country, Mr. Allen, I find more and more people saying, what are our goals with respect to the Soviet Union? Now, the Soviet Union clearly—and they are candid about it—is aiming toward domination of this world, the foisting upon the entire world of the concepts of socialism and communism.

But what do we do in response? What is our goal, would you say, based on your experience, with respect to whether we intend to inculcate free enterprise and freedom? Are we on a collision course or are we sitting here passively while the Soviet Union is actively pursuing its goals?

Mr. ALLEN. As a long-time student of the Soviet Union and one who has been interested in East-West relations and the specific area of United States-Soviet relations, I have the feeling that we do not have clearly articulated goals vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Maybe that is a condition of our existence, that we simply cannot come up with, if you will, a game plan of objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is a malicious power. The Soviet Union, as I indicated in my testimony, does not share the same goals that we share. The Soviets share goals that are the opposite of our goals. The Soviet Union has accumulated an enormous power.

So as much as we dislike the Soviet Union and the Soviet system, without disliking the Soviet people, we are compelled to deal with the Soviet Union. In long-range terms our objective of containment, our policy of containment, has been to try to alter Soviet behavior. But we have been noticeably unsuccessful in altering any significant aspect of Soviet behavior, and I do not think we are going to in the future, either.

Right now, in my view we are at an important threshold of opportunity for the future, and contained in that threshold are the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet Union itself—its economic crisis, its apparently permanent succession crisis, its inability to organize itself, the fact that the Soviet Union's image is suffering throughout the world, it is no longer the model for development in the world of today.

So the Soviet Union is at the first step, if you will, of a series of steps that it must take either to reform itself to achieve efficiency or the consequence—the alternative may be a long period of decline and collapse. It is not going to happen that easily.

The Soviet Union has the capability to squeeze from its people what it wants. It will always be able to get as many weapons as it thinks it needs out of the Soviet people and the Soviet economy. It will find a way. It is not as expensive for them as it is for us, nor are they subject to debate.

Internally, the Soviet Union is fraught with dissident reaction. Eastern European nations are no longer trusted. I would not want to be a Soviet military planner looking forward to sending a few divisions across Czechoslovakia or Poland to invade Western Europe, for example. The situation is becoming more and more tenuous all the time.

I do not believe the Soviet Union constitutes a legitimate government, and I believe that our long-range objectives should be, first, in stages, to keep the Soviet Union within its borders; and second, to bring about some form of change in the Soviet leadership. I do not think that is going to happen either. It is a totalitarian dictatorship that visits the worst forms of tyranny upon its own people, totally unlike the United States and the West.

But we are going to go through a period in which the Soviet Union, even in crisis, in my view is an exceedingly dangerous opponent. There is a view among some in this country, academicians, and some analysts in the media, who believe that if we are harsh to the Soviet Union that this type of behavior will drive them more and more into intransigence and into a bellicose attitude.

I do not believe that is the case at all. We should be firm, harsh, and correct with the Soviet Union, as President Reagan is doing. I sense that we are in a different situation entirely from that of 4 years ago when the first Reagan administration set foot in office.

I do not blame President Carter for all of the ills either, because I think during the 1970's we made some profound mistakes in respect to our relationship with the Soviet Union. After all, the whole idea of détente was to change their behavior: trade, aid, technology transfer, credits—I remove the word "aid'; I misspoke. Trade, credits, technology transfer were the name of the game.

The idea was that through a series of economic agreements that were in the Soviet Union's best interests we could Gulliverize the Soviet Union and make it understand that détente was not divisible, that they could not extract the benefits of détente on the one hand and continue to undermine our interests and the interests of non-Communist peoples everywhere willy-nilly.

But they did. They took the benefits of détente—trade, credits, technology—and continued on their merry way, utilizing all of those things to continue to build the power sector. We consistently badly estimated the objectives of the Soviet Union.

Our objective clearly is not to destroy the Soviet Union, to wreak havoc on the Soviet people. We should not be bitterly and, how should I say it, brazenly anti-Communist in the lowest sense of that word. We are opponents of communism and free men everywhere are opponents of communism. We should remain unalterably opposed to the Communist system.

I read in this morning's newspaper, in the Washington Post—it made a fairly prominent place in the Post—that in Yugoslavia, considered by many no longer to be a Communist country, three editors were sentenced for seditious activities for having criticized the regime. That happens in Romania, in Bulgaria, in Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It does not happen anyplace else.

The Soviet Union will forever, in its present formulation, as long as it adheres to even the trappings of Marxist-Leninist dogma, be a totalitarian state with whom we can have no common ground, but with whom we will coexist.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Yes or no; should we be doing more to help the people in Afghanistan?

Mr. ALLEN. Emphatically, yes.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. I welcome you to this hearing.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator CRANSTON. I have just one question. How do you view the role of the loyal opposition? Should it be simply to say "amen"? What do you view as our role?

Mr. ALLEN. Having been in the loyal opposition, I think the supreme duty of the loyal opposition is to get the power. And so I respect most of the——

Senator CRANSTON. I am in full agreement.

Mr. ALLEN [continuing]. Most of the techniques for that. And I know very well, Senator, that you and I have discussed many facets of that.

The role of loyal opposition is a crucial role. It can be a critical and at the same time a highly constructive one. I personally believe that common cause can be made with every Member of this body, of the U.S. Senate, in loyal opposition to whatever policies may be pursued by the administration of President Reagan, and that criticism can be consistent and harsh. It can even be abrasive.

I think that the other component of an effective loyal opposition is a dominant majority that is willing to listen and discuss. But I think that when decisions are made in the national interest, decisions that appear to have the consensus support of the American people, a majority of the American people, the loyal opposition ought profitably at that point to dampen its enthusiastic response of opposition and climb on board.

I was only 9 years old when World War II ended. I can remember the day World War II broke out, December 7, 1941. I knew there was a lot of criticism, even as a child in grade school, of President Roosevelt. But there seemed to be an ability to move behind President Roosevelt in that effort.

Senator Helms had just remarked about the inability of President Roosevelt to conduct himself in today's atmosphere. Certainly, even during the Korean war, while there was enormous criticism of certain policies and tactical moves in the war, we had broad-scale support.

It was Vietnam that made the difference. And I think that the loyal opposition, whether it be partisan or ideological, many times during the Vietnam war went too far, just as I consider the administrations went too far in maintaining a cloak of secrecy around actions that were of profound national importance and ought to have had at least the commentary of the loyal opposition.

I hope that the loyal opposition is not sufficiently effective to congeal all its forces to upset any of the programs of this administration, at least the main ones, particularly in the defense budget, although I recognize that there is heavy and growing criticism of that defense budget. And I am particularly hopeful that on the issue of the strategic defense initiative, for example, once the issue is decided—and I think it will be decided in favor of the President because it seems the overwhelming majority of the American people, when they understand the strategic defense initiative, are on board—once the issue has been decided, the opposition could at least abate in intensity and support what appears to be the most important breakthrough in many years.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cranston.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Allen, one of the materials that you handed us was "Can America Catch Up: The U.S.-Soviet Military Balance," put out by the Committee on the Present Danger. I note that on page 52 it gives a comparison of the naval balance at the end of 1983 of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the numbers there look very unbalanced.

It indicates that the United States has a total of 525 ships or submarines and the Soviet Union has 2,562, which is almost five times as much. In ballistic missile submarines, the United States is shown as having 35 and the Soviet Union with 79. In nuclear attack submarines, it shows the United States with 95 and the Soviet Union 120. That is more nearly equal. But for diesel attack submarines we have 4 and they have 168.

Are those numbers real that we see there? Is there a flaw to that or is there really that much difference in our naval power?

Mr. ALLEN. I cannot comment in detail on these numbers. The sources are given as the Department of Defense annual report for fiscal 1985, a publication called "Soviet Military Power 1984," the Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, January 1984, and the Armed Forces Journal of April 1984. So I would suspect that they are a composite. The only category that would be missing, I suppose, to count on our behalf, Senator, would be ships that are not simply military, but that are in civilian service, that could be converted for logistical or other transport purposes.

A lot of work went into this particular study, and on the inside of the back cover you will see the people who had the opportunity to review this study, in fact who created it, including a former Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator PRESSLER. So you would say, according to this, that the Soviet Union is just overwhelmingly stronger in the area of naval capability?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes; I would indeed in terms of ships, if you are measuring just ships.

Senator PRESSLER. OK. Then is there a difference in the capabilities?

Mr. ALLEN. I think there are considerable differences in capability. As you know, we are embarked on a program to restore a 600-ship Navy to the United States. This seems to me to be among the wisest of our decisions so far.

It is very difficult to measure the total effectiveness of their equipment versus ours. But we are getting well again, thanks to the program that the Congress worked on with President Reagan. And I think by the time this program runs its course into the 1990's we will again feel quite secure in naval terms.

I can remember also, I might add, that 20 years ago the argument was that the Soviet Union not only was not trying to catch up with the United States in terms of military power, but that the Soviet Union would never seek a blue water navy status. Today we have it. There were those of us at the time who argued that that was exactly what the Soviet Union was seeking.

Senator PRESSLER. I think you have described the Soviet Union in a very realistic and harsh way. Should we, regarding a country that we feel that way about, have diplomatic relations with them? Should we let our tourists go there? Should we sell grain to them?

Should we carry on all the activities that we do? You mentioned you were against détente. Where do you stop? Of the three things I just mentioned, would you continue them?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, you know, one of the amusing—well, not very amusing, I guess, but one of the interesting aspects of our relationship with the Soviet Union is that we had no relations until November 1933, none whatsoever. It was President Roosevelt who initiated that diplomatic relationship.

Over the years it has been perfectly obvious that we should and must have a diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union. So the act of diplomatic relations, of having diplomatic relations, does not pertain to détente. You do not have to like someone to enjoy diplomatic relations.

Should we send our tourists to the Soviet Union? Absolutely. Unfortunately, we do not have any programs, any Federal programs designed to get tourists to the Soviet Union. I wish we did, and I know we are cutting Federal programs.

I say that half in jest, but I wish we did have programs to get tourists to the Soviet Union. In fact, for most people it suffices just to approach the Berlin Wall. Yes indeed, we should have extensive tourist visitation to the Soviet Union, because that is good for us. That I think only reinforces the harsh reality that separates the Soviet Union from us.

Should we sell grain to the Soviet Union and other things? Yes, for cash. And with respect to technology, we should guard very carefully our technology, in my view, guard it very carefully and make sure that no technology that is not available elsewhere that could easily be applied to the power sector of the Soviet economy be shipped to the Soviet Union.

Senator **Pressler**. Let me shift regions. I recently made a trip to South Asia and I observed that the little countries around India—Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh—all feel rather uncomfortable with their big neighbor. I have advocated to the Secretary of State that we upgrade our treatment of those countries wherever possible. Not that we should not be friends with India. We should also be friends with India.

But I found in that region of the world almost an inverse relationship to the amount of foreign aid we give—the country that was least friendly to the United States in terms of what their ministers said was India. Of course, there you have the same thing you run into in Mexico. The ministers and the wealthier Indians seem to have an anti-American intellectual streak. They may not really believe it. I do not know, it is hard to judge.

But I found that in Bhutan, to which we have never given any aid, it is the most pro-American of all. What about the Indian subcontinent? Should we be doing more? Should we not be doing more with the little countries? It seems that our policy there is so oriented toward India.

And of course we are doing a number of things in Bangladesh but we do not treat it at a very high level. At least I was the first Senator to visit there in 10 years. Not that that means that it is treated at a high level, but it is not a place where we send a lot of people or that gets a lot of attention.

Mr. **Allen**. I am astonished to hear that you are the first Senator to visit Bangladesh in 10 years, but impressed that you did.

Certainly, within the growing limitations of our ability to do things with respect to foreign aid generally, we should pay more attention to the countries that you mentioned. Our relationship with India is very important, and after the tragic assassination of Mrs. Gandhi it appears that we may be approaching a period of normalization of our relationship with India and perhaps we will be able to communicate more effectively with India, particularly in the area of reassuring India that nothing we do in supporting neighbors on her periphery would or should be construed as a threat to India.

You mentioned Asia generally, though, and I would like to pay high tribute to President Reagan and Secretary Shultz for their initiatives in beginning to consider Asia again as a whole. Some very important movement is now taking place in the U.S. Government that seeks to address U.S. interests in Asia over the long term.

I have been privileged, as some Senators and some Members of the House have been, to be named to the U.S. National Committee for Pacific Basin Economic Cooperation, a group of 50 people consisting of Government officials in their private capacity, Members of Congress, businessmen, academics and others.

We are now beginning to take a very serious long-term look at Asia, and as we do we are defining our economic and strategic interests and security interests, as well as our political interests. Asia is where more will happen in the decade ahead than in any other place in the world, and it is lamentable that the subcontinent will not participate as fully and as dramatically as will, say, those nations we think of as being very Asian, such as the six ASEAN states, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.

But hopefully, as the administration begins to map a long term strategy for the first time since Vietnam and probably for the first time ever in the postwar history of the United States, we should pay more attention to the subcontinent, which represents important human and other resources for us.

Part of the problem is, in terms of attitude, many of the inhabitants of those nations, you correctly observed, such as intellectual leaders and others in India, maintain an attitude that, shall I say, is sometimes somewhat less than friendly, as it ought to be, toward the United States, and does not recognize some of the good things that we do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Allen, it is a pleasure to have you before the committee this morning. I just have a couple of questions. We appreciate your testimony. I have had a chance to review it briefly.

I believe you were still in the administration when the decision was made to pursue or commence the contra operation. As we all know, it is now not so covert an operation, which I think the chairman accurately noted the other day in his speech before the Press Club here in Washington. I wonder if you might take us back to those early days and describe for us what the motivation or the purpose of the contra operation ab initio, and then tell us whether or not you think that original purpose has been sustained or has the original purpose been changed?

Was it originally intended to be not only an interdiction effort, but also a destabilization effort? Or did that secondary role evolve as the policy developed over the course of numerous months?

Mr. ALLEN. The process of providing assistance to dissident groups did indeed begin during the latter months of my time in the administration. A great deal of time was spent assessing what would happen in Nicaragua, what the future course of the regime would be, and whether or not it was beyond the pale in terms of trying to come to some form of agreement to reduce its incursions into or support for guerrilla operations in adjacent territories.

You may or may not know that President Reagan attempted a series of back channel communications. Some of them went through the Secretary of State and the Department of State, missions that involved even some consultations and discussions with

Castro and his people, the utilization of various leaders of Central America, including the then President of Mexico.

And the conclusion that seemed to be generally accepted in the administration was that there was very little hope that the regime in Nicaragua, the Sandinista regime, would alter its course, and therefore one should begin considering providing assistance to the forces of true democracy, real democrats in Nicaragua.

I left after that——

Senator DODD. I do not mean to interrupt you, but I want to try to put this in a proper timeframe in order to understand it. In other words, at the earliest stages of this decision to move forward as we now know it, the purpose was interdiction. Yet a decision was made fairly early on that, other efforts that you have described having failed, the support for this operation would go beyond interdiction. Support to dissident groups, as you described them, represented certainly to a far greater degree our values, and implicitly of course, we would prefer to have them emerge as the new leadership of that country?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I cannot comment in great detail as to whether or not we would prefer to see them emerge as the new leadership. But democrats, with a small "d," would be preferable, and I strongly felt at the time that ways should be found to assist democrats in their opposition to the Sandinista regime.

Senator DODD. You are not talking about winning seats in a parliament?

Mr. ALLEN. Sir?

Senator DODD. We are not talking about winning seats in parliamentary elections.

Mr. ALLEN. No, we are talking about winning seats in elections if there could be elections, utilizing whatever democratic means there were to advance the cause of democracy.

But I want comment on interdiction. I felt strongly that, in view of the information we had available to us, that the Secretary of State was correct in wanting to move more vigorously to achieve some form of interdiction. There was never any final conclusion as to what form that interdiction might take.

But the intelligence was so persuasive, so convincing as to what was happening, especially with respect to the construction of military facilities in Nicaragua far beyond the defensive requirements of that small nation, that some action——

Senator DODD. Do you think that might have had anything to do with the Contra operation in the north?

Mr. ALLEN. I do not recall the precise time. I must not have been informed, since I had left when the decision to fund Contras began. I have to assume that it must have had its beginnings at least in the discussion stages in the latter part of 1981.

I not only fully support it. I urge you and every other Member of the Senate, if you are an opponent of funding the Contras, to reconsider, because I consider—I believe that aid to the forces that would ultimately be able to create democracy in Nicaragua should be a high priority for the United States.

Senator DODD. Why do we not just declare war against them? Why are we stalling; skirting the issue of support for the Contras? If it is the decision and determination that the Sandinista government is a threat to our security, and to the security of our allies in the region, why do we not just come out and declare war?

Apparently, as many in the administration suggest, the Contra operation is broadly supported by the American people. I do not necessarily agree with that, but that suggestion has been made. Why does not the President just come up here and say: Look, this is an imminent threat and danger to our interests in the region and to our allies; I am asking you in the Congress to give me the authority to go down there and deal with this problem.

Why are we dealing with this in a half-hearted manner, pretending we are not trying to overthrow anyone? I know we would really like to get rid of that government there. Why do we not deal with it headon?

Mr. ALLEN. The last declaration of war that I recall was at a time when I was a very young person, and I do not believe that the conditions that prevailed at the time to force a declaration of war then prevail now. And we have a problem, and have always had a problem, Senator Dodd, about the fuse on such operations that threaten us.

It was not apparent in the case of Castro—and I should add as a footnote, not only was it not apparent, but when it did become apparent we were subjected to some of the most unbelievable misinformation about Fidel Castro in terms of shaping our opinion and reaction to him, that it almost became too late. And of course, after the Cuban missile crisis we entered into a form of guarantee of the permanence of Fidel Castro.

In a certain sense, the same situation applies here. There is no imminent threat implying disaster to our interests in the region. But there is a long-term threat, and the longer the institutional roots of this Marxist-Leninist dictatorship are allowed to sink themselves into the fabric of Nicaragua the harder it will be to pull up those roots.

There are very few examples—we have no examples in which Marxist-Leninist regimes have willingly given up power. And my argument would be, let us at least support somebody who will give us the prospect—not the guarantee, but the prospect—of future political change, because communism is a system that does not admit of future political change.

Senator DODD. Well, I watched the President a few months ago visit a country that has a Marxist-Leninist government, one that embraces those values, and says so to everyone who will listen. The President spent a profitable week pragmatically dealing with the Chinese. We have significant trade relations. A Marxist government and yet a government with which we are willing to try and resolve things between us and develop a harmonious relationship, despite our fundamental differences.

I do not suggest it is just this administration, because it has gone on for years. What is it about Latin America, specifically Cuba and Nicaragua, that makes it difficult not just for the Reagan administration, but since the early 1960's, for us to develop the same kind of pragmatic relationship we have with the People's Republic of China? President Nixon developed a rapport with the Soviet Union, although it did not ultimately pan out as well as we would have liked.

What is it about the Latin American region that seems to make it impossible for administrations of all colors and stripes to deal with these realities in a far more pragmatic way or develop a more pragmatic approach than we have to date?

Mr. **Allen**. In my view, nations pursue their national interest or interests. In the case of visiting the People's Republic of China, the President did so in pursuit of the national interest because he believes that a normal relationship with the PRC is in our best interest, and to the extent that the People's Republic of China can function as an asset in the global balance of power loosely counted on our side, as opposed to the Soviet side, then that meets our national interest.

Of course, we also see signs of change within the People's Republic of China. President Reagan, while there, gave several very stirring speeches, most of which were not conveyed to the Chinese people contemporaneously, but only later did they hear his message, his appeal for democracy and for freedom.

Now, you ask, what is it about Latin America? Well, in one sense I have to at least implicitly agree with you when I say that we have not had a coherent policy toward Latin America in my lifetime, in my adult lifetime. I do not recall a sensible policy statement toward Central America or South America.

Senator **Dodd**. I read your lecture here and you note that the Carter administration actually refused to identify Central America as a vital U.S. interest. I want to ask you about this.

I mean, I presume today that you would have a different view of the Panama Canal treaties than you did prior to their approval here in the Senate.

Mr. **Allen**. No; my view is the same.

Senator **Dodd**. You are still opposed to them?

Mr. **Allen**. No; I did not oppose them.

Senator **Dodd**. Oh, you supported them?

Mr. **Allen**. Yes, sir; it was my candidate who was the well-known opponent, but who, I might add, did not even mention the words "Panana Canal" during the 1980 campaign, did not even mention the words.

Senator **Dodd**. Well, do you think they are working well? And here was an example, where a policy that approached a difficult issue was resolved intelligently?

Mr. **Allen**. Well, so far so good. It is working well. And there are big problems with respect to the future administration of the Panama Canal, and there are questions about its capacity and, I might add, our participation in a new Panama Canal scheme.

But yes, indeed—and I might add that I was in Tokyo, Japan, having breakfast with that candidate when he got the news about the Panama Canal vote in the Senate. And we were having breakfast with the distinguished former Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Ushiba, who lamentably passed away very recently.

But President Reagan's—then ex-Governor Reagan's initial reaction was: It is the law of the land. I do not like it, but it is the law of the land. And since then it has not been an issue.

Senator **Dodd**. I was only raising it as an example where, for once an alternative method of resolving differences there had proved fairly successful. We have there a good example where a situation that could have otherwise exploded was dealt with intelligently and pragmatically. The most important issue, however, is that it proved to be in the best interests of the United States at least at this juncture. What happens down the road only time will tell.

Why cannot something like that be approached more successfully in dealing with the problems of Nicaragua and El Salvador? Why is not more of an effort being focused on the Contadora process? Why do most of the speeches we hear have to do with the Contra operation? The Kissinger Commission report had only one reference to the Contadora process in 133 pages.

How do you explain that?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I am not going to represent the point of view that Contadora is going to resolve—adherence to Contadora is going to resolve the problems of the region. Even the signatories to Contadora are busy now restructuring Contadora to more accurately reflect what they consider to be their interests.

I cannot explain it, but it has to do with our failure to assign priority status to this region, which is of vital national significance to us. I mentioned that we have not had a policy, and I think we are going to go through a period of time before we can get one that is sensible.

But it is this administration, Senator Dodd, and I wish it was another administration, that had initiated the Caribbean Basin plan, the CBI. I wish we could have witnessed the rapid progression of all of Central America, the Caribbean and South America toward democracy in previous years that we are seeing now.

Things are getting better for people in the region. It is going to be a long time before they get entirely better and get well again.

We need a program of active involvement. We need Presidential attention, congressional attention to Central America on a long-term basis. In the same way that we are beginning to examine our policies and objectives toward the Pacific Basin, we need the same kind of attention devoted to Central and South America. And if it takes decades, then so be it.

But we need to have a national consensus. In the meantime, the success of the Marxist-Leninist revolution in Nicaragua poses an important threat in my view to the security and the stability of the Western Hemisphere, and most particularly to the nations immediately adjacent.

Senator DODD. I thought you just said it did not? I thought I just heard you——

Mr. ALLEN. Long-term threat. There is no short-term threat. It is a very distinct and important long-term threat.

I just met yesterday, the other day, with some Costa Ricans whom we had here. They are deeply concerned, and as a matter of fact this leader of the opposition party said that the first act that he would take upon entering office as President of Costa Rica would be to abandon neutrality vis-a-vis the Sandinista regime, said neutrality being the present policy of the regime in Costa Rica.

Senator DODD. Well, I certainly do not disagree with you about the need for long-term policy, and I think probably all of us share common ground on what we would like to see emerge. I suppose it is the tactics from time to time that cause the disagreements to emerge.

I appreciate your statement, and I certainly agree with you on your last comment. I thank you for coming before the committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Mr. Allen, may I pursue for a moment the Nicaraguan question. I would concur in the judgment that the pursuit of negotiations between the United States and Nicaragua must be based on a common agreement that governments in the area ought not to seek to destabilize one another. The interdiction aspect of our policy was designed to try to prevent that occurring in El Salvador and elsewhere. Beyond that, I suppose, a further prerequisite to fruitful negotiations is acceptance by the nations of Central America that they ought not serve as Soviet bases of operations, stating it very candidly. As you pointed out, there was evidence early on in Nicaragua involving extensive airfields and other operations that suggested something more than defense of the country.

There seems to be for the moment some dispute as to why negotiations are not proceeding. The Secretary of State has testified that we seem to be back to square one with regard to negotiations, that no progress is being made at the bilateral level, and that Contadora group is held in contempt by the Nicaraguans presently.

This leads to the feeling that some pressure needs to be applied by the United States at the moment, and the question is, as Senator Dodd said, what tactical steps ought we to be contemplating at the moment?

Mr. **ALLEN**. Senator, I think that continued support to the Contras is in the best national security interest of the United States and represents the best hope for maintaining the democratic option for Nicaragua. It is possible to elaborate on that, I suppose, in terms of specific methodology.

But the principle is what is at stake as I understand it in the debate that is going on within the country today, between the administration and the Congress. I would like to settle on the principle and perhaps in a second phase, if we could maintain our level of assistance to the Contras, there could be greater cooperation with members of this committee in determining specific applications of that aid for whatever purpose.

I do not think that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or any other committee should get engaged in the business or become engaged in the business of deciding whether or not specific covert actions should take place. But we stand for democracy, and it is true we are put in somewhat of a box when we are asked why is it that we oppose Soviet intervention in the hemisphere, yet we propose to intervene.

And I come back to one element in my testimony or one item that I mentioned in my testimony. It is not the same. We are not the same as the Soviet Union. We are different. We are seeking to preserve peaceful and democratic change. As I said in my response to Senator Dodd, the system known as Marxist-Leninist or Communist simply does not admit of future peaceful political change.

That being the case, whatever the fine tuning may be, I urge the Members of the U.S. Senate to work hard to reconsider any negative feelings or attitudes they may have about this important task. It is not the most tasteful thing in which we are engaged, but it may be one of the most necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony and for being so forthcoming in your answers to all of our questions today. We appreciate likewise the additional submissions that you have made of papers and polls and speeches. We appreciate the receipt of the book, which will be very helpful to us.

Thank you for coming.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Senator.

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, February 6, 1985.]

OUTLINES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1985

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Pressler, Evans, Pell, Glenn, Zorinsky, Cranston, and Dodd.

The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will now come to order.

The committee now finds itself fully engaged in the task of a comprehensive review of American foreign policy. Having heard previously from Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and former National Security Adviser Richard Allen, the committee is attempting in part to come to grips with a central problem in the Nation's foreign policy, namely the balancing of foreign interests and commitments with commensurate power and resources to support them.

Many Members of Congress, including some who support the main outlines of U.S. security policy, worry nonetheless that our global security interests are expanding and outrunning the resources and the political will necessary to sustain them. Others would suggest that if U.S. military resources are stretched to the limit of their ability to support vital and important security interests, then the major problem for the United States is one of being underpowered rather than overcommitted, that the United States needs to expand its margin of safety by enhancing its military capabilities.

The committee is privileged to have before it this morning Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, former Secretary of Energy, and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I can think of no one more thoughtful or better qualified to address this issue than Dr. Schlesinger.

We are delighted that you are before us this morning and are grateful to you for coming. But before I ask you to proceed, Dr. Schlesinger, I would like to ask Senator Claiborne Pell, the ranking minority member, for his opening statement. Senator Pell.

Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join with you in welcoming Dr. Schlesinger, who really occupies a unique role. He is one of the few men in the United States who have ever served in Cabinets under two different parties and two different administrations. I think his objectivity and his knowledge will be of great help to this committee in its deliberations. We welcome him.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Would you please proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Senator Pell, and good morning, Senator Glenn.

It is an honor to be invited to appear before this committee today as it examines under its new chairman the international position of the United States. The challenge to this Nation and to this committee, given its responsibilities, is certainly not diminishing. While history does provide some guidance to us in our perplexities, the position of the United States in this era is historically unique.

Never before in history has a nation, any nation, attempted to maintain stability essentially on a worldwide basis. That task, immense as it may be in itself, is made even more complex by the reality that the nation attempting to maintain stability is also a political democracy, and one with strong moral impulses.

It is therefore simply a fact of life, perhaps unwelcome to some, that American foreign policy must take public sentiments into account and cannot simply be guided by the calculations of realpolitik. It should also be noted that in the United States there is little deference to a governing class. As a consequence, any administration that persistently defies public sentiment on foreign policy is likely to be ousted.

In certain respects the task of fulfilling U.S. international responsibilities has become gradually more arduous since the end of the era that succeeded World War II. At the close of that war, the United States was, quite simply, the preeminent power in the world. Economically, politically, and within limits militarily, the United States simply bestrode the world.

Reasonable policy objectives were sustained with remarkable ease. For the American society it was a happy period, one to which many look backwards with nostalgia. From an American perspective, the only misfortune was that our preeminence was inherently transitory. As the war-torn powers of Europe and Asia recovered and as the Soviet Union gradually equipped itself to counter the military advantages of the United States, our relative position inevitably had to decline.

Yet for an extended period it was easy for the United States to fulfill her commitments. And, it might be added, a national consensus backed those commitments. When the United States clearly defined its objectives, even in circumstances as inherently unfavorable as northern Iran or the Berlin airlift, the Soviet Union felt obliged to give way. Even as late as 1956, at the time of the Hungarian uprising, the Soviet Union had to consider the possibility of direct American involvement. Clearly by 1968 in Czechoslovakia, or even more markedly in 1981 in Poland, the potential reach of American power had been markedly reduced.

In the 1950's, Secretary Dulles could articulate the reality of American strategic dominance in the doctrine of massive retaliation. Despite grave reservations within the intellectual community, the simple fact remains that the doctrine worked quite well for a period.

But the era in which the United States could fulfill her commitments at relatively low risk could not be long sustained. Quite simply, the United States was destined to lose its preeminence, and consequently the doctrine of massive retaliation, which so eased the problem of meeting international commitments, would no longer be tenable.

As the United States lost its position of preeminence, its role inevitably changed. The decline of American power meant that the United States would be more regularly tested. Challenges of a sort previously unthinkable became inevitable. North Vietnam, Khomeini's Iran, and perhaps Sandinista Nicaragua are the outstanding examples of this changed environment.

Perhaps one need do no more than contrast the ease and the success of the U.S. involvement in Lebanon in 1958 and in 1981-82 to underscore the relative decline in American power and the increased difficulty for the United States in achieving her international objectives.

The upshot is that the United States can no longer have her own way as readily as in the past. We will, as the saying goes, win some and lose some. When we do suffer a serious setback, as in Lebanon recently, that fact may not be fully borne home to the American public, whose chief reaction may be one of relief.

The fact of loss will, however, not be lost on other audiences in the world. An American loss not only damages our prestige, it further reduces our capacity to fulfill our commitments. Yet even under the best of circumstances, some losses are perhaps unavoidable.

And if we extricate ourselves with considerable dispatch and skill, the fact of loss, as in Lebanon, may in some quarters be softened by admiration of our skill in extrication—perhaps in accordance with the ancient adage that he who fights and runs away lives to fight another day.

The decline of American power is, of course, made more serious by the simultaneous end of the national consensus on foreign policy, which was shattered in Vietnam. Associated with the end of national consensus has been the revival of conflict between the executive and legislative branches, a conflict inherent in the separation of powers, but which had been largely dormant in the period from Pearl Harbor to Tet.

There are, of course, ironies in these developments. At a time that our gross advantages in military power have declined, a national consensus is more necessary than heretofore to make effective our residual power. Moreover, any domestic divisions weaken our capacity to make use of whatever power we have.

But pointing to ironies does not alter reality. A national consensus cannot simply be wished into being. It can be restored only gradually, over time, if at all. It will come about only through the development of mutual trust, through reasonable success, and through the sustained credibility of the executive branch.

As to the conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, these cannot be wished away. Legislative power may have been dormant in the 1950's and 1960's, but it is now aroused. The deference earlier shown to the executive branch is not likely to be quickly restored. Whatever the longings of some past and present officials of the executive branch, including, Mr. Chairman, perhaps myself, to roll back the legislative intrusion, the good old days—which means only the post-World War II days—will not return.

It is these changes on the international and domestic scene that create the new dilemmas for American foreign policy. The United States has lost its preeminence. While it remains the leading nation on the international scene, its power, which earlier was scarcely disputable, is now very much disputable.

Simultaneously—and not simply by coincidence—national unity has been fractured, both in terms of the national consensus and in terms of the agreement between the executive and legislative branches. In short, these changes imply that the costs and risks of sustaining our international position have risen.

Despite the relative decline of American power, not only in relation to the Soviet Union but even in relation to some Third World countries, the degree of American commitment worldwide, however, has generally not altered. Indeed, in some parts of the world, most notably in the Persian Gulf region, those commitments have risen.

The unchanged state of U.S. commitments, accompanied by the relative decline of American power and the evaporation of national unity, have led to two distinct gaps, in which this committee has expressed specific interest. These are the commitments power and the consensus policy gaps. Let me start with the former.

The reality that our commitments stretch thin our available resources has led to some hankering, especially during the Vietnam period, that we reduce our commitments to match our resources, and thereby lower the risks the United States faces on the international scene. Generally speaking, such expressions have been merely a longing. To the extent that such longings reflect a desire significantly to reduce military spending, they have rested on illusion.

The central foreign policy commitment of the United States since World War II has been to sustain a free Europe, and it is to this commitment that the overall cost and structure of the American military establishment has been primarily addressed.

Senator McGovern is the only candidate in modern times who has directly challenged that commitment. His slogan of "Come home, America" would have solved the power-commitment gap, though in my judgment would have raised other and far greater difficulties.

The Mansfield amendment, unlike the more recent Nunn amendment, which has different purposes, chipped away at the commitment to European defense, although it did not challenge it directly. If we are to sustain our obligations in Western Europe, which I believe we must, the hope for substantial reductions in our military posture is illusory.

From time to time, attempts have been made to curb our involvement in other parts of the world, which appear less central to American foreign policy. The Nixon doctrine, promulgated under the pressure of American public opinion during Vietnam, was one such attempt. It resulted in a thinning of our forces in several regions around the world.

Perhaps its most distinctive feature was its attempt to establish the Shah of Iran as the principal guarantor of Western interests in the Persian Gulf. That attempt, within limits, was successful. Nonetheless, even at the height of his power, that concept imposed greater responsibility on the Shah's regime than it could sustain.

From the standpoint of the power-commitments gap, the irony lies in the major expansion of U.S. commitment in the Persian Gulf region since the Shah's downfall, even in a period that our power relative to our commitments was still shrinking. Both the Carter doctrine and the Reagan corollary imply a degree of American commitment in the Persian Gulf to which, to put it gently, our capabilities are not well matched.

President Carter had also attempted to reduce our forces in Korea—a change in our overseas military posture that has intermittently been suggested since the close of the Korean war and, incidentally, Mr. Chairman, by the JCS, and by Secretary Acheson just before the Korean war. The withdrawal of our ground forces was vigorously resisted on Capitol Hill, including by some individuals who previously had urged an adjustment of our commitments to our power.

I use these incidents to underscore a fundamental reality: It is far easier for individuals to call in the abstract for reduced commitments than for a great power actually to define those commitments that should be reduced or jettisoned.

For any great power, and most notably the protecting superpower of the West, to back away from commitments is more easily said than done. In practice, the loss in prestige may actually reduce our power more than the reduced claims on our military resources enhances that power. In that may lie the supreme irony.

Closing the power-commitments gap may not be possible through reduction of commitments. The United States, as a great power, has essentially taken on the task of sustaining the international order, and any abandonment of major commitments is difficult to reconcile with that imposing task.

The upshot is that our commitments will remain large and that our military power will remain more modest in relation to those commitments than it has been in the past. That implies a degree of risk that we must acknowledge and accept. Try as we will, there is no acceptable way that we can escape from either these responsibilities or these risks.

It is, of course, the recognition of these costs and risks that has led to the so-called consensus-policy gap. Fulfilling our commitments was relatively simple in the past. When we had the visible power simply to smash our potential foes, as in the 1950's and 1960's, there was little difficulty in sustaining domestic agreement.

Vietnam brought a sea change in domestic attitudes. The human and financial costs of conflict were brought home to the American public. Since then, there has been a notable reluctance to see American forces become engaged, and notably in third areas of the world.

It has become potentially quite difficult to foster a national consensus in the event that U.S. troops become engaged abroad. No administration is eager to accept the domestic political penalties and the domestic divisions inherent in using U.S. forces to stabilize third areas of the world.

In such places as Lebanon or Central America, there is little question regarding the raw physical power of the United States to impose its will. There is no power-commitment gap, but rather a consensus-policy gap. Other nations have come to doubt, not the abstract power of the United States to achieve its goals, but rather its staying power in sustaining them.

It is notable that this administration has shied away from engaging American forces in Central America and has also withdrawn American forces from Lebanon, despite some embarrassment, when the cost of that engagement began to rise.

Thus, ultimately we are faced with a paradox. In dealing with what is the central strategic problem of the United States, the formidable capabilities of the Soviet Union in relation to finite American power, there is at base a domestic consensus, with respect to both protection of the North American continent and our obligations in Europe. Yet, paradoxically, it is here in this arena, in which the consensus is not seriously challenged, that we may face a real gap between our power and our commitments.

By contrast, in much of the Third World, in which our power is certainly commensurate with our commitments, there is simply no domestic consensus regarding the prospective use of force. Thus, overall, in all parts of the world we are likely to have to contend with at least one of these two gaps. Such is the penalty for the loss of our postwar preeminence.

These perplexities lie behind the disputes, the differences between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. In effect, the Secretary of Defense has insisted upon domestic consensus before U.S. forces become deployed. Given the circumstances, that is indeed a demanding requirement.

Were it to be rigorously implemented, it would virtually assure other powers that they can count on not facing American forces. Nonetheless, Secretary Weinberger has clearly and repeatedly indicated his willingness for the United States to face down the Soviet Union, a far more onerous commitment.

It is for this reason that the Secretary has fretted about our military weaknesses in respect to the Soviet Union and has insisted at the same time on stronger forces, which, in at least a superficial paradox, he argues should not be used in the most likely contingencies.

Much as I personally sympathize with the concerns of the Department of Defense in the post-Vietnam era, I cannot concur with the emerging belief that the United States must only fight popular, winnable, wars. Such a self-denying ordinance is scarcely consistent with the public support for expanded defense spending of recent years.

The likeliest physical challenges to the United States come in the Third World, not in Europe or North America. If the more predatory states in the Third World are given assurance that they can employ, directly or indirectly, physical force against American interests with impunity, they will feel far less restraint in acting against our interests.

Much of American foreign policy inevitably is concerned with such Third World problems. In the recent dispute, Secretary Shultz may have somewhat overstated his case. I for one do not believe that there is a political base in this country for American preemption against terrorist groups. Nonetheless, the Secretary is right with regard to his essential point:

The United States must be prepared to retaliate against those who repeatedly employ physical force against our interests. It cannot allow an assured free ride. It ought not give assurance to others that U.S. forces will never retaliate. It should not announce in advance what it will not do. That is simply unsound strategy. In the face of repeated provocations, it must be prepared to retaliate, selectively.

All nations, Mr. Chairman, love glorious little wars. Even World War II, with its sequential victories, was immensely popular in Germany, until 1942. The intelligentsia will no doubt have misgivings, since public enthusiasm sweeps away serious legal and moral questions. But popular support is hardly weakened by such quibbles.

Thus, it is useful to have a Grenada to trump a loser like Beirut. But from the national perspective, such easy victories resolve remarkably little. If a conflict is sufficiently easy to be a glorious war, it is certain to be marginal to our interests.

Americans historically have embraced crusades, such as World War II, as well as glorious little wars. The difficulty is that the most likely conflicts of the future fall between crusades and such brief engagements as Grenada or Mayaguez.

Yet, these in-between conflicts have weak public support. Even in the best of times, with national unity and at the height of our power, public enthusiasm for Korea and Vietnam evaporated in just a year or two. Indeed, any war that is not a clearcut winner will not long enjoy public enthusiasm.

The problem is that virtually no opportunity exists for future crusades, and those glorious wars are likely to occur infrequently. The role of the United States in the world is such that it must be prepared for, be prepared to threaten, or even be prepared to fight, those intermediate conflicts that are likely to fare poorly on television. Whether this Nation, the leader of the free world, can measure up to such challenges will to a large extent define the future shape of international politics.

Mr. Chairman, it is time for me to draw some conclusions. For two decades subsequent to World War II, the American position in the world was preeminent. In the past 20 years, as our relative power has receded, our commitments have not receded commensurately. Indeed, they have grown.

Thus, we unavoidably live with a high level of risk. Such risks make it far more difficult, even in the best of times, to achieve domestic consensus regarding national policy.

Is there a path out of these perplexities? I wish I could suggest one to you. However, there is none. The United States is now obliged to live with the risks that have been the lot of all other nations less favored than we have been throughout much of our history. We shall have to bear continuously a degree of risk that is unwelcome.

In the aggregate, our international commitments exceed our capabilities to fulfill all of them simultaneously. Yet it is not easy for a great power to shed its commitments. Our commitments will continue to exceed our resources. Prudent planners will argue that we are running a bluff. Worriers will simply worry. But in fact it will represent the conscious acceptance of risk and a conviction that not everything will go wrong simultaneously.

None of the usual solutions are available to eliminate those perplexities. Despite all the longings, we are not in a position dramatically to redefine our commitments. As a practical matter, there is no way unilaterally to augment our forces to the extent necessary to reduce risk to a level that is basically comfortable.

Perhaps I should add, Mr. Chairman, that the President's strategic defense initiative is not a panacea that could restore America's historic advantages. For any who may embrace such a hope, it will remain illusory.

Nor is it possible for us to engage our allies overseas to a degree that will eliminate either our responsibilities or our risks. No doubt our allies should do more. Their real budget problems, however, as well as, in some cases, the desire for an essentially free ride, mean that we will not improve the Western position sufficiently that we can cease to rely upon nuclear deterrence.

Finally, although I am a strong proponent of arms control, arms control can never reduce the Soviet threat to a point at which we would be comfortable. Various measures may indeed limit certain risks, perhaps most notably the risk of instability.

But the Soviet Union has achieved, and will continue to achieve, its own security objectives by placing the United States at a degree of risk that we find unwelcome. There is no conceivable set of arms control measures that could persuade the Soviet Union to ease the discomfort that the United States ultimately feels in bearing this risk. For to do so means that the Soviets would be obliged to accept what would appear to them to be an intolerable level of risk. This condition of the international scene will continue until such distant date when there may be a change of heart with respect to basic ideological differences.

Mr. Chairman, I could go on. But it seems appropriate to pause at this point and to see whether you or other members of the committee may have some comments or questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Schlesinger. We deeply appreciate your very thoughtful and provocative statement.

Before we begin our questioning, I would mention to members that the warning light system has been revived, at least for the moment, and we will see whether it works. The yellow light should give you 1 minute of warning before the 10-minute question time has come to an end, and the red light means that you should cease and desist as soon as possible thereafter.

Senator Pressler has a commitment shortly and therefore I will yield to him for questions at this point as the first questioner.

Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I shall return later and I will just use 5 minutes now.

Mr. Secretary, let me compliment you on your statement. I think it is a very accurate statement. As a veteran of the Vietnam war, I am probably one of the few people who believes that we accomplished some things in Southeast Asia in the Vietnam war, even though we technically lost the war. But in terms of containment and in terms of certain decisions China made, I think we accomplished a great deal.

I wanted to ask you about your strategic defense initiative comment. Why do you say that the strategic defense initiative is not a panacea that could restore America's historic advantage? And why do you refer to it as an illusory hope?

Secretary **Schlesinger**. Senator, in the first place, let me endorse your comments about Vietnam. The war had its favorable as well as unfavorable aspects. Perhaps the most significant was the change of power within Indonesia, which I believe was a direct result of the United States showing the flag in the region.

The United States, of course, was not defeated in battle in Vietnam. It supported the regime that ultimately lost, but we were not defeated in battle.

Senator, with regard to the strategic defense initiative, there is the hope—and that hope is contained in the original vision that President Reagan laid out in March 1983 and has since reiterated in the inaugural address—that the United States might be able to create a defense that would make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

This hope is not going to be fulfilled. Indeed, there is no way that we can establish so perfect or near-perfect a defense, even against ballistic missiles, in my judgment. But when one includes, in addition to ballistic missiles, the air-breathing threat and the capacity the Soviets have to deploy bombers, cruise missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles, and to increase the number of submarines off our shores, the notion of a defense that will allow protection of American cities is one that will not be achieved.

But it is this goal that provides the political magic, as it were, in the President's vision. Moreover, it is this goal that would permit us to restore our position of strategic dominance.

Once one moves away from that goal, there are many reasons to examine strategic defenses. Since the 1960's the Pentagon has been engaged in research and development of ballistic missile defenses. It is appropriate now to take another look at this issue, since the Soviets have developed counterforce capabilities. But this is different from the vision that the President held out.

Indeed, in Secretary Shultz' statement to this committee, he attempted to back the President away from his original vision, as have other members of the administration. The Secretary said that we could make a Soviet first strike impotent and obsolete.

It is quite plausible that we can make such a first strike impotent and obsolete, but that is two moves from what the President suggested. The President said we would make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, and he indicated that we would be able to do more than just protect ourselves against the ballistic missile threat. We could protect ourselves from other threats as well.

The only hope that the Secretary of State holds out, in effect, is that we will be able to make a full first strike against our missile fields obsolete. That is a subject well worth examining, but it is not going to restore America's strategic supremacy.

Senator PRESSLER. I said pretty much the same thing to Secretary Weinberger when he was here, about cruise missiles being able to transport nuclear weapons. He said at that time that we nearly have the technology to shoot down cruise missiles. For example, he said the Soviets had shot down one of their own missiles. That was corrected by the Pentagon later that day.

I have some additional written questions on this subject, but I have one final oral question. In the New York Times, Brzezinski and others wrote an article saying that the cost of SDI for the two layers that they describe would be $60 billion a year. Prior to the President's star wars speech, the Pentagon gave some estimations at up to a trillion dollars.

What is your best estimation?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Well, I think it is clear that the article in the New York Times magazine section gave essentially a come-on price.

In the 1960's, when I was at the Bureau of the Budget, we were looking at the Sentinel system and then the Safeguard system. That limited system, either the Sentinel system that was designed for thin area defense, or the Safeguard system that was designed to protect our missile fields plus our national command authorities, would cost over $100 billion in today's terms. That is for a very limited capability in comparison.

The cost of a full defense of the sort that the President hopes for, which is the Astrodome over the United States of America, is going to be well over half a trillion dollars and probably will exceed a trillion dollars in my judgment. The numbers that you saw in the New York Times magazine section are unconvincing.

For example, each of the 100 satellites that would be purchased cost about as much as a stripped-down B-1 bomber, or not much more than, let us say, a Boeing 747. I do not think that we can provide military space vehicles with 100 percent reliability at such low costs.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I have four more questions for the record, which I will submit in writing, regarding the SDI and NATO. And I thank you very much for yielding.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, may I help out the Senator with regard to SDI and NATO?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The NATO problem is a very serious problem from the standpoint of SDI, because the Europeans have barely been able to summon the desire to support us in our R&D phase. The contrast between Mrs. Thatcher's eagerness to talk to Mikhail Gorbachev when he was in London about the militarization of space and her slow embrace of the research and development phase of star wars is, I think, a warning to us that we will be creating divisions within the NATO alliance unless we are very circumspect in proceeding with the strategic defense initiative.

The Soviets will be in a splendid position to achieve what they have wanted over the years, that is to bring divisions between Europe and America.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To my mind, the most destabilizing weapons system we have now, the most dangerous and the most unverifiable, is the cruise missile. It seems the simplest and the one that is the easiest to produce.

In your view, how can one build up a defense against the cruise missile? How can one verify it? The Astrodome concept, as you know, is fine, but it stops short of the cruise missile, which as a colleague, the Senator from New York, mentioned, can go under the Brooklyn Bridge. How do you handle that defense in your view and what would be its cost?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The Soviets, of course, Senator Pell, have spent a substantial share of their defense budget on strategic defense for many years, whereas since the 1950's the United States has gradually reduced its level of effort. The system we have today is capable of a skeleton defense of the North American Continent; some protection down in the Miami area against Cuban aircraft, although very limited protection; and also of some protection against small intrusions into the territory of the United States.

So we would start from a very low base. We have better technology than the Soviets. We can build a defense, a substantial defense, against the air-breathing threat. But that would be done at a considerably high cost to the United States and we must recognize those high costs.

In my judgment, if you wanted a complement, as you must have, to a hypothetical Astrodome defense, you would have to spend on the order of $50 billion a year. You would build up to that level as you procured the necessary equipment.

For example, we would need approximately 3,000 interceptors, which do not come cheap. We would probably need on the order of 100 AWACS. In short, one is looking at $125 to $150 billion in new aircraft, which is a not insignificant sum, even if spread over 10 years instead of 5.

One would have to develop an entirely new radar system for the protection of North America. And indeed, one would be deploying ground-based defenses, such as the Patriot system. And the overall cost of this would be about $50 billion a year. If we stretched it out more, we probably could hold it below that.

My primary concern, Senator Pell, is that even if we were to launch ourselves in the direction of the all-out strategic defense capability, the Astrodome concept, and simultaneously build an air defense system for the United States, and I do not think we will, we are talking of expenditures of $150 billion a year, up to that level.

And that would mean a stripping down of the American Defense Department. Conventional forces are indispensable for the position of the United States. We must think through these decisions, it seems to me, before we launch ourselves in that direction.

Senator PELL. A horseback judgment on your part is that the cost of just the lower limit—the Astrodome is there, but you have the empty space in between—for the cruise missiles would be then approximately, did I hear you say, $150 billion?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir. For that it would be roughly $50 billion a year, and you could shave that. If you go for both, the all-up Astrodome concept and simultaneously, as you must, develop the defense against the air-breathing system, you would be spending up to $150 billion in 1985 dollars.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

My recollection is that in April 1982 you suggested to this committee that you might be able to support a mutual and verifiable freeze. Would that still be your view or would you disagree with that?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I do not think so, Senator. I would have to look at my testimony at that time. I think that I have been quite skeptical of the freeze all along. I said that it deserved careful examination, if memory serves me correctly. I thought the Soviets would find so many problems with it that we might be willing to negotiate with the Soviets on that issue in order to avoid the burden for the United States of having turned down what appeared to be widespread public sentiment in Europe and North America.

But I do not think the Soviets will be prepared to agree to a freeze due to serious reservations with regard to verification. Therefore, while I am skeptical of the concept, I was perhaps less hostile than some.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

I know you must have thought a great deal as to how we achieve a successful outcome in Geneva. We all know what our objectives are. What in your view are the Soviet objectives?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The Soviets, Senator Pell, in my judgment have two sets of objectives, one of which they will be exceedingly effective in achieving. That objective is the political gains and the propaganda gains that they get from going back to the table.

As we will recall, the year 1984 was a very poor one in terms of the Soviet image in the world. They walked out of the Geneva negotiations and suffered a severe black eye in Europe for having done so. They did not achieve their objectives with regard to stopping NATO weapon systems deployments. In the fall of 1983 there was the shoot-down of the KAL aircraft. These two things shifted the international perception in support of the United States and against the Soviet Union.

By going back to Geneva at this time the Soviets, to a large extent, have put that very unfavorable image behind them. Not only have they put those costs behind them, as I indicated in my response to Senator Pressler's written question, the United States will be on the defensive on this issue at Geneva because our European allies, for very good reasons in some cases, are strongly opposed to anything beyond research and development on the strategic defense initiative.

The British and French have their own small independent nuclear forces. The French have been, what shall I say, more open or less gentlemanly about indicating their feelings. The British have been more gentlemanly and a little more guarded in their criticisms. But both feel that their own independent nuclear capabilities, in which they are investing much of their national treasure, will be made obsolete if the Soviets were to have even a small defensive effort comparable to our own.

The Germans are deeply worried by the possibility that a major diversion of American resources into this area that would lead to a reduction of American forces in Europe. In general they share some of these concerns about the militarization of space, the arms race, and so on.

So the Soviets will be in a beautiful position to exploit this. The structure of the discussions is in the Soviets favor because they can say to the Europeans: We would be happy to proceed with regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces, but you know the obstinacy of the Americans on strategic defense precludes that.

It will be a very enticing package and we will have to be on our guard against it. So the Soviets will have put behind them some of these problems. They will have the opportunity to exploit these differences. So the political gains are very clear.

As to substance, the Soviets are genuinely concerned about American technology, including American ballistic missile defense technology. They would like to curtail our efforts in this area.

The Soviets are not charitable. They do not go to these negotiations simply to help out the United States or to pursue peaceful objectives. They are there for specific purposes: to constrain American technology and to get reductions in deployed American weapons systems.

In this case they are in a beautiful position. Either they will achieve the substantive objective of getting the United States to constrain its ballistic missile defense ambitions, or if it fails that, it will be far more successful on the political front.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Dr. Schlesinger, in the construct that you presented, essentially you talked about the commitments that we have and indicated that great powers do not easily rid themselves of commitments, and that we probably should not attempt to do so because this might diminish our credibility and prestige disproportionately.

You pointed out that, relatively, we are less strong, in part because others are stronger and there are more players in the international competition. Then you made the point that it is ironic, given the relative lack of strength, or the diminishing of that strength, and all the commitments which we must keep, that, at least in our domestic situation, things have become more divisive.

At the moment when such consensus might have been expected to make this relatively smaller amount of power more meaningful, even that residual power is likely to be fractionated because we cannot agree on how to use it. Thus, in the case of the Third World situations, where we have the power, we do not have the will to use it. Yet elsewhere, we may not have enough power to support truly vital interests.

Then, unhappily, we come to the end of the statement before you have helped us out of the dilemma. In essence, I think you advised that we not cut the commitments. But what things might we do to become relatively stronger, or are we simply fated, given the number of players in the drama, to have a relatively diminishing role? Is there any way to close the gap between power and commitments?

Secretary **Schlesinger**. Mr. Chairman, a great power like the United States can be compared to a bank. I do not want to press the metaphor too far, but just as a bank does not carry reserves to cover all of its deposits, so the United States or any great power does not have the forces to deal with a simultaneous claim, or the equivalent of a withdrawal, at the same time.

The banks continue in operation, by and large. The great power is normally able to fulfill its commitments. We have been able to measure up to our commitments, by and large, despite this relative decline in our power.

What can we do to enhance our position? Even though our relative power has declined and even though this may not be fully understood by all elements in the American society, we are the leading nation in the world. Our residual power is much respected. It can be enhanced.

I think that a prudent defense buildup is certainly desirable in reducing certain risks, not to the level that they are zero, but to the level that no sensible opponent will be tempted to move against us in the area of our vital interests.

That requires not only effort by the United States; it requires effort by our European allies. Making the European deterrent airtight is something that we cannot do unilaterally, but we can encourage measures that will move it in this direction.

While I do not want to be euphoric about arms control, it can limit risks, particularly in this area of instability. It is not going, however, to eliminate the basic problems that we are going to have to go on bearing for an extended period.

Certain commitments disappear, Mr. Chairman, more or less perforce. Senator Pressler mentioned defeat in Southeast Asia, which was a political defeat, not a military defeat. Obviously, our commitments in Southeast Asia have receded. You mentioned just before we came in this morning the refusal of New Zealand to accept American warships in their ports if they are nuclear powered or unless we announce that there are no nuclear weapons on board.

We should be, I think, fairly circumspect in insisting that other nations allow us to defend them. If they are not prepared to take the necessary minimal steps in their own defense, that commitment also goes down.

On the other hand, there has been this surge of American commitments which reflects the dependency of the free world, now somewhat lessened, on the Persian Gulf. The Carter doctrine and the Reagan corollary to that doctrine demand great capabilities that the United States probably does not have.

We depend upon our general prestige, I think, rather than our capabilities, to fill those commitments. But this underscores the fact that the maintenance of the prestige and the image of the United States in the world helps as much as raw capabilities to sustain those commitments.

The **Chairman**. Well, those are important steps in the external environment. What counsel could you give in terms of the internal environment? In other words, is it possible in your judgment, having served now in several administrations, in the presence of both parties to return to a greater degree of political consensus, with corresponding perception by the rest of the world.

The world now may perceive that there is little left of this political consensus, and this committee is hopefully searching for how we amend that state of affairs. But is it doable? Have things progressed in terms of the executive-legislative relationship or in the evolution of the parties in shaping foreign policy, so that it is illogical to assume that this fractured political consensus can be repaired?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I am optimistic, but not completely, Mr. Chairman. In the first place, I think that we sometimes exaggerate the role of partisanship in foreign policy. There are differences between the two parties, to be sure, and among members in each party in both Houses on Capitol Hill.

But the opinions they express are usually genuine, an expression of conviction rather than just a search for partisan advantage. I think this is one of the things about the American society from which we can take some considerable comfort. Partisan and ideological differences in the United States are less deep than they are in some other nations.

What can we do to improve our position? Well, part of this answer is maybe not very reassuring. Consensus is based on being in the middle of the road. National consensus depends also on avoiding divisive issues whenever possible. Sometimes they cannot be avoided. President Roosevelt, for example, in the 1930's did not feel he could equivocate his position on the war in Europe. But generally speaking, to maintain consensus one must avoid the creation of disharmony, and that means being in the middle of the road. I would say, for example, that it is hard to create a consensus on foreign policy issues while we have deep divisions about the nature of the Federal budget and about the role of the Federal Government.

I am not saying that it should be that way. I am just simply stating I think this is the reality. Concern about budgetary expenditures spills over into concerns about excessive demand, or what is perceived to be excessive demand on our resources overseas.

I think that the strategic defense initiative that was raised by Senator Pressler and Senator Pell is an initiative that is not fundamentally consensus building. It breaks away from what has been the basic strategy of the United States since the signing of the 1972 ABM Treaty. So I think one has to have issues that avoid divisiveness as much as possible.

There is one final thing. The executive branch, when it comes to Capitol Hill, must come in the most credible way possible. The executive branch must be in a position that even though Senators and Representatives may disagree with its substantive goals, that it believes that it is not attempting to cut corners or avoid either deeply complex questions or the evidence on such questions.

These are very demanding ways to proceed, Mr. Chairman. I concede that once the consensus has broken down, once the deference that was once given to the executive branch has weakened if disappeared, then only great respect for the wisdom of the executive branch, the belief in the evidence that it puts forward will, I think, restore that consensus.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much.

Senator Glenn.

Senator **GLENN**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I thought your statement was excellent.

Secretary **SCHLESINGER**. Thank you, Senator.

Senator **GLENN**. You know, everybody always says oh, it was a great statement, but I really do think compared to some of the other statements we have heard, that was an excellent statement.

First, to comment on the SDI, I am amused sometimes at the estimates of the cost of SDI. I think that once you get to the engineering phase of a project, then you can put dollar figures to it. Until you get there, however, all these figures are purely taken out of the blue.

I spent last summer visiting many of the finest scientists in this country who work on lasers, neutral particle beam projectors, and microwave projectors, to see where we stand with this technology. There was not one of them that said they thought that we would have the option of even deciding what system to build for 10 years.

General Abrams was here one day. He likened star wars to the Apollo project; we just have to decide to go, and then go ahead and do it. I told him then that I thought that was nonsense, because when we decided to do the Apollo project, we knew all the engineering. We didn't have to make one single solitary physics, scientific, or technological breakthrough to go ahead with the whole Apollo project. Yet, we talk about star wars as though all we have to do is decide to go, and we go, and that's just pure nonsense, because the physics has not been invented yet to do star wars.

I fully support SDI research. But I think we are still in the research phase, and we cannot even begin to make estimates of how much SDI is going to cost. There are just a jillion questions that have to be answered yet.

But anyway, on to something else.

Secretary **SCHLESINGER**. One comment, Senator. It is different from the Apollo program in another way. The Moon is an inanimate object. In SDI we are dealing with a calculating foe, sometimes a foe that we regard as malevolent, but a foe who will be prepared to take countermeasures, very intelligent countermeasures, against whatever it is that we deploy.

Now, solving the physics problems on our side, even if we get there, does not solve the problem.

Senator **GLENN**. The Moon was not likely to change course, nor was it likely to shoot back.

We are trying to determine some of the foreign policy aspects of where the country should go, then determine what the defense posture should be; and it has to be in that order. I think we too often forget that.

We have some 42 treaty alliances. We are even committed right now to coming to the defense of Nicaragua and Cuba under the Rio Treaty. So obviously, these treaties need to be looked at from time to time—and changed perhaps—before we decide what our commitments will be.

But it seems to me there are some other things, too. There are some tides of history that determine trends in foreign policy that I do not think we have addressed enough on this committee, nor perhaps by the administration either.

For instance, one factor is economics—including the debt. If the dollar stays as strong as it is right now—say for a decade—we will alter world patterns on which foreign policy are determined.

As you pointed out, the nations of Europe have now recovered from World War II. They no longer are as dependent on us. We can no longer just play a tune, and have them dance to whatever we want.

The relative power changes and the territorial aspirations of the many countries that we have to consider in foreign policy are also a factor.

Another trend that we don't speak about too often is religion. If you look across southern Asia from Morocco clear across to Mindanao in the Philippines, what are the differences? They are basically religious. We have seen the rise of religious fundamentalism, whether it is Islam versus Judaism, or the Hindu versus Moslem. The Soviet move into Afghanistan may well have been occasioned by the fact they saw a growing Muslim influence in the Soviet Union. These are estimates that up to one-quarter of the Soviet Union's population would be of Muslim heritage by the year 2000. We have even seen a rise of fundamentalist thought in our own country, and it is having a big impact on our own society. And all these things affect the American consensus on foreign policy.

All of our preeminence is not tied up completely in military matters. These are esoteric matters perhaps, but I think they wind up being very fundamental to what our foreign policy has to be. It is not all military, even though that is the biggest factor.

The world situation is changing, and our foreign policy changes with it. Our defense posture has to change also. These are big tides of history that we are dealing with. When we try and set our defense posture for the next quarter century, we get into a lot of these different areas.

That is more a statement than a question, but I wonder if you would comment on some of these areas, and particularly if you see some things that we should be moving on to do in these areas.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Well, thank you, Senator.

The first comment is indeed, preeminence is not purely military. It was not in the post-war period. What gave the United States its preeminence was not only our control of nuclear weapons, our exclusive control, but the fact that we emerged from World War II with perhaps 60 percent of the world's manufacturing capacity, 50 percent of the world's net output, and the other countries, the other principal nations were all, with the exception of Canada, damaged to a lesser or greater extent.

One cannot ignore the military factor, of course. The reason the United States carries weight in international disputes and why Costa Rica's views are infrequently sought is that the United States is strong.

But our relative military posture has declined, and following up the chairman's earlier question, what can we do about it? We are the leading nation in the world. We are going to have to be far more astute not only in managing our military resources, which was the case when we were light years ahead of our potential foes, but also in the use of diplomatic and economic instruments. Through the clever, intelligent use of these instruments, in addition to our maintaining an adequate military posture, we may be able to maintain the rough stability that assures the American people of the kind of international order that they wish. It will be more difficult, but it will not be impossible. It will require great astuteness. It will require a recognition on the part of the United States that the rest of the world is no longer prepared as it was in the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's to hold up important issues of their own while the American society reaches a decision. We will have to react more quickly and more perceptively.

You mentioned the issue of international debts. The United States has a responsibility as the leading economic power to keep the system of international trade and international finance going.

Senator GLENN. And if there is one thing that drives international foreign policy for all countries, it is economics. We have not really discussed the economic strengths of different countries around the world. Economic matters and trade matters normally have been the determining factor, and wars followed those economic interests.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. All administrations come back to the center. The Carter administration came into office, for example, with the belief that it could largely eliminate security assistance; that we were selling too many weapon systems overseas. I think that belief faded by the second or third year of the Carter administration so that by the close of the administration we were providing substantial arms to nations that previously had not been considered appropriate recipients of those arms.

The Reagan administration came into office with the view that multilateral financial organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and so forth, were intruding on American policy and were perhaps an instrument, in some sense, of socialism. By the time of the Mexican debt problem, which occurred in September 2 years ago, there was a fire brigade treatment by the administration to recognize the need for the United States to involve itself in saving Mexico from the problems of indebtedness. This was caused, in part, by the fear that a chain reaction might follow the default of a major debtor nation. And we reacted very intelligently but somewhat belatedly, but in time.

We will have to move more quickly in the future with such reactions. We can no longer sustain the international order as we did in the 1950's or the 1940's simply by providing American resources. We can no longer afford to wait with regard to diplomatic issues until the conveniences of American politics allow us to respond.

Senator GLENN. I know my time is up, and I thank you for your statement.

You stressed that our strength is declining so we can no longer be the preeminent power. To me, that means we need better cooperation with our allies. But when we see Europe backsliding on what they promised, and Japan is still sticking with its ridiculous self-imposed limit of 1 percent of GNP for defense. Unless these and other allies are willing to come forward, as I see it, we will be in a declining condition just as you outlined. Now that they are recovered, if we can get them to live up to their responsibilities they supposedly took on, then that to me is the answer.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I fully agree on that, Senator, and I think that we have to be more consistent in our efforts. One of our problems in dealing, for example, with the Japanese is that in pushing certain objectives our efforts have been sporadic. The Japanese have been extremely astute in recognizing the sporadic nature of American policy pushes. They have come to the conclusion, quite rightly, that if they only wait 6 or 9 months, the Americans are likely to move on to some other issue, and the first issue will go away. So we must be more consistent.

Senator GLENN. The weather will change.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps I will have a chance to carry forward on the line that Senator Glenn was just beginning, because it ties in with what I wanted to ask.

First a comment or two on strategic defense initiative. As an engineer I would agree wholeheartedly with Senator Glenn that you cannot make any kind of cost estimates that mean anything at the point we are apparently now at with respect to scientific knowledge for the strategic defense initiative.

I guess, however, I am not so sure I totally agree with the statement I think I heard you say, that the goal of complete defense coming out of SDI will not be achieved. I guess I would go as far as to say it is not likely to be achieved, or we cannot conceive today how it will be achieved. But I remember very well an eminently forgettable American inventor who suggested on the centennial of the United States that we close the Patent Office because all had been invented.

Senator GLENN. If the Senator would yield a second, Vanabur Bush also said ICBM's were ridiculous; they were not technically possible.

Senator EVANS. All right.

Let me carry forward then your comments that the SDI is creating consternation in Europe and——

Secretary SCHLESINGER. That is not my word, Senator.

Senator EVANS. Pardon?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Concern, not consternation.

Senator EVANS. All right. Concern. I think there is a fear of decoupling, that we would look to ourselves rather than the defense of Europe if we thought we had safety through SDI.

But it seems to me, just as Senator Glenn and others have mentioned, then the alternative is a greater share of defense being assumed by our European and Asian allies. If you were Secretary of Defense today, what would you recommend to the President as a consistent long-term policy relating to an assumption of a greater share of defense by our allies?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Well, this is not meant to be discouraging, Senator Evans, but I would recommend about the same things that I was recommending a decade ago; and that indicates the degree of success that we have had in this last decade in moving in that direction.

With respect to Japan, I think that the United States must be very serious, and we have not been, as the colloquy with Senator Glenn indicated. We have not been serious with the Japanese. We have not persistently said this is what we expect you to do from administration to administration and even within the various players of administrations.

The Japanese should be encouraged seriously to protect the sea lanes at least down to the Philippines, perhaps as far as the Straits of Molucca, their own sea lanes, the approaches to Japan, and to have an air defense capability that is serious and can handle anything that the Soviets might throw against them given their relative remoteness from the standpoint of Soviet power, and they must have an adequate logistical base in Japan for their ground forces. This is going to cost more than 1 percent of the GNP. But we must be very serious with the Japanese.

Europe is, of course a much more complex question. Some of the nations in Europe, all of the nations in Europe, of course, almost all are democracies, and so they must deal with their own problems of domestic consensus. I think that as a practical matter we are not going to see a major defense effort on the part of Denmark, perhaps some of the low countries; but these are marginal from the standpoint of the United States.

The critical question for the NATO alliance, in my judgment, remains the development of stronger and more impressive conventional capabilities in the center of Europe, and that can be done in large part by a greater and redirected effort on the part of West Germany.

The West Germans can put into the field something on the order of 700,000 territorials in 48 hours that are not part of the regular military establishment. But we here in the United States, and even more clearly in Europe, have neglected effectively to make use of these reserves. We have not equipped them properly. We do not have an assigned role.

So I think that much can be done as long we do not set our ambitions too high. If we ask the West Europeans to float the number of divisions that the Warsaw Pact has. They are not going to be able to do it. They will not do it. But if we set more modest objectives that will substantially enhance deterrence, I think that we can indeed achieve that.

Senator **Evans**. Do you believe that those modest goals would or could result in some relative lowering of our own investment in defense, or are we collectively so short that we need to increase those while retaining the current requests for our own defense?

Secretary **Schlesinger**. I do not think that we can look, as long as the international power struggle continues, to any serious reduction of our defense effort, Senator. In the present circumstances, I would like to see a redirection of our joint efforts toward the Persian Gulf region.

In Europe we have a deterrent of medium confidence. In the Persian Gulf region military capabilities are such that we have a deterrent of only low confidence, and it should be improved. We have made commitments in that region that are very impressive; staggeringly so.

So I think that a redirection of effort is desirable, and there is no way that we can see a substantial dropping of our defense budget.

Senator EVANS. I would now turn to the Persian Gulf, which was one of the questions of national interest I was going to ask about. There is an alternative way to increasing our defense presence there, and it seems to me it is along the line of development of new technology that is a lot more achievable than the strategic defense initiative, and that is alternative energy development that would make the Persian Gulf perhaps no longer of strategic interest to the United States.

Is that a more suitable and perhaps a more achievable alternative than trying to live up to what I would agree with you are overcommitments in the area today?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Well, Senator, I think you have served up that question to the right man or perhaps the wrong man.

Senator EVANS. I know of your dual background, and it makes you uniquely capable of answering it.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I would very much like to see us do more in the energy area. We are now allowing complacency to set in and we are not pursuing related technologies as vigorously as we should. I was disappointed to see that the President's budget called for a moratorium on the accumulation of our strategic petroleum reserve. This bears directly upon the national security of the United States, because it affects the ability of this country to fulfill its international commitments.

However, having said that, the dependency of the free world on the Persian Gulf is going to increase in the next decade or decade and a half. The United States itself will become increasingly dependent on Persian Gulf resources. The Department of Energy, not under Carter direction at the moment, projects U.S. oil imports in the year 1995 will be 9 million barrels a day and rising. U.S. production is now falling. Canadian production is now falling. British production in the North Sea will top out in 1985. The long awaited or long feared or long welcomed decline in Soviet production, which the CIA predicted would occur in 1977, now seems to be starting.

So we are going to become increasingly dependent on the Persian Gulf. If we are able as a single nation to avoid dependency, which I should welcome, our allies will not. The Japanese and the West Europeans will remain dependent on the Gulf. Soviet domination of the oil tap in the Persian Gulf would imply a revolution on world politics that we would not welcome. So there is no escape from that. We can and we should, as you suggest, attempt to mitigate our problems.

Senator EVANS. Mitigating is one thing. It seems to me there is an opportunity to go even further, but it will not happen this year, next year or perhaps in the next decade.

If I have time, Mr. Chairman, for one final question. You mentioned the need for the executive to be credible in coming before Congress. Given the current budget situation we face and the appearances of the Secretary of Defense, do you believe the administration is being credible in its call for the level of defense and its unwillingness to discuss any kind of shift in defense spending, especially given the nature of stories over the last several years on our difficulties in procurement, the statement of Mr. Stockman yesterday on retirement, the increasing questions of some about the level of forces—not the forward forces or those that are potentially in combat, but some of the background forces that may be superinflated?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I am sorry you raised that question, Senator, because I have a natural empathy for a Secretary of Defense who is attempting to sustain defense expenditures when the consensus has shifted against the Department.

Senator EVANS. I understand.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. But the brief answer to your question I believe is no. Given a $200-odd billion deficit, $222 billion projected, given the fact that the structural deficit is projected to rise in the out years, and given the present revenue base there is no way we can continue this rate of defense expansion.

If the administration were prepared to come forward and say that of our defense buildup is so important to our negotiations in Geneva and to the building of our strategic forces that we are prepared to ask for a tax increase to fund it, that would be indeed a credible position.

But I do not think that the administration, particularly after the nature of the discussion in the 1984 campaign would be prepared to embrace that. Therefore, I must conclude, much to my regret, that in pressing for the maintenance of this level of defense buildup the administration is not enormously credible.

I am not sure that I would not engage in the same tactics as the Secretary of Defense has, however, because any retreat at this point will lead to a call for greater retreats at a future date.

When the consensus changes the demands for defense reductions just continue day after day, week after week. It is not generally recognized, for example, that in 1 year's time the administration has lowered its request for fiscal year 1986 by some $36 billion. Between the time it came into office in 1981 with revisions of the 1982 budget, and today, it has lowered its ambitions for fiscal year 1986 spending by $65 billion, if I recall correctly. The administration's request for fiscal year 1986 is lower than its request for fiscal year 1985. Whether or not appropriations slip below the Carter projection level in 1985 is still debatable due to the rate of inflation. There will be no debate in 1986; appropriations will probably wind up some $40 billion less than President Carter projected.

I have great sympathy. I think that we have seen the collapse of the administration's defense ambitions and yet I agree with the thrust of your question. Given the size of the budget deficit problem it is not credible to come forward and say we must sustain that buildup.

Senator EVANS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Evans.

Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is good to see you again, Dr. Schlesinger.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Good to see you, Senator. Thank you.

Senator ZORINSKY. I attended a NATO meeting not too long ago in Brussels and was either fortunate enough or unfortunate enough to be there at the time when the West Germans were accusing the French of not actually being partners in NATO. And of course, the question continually raised was at what point, inasmuch as the French Government has said it is a member of NATO, would French forces enter in support of NATO in the event of any confrontation with the Soviet Union. The French responded that they will enter support of NATO at the time they feel it is in the best interest of their country to do so. And of course the debate became very heated. You know, a lot of people call these events junkets, but as an American participant in the NATO conference, it certainly gave me an insight into the basic human logic and judgment that will enter into a decision made at a time when life and death is determined, if God forbid it ever need be, in a conflict in their continent.

It disturbed me a great deal because there seemed to be a great mistrust, no definition of when they are coming to help, and it developed into a complete disarray.

From your position and your past experience, do you think this is an amalgam that can be counted upon? As you indicated in your statement, we have to be exposed to a lot more risk than we ever were before. Risk is risk, but dumb, stupid risk is not acceptable to the taxpayers of this country nor in the best interest of this country. That is why I am very disturbed as to NATO criticism of our strategic defense initiatives and our refusal to transfer high technology. They make that criticism based on the fact it is costing them jobs, but we export our jobs and increase our deficit of trade balance with the very people that seek to criticize us for a lack of transfer of high technology.

What are your views, Dr. Schlesinger, with respect to whether we can count on these people when push comes to shove, or should we lessen our exposure to risk throughout the world?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, that is a very probing question, and it is a very complex one. There is no guarantee that we can count on anybody in this world or that anybody can count on the United States. There is a recognition, I think, that our Allies will respond, and that the United States will respond. We must bear in mind that our goal is to maintain deterrence. As long as Soviet planners, who are guided by Soviet intelligence officers, are looking at NATO's array of capabilities, it may be possible even if the alliance were not to respond in an emergency, to avoid the emergency in the first place.

This is of some comfort as it contributes directly to deterrence. Your question goes beyond that: What does it do to defense capabilities when push comes to shove? There is no assurance in advance, and yours is a question, as you recognize, that frequently is not raised in polite diplomatic circles.

I would make these three points. First, what you witnessed in Brussels is a reflection of a phenomenon. One of the reasons why the United States is the leader in this alliance is that while we refer generally to Europe as if it were a single entity, the fact is that most of the nations of Europe trust the United States more than they trust some of the other European states.

The second point: The decisions of General de Gaulle in the mid-1960's to remove NATO from French soil and to remove France from the integrated structure of NATO were a serious setback to the alliance. There is no question. I think the French reliability exceeded by far French willingness to participate in integrated activities. 4.

General de Gaulle said that France would be a good ally, and he was widely believed. For example, in the Berlin crisis in the early 1960's the most stalwart support the United States received was provided by Charles de Gaulle. So even though he was uncooperative in one respect, he was quite resolute in another.

The third point I would make is this. I think that your question raises great issues about the alliance's coordinated strategy. What underlies the German concern expressed at Brussels is that French strategy is quite different from the strategy of the rest of the members of NATO.

We try to gloss over this, but French strategy is expressed to be immediate nuclear use. France, under various regimes has weakened her conventional forces. This is of little use in the actual engagements that you are hypothesizing, even though it contributes to deterrence. It is no great reassurance to the Germans if they think that one of the partners in the alliance will readily turn West Germany into a nuclear free fire zone.

But these are questions that I think reflect inter-European differences. My own judgment is that, in the event of a Warsaw Pact surprise attack, most of the Western Allies are likely to perform better than one might think, given the public quarrels that go on in any democracy. And indeed, the Poland's, Czechoslovakia's, Hungary's, and East Germany's of this world, which we include in the Warsaw Pact order of battle, and from which you hear very few words of dispute, will perform a great deal worse.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have given us a very thought-provoking statement and have covered a lot of ground. I will not take up much more of your time here this morning.

Throughout your statement you make an interesting analysis between the gaps that exist between our commitments and our ability to respond to those commitments. One of the issues you are tremendously familiar with is our intelligence gathering capability. Obviously that plays a very important role in determining how serious a response we should be making, how serious a situation may be in a given area where we do have commitments.

I am wondering. There has been a great deal of talk here on the Hill and elsewhere in the last 3 or 4 years by both Republicans and Democrats concerning the politicization of the intelligence community, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency.

Given the problems of a few months back with the mining issue in Nicaragua, I am sure you are more than familiar with it. You of course have more than just a passing experience with the agency, and, in fact, in your tenure there, you made real efforts to trim back, I believe, in terms of certain budget areas. You also had a reputation of being somewhat skeptical of the cloak and dagger approach.

I wonder if you might characterize what the condition of the CIA is today. Have I overstated the case by saying it has been overly politicized? Let me just stop right there. That is enough for you to consider at this moment.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Well, this is a very delicate subject, Senator Dodd. I think in general the CIA is in good shape. It has high morale, higher than it was in the 1970's. Our intelligence gathering capabilities are substantial and perhaps as good as they can be.

Intelligence gathering, as all analysis, is designed to influence the judgment of the ultimate policymakers. There is no guarantee that good intelligence will influence the judgment of the ultimate policymakers, but that is not the task of the intelligence community. It is to gather good intelligence. I believe that the intelligence gathering capabilities are as high as they have been in the past.

With respect to what I referred to as cloak and dagger operations, when I was Director of Central Intelligence in some respects I was eager that those be expanded and our reluctance to go after what were referred to as hard targets be reduced. So I have no question that we need to have strong intelligence capabilities in the human intelligence area and that those are stronger than they have been in the past.

The heart of your question, however, goes to something else, and that is whether these excellent capabilities properly influence the judgment of policymakers. Attitudes on this, of course, will depend on the opinion a policymaker holds on a particular issue.

As you know, there are many views within the Central Intelligence Agency about the wisdom of our somewhat covert, somewhat overt operations in Central America. But the decisions with respect to that are made not by the people in the intelligence community; they are made by policymakers, as they should be.

Finally, all of us worry all of the time and should continuously worry about the possibility or even the degree of politicization of intelligence judgments. It pays for us to be alert to that problem. But in general, I think when policy, in the eyes of some, is going in the wrong direction, it is not because of the failure of the intelligence process. It is because of genuine disagreements with respect to the appropriate policy.

Senator DODD. Thank you for your answer.

You have raised the issue earlier and I have raised it with others who preceded you to the microphone over the last several days. Could you share with us your general feelings about this covert, or not so covert, operation in Nicaragua?

We are going to be faced with that decision very quickly here one way or another, I presume based on current information, to continue to finance one way or another the Contra programs. Could you share with us your general observations as you see it today of whether or not it would be judicious for us to proceed or what course we should follow?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. It is a very difficult question, Senator, and I will attack it directly. I trust that candor will not lead to rejection of what I have to say.

In the first place, in retrospect—underscore, in retrospect—it is not clear that it was wise for the United States to launch these operations in Central America.

In the second place, having been launched, it is not obvious that even if it were unwise initially to launch them that they should be curtailed.

In the third place, it seems to me that one must have a reasonably clearly defined objective for covert operations. That has not necessarily been the case from the first in Central America. The initial explanation of our operations in Central America was that they were designed to interfere with, interdict the flow of arms into El Salvador. That is an onerous task, and indeed as the operations have developed it is plain that this was not the primary objective.

The primary objective was to bring pressure to bear on the Government in Managua. Is this a legitimate objective? I think that it may well be a legitimate objective in logic in two circumstances. One is if we can actually bring down the Government in Managua and develop a government more to our tastes.

I say in logic now. I am not arguing the policy benefits. Asking does this thing make logical sense is the first thing to do before you decide whether it makes policy sense. It is plain, I think, that there is not the political base in the United States for such a vigorous role by the United States. Consequently the Government in Managua is going to survive.

The other logical basis for this pressure that we have brought to bear is the road to negotiations. But if one is bringing pressure to improve one's negotiating position at the bargaining table, one must be prepared to negotiate and be at the bargaining table.

It is not clear in my own mind that there has been that willingness within the administration to make this decision. Is all of this designed to help us cut a better deal with the Government in Managua, one we would prefer not to be there but one we are not going to upset, or are we just going to go on in a campaign of harassment? We ought to make that decision.

Now finally, going back to this very difficult question of how to improve consensus, this was, Mr. Chairman, what I had in mind earlier when I said that the executive branch must be credible. In this case the executive branch has not defined its objective or given the Congress an objective that is different from its underlying goals.

This did not create harmony between the two branches, aside from their differences about policy. And then later, when the Boland amendment was passed, difficulties which I do not want to enumerate sprang up as to whether there was harmony between what the Congress had passed as law and what the executive was trying to do.

I think that we must overcome this degree of distrust between the two branches, but that requires the executive branch to be credible.

Senator DODD. That sort of touches on my first question as well, with regard to the intelligence community. I thank you for that response.

I see the red light is on. Is this the last round, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Not necessarily. Do you have another question that would finish you up or do you have several more?

Senator DODD. I have one that would finish it.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you not proceed with that at this time, then.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Moving quickly to the Far East for a minute, I spent more than 1 month in China, Japan, and the Philippines this past fall, and had a very worthwhile meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone in Japan.

The major issue, of course, is the question we have raised a number of times; the willingness of the Japanese to increase their expenditures in the defense-related areas. They will argue very forcefully that in fact they have, and can prove so. But it has not quite reached the 1-percent figure that everyone holds out as sort of a magical number of a demonstration of commitment.

It occurred to me that maybe we are asking the wrong questions when we start discussing this numbers game with the Japanese; my own view is that our principal reason for a defense or for a strong military position there has less to do with Japan and more to do with South Korea. I do not know whether that is still the case or not.

That was always my impression that this was the rationale for some time; that what we are asking the Japanese to do is to build in redundancy, rather than to complement what is our principal or primary rationale for a strategic position in the Far East.

I wonder if you would expand on that thought at all, or disagree with it, just on the notion of how we ought to be approaching the Japanese on this issue?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Well, in the first place, we are asking the Japanese to do several things. There is an element of redundancy for the purpose of enhancing general deterrence in the Far East, designed to protect South Korea immediately more than Japan.

But when we tell the Japanese it is desirable for them to build up their defense of the sealanes as far south as the Philippines or the Straits of Molucca, this is not a question of redundant capabilities, nor does it have much to do with the defense of South Korea. This is the protection of what really are Japanese fundamental interests.

I would make two comments. First, the issue of defense may be less important in the intermediate term than the issue of trade. The United States is running a very substantial balance of trade deficit with Japan and a decade of talk, indeed two decades of talk, has not altered what I think is a serious international problem because of its financial repercussions. It is a problem in the political relationship between the countries and a political problem within the countries. It is perhaps more pressing than the defense issue.

I think in this connection we must decide what we want—I repeat, what we want. We must recognize that the Japanese have been very astute in understanding the character of the American society. They understand the different sources of power and the way our attention tends to shift over time. They understand that the President of the United States, any President of the United

States, has to decide what he wants of his subordinates. If he wants, for example, to press on defense issues he ought not to allow some of his subordinates to whisper in the ear of the Japanese: "Do not listen to the Secretary of Defense. He has to say that because he is Secretary of Defense. You can relax a little bit, for we are not going to put that much pressure on you."

The United States has to speak with a uniform line and it has to speak with a uniform line consistently over time. We cannot flit back and forth, from the trade issue, to the defense issue, to automobiles, to oranges, and what-not, and expect that the Japanese will, given the nature of that society, do anything other than wait us out.

I think the time has come that we must be more consistent in our presentations to the Japanese. In the 1950's, Japan's GNP was perhaps one-tenth or one-twentieth that of the United States. It is now half that of the United States or more. In addition, Japan is no longer a trivial player on the international trade scene. It is a major player. It cannot be regarded as marginal.

And therefore we have to be as forthright in our dealings with the Japanese as we have frequently been with our friends in Europe.

Senator DODD. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to have an extra question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Dr. Schlesinger, I was intrigued with the general point in your prepared testimony that when the United States suffers a serious setback, as in Lebanon recently, the reaction of the American people may be one of relief that we did not grow more involved militarily in such situations. On the other hand, a very different kind of reaction and perception may be found on the part of audiences throughout the rest of the world, one relative to the diminishing power of the United States and the declining credibility of our commitments.

You pointed out in your responses to previous questions that perhaps it was not wise for the intelligence apparatus of the Government, with the assent of the two Intelligence Committees, to have proceeded initially with support of the Contras in Nicaragua.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. In retrospect.

The CHAIRMAN. And you qualified that response further by suggesting that support to the Contras for the purpose of interdicting arms shipments from external sources was one thing while support for the purpose of destabilizing the current regime was quite another. You suggested a degree of confusion as to which objective was being promoted, even though the Intelligence Committees may have felt it was the former rather than the latter. And I think most members would insist that this was the case.

And now, of course, you make the point that if this support of the Contras is no longer a covert activity but a major foreign policy dispute, the administration, to be credible, must clarify what it really wants to do: Replace the Government in Nicaragua or negotiate with it; and if the latter, define what our objectives should be in such negotiations and then go to the Congress and the American people in search of support for such initiatives and objectives. Absent such support, any negotiating initiative would be vulnerable to any flareup in military activities, thereby producing perhaps another situation such as Lebanon, wherein we simply vanish, much to relief of part of the American public but with a severe loss elsewhere in the world in terms of the credibility of our diplomacy as well as our commitments.

If this analysis is reasonable, how should the administration react to a situation in which one or both of the Intelligence Committees in the Congress refuse to give the administration some $40 million for support of the Contras? In fact, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee has said that there are not sufficient votes in that committee to approve aid to the Contras.

On the other hand there have been suggestions that since aid to the Contras is no longer covert, perhaps the Foreign Relations Committee ought to take up the issue of assistance in a very overt way and, as a means of pressuring the Nicaraguans into serious negotiations, perhaps authorize money up front for precisely that purpose. Some analysts would observe that such an action would violate various treaty obligations we have, if not constitute an act tantamount to war. That may or may not be so.

Do you have any reactions to these thoughts? Should we be involved in Nicaragua; and given your earlier thoughts abut the costs of cutting and running, how ought we to proceed at the present time?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. In the first place, Mr. Chairman, this is an issue now that transcends, I think, the oversight functions of the Intelligence Committees and must appropriately pass beyond those committees. Whether or not the Senate or the House have closed sessions or should have closed sessions—and I believe they should—this is beyond the role of the oversight committees. The oversight committees are not charged with responsibility of judging the policy significance of what the administration is doing. That goes well beyond their purview.

Putting aside the desire of a distinct minority within the administration that we go in and clean up the Sandinistas, this issue has now become one designed primarily for negotiations.

And therefore the Senate, it seems to me, has a perfectly legitimate role in negotiating and discussing with the administration. You must ask, "what are your objectives?"—not normally a role for the Intelligence Committees.

What are your objectives in the negotiations? In my judgment, we can achieve a great deal in negotiations, but we are not going to get the Sandinista regime to commit suicide. We are not going to get them to change the nature of the regime. We cannot negotiate that at the table. We would have to overthrow them to achieve that. The debate thus should transcend it.

Now, my response to your question may offer more comfort to you than to Senator Dodd. On substantive grounds I would be very reluctant to see the Congress cut off this money, certainly in the absence of a discussion with the executive branch over the ultimate objectives of the negotiations. The Congress, of course, can use such money to make more persuasive its views with respect to such matters.

But unfortunately, the issue of Nicaraguan and covert activities has moved beyond the substantive role that the Contras may be playing to a question of trust between the two branches of government. This issue of distrust must be resolved. The Congress must feel that it is getting accurate facts and an accurate representation of policy from the administration. The Congress must feel that when it has passed a law the administration will not diverge from that.

A measure of distrust has grown up. I think it is distrust and the problems within the Government of the United States that will cause this aid to end unless something happens. On substantive grounds, now that it has been initiated and if it can play a role in some negotiations with Managua, it perhaps ought to be continued.

I am sorry for that complex answer.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very important answer. Clearly the element of trust is of the essence at this point. Unless the administration is clear in its objectives and they are shared by at least a leadership cadre of people involved in the foreign policy in the Senate and House, then we are going to come to an unfortunate end with regard to this situation in Nicaragua.

But that time is probably short in defining what we are about, namely negotiations, what our objectives are, and how the Contras or any other force that is foreseeable might be useful in providing pressure on the regime for the bargaining that must ensue.

And I appreciate your addressing these questions forthrightly.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We all share the hope, Mr. Chairman, that this issue, as other issues, can be addressed on the substance, the foreign policy substance. This implies that we must resolve other kinds of differences within the Government as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask for your advice on still another subject that will come before this committee. There are pieces of legislation now entered in the House and the Senate dealing with economic sanctions against South Africa as well as suggested U.S. programs that might influence the South African Government to end apartheid that do not involve economic sanctions, but have at least other, less coercive conditions attached to them.

In your judgment, are the South Africans likely to be affected by such measures, coercive or noncoercive? Does it make a difference in terms of the government or public opinion there what we think and what we do? And is apartheid likely to come to a quicker end through what we do, or will our actions merely exacerbate the problems and difficulties for blacks in South Africa in particular?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I do not think that economic sanctions are likely to affect the policies of the regime in South Africa. They will do so no more than, let us say, oil sanctions did on South Africa some years ago.

We must recognize that the impact of economic sanctions will fall primarily on the black minority. If we are to embrace sanctions we should do so recognizing that those who suffer most from such sanctions will be those, in a sense, whose position we are trying to uplift.

I have to say that I have great distrust for economic sanctions. They can only be used for very specific policy objectives, for very limited periods of time, and in circumstances in which there is no other alternative. I do not see that to be the case in South Africa.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Pell, do you have additional questions?

Senator PELL. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Evans, do you have further questions?

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No.

The CHAIRMAN. If not, then, Mr. Secretary, your questioners have disappeared and we are coming to the conclusion of what has been, I think, a most important hearing.

We thank you again for the thoughtfulness and the time that you took in the preparation of your statement and the very fine answers to some very difficult questions. It was good to have you.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, February 7, 1985.]

OUTLINES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1985

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Pressler, Pell, Cranston, and Dodd.

The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is now called to order.

The committee will conclude today the initial phase of its hearings into the future of American foreign policy. Following return from the week-long recess, the committee will plunge into the second phase of the hearings, taking up at that time the theme of Soviet-American relations and arms control.

The committee has had the extraordinary good fortune over the past week of hearing from a cross section of American policymakers, past and present. As I compare the statements of George Shultz, Caspar Weinberger, Cyrus Vance, Richard Allen, and James Schlesinger, it is clear to me that there is more in American foreign policy, past and present, that unites us rather than divides us.

If we are about the task of trying to forge a new consensus in foreign policy, perhaps it is in part because we have tended to dwell on differences rather than to highlight basic areas of agreement.

The committee was treated yesterday to a masterful exposition by James Schlesinger of some of the basic dilemmas facing American foreign policy. He noted that the unchanged state of U.S. foreign commitments, accompanied by the relative decline of American power and the evaporation of national unity, have led to two distinct gaps—the commitments/power gap and the consensus/policy gap.

In a most concise manner, Mr. Schlesinger posed a central paradox in American foreign policy, and I quote from his statement:

> In dealing with what is the central strategic problem of the United States—the formidable capabilities of the Soviet Union in relation to finite American power—there is at base a domestic consensus with respect to both protection of the North American continent and our obligations in Europe.
>
> Yet, paradoxically, it is in this arena—in which the consensus is not seriously challenged—that we may face a real gap between power and commitments. By contrast, in much of the Third World, in which our power is certainly commensurate with our commitments, there is simply no domestic consensus regarding the pro-

spective use of force. Thus, overall, in all parts of the world, we are likely to have to contend with at least one of these two gaps.

The committee is privileged this morning to have with it Gen. Alexander Haig, former Secretary of State as well as SACEUR, an individual who brings to the analysis and practice of American foreign policy a unique perspective borne of service in and out of uniform. General Haig, the committee is delighted to have you back this morning. We look forward to your observations.

Before I ask you to proceed, I would call upon Senator Pell for his opening statement.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming General Haig to the hearing this morning. I think it will probably be a shorter hearing than the first hearing, at which I had the pleasure of being with General Haig when he was confirmed for Secretary of State.

I wish him well and success in his new ventures, and look forward to hearing what he has to say.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

General HAIG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Pell. This is indeed nostalgic, when one thinks back to almost 4 years ago this month to the 5 cordial days I enjoyed before this committee. [Laughter.]

The only thing that amazes me is that some of the members have not lost their enthusiasm. I can assure you I have. [Laughter.]

Well, I think I am aware of some of the broad philosophic issues which have interlaced the motivations for this hearing and I have in a prepared statement tried to address some of them in not too extensive a form, but at least to address them. If I may impose upon the members here seating, I would like to present that formal statement and then take your questions as they arise.

It is certainly a privilege to be asked to testify on the subject of American foreign policy, given my past record. Hopefully these hearings will make a contribution toward the reestablishment of the bipartisan approach that has always characterized American foreign policy when it was at its best. As we near the end of this century, the challenges facing the United States are simply too great to do with less than bipartisanship.

Basically, our foreign policy expresses the relationship we want as a nation with other nations. It must reflect our values and define our interests. The sacrifices we are willing to make in pursuit of our foreign policy objectives also tell the rest of the world something about the courage of our convictions as a nation and a people.

In recent years, our fundamental approach to foreign policy has suffered from a lack of balance as we have swung from the extremes of strategic passivity to a newly emerging strain of unilateralism that perplexes allies and adversaries alike.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Second World War finally resolved the historic debate between the American isolationists and the internationalists about our world role; 20 years later, however, another conflict fractured that consensus and gave birth to the renewed arguments that we face today. In the wake of Vietnam, we have fluctuated between a foreign policy that seemed to stress realpolitik at the expense of ideals on the one hand, and a preference for the proclamation of ideals regardless of reality on the other.

The idea that the United States, acting alone in an interdependent world, can somehow renew the mythological golden era of the immediate postwar years when we seemed invulnerable to international political or economic developments is certainly a dangerous illusion today. Nor can we suggest that we are strong enough to confront the Soviet Union alone, if need be, but that we are too weak to negotiate arms control agreements as well as other areas upon which we are divided.

Neither allies nor adversaries can follow such a course. Unilateralism leads only to greater insecurity. I must add that it is equally dangerous to think that the enunciation of pieties alone can serve as a substitute for the active pursuit of the very values that we proclaim.

Our experience with these fluctuations should teach us a very clear lesson. A foreign policy that pursues realpolitik and neglects ideals will offend America's sense of right. A foreign policy that pursues piety and neglects power will offend America's sense of reality. Only a balanced approach will merit the lasting support of the American people, and by balance I mean a policy that advocates American values in a realistic strategic framework.

Today the achievement of such a balance is obstructed by three interrelated challenges: First, the preoccupation with the alleged gap between ends and means in foreign policy; second, our confusion about the role of force in foreign policy, which, as Secretary Shultz has warned, threatens to make us a hamlet among nations, forever undecided about our course of action; and, third, and finally, our persistent failure to realize the interrelationship between our domestic economic policies and their international consequences, and the relationship of both to our overall security.

Unless we understand this pattern, our safety and our prosperity together will eventually be jeopardized. Let me begin with the issue of ends versus means.

In a time of economic austerity and fiscal hardship, it is always tempting to reduce our foreign policy problems to the gap between ends and means. Some say that if we could only reduce our commitments abroad we could close that gap. Others argue that the nation must somehow redefine how much is enough.

In my view, it would be a profound delusion to conclude that the central difficulty facing us in foreign policy today is a question of ends and means. The American people know that our purpose must be to create an international environment hospitable to democratic values, an international system which encourages necessary and desirable historic change through peaceful process and rule of law.

Sufficient resources to reach every objective and fulfill every commitment simultaneously along the way to that goal are available only in the fantasies of planners. To subject our commitments exclusively to a means test is to put the national interest at the mercy of the legendary "beancounter." After all, the establishment of priorities is the business of our leaders.

Foreign policy must not become a zero-sum game. We cannot expect to have to meet every contingency at once, and in any event there is no way to do it. Even fully mobilized in World War II, we chose a central theater on the grounds that the loss of Europe would eventually prove fatal to our independence. That judgment endures today.

Preoccupation with means leads eventually to a disasterous outcome. We shall be tempted to turn the establishment of priorities into a systematic reduction of commitments. This will lay the foundation for an international condominium, divided between the diminishing democracies on the one hand and, on the other, totalitarians free to make their spheres of domination as they so please.

Furthermore, our undue concentration on strength or the lack of strength will inhibit prudent application of resources to deal with the pressing contemporary problems we face. This point is amply illustrated by the second issue hampering our search for a balanced foreign policy—the confusion over the role of force in defending America's interests. We have been debating the morality of nuclear deterrence and on another we have also been arguing over the use of force in ambiguous circumstances, particularly Third World conflicts where our interests are not so obviously challenged.

Candidates for the Presidency during the election campaign, and, more recently, high public officials have vied with each other to prescribe specific conditions which preclude the use of America's Armed Forces

Ever since the dawn of the nuclear age, we have lived with the fear of two events—a suicidal nuclear exchange or the suicide of our values through capitulation to nuclear intimidation. It should be clear that the only safe and moral course between these twin evils remains the doctrine of deterrence.

Only if we maintain the capability to deter both war and surrender by appropriate means, which may well include defense against missile attack, only that way can we be faithful to ourselves and protect our interests. But we cannot do so if we cease to believe that our civilization is worth preserving, and we shall never convince those who wish us ill to respect our values unless we are prepared to sacrifice for them.

These principles hold true for the use of American military power in situations more ambiguous than a direct attack on our country or our interests. On this issue, a major industry has grown up devoted to the manufacturing and distribution of lessons supposedly derived from the Vietnam experience. We are cautioned that the United States should never use our power to intervene in a complex regional problem. Some even allege that we distort the reality of local conflicts by identifying their outcome with the East-West struggle. I myself experienced that criticism from within my own administration.

Events after the American departure from Vietnam amply confirm that whatever the indigenous problems of South Vietnam, the war became in the end a conquest of the South by the North, aided by the Soviet Union. Our trouble was not the morality of our approach. As John Stuart Mill wrote, "Intervention to enforce nonintervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent."

Democratic values, not to speak of American security, can hardly survive in a world where the enemies of democracy feel free to intervene forcibly but the friends of democracy are inhibited as a matter of principle from coming to their assistance. It is equally important, however, that our actions be prudent. The conduct of the Vietnam war, with its half measures, its hesitancies and graduated response, confused our people while allowing the enemy to adjust to the pace of escalation.

Today in the debate over Central America, for example, we see the consequences of our failure in that war in Vietnam. It is true that we cannot ignore the local roots of instability, but it is also true that Soviet intervention there gives the regional crisis a strategic dimension. Just as significantly, it makes the successful treatment of these local troubles extremely difficult. The true lesson of Vietnam is not the immorality of our intervention, but rather the prudence with which we must conduct our policy.

We face another challenge as well. An act of state-sponsored terrorism in 1979 prompted the American people to banish the practitioners of strategic passivity from the leadership of this Nation. It grieves me today to say, however, that we have not yet developed an effective response to such terrorism, which like Soviet-supported interventionism operates below the level of traditional warfare.

Of all the tragic consequences of the Lebanese crisis, I would say that in the future—and indeed in the very near future, I am afraid—we may suffer the most from the impression that terrorism forced the United States to abandon its course in that troubled land.

In dealing with this problem, it will not do to warn continuously of retribution while confessing an inability to find the culprits. It is even more self-defeating to set forth lengthy requirements about the ideal conditions under which American forces may operate. Those conditions have rarely been met continuously even during wartime. In any event, terrorism has become attractive precisely because it defies such criteria.

As we consider our policy, we should be wary of the notion that a popular consensus on the action to be taken against terrorists must precede the action itself. Consensus is, of course, the lifeblood of democratic politics, and it gives our Nation and other free people a unique strength. But a consensus on terrorism or, for that matter, on any foreign policy issue, does not arise in a vacuum.

Too often in the past we have been shocked into agreement only after some terrible event has taken its toll. A more sound policy anticipates crisis and acts to avert it. Otherwise, to await the coming of a consensus on specific action is to risk becoming the servant, or the victim, of history, rather than its master.

Obviously we should be careful and as precise as possible in the use of force to deal with terrorists. Establishing the identity of various groups is important. So is the identity of those governments that support them. I dare say there is no such thing as independent international terrorism. There are only groups operating with the tolerance, if not the active support, of several different governments.

At the same time, we must understand that just as the ambiguity of regional conflict imposes risks in the defense of our interest, so the battle against terrorism also imposes risk. In the final analysis, governments and leaders are elected to make decisions. We cannot expect to deal effectively with such violence simply on the basis of a daily referendum or a quest for perfect information.

Military action, even carefully prepared operations, may and do go astray. Mistakes are made. As in any hostage situation, the rescue itself may endanger the innocent victims and bystanders.

Nonetheless, I submit that inaction in the face of terrorist assaults is a far greater risk in the long run because it convinces assorted hit men and fanatics and the calculating governments who help them that we are too confused or too fearful to resist, and in this regard the gap between our resounding rhetoric today and our demonstrated resolve may be the most dangerous imbalance of all.

The third and final issue concerns the international consequences of our domestic economic choices. President Reagan, I think, understood correctly in 1981 that disarray at home undermined our capacity to lead abroad. I saw it for 5 years during my time in NATO/Europe. His economic program, which I supported, contributed to many important reforms and assisted the revival of economic growth that we enjoy today.

Nonetheless, no one can be pleased by the continuing imbalance of fiscal excess and monetary restraint, together with an immense and growing trade gap, that confront us today. Some experts believe that our expansion is being financed largely by foreign investment, attracted by high interest rates, while the deficit consumes too much of our own capital. At some juncture the renewed growth of our trading partners will also require additional investment now flowing to the United States. In the meantime, economic hardships and technological change, both here and abroad, are contributing to rising demands for protectionism.

All nations, of course, have blemishes when it comes to international trading practices, in contrast to the solemn declarations of fidelity to free trade. Yet, only the United States, as the world's largest and freest market, has the capacity as well as the interest to lead in reversing this trend.

The next economic summit ought to be the scene where an American President at long last, equipped with a substantial deficit reduction program, leads our allies in the Pacific and Europe toward a freer trading system. The alternative is a slow slide toward that abyss of economic warfare which earlier in this century set the stage for World War II.

No one should be under the illusion that economic unilateralism can be compatible with our national security any more than political unilateralism. The economic dimension of foreign policy is to be found precisely in the connection between our security and our prosperity.

Surely after the last 10 or 15 years of sometimes brutal experience the Western allies should know that failure to resolve our economic differences can often deprive us of the flexibility to deal with our security problems. To the perennial question of guns versus butter our answer must be to do both or surely we shall succeed in doing neither.

Ultimately, foreign policy is a test of a nation's character. Americans have given adequate evidence of our courage, the most important quality, as Churchill observed, because it guarantees all the rest. We have sacrificed lives and treasure because of our belief in democracy. Our leadership has been sustained by the moral grandeur of our ideals, not just our considerable material power.

In the final analysis, America means faith in the individual, respect for his rights, and confidence in his skills. As we consider the future of American foreign policy, we must never forget its roots in the Nation's character, in our innermost hopes and dreams. Yet, to flourish, these roots must be cultivated with wisdom and balance. The challenges we face today test our intelligence more than our strength. Let posterity record that we were wise enough and balanced enough to leave a better world for our children.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Secretary Haig, thank you very much for a strong and eloquent statement. I would like to commence the questioning by picking up a point that you made in your testimony in which you say "Democratic values, not to speak of American security, can hardly survive in a world where the enemies of democracy feel free to intervene forcibly, but the friends of democracy are inhibited as a matter of principle from coming to their assistance."

During your tenure as Secretary of State—especially during the first year—you made a number of statements with regard to Central America and the problems that we faced at that point. Many of those problems we still face, but in somewhat different forms. When you talk about intervention, would that include support of elements that might bring pressure on the Sandinista government presently in Nicaragua and, if so, can you offer this committee any formulation that may be more satisfying than ones that we have seen?

Yesterday Secretary Schlesinger made the point that the Nicaraguan situation may have gone beyond the point of an intelligence issue. It is a foreign policy question generally, one in which the administration will have to offer a credible case for what its objectives might be in an effort to gain some consensus in a bipartisan way to support it.

General **HAIG**. Mr. Chairman, I cannot answer that question without going back into history during my time as Secretary of State.

In 1981 and 1982 we were confronted with the first exposure to the challenges of Central America, I expressed a strong skepticism about covert action as the sole vehicle for achieving the objectives which meet the best interests of the American people.

I opposed covert action for three reasons. First, because in modern Washington and especially in the administration at that time, covert action was a contradiction in terms. There were no secrets.

Second, I believe that the scope of action that would be necessary to deal with the regional and global aspects of the Central American problem would be of such a substantial character that they couldn't and shouldn't be covert in the first place.

And third, because from my own experience of some 20 years in national security policy formulation, we must always be careful not to let covert action become a copout allowing Presidents to go to bed every night thanking God they are taking strong action against a known threat, and yet get up every morning still being loved by the American people because they have not disturbed the tranquil international environment or the comfort of the American electorate.

I was overruled at the time. But once the United States started down that slippery covert slope, to now suddenly recoil from it I think would be a tragic setback for the conduct of what is admittedly a somewhat flawed approach to the Central American problem. I think the cost of being driven away from the right as set forth in my statement to support those who seek freedom against those who seek to suppress it, will place the United States in an untenable position. The attitudes of every threatened Latin American republic which are watching us with great intensity will be seriously influenced. When you speak to them outside the venue of public exposure they are tremendously concerned that America has again lost its will to deal with a totalitarian threat in this hemisphere as we did in Southeast Asia.

In sum, what I am saying, is covert action is at best an ancillary aspect of policy, and should never be the centerpiece. It is a copout. But now that we have done it, I would hope that we would have the wisdom to hold the course and support our President.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me pursue it a little bit further because, as you have pointed out, the covert path did not work. We are having a broad general debate as to whether we should seek to support the Contras by a straightforward authorization and appropriation of money, whether we should deal with them through the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff as opposed to the CIA.

From your own experience in Government, what would be some of the difficulties in adopting overt forms of assistance to the Contras?

General HAIG. I have to suspect, Mr. Chairman, that would be a legislative copout just as the other approach that I criticized was an executive copout. And I would hope that we would not create a set of conditions in the Congress which in our heart of hearts we know will never be realized in order to have this issue die on the vine and make everyone comfortable only to face the challenge in a less ambiguous situation tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, fair enough, but I suspect that rather than being a copout, we are still looking for a formula. I have made the observation that I do not believe that two Intelligence Committees of the Senate and House have majorities to support the request for $14 million of aid for the particular program that is now there. That may be wrong, maybe they will surprise me, but my guess is that that will not work, and I think many others share that view.

Now, that being the case, even the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee has said he would support an overt affair, which means that his committee loses jurisdiction in a way and this one obtains it. This is why I have a more than passing interest in what may come before this committee. And in trying to think of potential legislative forms, are there foreign policy implications in overt aid that were not present in the covert situation? And, to follow up your general statement, would the financing of people who are intervening on behalf of freedom create particular problems in terms of the ways in which nation states conduct themselves.

General HAIG. Now, I think you have asked a very important and cogent question, and I think it also would be ludicrous of me, having condemned the espousal of pieties against the framework of reality, to tell you that you have to march ahead regardless, knowing that the votes simply are not there.

I am afraid as a precedent, however, that the problem of generating legislative support for overt Contra activity in Nicaragua could bring with it a number of unforeseen potential problems which go even perhaps beyond our own shores, and which would probably cast even a greater focus on what could well be a failure in the final analysis. In other words, I do not think you could get the kind of approval that you suggest would be obtainable through an overt approval.

I would prefer to see our executive branch take this issue to the people in a little more vigorous way than it has heretofore. It would be naive to suggest that this issue was high on the agenda of the executive branch priorities as the recent campaign approached in this country, and there was a certain willingness to let it muddle along.

If we are serious about the need to support the contras—I would be, given the precedent we have already undertaken and despite my objections to it in the first instance—then I think it is up to the President to bring this question to the American people and seek the necessary support consistent with the recognized right of a nation to conduct covert action.

I think it was Jeanne Kirkpatrick who said "international law is not a suicide pact," and so long as other nations engage in these activities, we have the right and indeed at times the obligation to conduct them ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the President seek the support of the public for the covert actitity?

General HAIG. Yes, it is rather ludicrous, I must admit, but I think what he must do is request the support of the American people to continue with the covert program, and not suddenly create a huge legislative brouhaha by attempting to legislate a formalized overt program.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I would defer at this time to the Senator from California who has to move on.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. I thank you very much, Claiborne.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I welcome you to the committee. It is always a pleasure, always instructive and always fascinating to hear your views.

It is obvious that in the first term of the Reagan administration there was considerable disarray and and controversy over negotiating a position on arms control. It is apparent that there were counterforces at work that really frustrated any significant negotiations insofar as our part was concerned. There were also problems, of course, on the Soviet side.

Insofar as our side is concerned, is it your impression now that the administration has overcome those problems and is united and can work out a unified, agreed negotiating position? Or do some of those same problems still exist within the administration?

General HAIG. It would be difficult for me to say, Senator, having been disassociated from the internal mechanisms over the last 2 years. I would just make several observations:

First, I think it is desirable and constructive to have different points of view within the executive branch on how to proceed in this vital area. It would be unnatural in the extreme not to have them. We have had them throughout the history of arms control.

My concerns were that, to use an old Haig coin, we did not have anybody in charge of the process 2 years ago.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

General HAIG. Everybody has a vested interest, and the President was frequently faced with a potpourri of differing points of view around the Cabinet table. He then did what most Presidents are inclined to do in such instances when they are not intimately acquainted with all of the intricate details of the issue, and that is, cut the baby in half. And that is frankly what we did in the initial phases of our arms control proposals due to a lack of organizational discipline.

But every Presidency is a learning experience, and this administration is certainly no exception. What were originally nonnegotiable and I think rather shortsighted if not stupid, proposals, like the zero option, we have recoiled from. We have now come forth with a number of far more negotiable approaches. We have merged the two phases. We recognize that the Soviet Union is not going to relinquish substantially its current superiority in ballistic missiles which today seriously threaten our land-based response through the tradeoff of noncomparable U.S. systems such as air-breathing cruise missiles or bombers or some regional tradeoff. I am very optimistic that the President has learned a great deal in 4 years, that he has a very good team put together today, and I hope that team will come firmly and unquestionably under the control of the Secretary of State, because arms control is always a subsidiary of our overall foreign policy and must not be an end in itself. So my answer is I am more optimistic.

Senator CRANSTON. Of course, you do have different viewpoints that have to be hammered out in an administration. We all recognize that. Is it your impression that the Secretary of State is now taking charge of this negotiating process, if not fully yet in charge?

General HAIG. Yes. My remaining pessimism, Senator, does not any longer focus on the zoo that I had to operate in as Secretary of State, but rather my fear that we are once again as a Nation deluding ourselves about how best to achieve a "calculus of self-interest" in Moscow which would support real reductions. We are already talking about bargaining chips, about systems which are 10 to 20 years from development as tradeoffs for existing Soviet threats.

I am also very nervous about our theater position, because I suspect there are some in the administration that are beginning to look to the tradeoff of our ballistic response in Europe, as limited as it is—and I am talking about the Pershing II—for other American strategic interests. If we follow that sophistry, we risk shattering the NATO alliance and the basic framework upon which our security is built.

I must say this is probably the key issue in the upcoming arms control talks, which are going to be very slow and extremely tedious, because our larder of incentives for a Soviet calculus of self-interest is substantially less than it should be. That is why I have been a great proponent for the MX missile. Not because I see the MX as the answer to a maiden's prayer, but because it is the only interim fix that we can apply to a U.S. inventory of missilery which remains very inadequate to the arms control task we have asked our negotiators to undertake.

Senator CRANSTON. I am glad you are optimistic about the Secretary of State being able to take charge. How optimistic are you about our ability to actually negotiate something significant and meaningful with the Soviets?

General HAIG. Well, I would condition a guarded optimism for at least some ancillary constraints which would be more confidence building than substantial in the near term, to the question which the American legislature is going to have to face in the period immediately ahead: Are we going to go ahead with an MX missile which is the bona fide of our ability to truly negotiate substantial reductions? Are we going to continue to support the development of the light missile?

You know, if you involve yourself in arms control, and you deal with the Soviet Union, you tend to be a bit pessimistic. For example, the ABM Treaty was negotiated in a situation where the United States enjoyed technological superiority, and we accepted that treaty as a tradeoff in which we anticipated Soviet restraint in their offensive ballistic missile category. We were wrong and I'm afraid sadly disappointed by subsequent events.

And so my point is, Senator, that the Soviet Union is not impressed by research and development, by phantom systems which we Americans may or may not deploy. They are only impressed by real American capability as they compare it with their own existing capabilities. That is why I am pessimistic about progress because of the wrenching debate already underway here, and, the apparent paucity of support for the conclusions of the Scowcroft Commission, which included a bipartisan group of conscientious and dedicated advocates of arms control. Within a matter of a year and a half an earlier consensus favoring the Commission's findings has evaporated. This is a clue to a combination, of problems here on the Hill and a lack of effective management in the executive branch.

Senator CRANSTON. I would like to ask you in a different matter relative about your comment about ensuring that foreign policy does not become a zero sum game.

One of my concerns about the strategic defense initiative is the argument presented by some of its advocates that if the Soviets are afraid of it, it must therefore be good. Particularly in the realm of satellite killers which can blind the superpowers in the heat of a crisis, what is bad for one nation is not necessarily good for the other.

Like most Members of Congress I support prudent research into strategic defense. But I hope we can negotiate agreements that would foreclose actual deployment. Can you comment upon and identify those aspects of SDI that you think are best and worst in terms of hopes for future strategic stability?

General HAIG. I will begin with my usual subtlety, Senator, by pointing out that I thought the President's speech on this subject was ill-timed, ill-advised, and created the problems and confusion we are living with today. In short, I wish he had not made the speech.

A strategic defense initiative is so significant, that it required months of careful education and preparation, not only for the American people but for our allies in Europe who have been so severely rattled by their perception of what we are proposing.

It was ill-defined. I sat there with Ed Teller on one side and Hans Bethe on the other, and they were like the blind man feeling the elephant; one thought he had the trunk, the other thought he had the tail. The hawks thought we were replacing the offense with the defense, and they do not like that; and the doves thought we were destabilizing outer space and bringing on "Armageddon."

The truth is that our deterrent is in disarray, and there are only a few remedies that we Americans can undertake to keep the essential balances with the Soviet Union intact. One is to build counterballistic capability like the MX and the minimissile and the Pershing II in Europe, and the other is to rethink the prospect of enhancing that deterrence by defending against the threat to our retaliatory forces, and especially our ballistic retaliatory forces. In other words, the strategic defense initiative could be an enhancement to the deterrent which has preserved the peace throughout the nuclear age.

Second, Americans simply cannot turn over outer space to the mischief of the Soviet Union, and I am sure that is why you make the point you make about research and development. We do not have the luxury of doing that since we know the Soviets have been active in strategic defense. We know about their radar complex in the central Soviet Union which is approaching a direct violation of the ABM Treaty obligations. We know they have been testing antisatellite systems. We know they were working with ground-based and space-based laser and particle beams. And we Americans just simply cannot afford to offer them a monopoly in outer space.

Frankly, I wish some of the rhetorical excesses associated with the SDI had been avoided. That is why the President's speech, in my view, was somewhat counterproductive. Nevertheless, I remain a very strong advocate of this policy and conducting research and development to see whether or not we can create conditions under which the deterrence that has prevented nuclear conflict can be enhanced. It is too early to say whether that will actually occur. Certainly, it is not going to make a substantial difference at the negotiating table in the near term because the Soviets are too smart to trade off American theories for their own realities.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. Your responses did not disappoint me in their fascination and their substance.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cranston.

Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. I would like to change areas of the world a little bit and turn to India and the subcontinent. I made a trip over there recently which was somewhat educational, I hope; but I found that in India the officials from the Prime Minister on down were somewhat anti-American in their statements and very pro-Russian. I do not know if they really meant it or not. It occurred to me that it is something like talking to intellectual Mexicans in that they are anti-American as sort of a—I do not know if they really would be if push came to shove.

But I suppose most of the Indian rhetoric is related to Pakistan. Still, I do not think the Indians would really want the Soviets in Pakistan either. The little countries around India, be they Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, or Bhutan, all feel crowded by India. India and China jostle for control or hegemony in that area. Excepting Bangladesh, it seemed to me that there was an in verse, aid to friendship between these countries and the United States. Bhutan was the most pro-American, and we have given no aid to it.

India is going to be the largest country in the world in population by the year 2000 if present trends continue. Are we on the right track in the India-Pakistan situation?

General **Haig**. Senator, I think we have been on the right track with respect to Pakistan but I wish that we had been able to accomplish more in improving our overall relationships with India. Of course that is a two-way street. It is not a decision to be made in Washington alone and requires reciprocity on the part of the Indian leadership.

I happen to believe that in the recent past—and I include the later years of the incumbency of Mrs. Gandhi—that there was a growing feeling in India that the relationship with Washington could and should be enhanced. Notwithstanding the aggravation caused by the Pakistan shift in American policy which was not only sound, but imperative for stability in that region. Many Indian leaders understand that. It is not in our interest to force them to become totally dependent on the Soviet Union for arms, economic development and growth in international intercourse. Today they are not, although they are to a larger degree than I would like.

So I think in the months ahead there are opportunities to enhance our relationships with a new Indian Government, and again, that always is best done through quiet diplomacy rather than public posturing.

Senator **Pressler**. Now, in terms of some of the South Asian countries, the small countries around India, would it be in our interest to treat them at a higher level, to try to have more joint ventures, to invite the King of Bhutan for a state visit, to talk about building a naval base in Sri Lanka publicly, to try to be friends with everybody in the region? Our traditional policy has been to upgrade India, and the little countries around are trying desperately to be friendly to the United States, and we sort of ignore them, and they are looking for allies. They are sort of caught between the two giants there.

Should we have a definite policy of upgrading our treatment in Southeast Asia of the five or six smaller countries? We have done that with Pakistan, I guess you would have to say, but not with the others.

General HAIG. I think in general the problem of American diplomacy is always to convey an attitude of openness and the desire for enhancement of a relationship with large nations and small. And I have a great deal of confidence in Mr. Murphy who handles the South Asian region for Secretary Shultz and in Secretary Shultz' ability through a constant assessment of the reporting of our professionals and our appointed ambassadors in the field and our intelligence agencies who keep a finger on these things, to flag under ordinary conditions opportunities for improving relations.

So I do not think that this region of the world lends itself to a suddenly high profiled new American approach. I think the area where we have done perhaps the best since Vietnam has been in Asia, because we have generally let the nations of the region take the lead in collective action. For example, in ASEAN and with the difficult question of Kampuchea, although I wish we could do more there to help that problem. Also, as our policies have assisted in the evolution of the thinking of the leaders in the small states around the peripheries of China and India. I would be very leery of some brandnew grand design which is suddenly going to achieve the millenium.

Senator PRESSLER. Now, in regard to Pakistan, the Indian leaders always say—well, the weapons you are giving them could not possibly be used against the Soviet Union; they could only be used against India. And they cite Pakistan's wars with India. How would you respond to that statement?

General HAIG. Well, then it would make me very nervous if I lived in Pakistan and saw India with a nuclear weapon and modern Soviet systems because that shoe fits the other foot as well.

It is a self-defeating argument for those who use it, and it can create even larger problems with respect to our current policies toward Pakistan.

Senator PRESSLER. So in general you believe we are on the right track in South Asia?

General HAIG. Yes, I do. And it was a difficult reversal, but historically I think we should have learned that when we create insecurities, as American policy sometimes does, we feed appetites for nuclear weapons. And the best way always to deal with the nuclear question is to try to relieve insecurity, to provide other means, to lessen the appetites of non-nuclear states for acquiring nuclear weapons.

I think the proliferation of nuclear weaponry today is perhaps the most dangerous single threat to international peace and I think in hindsight we have done rather well.

If one looks back, adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, acceptance of international safeguards represent a remarkable accomplishment for American leadership.

Senator PRESSLER. What about a naval base in Sri Lanka if we lose out? And of course, New Zealand is quite a ways away. But in that area of the world, including the oceans and so forth, we really do not have a presence, and it appears that Sri Lanka has a very good facility and a port. Would that be something we should be considering?

General HAIG. If I know my friends in the Pentagon and in the naval service, they look at every target of opportunity with respect to the stationing and colocating and bunkering, and I am sure they have not overlooked Sri Lanka. So I would leave it to the experts.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pressler.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In behalf of Senator Cranston, I would like for a moment to focus on South Africa and ask you, Mr. Secretary, how you feel we can best avert the growth of support for extremist forces there, and how can the United States most effectively press for genuine reform?

General HAIG. That is an extremely difficult issue, of course. Again I would turn to the admonition in my formal statement: Pieties, outside of a strategic framework can sometimes be more counterproductive than perhaps even benign neglect although I would not advocate either in this case.

We always must ask ourselves, what are the alternatives to the policies currently being pursued by the U.S. Government? I think I know those policies. I do not like the handle that has been put on them, the little cliche of "constructive engagement" or whatever they use. I am always suspicious of those cliches.

I visited southern Africa a year ago, precisely a year ago, and had an opportunity to go to Namibia to meet with the multiparty Congress, and to South Africa. In South Africa I spoke to almost—not all, but almost all of the major leaders of the black and Indian populations, with the single exception of Bishop Tutu, whom I did not see.

They all expressed their fundamental opposition to apartheid and the need for urgent reform, which was not evident to them in the recent reforms of the Botha government. But they also were very leery of "one man, one vote." They looked at their neighboring states and saw the shambles that most of them represent today. They were not enthusiasts for disinvestment, because they felt—and I think quite correctly—that if we attempt to bring South Africa to its economic knees through such policies, the first victims will be the majorities who are seeking to enhance, their own welfare, their own progress.

I have read recently Mr. Botha's statement on the subject of the majorities, and the need to share power and to share responsibility and opportunity and was somewhat encouraged.

I think the United States is always best served by constant, quiet diplomatic pressure to achieve desired reform. When we indulge in public pressure against otherwise democratic structures—and the South African Government is a democratic structure, although some may describe it as something less than that in terms of its racial policies—then we make it more difficult for incumbent leaders to move in the directions that we would hope they would move. We then create internal tests of political manhood. If we overplay this issue—and I know there is a lot of attention being given to it today—we risk a setback to reform. And so I think we have to be extremely careful in dealing with this anguishing issue, but above all never compromise on our firm opposition to apartheid.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

In connection with relations with Latin America, much of the problem stems from Cuba. Do you see any possibility of normalization? I am not saying becoming buddy-buddy, but a normalization of relationships with Cuba; and how should we move in that direction?

General HAIG. I have always felt that a Marxist regime, whether it is in Moscow or in Havana, is as much influenced by self-interest as it is by ideology. The task of enlightened statecraft is to create a calculus of self-interest in Havana that would lead them to reverse their contemporary policies, which involve the intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states.

How best to do that is the $64 question. I have never believed that discussions on peripheral issues which tend to legitimize Castro's regime as he continues to violate accepted rules of international law in Central America is the right course. For that reason, I am nervous about the recent discussions on the exchange of the undesirables and resultant effect of legitimizing contacts with Castro's Cuba while he blatantly continues to rape neighboring states in Central America.

Having been involved in several discussions with him during my time as Secretary of State, either directly with his Vice President or indirectly through Ambassador Walters, it is very clear that Mr. Castro has yet to accept the concept that it is his obligation to butt out of the internal affairs of neighboring states and permit them to determine their own futures. Until he does that, formally or in practice, I would say the basic prospect of an improvement in relationships is rather slim and ancillary contacts can be counterproductive.

The real question is how to get him to make that judgment. I happen to think it's a very achievable goal and a desirable one. For that reason, I would have done a great deal more to bring to his attention that this administration, this "new America" that the President speaks about—this "American revolution" is no longer going to benignly accept the export of Soviet Marxist-Leninist terrorism, wherever it occurs, they must see us take actions to oppose it.

Does that mean going to war with Cuba? Certainly not. I would be hard pressed to believe that Mr. Castro, who presides over an island-state of 11 million people 100 miles from our shore, would risk a military confrontation with the United States. Precisely the opposite.

The problem, Senator, is he believes that we will neutralize ourselves here in Washington and among the American people, and therefore he has carte blanche to continue with the illegal actions he is currently engaged in. Until we change that calculus on the part of Mr. Castro, the prospects for real progress are very dim.

If we can do it, and I think we can—and that involves also a very intense dialog with the Soviet Union because it has a stake in this question—then I would be optimistic. But we just simply continue to neutralize ourselves.

Senator PELL. Well, this brings us to the whole question of terrorism and interference in another country's way of life. Your statement advocates forceful action against terrorists and the governments on whom terrorists usually depend.

In that regard, could you give us not a laundry list, but a couple of examples of what could be the more forceful actions about which you are talking?

General **Haig**. Now, please, Senator, do not read my statement as an advocacy of the use of American force against terrorism as a policy. My statement was designed to cope with a series of intellectual discussions which have been prevalent on the scene here in Washington and which were an effort also to respond to questions forwarded to me by the chairman.

I talk about prudence in the use of force, but I also make the point that if we tell those who engage in terrorism that we will never react, then we are simply going to be facing a hemorrhaging of this kind of activity worldwide. I think the consequences of Lebanon are already beginning to manifest themselves in a global stepup of terrorism.

And I think in the months ahead we are going to see more, and I am very concerned about peace in the Middle East in the midterm. I think we are slipping toward another blowup.

What I am saying about the use of force against terrorism I think is best demonstrated in the events that occurred recently in Lebanon. We had an Embassy blown up. We had reasonable intelligence to support the fact that that operation was run logistically and intellectually by Syria. We tended to blame Iran. It is not the Iranian Government that is conducting this terrorism in the Middle East today. It is Syria and Qadhafi's Libya.

There is also a heavy Soviet hand involved, because it provides the means and training and sometimes the strategic guidance. Iran provides mindless young zealots who believe they are going to paradise if they take care of an infidel, but they are not the guiding hand of terrorism in the Middle East today and we have failed to face up to that.

When our Embassy was destroyed, with the loss of life involved, we essentially did nothing. It was a very short step from that attack to the attack on the Marine barracks, in which we again did essentially nothing.

At such times, following prudent calculations, we Americans must be prepared to take action if indeed it will meet the objectives that we are seeking. But there are no preset formulas that this committee or that Al Haig or the Secretary of State or the President should attempt to lay out to get the American people's endorsement as to when or under what conditions prudence favors direct action.

The important thing is to be sure that those who engage in terrorism know that we just might, and where we have hard evidence that a nation was involved I would say we should, unless it is an act of imprudence.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much. I see that my time is up.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Dodd.

Senator **Dodd**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to see you.

General **Haig**. It is a pleasure to see you again, Senator.

Senator DODD. I apologize for being a couple of minutes late. I gather you had a chance to discuss Central America a bit, and if time allows I will come back to that. If I am being redundant please say so, and I will pick it up from the record.

I would like to ask you at the outset, if I could, about the Genocide Convention. The President, after a lengthy review—in which I presume you were probably involved, announced last year that he supported ratification of that Convention. In fact, we had sent out the treaty from this committee to the floor of the Senate and did not get a chance to really have much debate on it, let alone a vote. But we did pass a resolution overwhelmingly that supported the basic principles of the Genocide Convention and called for an early consideration of that treaty in this Congress.

I am wondering if you could share with us your views. Do you believe that it is in the interests of the United States to ratify the Genocide Convention, and do you support its ratification?

General HAIG. I think I got sandbagged on that question 4 years ago when I was here for confirmation and I expressed some support for the Genocide Convention at that time, because as a matter of principle it is hard for anyone to be opposed to motherhood, and that is what that is.

Senator DODD. But some are, though.

General HAIG. I do not want to sound so disparaging of the carefully honed words of the geniuses who put it together. But let me suggest that I think today we want to be very careful that we know what the consequence of these expressed pieties will be and how, again, different people, well-meaning people, friends, would take such an expression, which really is not an action document, but again, a pontificating piety, devoid of meaningful action.

I would far rather see this committee and this Senate deal with a real resolution on the suppression of the sovereignty and the freedom of the people of Afghanistan, or the interventionism in Central America, or the rape of Kampuchea.

That is not to suggest for a moment that I do not basically feel very comfortable with the stated objectives of the treaty. But it is always a question of deciding, what is it you achieve in practical terms and what are the costs in practical terms, and should not our energies be directed toward more relevant tasks?

Frankly I have trouble with it. I do not want to present myself as an expert on the language of that treaty or its objectives or its motivations, which I would probably be basically comfortable with in a vacuum. But we do not live in a vacuum.

Senator DODD. Am I to understand by that, considering everything you have said, that you would not oppose ratification and in fact would support it?

General HAIG. I probably would not today.

Senator DODD. I have read your book "Caveat. 'There is a chapter in which you deal with Central America. You discuss at some length, Cuba and El Salvador, almost exclusively El Salvador and Cuba, for obvious reasons which you have already addressed in response to Senator Pell's questions.

But foremost, although your views on Cuba I do not totally disagree with, central to the issue and the issue that will be before this committee and this Congress very quickly, one that we must address, is the issue of Nicaragua.

I understand that earlier, in response I believe to the chairman's questions, you suggested that a covert operation was sort of an executive branch cop-out and an overt operation would be a legislative cop-out of the problem.

General HAIG. And for entirely different reasons.

Senator DODD. I was going to ask you to explain what you mean by that and what you would suggest. What policies should we follow and how should we deal with the situation in very practical and real terms?

General HAIG. Senator, you know better than perhaps I would ever know that this is an extremely complex and vexing question. It has already engaged the best minds we could assemble under the Kissinger Commission. Nobody has a clear answer.

I would have thought in 1981 the prospects for doing what was right in Central America were very great for President Reagan. It was one of the most profound frustrations in my tenure in the administration that we failed to look at the issue in its essence, that we repeated the misjudgments of Vietnam by acting as though we believed that what was going on in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Central America is exclusively the historic struggle for social justice.

Senator DODD. Going to the source, as I recall, was a phrase.

General HAIG. Well, I used that term, and I suppose maybe I would have re-invented another term if I had it to do over again, because I thought the White House staff agreed. I had read our party platform and I think I know what President Reagan stands for and I support what he stands for. But I found it to be otherwise in practice.

What I am saying is, what gives a strategic dimension to the crisis of Central America is not the struggle for social justice, as important and as vital as that is to American ideals, rather it is the exploitation of that struggle by external powers, Castro's Cuba and the Soviet Union.

I made the point 4 years ago that we had to take that issue on at each level. If we deluded ourselves that we could deal exclusively in Salvador or in Nicaragua in a repetition of the so-called hearts and minds struggle with covert activity and back alley tactics, then we were deluding ourselves and we were creating an incentive for the Soviet Union and Castro's Cuba to up the ante.

That is what we did in Southeast Asia, instead of facing up to the true nature of that problem and deciding this is an area which is not in our vital interest and we had best stay out, or that it is in our interest and therefore we must do everything possible to bring about a prompt and successful outcome. And in this case, that meant going to Moscow and to Havana, to deal with the problems in tortured Salvador as well as in Nicaragua, which is also a victim of American short-sightedness.

I hope I am answering your question.

Senator DODD. I was going to take you back and say, what sort of problems did they give you? If they had been following your advice, if the White House had gone along and said, Mr. Secretary, you write the blueprint, we are behind you, what would you have done 4 years ago in this area specifically?

General HAIG. Well, I think I went about as far as I could responsibly go in my book on that question, and certainly in an open session it would be very wrong for me to be too explicit. But if you read my chapter on Central America with the kind of care that I know you read things, I think you will understand.

Senator DODD. "The Will to Disbelieve." I know the chapter.

General HAIG. Right.

But you will see that there was a dialog under way with the Soviet Union. There was a dialog under way with Castro's Cuba. Our problem has not been that we did not talk. The problem is they did not like what they are hearing. There is a difference.

I thought there was an opportunity to move that issue, but it would have taken somewhat more starchy actions on the part of the United States, short of the use of force, at that time. Now, these things—this credibility is like a rubberband. If you miss the window of opportunity and that rubberband gets stretched, then the next time around—and that is today—what would have worked 4 years ago would be far more difficult today, far more difficult.

I do not have any bright ideas to give you here in an open session as to what we should do. But let me tell you what the basic problem is in my view.

The basic problem is that Mr. Castro has convinced himself, as a result of his long experiences with the United States, that if you give the United States enough time it will neutralize itself and, therefore, he can continue to violate international law with abandon, because we will talk ourselves out of any effective counter-program. We continue to fail to create a calculus of self-interest in Havana which would tell Castro that time has come to tend to the agonies of his own people, rather than maintain 40,000 to 50,000 mercenaries abroad on behalf of the Soviet Union.

Senator DODD. Would you be comfortable at all—you used the word "starchy," and I do not want to try to nail you down. But have you excluded use of force?

General HAIG. No, I would never exclude use of force. I would never in a public statement as President or Secretary of State or any other official capacity say that we would never use force.

Senator DODD. I did not mean to say that you said never use force. I would never charge you with that.

General HAIG. I did not think you would. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. What I referred to was going back to the source, dealing directly with Cuba, more so than with the Soviet Union. You mention in your statement that there is a great deal of rhetoric about terrorism and then nothing seems to happen. Obviously, rhetoric serves a purpose in trying to ameliorate the threats that, as you have described it, are posed by Cuba.

But I am wondering if you could take this a bit further, beyond the rhetoric, which apparently was not very successful, given the events that have transpired. You said we were talking, they were not listening or were not paying attention.

Can you share with us some things that, beyond the rhetoric, short of a military invasion, that you think might have been more effective in terms of dealing with Cuban interventionism in the region?

General HAIG. Well, you are pressing to the limits of what I think I should discuss in a public forum, and it is not simply a question of Cuba. It is a question of the Soviet Union and Cuba, and we have a legislative history with respect to the Soviet Union and Cuba that involves certain agreements at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, elaborated and broadened somewhat at the time of the submarine pen construction in the early 1970's, and let me just say this, Senator, that within the framework of those understandings, I believe we had sufficient leeway to create the calculus of self-interest in Havana and in Moscow that would have faced us with a very different set of challenges than we are facing today in Central America, and I would say the picture there is rather grim today. Even though we have pounded considerable resources into the region and have therefore held our own in security terms, I would say I am not encouraged in the long term without some change in our basic approach.

Senator DODD. One of your predecessors testified before us the other day. I asked him about the legal issue of funding of the Contra operation.

Do you have any opinion on that? Secretary Vance suggested that the Contra operation as it is presently construed, as he would interpret it as being in violation of international law.

Do you have any feelings on that? I presume you do, but do you want to share them with the committee?

General HAIG. Well, I again have to rely as I did earlier on the rhetoric of my friend Jeanne Kirkpatrick who said "international law is not a suicide pact" in which we allocate to others an inherent right to violate accepted rule of law and restrain ourselves. International law was never intended for that. Article 51 of the United Nations charter provides ample justification if you consider Central America vital to U.S. interests.

The difference between Secretary Vance—and he is a very dear friend, and I respect him immensely—his view and my view is night and day. I happen to think this is a problem of Soviet interventionism and Castro interventionism as well as a severe problem of social justice.

Senator DODD. I see that my time has expired. I will come back again.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, would you like to ask a question?

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up on the question of international law for a moment. Obviously we have a different view. I probably would agree more with Secretary Vance, but I am sure we could both agree on the importance of the fact that we should obey American law.

My point here is that when we engage in the Contra operations, we are violating American law. Title 18 of the Code of Criminal Procedures, says "Whoever within the U.S. knowingly begins or sets forth, provides, prepares the means for or furnishes money for or takes part in any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried out against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state or any colony or people with whom the United States is at peace shall be fined" and so on.

How do you feel about that? Perhaps you should have included that in your statement as well.

General HAIG. Well, Senator, you know, you have me between a rock and a hard place, if you think I am going to come here and be a public advocate for violation of rule of U.S law. I like to think of myself as a zealot in the direction of upholding both United States and international law, and that is the whole issue we are talking about here, peaceful change through rule of law as distinct from bloodshed, terrorism and so-called wars of liberation which are the modus operandi of the Soviet Union and its cronies.

Now, I do not think—and you also have me between a rock and a hard place because I have already stated to you my opposition to covert action per se as a vehicle for achieving major foreign policy objectives. On the other hand, we should understand today we are dealing with a strategic problem involving the vital interests of the United States and those who share our values around the world, and that we have gone down a route which has been traditionally pursued, and I do not know of any law that prohibits the United States from engaging in covert activity. Were there such a law, I would be for its change as rapidly as possible, and I am not aware of any law universally accepted, that specifically prohibits the conduct of covert activity by the U.S. Government.

We are entitled to engage in it just as any other nation until there is an accepted rule of international law adhered to and abided by by all and one which does not put in jeopardy the vital interests of the United States.

But where our vital interests are involved, I think we have to be extremely careful about the legalities that may be peripheral to the basic issue.

You know, the easiest thing to do is to seek refuge in rule of law always where vital interests are concerned. It is easy for me. I think there is hardly an issue involving East-West tensions that the West is not best served by taking rule of law as its guidepost, and therefore we must do everything we can to strengthen it, not to weaken it. And that is probably one of the reasons why I had an aversion to covert activity in this instance.

But now we are there.

Senator PELL. Following up the importance of strengthening international law, should we not be willing to abide by the ICJ's views with regard to the Nicaraguan case? We are going just counter to the direction you are talking of. We are certainly not improving the scope of international law by declining to accept the jurisdiction of the World Court.

General HAIG. I support the administration position on the ICJ. I recognize that it is a painful one, but I think given the issues involved and the past record of that body, and some serious legal question about its jurisdiction, that they did the right thing.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, when you are finished, I have just one more regional question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler, would you proceed?

Senator PRESSLER. I have recently looked at the budget of Costa Rica, to switch back to that region of the world. Costa Rica's budget or their income, as I understand it, is now about one-fourth U.S. aid, and we are going into the Caribbean Basin Initiative which will provide additional incentives.

Are we going to create a series of states in that region which are dependent on the United States? Are we creating a dependency cycle there that we have not had before that will be unhealthy in the long run?

Costa Rica in particular has not been in that cycle in the past, but it is getting there quickly. And is that a healthy thing, and what can we do about it?

General **Haig**. Well, again, I think you have to look at that, historically, Senator. We have had convulsions of U.S. generosity in Central and Latin America for the last 100 years. Our problem is we have never stayed the course, and we have never maintained a coherent, consistent, and reliable approach to the region.

I do think that, as unfortunate as it is in this period of austerity and unprecedented deficits, that we are going to have to continue to be generous, and especially now because of the contemporary struggle that is underway, and the confusion, and the residue of the oil shocks, the decline in raw material prices. You know, I remember how the Caribbean Basin Initiative was born. It came out as a result of the almost sterile visit of Prime Minister Seaga, the first foreign visitor in the Reagan administration when we had a lot of platitudes and no action, and where even the action we have taken subsequently under the Cabibbean Basin Initiative I think has been inadequate because that initiative is not too different than the tax reform process. It comes up here to the legislature and the Christmas tree process begins, and vested interests to protect one narrow segment of our economy after another are tacked on to what was a very visionary and urgently needed assistance program for the Central American republics and Caribbean states.

And I do not think it has yet been a success story. I think we should be doing more, and it is not creating dependency. In fact, the whole philosophy of that initiative is to help others help themselves, as the President said, to "not give them fish but teach them how to catch fish."

I am very comfortable with the philosophy. What I am uncomfortable with is the practical emergence of a sound program that is really going to make a difference. I have just come back from the British Virgin Islands, the Caribbean region. We have got some problems. We have problems in Jamaica. And I tell you, if we let the one experiment in the Caribbean which has rejected totalitarianism, which has thrown out Marxism, fail, then I think we are sending a signal around the world that could have devastating consequence, especially in the Caribbean itself.

Senator **Pressler**. Well, as regards Jamaica, there was a flareup there recently. It appeared things were going pretty well, but those are not the reports we have had recently.

What more can we do for Jamaica, for example? We have given them the tax exemption for conventions and tourism, we have encouraged tourism, which is their main industry. I do not know what more we could be doing.

General **Haig**. Well, I suspect if you had Prime Minister Seaga up here, he would have some very good ideas for you. I do not want to present myself as an expert on the internal affairs of Jamaica, but let me suggest that most of our favorable treatment is laced with conditions which sometimes are so onerous for the recipient nation that it is hardly worth their effort to take advantage of it. And I could think of that in the case of the BVI, for example, where we have tax problems, and their major industry is charter boats, and we are treating them in such a way that I think we are going to drive that industry out of that country at great social and economic cost, and where the advantages for the American Treasury Department are miniscule.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, just a concluding observation to get your reaction. I understand that in spite of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, Nicaragua exports bananas and beef and tobacco to the United States at a higher per capita level. I am not sure that is right, but I have been told that.

Should we go a step further with the Caribbean Basin Initiative and truly distinguish between our friends and foes and not import so much from Nicaragua, or would that just aggravate the situation, if it could be aggravated any more?

General HAIG. Well, I do not know that we are importing a majority of our bananas and food stuffs from Nicaragua.

Senator PRESSLER. Not the majority.

General HAIG. I would hope that is not true.

Senator PRESSLER. Not the majority, but we are a major trading partner of Nicaragua, and we are importing——

General HAIG. Always difficult questions, never as simple as they sound. It was like the sanctions against Poland following the crackdown against Solidarity. Is it in our interest to punish the Polish people or is it in our interest to send a very firm signal to the Polish Government and the Soviet Union? The same problem with Nicaragua. Heaven knows Americans do not pursue policies which engender starvation among the populace simply because we do not like the government. I do not think you would want to be part of that, and I know I would not.

On the other hand, I think it would be very foolish—and it is the same in our dealings with the Soviet Union, for example, when we bludgeon our allies in Western Europe on technology transfer, trade, and credits, and we are the largest exporter of American grain to the Soviet Union. It's pretty tough for our European friends to understand. Nicaragua poses the same question.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

General HAIG. I danced around your question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Secretary Haig, going back to the terrorism issue that you touched upon in several places in your testimony, you state that inaction in the face of terrorist assaults is a far greater risk in the long run because it convinces assorted hit men and fanatics and the calculating governments which support them that we are too confused or too fearful to resist. We went into this issue at the time of the bombing of our Embassy in Beruit as well as the assault on the Marine barracks.

I gather from your testimony that, following the first bombing of our Embassy in Beruit and fairly good intelligence as to the identity of the culprits as well as their governmental sponsors, you believe we should have retaliated in a forceful way, targeting both the individuals responsible and their sponsors. I suppose the same line of reasoning should have applied after the Marine barracks were blown up, that there was even more reason to move in the direction of swift retaliation. You seem to be saying that the second Embassy bombing exacerbated things to the point where the

United States was in some danger of being run out of Lebanon altogether, and perhaps other places as well, because of the perception that we remained unwilling and unprepared to isolate the people involved, assign blame to sponsoring governments, and to react accordingly.

Now, what sorts of actions are available to us? For example, if we could isolate a small squad of people or its training camp, that might provide an appropriate target of opportunity for retaliation. But if the Government of Syria is culpable, as you indicated was the case in one or more of these situations, what effective measures can be taken in this circumstance that will make the slightest bit of impression on Syria?

General **Haig**. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is no set formula, there is no scenario, and it is very easy for me in hindsight to come up here and say we should have reacted when our Embassy was destroyed, and had we, we probably would not have been faced with the destruction of the Marine barracks. That is my conviction. I truly believe that.

On the other hand, to set out a prescribed response, that you go to a training camp, one extreme, or that you bomb a national capital at another, is really an exercise in futility. The only way you can determine these things is to make a careful assessment in each case.

I happen to think the environment in Lebanon at the time of the destruction of our Embassy was such that some very vigorous action against Syrian camps in the Bekaa Valley would have probably been appropriate and not too difficult to execute. Certainly we had the assets in place to do it, and I do not believe the American consensus would have been against it if it had been carried out promptly, surgically and with success.

Nobody can tell you beforehand that it will turn out that way, and you cannot demand those criteria either.

Another instance may be that we just simply know, as with the Iranian hostage situation, that our conclusion there would be we are going to have to live with it because the consequences of taking action would probably be more counterproductive than they would be productive. But there is no set formula. Each one must be accompanied by a continuing assessment.

But I suggest this in my paper as well, and that is that we cannot sit and wait for every crisis in order to lay out a scenario for reaction. The most astute statecraft anticipates crisis. And history will never tell you how many wars we avoided by good, sound anticipatory policy, or how much bloodshed it has averted. And we have to be somewhat more active and responsive, and I think our President, who I support fully, needs a little more flexibility and freedom of action rather than a strait jacket of increasing restraint on the freedom of the Executive.

After all that is what elections are about in this country. If officials do not perform well, vote them out of office.

The **Chairman**. Well, apparently the President agreed with your point of view in the action that he took in Grenada in response to the invitation of the East Caribbean powers. This clearly broke the mold of inactivity, and the hesitancy to use force.

General **Haig**. But we squandered it, and I will tell you why, Mr. Chairman, in two instances. One is we had the mining situation afterward which came at the worst time, and a lot of the dividends that came from courageous action in Grenada have been blunted, and second, we did not even clearly rationalize the action we took. There was ambiguity emanating from the executive branch. They said, well, there was a rescue operation for endangered American students, instead of stating that the line was drawn and we are not going to tolerate the installation of Soviet or Cuban military bases in this hemisphere any longer. This should have been the basic justification.

The **Chairman**. In other words, the President should not have relied upon the students claims that they wanted to be rescued or on the invitations from the Caribbean states. Rather he should have simply said: this is it, on occasion we act, and you ought to understand that?

In other words, is it possible that the President, right now, in anticipation of a terrorist attack somewhere, has in mind that he might surprise everybody and might react swiftly and decisively to indicate to terrorists that "enough is enough"?

General **Haig**. I think we talked ourselves into a position where he damned well better, and I may not be as comfortable with that reality as I sound. But I think we have talked ourselves into that position.

The **Chairman**. Returning for a moment to Central America, you have indicated that even though we may not have started off on the right foot, with covert aid we ought not to reverse course now. Essentially the President in his speech last night said we ought to support freedom fighters, wherever they are, whether it be Afghanistan or Nicaragua. Those are the two countries that he cited specifically.

Leaving aside the first for a moment, in the case of the second, the President obviously does intend to press that issue.

Now, what I suppose I would like for you to try to define is our probable course of action. Should we have a precise course? Should we say our aim is a negotiated settlement in which the current government changes its ways, agrees not to destabilize neighboring states or become a base for the Soviet Union in Central America, or is our aim literally to indicate that this government has to go, that we have to employ the means to make certain it changes, and that we have some candidates for a democratic government that might succeed a Marxist government?

Which of those two basic foreign policy aims would you pursue?

General **Haig**. Mr. Chairman, I think you have put your finger on some absolutely crucial questions about which there has been some confusion.

First let me make a general observation, that when we see Soviet interventionism, whether it is direct or through proxy, as we do in Central America, we also have to start out with some fundamental calculations, to include: is this a vital interest of the Soviet Union, and therefore a causus belli? Or is this a target of opportunity which is an extention of the activity we experienced in the seventies? These are very important calculations.

That is why Afghanistan is not necessarily Nicaragua. That is why Poland is very different from Central America, and the constraints against our freedom of action to pursue our ideals, interests and values are far more significant.

I happen to think Central America is a target of opportunity, not a causus belli for either the Soviet Union, and above all, for Castro's Cuba.

When this administration started out, we generally focused on the rule of law issue, and that is that we as a nation cannot tolerate violations of accepted rules of international law by Nicaragua, Cuba or the Soviet Union. Now, that is a matter of principle that I do not think we can ever walk away from. And so, the key issue and the implementing concession that would have to come from Nicaragua for normalization really involves Nicaragua's acceptance formally or in a de facto way, that they would no longer intervene into the internal affairs of their neighbors.

That approach has somehow become skewed in recent months, and we are talking not so much about interventionism but about pluralism in Nicaragua—democratic reform. I have always taken the position that we Americans cannot tell other governments what form of government they must have. I think history has confirmed that when a people have opted for totalitarianism in areas that are less than vital to the Soviet Union, the record of success has not been very good. It was not good in Chile, despite all the sensitivities about how we got there. I think you would have had that in Nicaragua if we had gotten the U.S.S.R. and Cuba out of the equation. Then we would have been less concerned about the situation. But if the Nicaraguan people by their sovereign vote, had chosen Marxism then we would simply have to live with the situation.

We do have a right to insist that they not impose their system on neighboring states, and they not violate international law in the process. I think there is some lack of clarity in the implementation of our policy on these two issues as your question so astutely surfaces. I would be more in favor of saying Nicaragua, you do what you want to do with your own future, that is your question and your people's question to decide, but you just have simply got to butt out of other people's affairs.

If we say we will never accept a Marxist regime in this hemisphere, that creates some strong problems for us in dealing with the other nations in the region and I think in the long run, it will rise up and bite us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Dodd, do you have additional questions?

Senator DODD. I have one specific one and a sort of generic one if I may.

I don't know if you have had a chance recently to look at the Philippines as an issue. You cite in your testimony how the best way to deal with crises is to see them coming and to act before they become full blown crises. I am not quoting you exactly, but they were words to that effect.

I wonder if you might have any suggestions for the committee on how you think our Government ought to be dealing with that impending crisis. In fact, you may argue it is already a serious one.

Do you have any thoughts on that?

General HAIG. Well, my hope is that we do not repeat the scenario of Iran, above all, and we should ask ourselves what are the alternatives to the current situation.

I also believe that we should recognize that we have a long history of a relationship with the Marcos government which is, I think, rather elegant.

Senator Dodd. I am sorry?

General Haig. Rather elegant, rather constructive, rather beneficial to the United States, to the Philippines and to the region as a whole. It does not mean for a moment that I would be comfortable with every policy of the Marcos government, and certainly recent events have been troubling. But we have to be sure that there is a continuity of responsible leadership in Manila which hopefully will be built upon democratic values, and includes support from the business community, the intellectual community, and the church. I think we are always best served by not becoming hyperactive here in the United States on that subject unless conditions develop which are simply intolerable.

I do not anticipate that. I have known President Marcos for many years. He has been a valiant and courageous fighter in World War II and he served his people well. Some may think his time has come. That may be true in terms of both his health and the calendar, but as Americans we must be very careful.

I could walk down the streets of any of our large cities and find injustices which probably compare to what I have found in Manila. That does not mean I am comfortable and it does not mean we do not have an obligation to try to help. It just means that sometimes our do-goodism brings about outcomes that we later regret. Certainly that was true in Iran. You might even make a case about Somoza's Nicaragua in the context of how you deal with proven and traditional friends. Do you work to replace them, as we did with Somoza, or do you go to them and talk to them quietly as friends and have confidence and some optimism that they have enough respect for our relationship that they will be influenced?

I do not have a current feel for the situation in Manila, but I say these things mostly because I think in the past our tendency has been to be hyperactive, rather piously self-serving, and fundamentally wrong headed.

Senator Dodd. Stick with Marcos?

General Haig. That is not what I am saying. What I am suggesting is that for the United States to make that decision for the Philippine people represents an abrogation of everything that we stand for.

Senator Dodd. Let me ask you a generic question.

In your confirmation hearings you had a line you used which I have used over and over again because I thought you encapsulated what ought to be the basic legs of a sound foreign policy, in fact, you could make the case in domestic policy as well, but I have used it in the foreign policy context. You said our foreign policy should be reliable, consistent, and balanced. You said that over and over again.

How would you characterize the Reagan administration's foreign policy since your departure? Has it been consistent, reliable, and balanced?

And that answer may not obviously be yes or no, and if you care to take a couple of minutes and tell us where you think it has been and where it hasn't been.

General HAIG. I would never say yes or no when I can use 20 minutes. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. I know that. [Laughter.]

General HAIG. I think there are two issues, two very broad issues that we are at a crossroad today in contemporary America. We decided one in the recent election—do we return to the passivity that characterized our foreign policy in the late seventies? That has been recently rejected by the American people, by the voter, in a rather substantial way.

The other issue is—do we delude ourselves into believing that the revolution that the President talked about last night in his State of the Union Address, which I rejoice in, has somehow recreated the unique power that we enjoyed at the end of World War II, which was itself an historic anomaly? If we believe that, we are headed for trouble. There are many on the conservative side who tend to support calls for "a pox on everybody's house," which suggests we will do it our way; we will pull our troops out of Europe; we alone will bash our European partners on sanctions against Poland; we alone will set the framework for world order; we will close our markets since we have enough markets here in the United States to go it alone.

In my view that is self-delusion of gigantic proportions but there is that tendency, and we see it in some of the administration's policies from time to time.

The correct course is to recognize that we are more, not less interdependent than we were four or five decades ago in international economic affairs, in security affairs, in political affairs. If we have enough sense to stay together with those who share our values, history is on our side because the Soviet Union's power which is "inorganic" and essentially military, is sooner or later going to weaken through a failure of the system itself.

These are the broad choices. Now, have we been consistent and reliable? I would say that the picture is mixed. Essentially I am fully supportive of the policies the President has been pursuing. I think his major contribution in the foreign policy area has been the rebuilding of America's military defenses. I think history will give him very high marks for this alone, and I hope that the current orgy of deficit mania will not derail that achievement.

Rather than a philosophic or ideological domination of a foreign policy, I have seen a modern populism dominate our foreign policy. Now, what is populism? It means a lot of things to a lot of people. There is a Texas variety, there is another variety from up in New York State, and it means that in any event, you get up every morning and you put your finger to the wind and say that following the consensus is critical, and saying I have to be popular above everything else and therefore I am going to do everything to ensure that.

Some of our foreign policy has been characterized by that tendency, and I think it came from less-than-experienced operators close to the President, not the President who is basically fundamentally sound in my experience.

That sounds rather presumptuous and it is.

I hope we abandon populism because I happen to think that populism in the extreme is not only bad policy, but it is not even good politics because in the long run, you develop a solid consensus, you garner the support of the American people exactly the way President Reagan himself did it, that is, by accomplishment. He has turned the economy around, he has rebuilt our defenses, he has got a higher degree of respect for the United States around the world. Success is what breeds consensus, not populism, not lurching toward each perceived whim of the people day to day and letting populism rather than principle dominate foreign policy.

There are times when Presidents must do unpopular things where you fellows up here in this committee might even be after impeachment. But if a President follows his conscience, using his wisdom and experience, and if he succeeds, when he is finished, he is an effective leader.

That is what Edmund Burke told us is the key to the future success of our foreign policy and to: balance, consistency, and reliability. It means you do have values that you adhere to, but that you always assess the achievability of the resulting objectives against the practical means you have for achieving them.

In the military we used to call it—and this is one of the key threads in your hearings. "Requirements planning" is to sit down and look at every threat to our interests around the world, every danger we face, and then calculate the assets we would like to have with which to deal with these threats. That is what I call the "fantasy of a planner." But it is not a useless exercise because it gives you a philosophic framework, a spinal column or roadmap which serves as the basis for a new set of planning calculations which we call capabilities planning, meaning what can we realistically do. Requirements planning provides a philosophic framework through which you complete capabilities planning.

Foreign policy is very much that way, and if you have not stuck by the principles of requirement planning which offers reliability, predictability and consistency, then watch out. To answer your quetion, I would give us a mixed review.

Senator **Dodd**. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator Pressler, do you have additional questions?

Senator **Pressler**. No.

The **Chairman**. Senator Pell?

Senator **Pell**. No, thank you.

The **Chairman**. Secretary Haig, we deeply appreciate your appearance here today. We are appreciative both for the preparation of your initial statement and your spirited answers to questions that I think were thoughtful and that brought to the fore the essence of your testimony. You have made a very great contribution to our hearings.

Thank you for coming.

General **Haig**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY, 20, 1985

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Mathias, Boschwitz, Pressler, Trible, Evans, Pell, Zorinsky, Cranston, Dodd, and Kerry.

The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is now called to order.

The committee has commenced at an early hour and will need to recess in time for the joint session of Congress that will hear Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain. But for the information of Senators, the witnesses and those who have joined us as our guests today, in the event that more time is required for questions, we have asked the witnesses to be available after the joint session. We may return, depending upon circumstances, to continue the hearing at that point.

We resume this morning the series of comprehensive hearings by the Foreign Relations Committee on the future of American foreign policy. The committee has set for itself an ambitious agenda—to review the foreign policy of the United States, its goals and strategy, its policy objectives, and the means employed over time to achieve those objectives.

The committee has had the extraordinary good fortune during the initial phase of the review to hear from a cross section of American policymakers, past and present. We dwelt at length with two issues in particular: Challenges to the postwar strategy of containment, as well as to the postwar consensus that undergirded that strategy; and, two, a growing inhibition to the use of force to implement that strategy, particularly in those fringe areas of the developing world.

The committee has identified several principal challenges that confront American policy. First is the continuing and difficult relationship with the Soviet Union. A proper assessment of Soviet goals and motivations is key to understanding both the strategic necessities and the costs likely to be incurred from involvement in so-called fringe areas of the East-West conflict.

The second challenge involves the need to design policies to ensure economic growth for the United States and its allies. This is absolutely vital if we are to support our defense commitments and to maintain the social safety net required in modern democratic societies.

The committee will address each of these challenges in the coming weeks. We begin today with a consideration of the Soviet-American relationship. This is a timely consideration, inasmuch as our negotiators will be departing soon for Geneva to begin a new round of talks with the Soviet Union on arms reductions.

Arms control negotiations and potential agreements must be viewed as part of a broad range of policies and actions designed to promote and protect U.S. interests in a world where Soviet power has been steadily increasing and Soviet ambitions are actively asserted.

The U.S. purpose must be to see that the uses of Soviet power are restrained and that Soviet leaders recognize that the risks of assertive and aggrandizing uses of power outweigh the benefits. This is essential for a positive evolution of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.

Much American arms control theory has been based on the premise of a mutual interest in stabilizing military relationships in ways that would make the outbreak of war less likely. However, the slow progress in arms control negotiations, and the very limited accomplishments they have produced to date, suggest that factors other than mutual interest in preventing war are at work as well.

It is for this reason that the broad purpose of the United States in conducting its policies toward the Soviet Union must be defined in terms of American interests. This broad investigation is clearly a central purpose of this committee. These interests clearly include the prevention of war and may, in that respect, overlap to a degree with the interests of the Soviet Union.

But they cannot ignore, and must certainly incorporate, the protection of U.S. security and well-being in the face of the challenges posed to the United States and other nations by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major military power in the international arena.

The expanded Soviet role and influence in the world, undergirded by growing military power, leads to the conclusion that we cannot in the foreseeable future expect to avoid maintaining strong and diversified forces of our own. But if we maintain our military strength, and if the United States is perceived as having the political will to use it in some of the numerous contingencies with which we may be confronted, there can still be considerable scope for policies, including arms control, that contribute to restrained and even constructive relationships with the Soviet Union.

Put most simply, the United States and its allies must be clear among themselves and make it clear to the Soviet Union that assertive uses of power and efforts to shift the geopolitical balance are fundamentally incompatible with productive and constructive relations in other respects. For that reason, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union must be seen in their totality.

The issue of restructuring Soviet-American relations has been at the heart of some recent efforts to thaw relations between the two countries. Since early 1984, the administration has undertaken a broad reconsideration of the role of arms control, attempting in some ways to integrate arms control within a broader design for Soviet-American relations.

However, when one surveys Soviet-American relations today, there would appear to be little left of them except arms control. Nearly every significant bilateral agreement has lapsed; there is little economic interchange with the exception of the rather isolated sphere of agriculture.

Most significantly, until the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in January in Geneva there has been very little political dialog between the two powers. A key issue, then, would seem to be whether it is possible to achieve very much in arms control in the absence of a broader framework of agreement.

Thus, the committee believes it important that we commence this component of our comprehensive hearings with a consideration of the overall Soviet-American relationship in order to understand more fully where arms control fits into the totality of the bilateral relationship and what weight ought to be accorded arms control in a longer term political relationship with the Soviet Union.

The committee is pleased to welcome this morning three eminent specialists in the field of Soviet-American relations: Larry Eagleburger, Richard Pipes, and Marshall Shulman. Each of the witnesses combines policy experience in Government with continuing analytical pursuits in the field outside government. We look forward to their thoughts.

Before asking the witnesses to proceed, may I ask the ranking minority member of the committee, Senator Pell, for his opening statement.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think we all agree that if there is one great problem in the world today it is the question of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. I look back 40 years ago to when I was a young Foreign Service officer. That was my area of interest at the time, Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. In these past 40 years it seems to me that when you come down to the nub of any problem, at the basis of it is the relationship between Washington and Moscow.

Here we are, 40 years later, still examining these questions. We are very fortunate in having the witnesses we do today, because they are very much specialists and experienced in these areas. Two of them are old friends of mine—Mr. Eagleburger and Mr. Shulman. I am very glad indeed to welcome all three of you here today and I congratulate the chairman on organizing these hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

A great deal of time has gone into a discussion of how the witnesses should make their presentations, but we will do so, with their permission, in alphabetical order. I will ask Mr. Eagleburger to start off, followed by Dr. Pipes and Dr. Shulman.

If each of you will attempt to make your presentations in 15 minutes, this then will lead to our questioning and some decision as to whether we shall proceed to recess and a continuation afterward.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, I think we should recognize that we will be leaving here at about 10:30, so if we could get in any questioning at all, the witnesses would even have to abbreviate their remarks further.

The CHAIRMAN. That is certainly true, and I suspect that the witnesses will be guided by those problems, but I do not want to truncate the able testimony we are about to hear too much. The Chair is prepared to reconvene the hearing after the Thatcher appearance so that we can have full testimony.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I agree with you that we have three eminent specialists. One has a son who is even more eminent. However, at 10 o'clock I will have to leave because there are some agricultural problems that the majority leader is going to discuss with us. So I ask you then to excuse me. I will read the record.

I really will miss listening to each one of you. I understand that, Mr. Shulman, you have a prepared statement?

Mr. SHULMAN. Yes, sir, I have submitted for the record a paper that I finished in the early morning hours this morning for another purpose but which is germane to your subject.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I will read it and I will read the record. I have asked the staff to summarize the statements of the other two witnesses. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I will have to leave at 10 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your coming, Senator Boschwitz. We are being joined by a new member of our committee, and that will be made official when the Senate finally determines committees, but we welcome Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts today. We certainly welcome you, Senator Kerry, and are delighted that you are a part of this hearing.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eagleburger, would you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER, KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, NEW YORK, NY

Ambassador EAGLEBURGER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning. I apologize that I do not have an opening statement, but unlike Mr. Shulman I did not work into the early hours of the morning, but I thought a lot. [Laughter.]

I also assume that the fact that Mr. Pipes is on the right and Mr. Shulman is on the left is not an expression of this committee's view of the various range of views. [Laughter.]

At any rate, at the risk of seeming to dwell for a few minutes on the obvious, I will talk a bit about what it is we are facing when we deal with the Soviet Union, because I think these are important factors to keep in mind.

We are dealing with a country which in its external policy has over 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, holds Eastern Europe in thrall, was behind the declaration of martial law in Poland, has supplied Syria with massive quantities of arms which have clearly very much affected the ability of any of us to make a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, continues to supply Nicaragua, and certainly is the support of Vietnam's effort to Vietnamize all of Indochina, and not too long ago shot down a Korean civilian airliner.

Internally it is a country that does not permit its Jewish people to emigrate from the country. It must maintain gulags. It is a country with no constitutional system for the transfer of power, and we have seen over the course of the last several years the contortions the country has to go through in the process of transferring power.

It is headed by an aged leadership which is profoundly conservative. We must expect, given the health of Mr. Chernenko, that we will continue to be dealing with a country, as we have for most of the last 4 years, with divided councils, and a relatively ineffective decisionmaking process. This is likely to continue for some time to come.

It is a country with an economy that becomes ever more out of date. It cannot cope with its economic problems, and I personally believe as the technology revolution continues will become even more unable to deal with those problems.

As far as we ourselves are concerned, the United States in the course of a little more than a decade, has gone from the euphoria of détente, through Jackson-Vanik amendments, Stevenson amendments, Clark amendments which prohibited our support for anti-Soviet forces in Angola, to the failure of SALT II, the grain embargo, and the Olympic boycott.

We have gone from enthusiastic support for arms control to deep doubts about it. We have gone from an attempt to reach agreements to, during the course of the last Presidential campaign at least, substantial attacks because we have been unable to reach agreements with the Soviets, despite the fact that it was the Soviets themselves who walked away from the negotiating table.

In short, over the course of most of the last decade U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union has been less than consistent, with exaggerated expectations, harsh reactions to some Soviet outrages and mild reactions to others. Now what does this background mean for the next 4 years, at least as far as my own judgments are concerned?

In a strange way I believe that the United States is in a better position to deal with the Soviet Union today than it has been for a number of years. We have a stronger economy and a major commitment to improvement in our defense establishment. The Soviets understand these kinds of factors and they deal with them, believing in real politik as they do.

We have, in my judgment, over the course of the last 4 years by and large maintained a consistent policy toward the Soviet Union; as a result the President has credibility in the Kremlin in a way that few American leaders over the course of most of the last decade have had.

We are now returning to the negotiating table, despite the fact, to emphasize it again, that it was the Soviet Union that not only left the negotiating table but said it would not come back until certain conditions were fulfilled. Those conditions have not been fulfilled, but the Soviets are back at the negotiating table, which ought to tell us something about the way in which we should deal with the Soviet Union.

Arms control, at the moment, is obviously the focus of these negotiations; that may be, in a sense—and I emphasize only in a sense, regrettable because, Mr. Chairman, I tend to agree with your opening statement that it is at least an open question as to whether we can maintain and move forward on arms control if our relationship with the Soviet Union across a broad front does not develop at the same time.

Nevertheless, I think it is clear in this democracy of ours, and given the attitudes of our allies, that we have no choice but to proceed, and to proceed sincerely, with these arms control negotiations in the hope that we can reach agreements which are of benefit to both sides. It is not that I object to proceeding with arms control.

Like it or not, these arms control negotiations will, to some degree, be hostage to, will be linked to, if you will, our ability to move forward with the Soviets on other issues. One has to hope that the Soviets have finally gotten that through their heads. We cannot always be certain of Soviet wisdom, but they have seen enough over the last decade, I hope, to recognize that if they indeed themselves want anything to be accomplished in arms control their conduct in other areas will make a difference.

Thus, I think it is important that the administration do what it is now trying to do, which is to bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table on a range of other issues that certainly harm the relationship, whether it be in the Middle East, southern Africa, Central America, the relations between East and West in Europe. Any number of issues need to be discussed and hopefully over time we can begin to move to correct some of the problems that exist in those areas.

Let me end with some cautions about the next 4 years. It is, at least in my mind, an open question whether the Soviet decisionmaking process, given the changes in leadership that have occurred over the last 4 years, and given the fact that Mr. Chernenko himself is clearly very ill, can come to grips with difficult issues, and can come to grips with those difficult issues in a rapid enough time frame to be able to move negotiations between the United States and the Soviets forward.

A second caution and, in my judgment, an important one, is that the United States, in proceeding now with the Soviet Union in arms control negotiations—or indeed in anything else—cannot and must not appear too anxious to reach an agreement. If we are going to bring the Soviets to sensible arrangements, we must demonstrate that we are not prepared to rush to judgment, no matter what the political pressures in this country may be.

It gets to a point which I can only describe as the American propensity to shoot itself in the foot when we are in the middle of negotiations. We too often tend to find ourselves negotiating with ourselves and forgetting that at the other side of the negotiating table is the Soviet Union, and that it is indeed they who must in the last analysis be prepared to compromise with us, not that we always compromise with ourselves.

We need as well, Mr. Chairman, to recognize that we must to keep up the pressure on the Soviet Union. I mean by that that we need to continue substantial defense appropriations. I am not now trying to get into an argument as to what is substantial. I am saying, however, that the Soviets must see that we are continuing to build up our defense establishment.

We must work to strengthen our relationships with our allies. That means, among other things, certainly the closest possible consultations as we proceed with the arms control negotiations. It means that sometime, with all respect to this committee, that we are going to have to come to grips with what is called the two-way street in terms of the purchase of arms materiel and equipment. We cannot forever go on being the main supplier to the defense establishments of NATO and letting the Europeans produce virtually nothing and being unprepared to buy anything they produce under almost any circumstances.

We must avoid as much as we can actions which would weaken the West. I talk here particularly about issues such as protectionism, and we must challenge the Soviets where they are weakest. Here I talk about areas such as Africa, where in fact it seems to me a number of black African countries that have spent most of the last several decades trying to make the Soviet system work have come to the recognition that in fact it does not work. They are ever more turning toward the West for support, help and assistance in developing a more open and more productive economic system.

In the last analysis, Soviet relations over the course of the next 4 or 5 years are probably manageable because both sides recognize the dangers of letting the relationship get too far out of hand. It will always be competitive, but I suspect it is manageable.

I suspect, as well, that the true way in which we deal with the Soviet Union is by paying attention to our foreign policy on a broad range of issues—economic development for the developing world, the debt problem, our allies, ever attempting to improve our relationship with the Peoples' Republic of China, our own economic health, issues of protectionism.

These, I believe, are at least as important in dealing with the Soviet Union as are the issues that directly affect our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union themselves. It is, in a word, that our relations with the Soviets are a mosaic of foreign policy decisions, only some of which directly relate to the United States-Soviet relationship.

And indeed the way we deal with problems which in the abstract look as if they are not related to the Soviet question may over the long run have far more impact on the state of our relations with the Soviets than these direct questions.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Eagleburger.

Mr. Pipes, would you proceed?

STATEMENT OF RICHARD PIPES, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FORMER DIRECTOR, EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, 1981-82, CAMBRIDGE, MA

Mr. PIPES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I have no statement, but I shall try to make my points succinctly and briefly.

The first point I wish to make is it seems to me we ought to learn from experience. We have two-thirds of a century experience in dealing with the Soviet Union, in the course of which we learn certain lessons which unfortunately are forgotten as soon as a new administration comes into office.

I have the impression that every new Secretary of State thinks that he can find a magic formula which will set our relations with the Soviet Union on a new path and stabilize the relationship in the long term. I proceed on the assumption that this is not very likely. In fact, it is unlikely as long as the present system in the Soviet Union prevails.

I see Soviet aggression, with which we have now 67 years of experience, as endemic to the system. In other words, it is systemic and to deal mainly or even exclusively with its manifestations, whether through containment or through détente, is almost certainly doomed to produce disappointment.

The reason why the Soviet Union is aggressive has to do with the Stalinist system and Marxist-Leninist ideology to which it is dedicated. Briefly, the Soviet elite, which enjoys an unusual degree of wealth, privilege, and power, can preserve that wealth, privilege, and power only by maintaining a state of artificial tension with the rest of the world and keeping its population in constant fear of war. It is only on this basis that it can claim its privileges and live at a standard of life infinitely higher than that of the rest of the population.

In other words, the Soviet system is the cause, and aggression is the manifestation. If this is the case, is there nothing ahead of us but continued tension and the possibility of confrontation breaking out into conflict? I think not. I am rather pessimistic about the short term and optimistic about the long term.

The Soviet system is in deep crisis. The crisis is due above all to the inability of the Stalinist system to cope with modern economy and its requirements, as well as with the demands of the military buildup and the costs of the imperial expansion which the post-Stalinist leaders have undertaken.

To the extent that the West on the one hand denies the Soviet Union economic assistance in the form of technology transfer—and I do not only mean high technology; I mean virtually all technology—and credits—and I mean not only credits to the Soviet Union but also to Soviet surrogates—to that extent enormous pressures build up in that economy compelling the Soviet leadership, not for the sake of the Soviet consumer but for the sake of the future of Soviet industry, to shift resources from imperial ventures and militarism to domestic needs, very much as China found it necessary to do.

To the extent that we match Soviet military buildup and to the extent that we impose high penalties on Soviet expansion in the Middle East, in Africa, in Central America, we are increasing the burdens on that system and compelling it to reform and to shift its energies from external expansion to internal improvement.

I have China as a model. It seems to me the evolution of the Soviet Union might well take the same path as the evolution of China because the problems which the two societies face are similar. China, from the moment it had decided to dedicate itself to domestic problems, to modernization, as they call it, had to call off its aggressive designs and it has become now almost a quasi partner of ours.

I think the same thing may happen to the Soviet Union, if and when we should pursue a consistent policy of economic denial and military confrontation wherever the Soviet Union expands.

I would like to say this in conclusion on arms control. I am not optimistic about the possibility of an arms control agreement being included at any rate in the next several years. The President's strategic defense initiative [SDI], if implemented—and it seems to me the President is quite determined to implement it—would totally revolutionize the military relationship between the two powers. I think most of the public is not aware of the dimensions of this project. By dimensions I mean its implications for Soviet strategy.

If deployed by the end of this century, it will entirely negate the Soviet strategy of a first strike in the event of a nuclear war and, by so doing, place the Soviet Union in a position where it will not be able to engage in worldwide aggression under the protection of a nuclear threat to the United States and its NATO allies.

The Soviet Union realizes this, and it will do all it can to prevent this program from proceeding. It will use arms control agreements to do so. It will also appeal to public opinion here, in Europe, and so on and so forth. Therefore, given the completely new dimension which our arms competition has assumed as a result of the President's initiative, I am pessimistic that anything may come in the next year or two, but I am very optimistic that in the long run this will force a rethinking of Soviet strategic plans and may produce a much more stable relationship than we have had heretofore.

Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Mr. Pipes.

Mr. Shulman, would you please testify?

STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHALL D. SHULMAN, DIRECTOR, HARRIMAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES OF THE SOVIET UNION, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY

Mr. **Shulman**. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I do not have a printed statement, but I have submitted for the record a paper that I have just been working on for another purpose but which addresses itself to the problems that you have indicated in your opening statement.[1]

The **Chairman**. It will be made a part of the record.

Mr. **Shulman**. Thank you, sir. I realize it is too long for most of the committee to read it now, and I would advise you not to start it late at night because you will not be able to put it down. [Laughter.]

But it does address some of the questions that you have opened up and which the other speakers have spoken to. For the most part, it does express disagreement with some of the views that have been expressed.

For my opening statement, I would like to say in response to the questions you have raised, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Pell's statement, too, that the current state of the relationship right now is a curious one and it is somewhat different in character than what we have observed in the recent period.

---

[1] See page 12.

It is a mixed, ambiguous and quite unstable relationship at the moment. It is mixed because since 1984, beginning with the President's statement in January of that year and the exchanges in the period, there was modification in the tone of the relationship to one somewhat more conciliatory and there were resumed the talks between the two countries.

We are now in a situation in which talks are going forward and there is perhaps some hope of progress on the secondary issues, such issues as the possibility of the reopening of consulates or exchanges or the current conversations about the regional problems in the Middle East, academic exchanges, even the possibility of trade.

So far that is not bad. It is at least better than it was a couple of years ago. But on the main business of the relationship which has to do with the management of the nuclear competition the prospects are not very encouraging.

I think it is clear that there is an irreconcilability between the positions that have been staked out by the two countries. The Soviets have made it clear that their interpretation of interdependence of the three sectors of the negotiations that came out of the Geneva talks with Secretary Shultz meant that if the space defense program went forward and if the further deployments in the INF went forward, there could not be any expectation of progress in the third sector, which had to do with the management of strategic weapons.

The United States has indicated that it is determined to have the first two programs go forward, so it is clear that there is, on the basis of the stated positions, an impasse and there does not for the moment appear to be a prospect of breaking through, at least not in the near future.

Now that brings us to your question. Is it possible, then, if there is not progress in the arms control field, that there be progress in other sectors? My answer is I do not think so. I believe that the military competition, which is likely to mount if these talks do not make progress, is going to be a dominating consideration.

That is, it is going to create higher tensions. It is going to affect the Soviet Union internally, and it is going to mean that both countries, I think, will be increasingly conscious that as we each produce and deploy new systems that are less stable and less verifiable than the ones we now have, as we are now doing, the insecurity of both countries is going to be increased. Under those circumstances I believe we are headed for a period of resumed tension with the Soviet Union.

So in answer to your question, I think those two matters are linked. I do not think it is possible to make progress in either way—that is, either the arms control or the general relationship—without some development on the other side, at least some hope or prospect.

Now it is a curious thing at the present juncture that the United States is stronger in this relationship. We go into these negotiations from a position that is clearly relatively advantageous. The problem, in my judgment, is that I am not sure we know how to use that strength wisely. I am not sure we know what we want for that strength or how to use it in a way that is in our own interest.

The Soviets, curiously enough, are going into this, I think, also with the consciousness that they are in a relatively weaker position. They face prospects down the road which are going to make life a good deal harder for them, and I will say a word about the reason why that is so, and the prospect is that their reaction, especially the reaction of the parochial aged leadership which they have, their normal reflex response is to overreact and to make things worse.

That has a certain irony at the moment because there is a possibility there are opportunities in the situation. I think there are pressures on the Soviet Union now coming from both outside the country and from within the country that increase its incentives for wanting to reduce the drain into the military sector, or at least not to have to increase the drain, which is very considerable.

Now I would just spell them out very briefly. Part of it comes from the state of the economy, obviously. I think Richard Pipes is right in saying that this is a system that is not able to cope very effectively with its economic problems as it goes into a period of advancing industrialization. The system produces disincentives to initiatives, to innovations. It is over-centralized. It is heavily bureaucratized. The level of productivity has been going down both in industry and in agriculture, and they face some very serious problems.

There is a lot of talk about the possibility and the need for reform but by and large the bureaucracy is extremely conservative, and so is the population. And they have entrenched interests which they are reluctant to give up. So the prospect of reform, at least from this generation of leaders, is not very good.

They have an enormous military drain, and the prospect is that it will be greater. Their foreign policy problems are serious everywhere. There is no prospect of gain and, of course, there is the problem of succession to the leadership.

So for those reasons I believe that if they were to see in the negotiations a way in which they could avoid having to increase the drain into their military sector that they would be prepared to consider it. At least that is a proposition that we ought to be testing.

My difficulty with the present policy is I do not think we are doing that. I think on the contrary what we are doing is confronting them with a situation where they simply are going to make matters worse. They are going to become more intransigent. They are going to go up the scale in the military preparation, step by step, no matter what it costs them. And the effect of this is to increase their repressiveness at home, which is not what we would like to see.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The following material was referred to on page 9.]

February, 1985

AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY FOR MANAGING US-SOVIET RELATIONS

By Marshall D. Shulman
Director, W. Averell Harriman Institute
for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union,
Columbia University

I. Introductory

The irony of the present state of Soviet-American relations is that the United States has some relative advantages that it does not know how to use, and the Soviet Union seems bent on making its problems worse.

There are always choices before the two countries, but the current state of affairs is unusually fluid, ambiguous and unstable, and the choices waiting to be made in Moscow and Washington in the period immediately ahead may be fateful for a long time to come, perhaps in some irreversible ways. It is useful to remind ourselves that relations between these two countries are not simply between two entities, as is often described in diplomatic histories, but involve an interaction between the complex political forces within each of them and it is in this interacting process that the choices will be determined.

For the United States, it is a good time to go back to fundamentals. Are U.S. interests better served by maximum pressure on the Soviet Union or by an effort to manage the competitive relationship at more moderate levels of tension and of military competition? These are unresolved questions in our government and in American public opinion. Matters are further confused by the fact that our public positions are not the same as those

---

Paper written for Conference on US-Soviet Relations sponsored by the Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior reflected in our actions.

Public policy on any subject is not very often a product of rigorous analysis, and this may be more true of policy toward the Soviet Union than of any other, for the subject is shot through with emotions, areas of dark uncertainty, fears, prejudices and primitive stereotypes, and most of all because it involves ultimate and complex questions of security and survival. The consequence has been that our policy thinking has tended to rest upon widely accepted assumptions about the Soviet Union that are in fact questionable, and upon prevailing judgments about how to change Soviet behavior that may be 180 degrees off. The combined effects of these assumptions and these judgments are pushing the relationship in directions contrary to our own best interests.

What particularly requires our attention is the conjuncture of two elements of the problem that are unusually fluid just now. One is the current situation in Moscow. The other is the changing state of military technology. The clarity with which we understand and react to these two sets of problems will determine whether they lead to singular opportunities or to heightened insecurity.

What follows proceeds from a characterization of the present state of the US-Soviet relationship, through an analysis of the main elements currently affecting each side of that relationship, to a discussion of what should be the objectives of our policy and some main guidelines better suited to these objectives and our own interests.

II. The present state of US-Soviet relations

A starting point for thinking about the present relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States is the deterioration that set in almost immediately after the high point of the so-called "detente" in 1972. It is often said that it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that destroyed the "detente," but in fact relations had reached a low plateau even before that event. Efforts at arms control had failed; the military competition had intensified; trade, cultural and diplomatic contacts had been reduced; cooperative programs had virtually ceased; and tensions had begun to mount. American attitudes toward the Soviet Union had hardened in response to Soviet actions in the Third World, Soviet military programs, and Soviet actions against human rights, and these responses were intensified by a conservative and nationalist tide in American politics.

In the course of 1984, a partial and ambiguous change modified the harsher aspects of confrontation between the two countries, as each sought to deflect from itself responsibility for the dangers of the confrontation before world public opinion. Diplomatic contacts were re-opened, prompted on the Soviet side by concerns over the prospect of heightened competition in space weapons and by the desire to probe the change toward a more conciliatory tone in U.S. statements.

In the period that followed, the relationship proceeded in different ways at several levels. The tone of the relationship remained markedly less hostile than had been the case during the preceding period, and promising conversations continued on a range of such secondary issues as the re-opening of additional consulates, exchanges, trade, cooperation on space projects, and the discussion of regional interests in the Middle East. But despite professions of interest on both sides for progress in arms control negotiations, prospects for such progress have not been encouraging in the face of irreconciliable differences in the negotiating positions of the two countries on the issues of space-based defense programs, the further deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and the basis for reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet position on the inter-relatedness of these three issues has been that progress on the third was not possible in the absence of agreement on the first two, while the American position has been equally firm that the first two programs should go forward.

The result has been a period of unstable ambiguity. The mixture of formal restraint in tone (except for the exchange of charges of cheating on previous agreements) and possible movement on secondary issues, with the prospect of an impasse on the negotiations to head off a steep rise in the military competition, appears poised, awaiting decisions on each side on the military issues. If the arms control impasse continues and the military competition continues to rise, both qualitatively and quantitatively, it is doubtful that the other aspects of the relationship can be insulated from the mounting tension, with serious consequences for a long time to come. The projected increase of new weapons systems, less stable and less verifiable than those presently deployed, will increase apprehensions and insecurity on both sides and will make any arms control regimen even more difficult in the future. The mobilization of effort and resources required by the Soviet system to keep pace with these developments will further strengthen intractability in Soviet foreign policy and repressive practices within the Soviet Union. The risk of miscalculation and escalation in the event of unpredictable local conflict situations will be further increased. Reciprocal effects of these developments can be anticipated within the United States, and strains within the Atlantic Alliance will be intensified.

Whether the relationship will evolve in this direction or whether the opportunity will be taken to direct events in a less dangerous direction, will depend upon choices now waiting to be made in Moscow and Washington. If the past is a guide, these choices may depend less upon rational calculations than upon clashes of interests and outlooks -- parochial and broad, ideological and pragmatic, traditional and modern -- and will be heavily influenced by perceptions of the intentions of the other side. There are too many uncertain variables to predict the outcome, but it is possible and useful to have in mind the conditions within each country that may affect its range of possible responses.

III. Factors affecting Soviet responses

The "objective situation" (to use a familiar Soviet phrase) presents strong incentives for the Soviet leadership to seek easement of further drains from its civilian economy into the military sector, if such easement can be found on acceptable terms. For fear of appearing weak and encouraging its adversary to seek advantages from its situation, the Soviet Union is reluctant to acknowledge these considerations, but the signs of it have been evident in recent Soviet behavior. Not only the overtures of 1984, but even earlier, during the negotiations on SALT II, the Soviet Union was prepared to make many more substantial concessions than was the United States to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

There are a number of factors that have created this "objective situation."

1. The long-term decline in the growth rate of the Soviet economy is the most pressing problem facing the Soviet leadership. This decline reflects continued low productivity in agriculture and industry, a lag in the advanced technological sector, a decline in capital investment, a decline in the growth of the labor force, a decline in raw materials and energy resources in the European part of the Soviet Union, low labor morale, widespread drunkenness, corruption, bribery and stealing. There is no lack of discussion of radical reforms and reorganization plans, but in the absence of strong Party leadership, the resistance to reform by the vast entrenched and privileged bureaucracy continues to prevail, and is supported by the predominant conservatism of the population.

The problem is made more acute by the continuing revolution in industrial and military technology. The current world transformation in industrial technology, involving the application of computers and electronics to the processing of information and production, raises serious problems for many countries, but most forcibly for the Soviet Union. The indices of power are changing among nations, according to the varying capacity of their domestic institutions to adapt to the requirements of this advanced technology, and in this new phase of industrial competition, the relative disadvantages of the Soviet economy are an increasing liability. The rigidities, the over-centralization, the built-in disincentives for innovation and initiative, the burdensome bureaucratization -- all mean that in the absence of some radical transformation in the administration of the Soviet economy, its relative position as an industrial power will continue to decline.

Not only did the period of "detente," which was intended to import advanced technology into the Soviet Union to ease these problems, fail to do so in sufficient measure, but the increased tempo of the military competition threatens to deepen them. The problem is more than a matter of the continued or increased diversion of resources from the industrial sector to the military sector. The emergence of an increasingly complex military technology inescapably links the future of a nation's power to the strength of its industrial technological base. Given the lag in Soviet industrial technology, the ability of the Soviet Union to compete with the United States in new and still more advanced military technology without great internal costs or fundamental changes in the administration of its economy is a painful dilemma for the system.

2. A related set of considerations may be found within the military sector itself. By virtue of having diverted an estimated 12 to 14 percent of its gross national product to the military sector since about 1963, the Soviet Union succeeded in achieving strategic parity with the United States by the end of that decade. Although this achievement was reflected in a

new note of confidence in Soviet military writings that it had the capability to retaliate against a possible attack, Soviet military programs did not stop there. Whether because of the traditional Soviet habit of over-insurance, because of the strong influence of the military bureaucracy, the perception of U.S. advantages in the asymmetrical strategic balance or the fear of U.S. technological superiority, the Soviet Union continued to develop and deploy new weapons systems, and found itself faced with a further "modernization" of U.S. forces which it had helped to stimulate.

The result is that the Soviet Union now faces the spectre of an adverse trend in the "correlation of forces," which means a still higher diversion of resources into the military sector at the expense of the consumer sector and the upgrading of its industrial technology. Further, it also faces the requirement of restructuring its forces to reduce their vulnerability to new U.S. capabilities and the possibility of the enormous drain of competing with the proposed U.S. space weapons program by countermeasures, a further expansion of offensive weapons and research and development of its own space defense capabilities. Like the United States, the Soviet Union is preparing new generations of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, bombers and submarines, and faces the prospect that the astronomical costs can yield no advantage other than avoiding the appearance of falling behind in the competition, and becoming vulnerable to pressure or to the threat of attack.

3. These economic and military factors are further complicated by a number of well-known domestic problems, the most notable of which at this writing is the failure of the prolonged succession process to produce a strong central leadership. Even with the emergence of a new leadership, it is likely to be some time before it can consolidate its position sufficiently to be capable of decisive action against the many sources of political resistance to change. Certainly there is more active politics below the top level,

preoccupied with the issues of the modernization of the system as against traditionalist resistance to change, than is reflected in Western popular writing. Certainly also there will be in the foreseeable future the rise of a younger generation to the top political leadership, but it is difficult to speak with assurance of the effect of this generational change on Soviet policies toward the United States or on Soviet policies generally. The younger generation of Party leaders are better educated and more knowledgeable about the outside world than the present ruling group, but they do not appear to be homogeneous in other respects. Whatever chance the system may have for modernizing reforms or a more enlightened foreign policy may depend upon the flexibility and pragmatism of the younger leadership, but it is equally possible that this may not be their inclination, or that resistance to change may be too strong to overcome.

The convergence of multiple problems, foreign and domestic, is daunting and at best may be expected to result in compromise measures for a considerable time to come. There is widespread cynicism and pessimism about the future, in contrast to earlier periods of rising expectations. Demographic changes are resulting in labor shortages and a shift from the preponderance of the Russian population over other nationalities, particularly the Central Asians. There is occasional evidence of restiveness among the minority nationalities, intensified in some areas by economic shortages, in others by religious repression. But although there is widespread dissatisfaction, there are no indications of revolutionary sentiment, even among those who dare to express opposition to the regime. On balance, it would appear to be a prudent assumption that these problems are not likely to confront the Soviet system with a dramatic crisis in the near future.

4. In all directions, Soviet foreign policy faces problems, some of them serious, and few promising prospects. In addition to its central problem of costly and dangerous relations with the United States, the Soviet

Union faces its most serious challenge in Eastern Europe. The solution of the Polish problem is not in sight. The German Democratic Republic is unexpectedly restive, with Hungary and Bulgaria showing cautious readiness to follow its wayward lead. The increased economic drain of the bloc compounds Soviet economic problems. Questions lie ahead for the Soviet leadership on the balance between resilience and tight control it will bring to bear to maintain the integrity of the bloc.

Despite some improvements in its economic relations with China, the Soviet Union has not been able to work out a political modus vivendi, nor to prevent growing economic and military contacts between China and the West. Soviet military deployments reflect a growing concern about the security of the Pacific region, but Soviet diplomacy has been so heavy-handed in its relations with Japan that it has not been able to deflect Japan from its relations with China nor from its security alliance with the United States.

In Europe, the Soviet Union has not been able to turn to advantage strains in the Atlantic Alliance, and its previous efforts to wean the Federal Republic of Germany from its Atlantic orientation have given way to a harsh revival of the "revanchist" line of attack. Despite its failure to mobilize West European anti-war sentiment to bloc the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union has not given up hope of fanning renewed concern in Europe, stimulated by the space defense issue, but its capability to influence these developments is limited by a lack of support for its policies in Europe.

Soviet influence has further diminished in the Middle East and in Southern Africa. The only notable recent advance has been the willingness of Colonel Mengistu to establish a Communist Party in Ethiopia.

In comparison with the relative activism of Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s, it has been relatively quiescent thus far in the 1980s. This may be attributable in part to the preoccupation of the regime with its domestic problems, and in part to the absence of opportunities to exploit at low cost and risk. Given the unpredictability of the manifold sources of conflict within and between the developing nations, it is not possible to foretell whether crises may arise that will involve the great powers in conflicting interests, nor how the Soviet Union will react to such local conflicts. The Soviet Union has not acknowledged any awareness that its activism in the Third World during the 1970s contributed to the deterioration of its "detente" relationship with the United States, but it would be hard to escape that lesson. Whether such awareness would be a factor of restraint in relation to local conflict situations in the Third World might depend upon whether it nourished hope of improved relations with the United States, or felt driven by the need to demonstrate that it was not weak or intimidated.

* * * * * * * *

In the light of the foregoing factors, whose weight is adverse to Soviet prospects for an active prosecution of its competitive relations with the United States, is it possible to conjecture what choices the Soviet leadership may make in the period immediately ahead? Such conjectures are obviously central to U.S. calculations.

At the immediate tactical level, the Soviet leadership faces the problem whether to continue to participate in a negotiating process whose productive outcome it regards with mounting skepticism. To do so, in the Soviet view, gives the United States the advantage of propitiating domestic and West European public opinion, forestalling the concerns about the danger of nuclear war that would otherwise attend increasing military programs. But to withdraw from the negotiations, as the Soviet Union learned from its experience in 1983, draws upon itself the onus for the lack of progress in the negotiations. The more likely response, therefore, is to continue to try to make the best of the negotiations, along the lines foreshadowed in Foreign Minister Gromyko's television press conference of January 13: to hold out the prospect of radical reductions in offensive strategic systems on condition that the United States accept its position on space-based defense and the intermediate-range nuclear weapons, with the possibility held out of trade-offs between the three sectors of the negotiations. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union would intensify its efforts to mobilize West European public opinion on the space and theater weapons issues in the expectation that the anti-war movement in Europe could be made more effective than it proved to be in 1983.

At a more fundamental level, it seems reasonable to expect that there will be debates and choices around the issue whether the political strategy laid down by Brezhnev at the XXIV Party Congress in 1971 is still valid or has been proved bankrupt. That political strategy rested upon the arguments that arms control negotiations with the United States were possible and in the Soviet interest; that relations of reduced tension with the United States would have economic benefits for the Soviet Union, which the Soviet economy required; and that the political competition could go forward side-by-side with "business-like" relations with the United States.

The outcome of these debates, paralleling those concerning reforms in the administration of the economy, may be determined largely by the balance of forces in Soviet politics. At present, the old traditional, parochial forces appear to predominate, entrenched in their bureaucratic strongholds, and their habitual reflex response of defiant over-reaction would make matters worse, but the situation is not without some fluidity. Forces for change from within are more widespread than is generally appreciated in the outside world, and logic is on the side of their arguments for modernization of the system and greater restraint in foreign and military policy. The effect of United States policy on these debates may be marginal, but it is not a negligible factor, for the available options are inescapably framed by the perceptions in Moscow of U.S. intentions and capabilities. To this extent, therefore, the debates may center around such questions as whether the United

States is seen as unalterably committed to an effort to undermine the Soviet system and to acquire a position of clear military superiority, or whether, if this be the present policy of the United States, it will prove transitory in the changing tides of American politics.

What this comes down to is whether American policy is seen as leaving room for acceptable choices, or only for capitulation, in which case the only possible answer can be defiance. This brings us to a discussion of the American side of the equation.

IV. Factors affecting United States responses

The dominant political mood in the United States supports a strong policy of adversarial pressure against the Soviet Union. Although the United States is presently in a position of relative advantage in this competitive relationship, there is a danger that the current mood may lead the United States to press its advantages in ways that will be counter-productive from the point of view of our own long-term interests.

Following are some of the main factors bearing upon present U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union:

1. A hardening of popular attitudes toward the Soviet Union from the mid-1970s resulted from Soviet actions in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, as well as Soviet actions against human rights and the continuing Soviet military build-up. These feelings were intensified by a backlash from the unrealistic expectations aroused by the so-called "detente" period, which was differently understood in the two countries. They were also intensified by a widespread sense of impotence stemming from this country's experience in Vietnam and with the hostages in Iran, and by the passing of the period of American military superiority.

2. Domestic political trends in the United States heightened these reactions. From the mid-1970s, the United States experienced a conservative

political tide and a resurgence of nationalism, expressed as a heightened patriotism. The external ideological focus of this mood is expressed as "anti-communism" as the main organizing principle for foreign policy; it reacts against what it characterizes as the weakness of the "liberal illusions" of the previous period by supporting policies of greater activism and military strength against a perceived heightened threat from the Soviet Union.

3. Taken together, these sentiments created powerful political support for a strong anti-Soviet posture and discredited policies directed toward arms control, reduced tension and measures of cooperation with the Soviet Union. In what became the ascendant view, the Soviet Union was seen as having acquired military superiority; the arms control process was seen as disadvantageous to the United States; upheavals in the Third World were seen primarily as the results of Soviet intervention; and more fundamentally, the Soviet system was seen as inherently and intractably committed to world conquest. It followed logically that the main objective of U.S. policy should be to bring unremitting pressure to bear to compel fundamental changes in the Soviet system, a contraction of Soviet power from Eastern Europe, Cuba and elsewhere, and a Soviet capitulation in the military competition.

4. The policies that flowed from this ascendant view of American objectives included:

-- forcing the pace of the military competition in order to overcome a perceived American inferiority, relying on the U.S. advantage in advanced technology, and drawing upon the traditional view of security through superiority rather than through negotiated limitations on weapons;

-- reducing economic relations with the Soviet Union, not only in advanced technology to staunch the "technology drain," but as much as possible (given political constraints) to maximize pressure on the Soviet system and to reduce its capabilities to shift resources to the defense sector;

-- applying political, ideological and propaganda pressure against Soviet vulnerabilities: in Eastern Europe, among minority nationalities, on the human rights issue, etc.;

-- stressing East-West aspects of local conflict situations, and military assistance to governments and political forces identified as anti-communist.

Despite the change of tone in public statements since 1984, these policies have continued to constitute the "hidden agenda" of influential elements within the government, although some confusion results from the presence within the Administration, as was the case during the previous Administration, of contending elements who would, in greater or lesser degree, modify these objectives and this policy agenda.

* * * * * * *

The assumptions on which present policy rests are not clearly articulated, nor have they been subjected to examination or debate, but their widespread uncritical acceptance is congenial to the present mood in American politics, and is a source of popular support. Some of these assumptions, however, are at best questionable, and the policies derived from them may have consequences quite different from what is anticipated. Among these assumptions are the following:

1. It is widely assumed that Soviet expansionist behavior is so inherently rooted in the nature of the Soviet system that such behavior can only be modified by bringing about fundamental changes in the Soviet system. The argument for this assumption rests upon the assertions that the revolutionary ideology remains in full force as a driving determinant of Soviet foreign policy; that the Soviet system needs to expand in order

to hold its leadership in power, to claim legitimacy or to validate its view of history in ideological terms; that the messianic tradition in pre-Revolutionary Russian history and its continental expansion reinforce the ultimate aspirations of Marxism-Leninism. These assertions ignore the considerable modifications in Soviet foreign policy behavior since 1917, the attenuation of the revolutionary ideology in practice if not in rhetoric, and the pragmatic nation-state responses to the external environment which have been dominant in Soviet foreign policy for many years. In fact, containment has worked where it has been applied, and Soviet expansionist tendencies have in fact been modified in practice where firmness, a balance of military power, and effective foreign policies have foreclosed opportunities for effective Soviet exploitation. The practical effect of a policy that seeks to compel fundamental changes in the Soviet system is to create in the minds of the Soviet leadership the apprehension that if the driving purpose of American policy is to undermine the Soviet system there can be no alternative to a relationship of total conflict.

2. A related assumption is that the problems of the Soviet regime are of such a magnitude that external pressure could precipitate a collapse, or compel the leadership to accept fundamental changes that would weaken their power. This assumption rests upon the arguments that there exists a revolutionary potential within the Soviet population; that external pressure could cause so serious a deterioration in living conditions that the revolutionary potential would be activated; and that the response of the Soviet leadership would be to accept fundamental changes in the system in the direction of democratization at the expense of their own power, rather than to resort to further mobilization and still greater repressiveness in the face of external hostility. It is difficult to see evidence for any step in this chain of assumptions and arguments. It is also

difficult to see the consequence of this effort, if indeed it were possible to mount and coordinate such a campaign not only by the United States but by other industrial societies of the West as would be required, as anything other than to drive the Soviet Union precisely in the wrong direction, toward a still greater totalitarianism. The assumption is wrong not only because it exaggerates the crisis proportions of problems facing the Soviet regime, and because it leads to consequences contrary to its professed aim, but because it ignores the more plausible probability that whatever prospect there may be for changes in the Soviet system in the direction of decentralization, less repressiveness and a more significant degree of popular political participation is more likely to come from forces for change within the system, under conditions of a non-threatening environment.

3. Another assumption implicit in present United States policy is that the most effective way to influence Soviet behavior in the directions we desire is by the unremitting application of pressure. As commonly stated, the argument runs that the Soviets only understand the language of force, that the Soviet leaders, being realists, will have to recognize the disadvantages of their situation and will capitulate or make concessions under pressure. It is no doubt true that, up to a point, the pressure that grows out of adverse prospects such as the Soviet leadership now faces can usefully discourage adventurous behavior, but it is also true that beyond a certain point externally-applied pressure can become counter-productive, if it puts the Soviet leadership in the position of being cornered with no way out except humiliation -- or bellicose defiance. There was wisdom in President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, creating a situation of strength in the area which obliged Khrushchev to withdraw, but allowing him a graceful way to do so. We are more likely to move Soviet behavior in the directions we would like to see by firm but non-bellicose measures, leaving room for the Soviets to protect their

legitimate interests in acceptable ways.

4. In the management of the military competition with the Soviet Union, our prevailing assumption appears to be that our security is best assured by seeking to regain a position of superiority. This traditional approach to security, carried over from the pre-nuclear era, can lead under present circumstances only to a continuing unregulated increase in the level of armaments on both sides and a decrease in security for both sides. Given the scale of destructiveness of nuclear weapons, it is not possible for either side to acquire a militarily-useful superiority. The only rational available alternative is a balance of stable weapons at more moderate levels to be achieved through arms control negotiations. It is often argued that arms control has failed, but the fact is that previous efforts in this direction have been constrained by political necessity to stop short of measures that would limit our planned military programs. What has been lacking has been a political leadership and a political constituency strong ~~enough and~~ committed enough to support a more rational management of the nuclear military competition. No one can say with assurance that the Soviet leadership would be enlightened enough to respond with equal rationality, but the United States cannot claim to have tested that possibility.

At an earlier point it was argued that there are strong incentives for the Soviet leadership to seek an easement in the heavy drains of its military sector, if such easement can be found on mutually-acceptable terms. But if the United States, instead of testing that proposition fairly, continues to force the pace in military technological innovation, there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union will keep pace with us, whatever the cost.

* * * * * * *

In sum, it seems apparent that the foregoing policies and assumptions, instead of leading toward greater security and a more tractable Soviet

Union, are pointing in the contrary direction. We are, in many ways, the strongest country in the world, but we do not appear to know how to use our strength wisely. Is there not a way of managing our relations with the Soviet Union more rationally?

V. An alternative policy for managing US-Soviet relations

First of all, to forestall misunderstandings, it should be made clear that the alternative policy discussed here is rooted within the broad center of the spectrum of American politics. It is not a "soft" policy; it is not based upon "liberal illusions," nor does it advocate weakness, or a return to the so-called "detente" of the 1970s. It begins with a question: given a realistic understanding of the nature of the Soviet system and of Soviet behavior, what responses on our part make sense in the light of our own best interests?

It accepts the necessity for strength and a military balance, but asks what kind of strength contributes to our security?

It makes a distinction between firmness and bellicosity.

It seeks to keep before the Soviet leadership a way out of their present situation that meshes their own enlightened self-interest and our own.

Above all, it gives primary emphasis to the most urgent problem in the relationship -- the rational management of the nuclear military competition.

No one can doubt that the Soviet system is authoritarian and repressive, and that the strong police bureaucracy within it behaves in a way that is repugnant to our values. Nor can anyone doubt that the Soviet Union sought, and seeks, to expand its power and influence wherever it thinks it can safely do so, or that its guiding purposes in international life are antithetical to our own. It has to be recognized at the outset that the relationship is a serious competitive one. What requires greater clarity of thought on our part is the question how to manage that competition so that it is less dangerous and less destructive to our interests and our values.

Clearly the primary objective of our policy in the immediate period ahead has to be to protect our security, our interests and our values in ways that reduce the danger of nuclear war, and to manage the competition at less destructive levels of tension.

If we are successful in this, it opens the way to a longer-term policy that should have an evolutionary purpose. It should be designed to encourage future generations of Soviet leaders to see that acting with restraint and responsibility, and enlarging the areas of genuine cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union would serve their own self-interest in the framework of the international system.

Two main and related imperatives flow from the implementation of these objectives. The first is to work toward a more stable and moderate level deterrent balance between the two countries. The second is to work toward a political relationship which makes these arrangements on the military plane possible, and which also makes possible the forestalling or safe management of crisis situations. We should have ever-present in our consciousness in the way we address these two imperatives that our long-term purpose is to encourage the relationship to evolve in a less dangerous direction.

What follows is offered as guidelines to an alternative policy and does not attempt, within the limited compass of this paper, to flesh out the detailed implementation.

1. Managing the military competition.

It might not have been predicted several years ago that the most troublesome issue in the arms control negotiations would become the prospect of a large-scale effort to develop space-based systems intended to defend the area of the United States from ballistic-missile attack. Appealing as the prospect might be, the practical consequence of its introduction into the scene has been seriously damaging to prospects for progress toward arms control in exchange for dubious prospects for realizing its stated purpose.

Once it is understood that the proposed defense-dominant strategy is not feasible, and that our persistent commitment to it will result in a destabilizing and enormously costly turn in the military competition, we should return to the realization that our security is better assured by a deterrent balance of offensive weapons, and our efforts should be directed to make that balance as stable and survivable as possible, at more moderate levels.

It is likely that some level of continuing research on strategic defense will be supported, as in the past. That level has been determined in the past by the requirement to protect the United States against the possibility of a break-out by the Soviet Union, and this has been judged adequate and non-threatening. It is possible that further research on ground-based terminal defense may reach the point at which the United States would wish to discuss the possibility with the Soviet Union of limited programs to offer some defense of some missile sites. This could be done within the framework of the SALT I agreement, and it need not have the destabilizing consequence of the presently-proposed Strategic Defense Initiative program, if it is made clear that there will not be flight-testing or deployment of components of the boost-phase elements of the SDI program, and that we are prepared to move seriously toward a ban on anti-satellite weapons, which would be even more important to us than to the Soviet Union.

In the absence of such limiting measures on the SDI program, there can be no doubt but that the Soviet Union will do what we would do if we were in their situation: launch intensive programs for counter-measures, develop hardened and rapid-burn ballistic missiles and increase their numbers as well as the numbers of missile warheads, expand cruise missiles and bombers, and expand their own research on strategic defense. Under these circumstances, they would not be receptive to proposals for a reduction in their offensive missiles.

The alternative, if we return to the recognition that our security is best assured by a stable and survivable retaliatory balance at more moderate levels, would be to make serious efforts to negotiate toward a comprehensive agreement that would, through a series of modest steps, reduce warheads and delivery vehicles in all categories, including missiles, bombers and submarines, so as to balance equitably the asymmetrical force structures of the two sides. Meanwhile, in our own modernization program, we should emphasize survivability and stability of systems as a matter of our own interest and to avoid giving plausible substance to Soviet apprehensions that we seek to acquire a first-strike capability.

One bar that would have to be overcome is the shibboleth held by some that it is against our interest to consider the negotiability of our proposals. The effect of not doing so is to advance positions so transparently one-sided that they are certain to be rejected, an outcome that is not unwelcome to those who, while professing to support arms control negotiations, in fact regard them as disadvantageous.

Another and more fundamental requirement is a more rational process of decision-making on defense policy, one that looks beyond the immediate present to the adverse effects proposed systems may have on our own security, as we did not do in the case of the multiple warhead missiles. This requires improved institutional provision for articulating an overarching national interest, against the parochial interests and pressures that now drive decisions on weapons procurement and defense policy generally.

2. Managing the political competition.

The essential first step in managing the political competition in the Third World is for the United States to give greater emphasis to the local factors involved in Third World upheavals, and to recognize that the Soviet Union is a complicating factor rather than a prime cause of these eruptions. Because of our ignorance of foreign political cultures and languages, we have not understood the local sources that have generated protest movements in the Third World. We have consigned all such protest movements indiscriminately to the Soviet camp, without regard to their desire to avoid such a dependency. We have tended to treat local conflicts mainly as counters in the East-West competition. This has been our problem from Vietnam to Iran to Central America today, and the effect has been to make our responses ineffective, to polarize local conflict situations between equally unsavory extremes between which only military solutions are possible. We can compete effectively with the Soviet Union in the Third World. We have many advantages in that competition, but we have to overcome our parochialism and ignorance to understand the local sources of turbulence and upheavals throughout the Third World, and to give appropriate and constructive attention to local economic and political conditions.

Regional conventional military capabilities may be required in some instances to guard against military intervention by the Soviet Union, but the United States should accept for itself, as it would ask of the Soviet Union, restraint against intervention by force to produce or prevent political change in the Third World. The United States should not regard it as essential to our security to prevent every increase of Soviet presence, provided that it did not threaten areas of vital interest to the United States or that it not be of such a magnitude as to threaten the independence of other countries. Containment need not be interpreted to mean that the Soviet Union should be prevented from peaceful expansion of its economic or political relations in non-threatening ways.

Although it has not been productive to seek agreement on abstract formulas for limiting the political competition, nor across-the-board "rules of conduct," it may be more productive to seek tacit or explicitly agreed limits on levels and means of intervention in conflicted areas on a region-by-region basis, taking account of the relative intensity of interest of the two sides in particular areas, with the aim of reducing the risk of escalation. In a number of instances, this has been done through diplomatic channels, and the experience can be generalized through mechanisms established to forestall, manage or localize regional crisis situations.

In consonance with our longer-range objectives, it should be part of our purpose to persuade the Soviet Union that its self-interest requires acceptance of and support for the international system, but this would require that the United States recognize more clearly than it has done that the strengthening of the international system is also of cardinal importance to our own security and interests. This means that we should not be tempted, in our competition with the Soviet Union, to violate international law or to flout the authority of such international institutions as the World Court.

The political competition with the Soviet Union also involves the industrialized nations. Our relations with the industrial democratic nations should be regarded as the vital central nucleus of shared democratic values and the rule of law in the international system, and should be managed with attentive concern for our respective interests. This requires close consultation to harmonize our respective security, foreign policy and economic interests. It has been all too easy to react with irascibility to the internal political and economic strains of our partners and the limitations they impose on their policies, but this manifestation of our currently ascendant nationalism is short-sighted and would deprive us of the central core of support for democratic values in the world. Such gains as the Soviet Union has made among the industrialized nations, in Western Europe and Japan -- and they have not been notable -- have resulted more from the shortcomings of our own policy than from Soviet adroitness.

3. Bilateral aspects of the relationship.

Both constraints and incentives are required to influence the movement of Soviet conduct in desired directions.

Among the incentives, the most important instrument available to the United States is the prospect of an increased level of trade between the two countries. We observed during the period leading up to the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in 1971, when the matrix of Soviet political strategy for the recent period was established, how much the support for a reduced-tension policy flowed from domestic economic needs. There can be no difference on the point that items of direct military application should not enter into such trade. But a prudent measure of trade, projected to increase over time in the absence of egregious Soviet adventurism, can limit the risks of strengthening military capabilities while providing at least marginal constraints on foreign policy adventurism that would jeopardize such trade.

Academic exchanges, properly managed, have resulted in a quantum leap in the depth of Soviet studies in the United States, giving us insights into the range of Soviet political life not reflected in its printed materials. Some cooperative programs, along the lines of the 11 bilateral commissions set up in 1972-73 concerned with health, agriculture, the environment, etc., although marginal in their effects upon the central core of the relationship, give expression to the existence of common interests in some limited areas and to the possibility of an expansion of these areas of cooperation if and when the relationship moves in more productive directions.

It should be added that the conduct of our bilateral relations requires more adequate diplomatic communications, not only at the top levels of government, but also in the day-to-day conduct of business. Management of the competitive relationship means that even during times of tension -- and perhaps particularly during times of tension -- adversary communication can help to establish boundaries within which competitive or conflicted situations can work themselves out with less risk of escalation that may not be wanted by either side, but that can result from loss of control or miscalculation. In the conduct of these diplomatic communications, the tone is of the essence. Firmness and clarity in stating and defending our interests does not preclude civility, whereas posturing for domestic audiences reduces these communications to an exercise in propaganda, to which the Soviets are all too ready to respond in kind.

4. Longer-term considerations.

We cannot predict what choices present or future leaders of the Soviet Union may make, but it is apparent that a new generation of leaders will take over the levers of power in the foreseeable future, and that they will be examining their options for changes in their domestic and foreign policies.

While these choices are mainly in their hands, they will be influenced by their view of our policies in considering the range of choices open to them. It should be our purpose to keep open the option that if they, in their own self-interest, move toward greater restraint and responsibility in the military and the political competition, we are prepared to accept a more productive and less dangerous relationship. We should make it clear that we regard it in our interest as well as theirs for the Soviet Union to be more deeply involved in the world economy, and to participate in and support the international system as a bulwark against international anarchy and violence.

It may be a long while before the Soviet Union is prepared to move in this direction, but we should with patience and firmness make it clear that we are not closing the door on that option.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Shulman.

We will proceed with questions now. Senator Pell, I would be happy to yield to you for the first question.

Senator PELL. I have no questions at this point, but I just want to add my voice to yours in welcoming Senator Kerry to our committee. I remember a few years ago when he was a witness, I said I hoped very much indeed and expected that he would be joining our body before too many years went by. Lo and behold, he has not only joined our body, but he has joined our committee as well, so we are very happy to have him.

I would defer to the other members for questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cranston has joined us. Gentlemen, we have 20 minutes before we will recess. Let me just ask if there are members who have urgent questions. The Chair would be pleased to go out of order today to make certain that those questions are raised immediately, and then in a more leisurely way we can proceed at another time.

Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. I have a brief question. If any of the gentlemen could answer it, or perhaps all of them comment on it, I would appreciate it.

In view of the comments that you have made concerning the difficulty in creating an optimistic attitude toward a negotiated result, do you feel that such difficulties will continue to affect Soviet grain purchases and other purchases from our country? Will there still be a quid pro quo, to some degree, concerning our political relationship vis-a-vis our ability to do business with the Soviet Union?

Will they punish us, for instance, in continuing to expand Argentine wheat purchases rather than U.S. wheat purchases, based on the fact that politically we have not had the success we seek?

Mr. SHULMAN. May I respond, Senator?

Senator ZORINSKY. Please.

Mr. SHULMAN. Sir, I think they will continue to make purchases, but I do not think there is much of a quid pro quo in it. The reason for that is it is very clear to them that the reason our Government is making this grain available is primarily because of domestic internal considerations. That does not give us much leverage on them.

Senator ZORINSKY Thank you.

Mr. PIPES. I would say that we have both decided to depoliticize grain purchases. Our agreements with them now are such that short of world war III I think we are bound to continue supplying them with grain.

As Mr. Shulman said, we sell it because it is advantageous economically. They buy because it is advantageous economically. They like buying from us. Our grain is good and clean, and deliveries reliable. We are the best market, so I think that will continue regardless of how relations are.

Of course, the industrial sales and so on is another matter. There I think we will be deeply affected by our relationship.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, there is clearly an intriguing question that arises from Mr. Pipes' testimony, that the strategic defense initiative might lead to real difficulty in arms control negotiations in the short run but will revolutionize the relationship, I think to use his words, in the long run to our advantage.

Mr. Shulman has also indicated that he sees difficulties in the short run. As a matter of fact, our position, as he characterized it, is incompatible altogether with possibilities for progress with the Soviet position. I would like to ask the three of you this. You are all somewhat pessimistic about the forthcoming negotiations for various reasons. But is there agreement that it would be in our best interest, should the strategic defense initiative research appear promising, to proceed with SDI even in view of the possibility that for several years to come we would have tension and lack of progress in arms control?

The three of you seem to agree that given the lay of the land, many problems develop in other aspects relationship—economic, cultural, political—because of the difficulties at the arms control level.

Mr. Shulman, would you commence?

Mr. SHULMAN. Yes, sir. I believe that the strategic defense initiative is not in our interest. I think it will create not only short-term difficulties but long-term difficulties from the point of view of our security.

In the first instance, as unaccustomedly Mr. Pipes and I agree, this is going to be an impairment to the present negotiations. It is very clear from the Soviet point of view that if we go forward with the SDI as it is now projected they are clearly not going to be receptive to any proposal for reducing their offensive missiles because a logical response on their part to the SDI, as projected, is what we would do if we were in their shoes, which is to add on additional warheads, additional offensive missiles, to add on a program for countermeasures to defeat the program, and to build other kinds of systems in greater numbers, the cruise missiles, bombers, and so on.

So it is not going to make them receptive to any of the other parts of our proposal dealing particularly with START.

Now there are elements of the space-based defense that might be looked at with greater refinement, but this is different from the SDI as projected. It is conceivable that some level of research into space would make sense. We are having somewhere around $1.4 billion in research on space-related matters.

The primary function of that has been to protect us against the possibility of a Soviet breakthrough and General Lew Allen, when he was chief of the Air Staff, testified that it was adequate for that purpose and it was not regarded at that point as threatening by the Soviet Union.

The administration is now asking for $3.7 billion and the indication is that primary emphasis will go on the boost phase of the program, and that testing will be ready in perhaps 2 years. This morning's paper suggests 2 years; at other times it is 3 years.

Now the problem there is if we go ahead at that level and in that kind of research then it is quite clear that the Soviets will respond in the way that I have indicated. Now as a practical matter I imagine that the Congress will come to rest somewhere between those two figures, between the $1.5 billion or $1.4 billion that we have had, and the $3.7 billion that the administration has now requested.

And there will be a question of judgment then how threatening that is. What does it mean? If we were to concentrate at reasonable levels of research—and I think everybody agrees some research should go forward—if we were to concentrate on the terminal phase and if it should be that we would reach a point where it would seem wise to explore with the Russians the possibility of a defense of some missile sites, that could go forward.

It would be consistent with the SALT I Treaty and there might even be a reason why the Soviets would have an interest in a hard point defense under those circumstances. So that part of the program could be made consistent with our interest in stability and in progress.

But if we go forward, on the other hand, with a very high level of the proposed research closer to the $3.7 billion point, and if that includes not only the terminal phase but the midcourse phase also, and particularly the boost phase, then that inevitably will produce a response on the Soviet side.

The main reason why I think that is not in our interest is if we go in that direction what it means is both sides are now going to be moving ahead with the systems that are now in preparation, both in the Soviet Union and here, the new missiles, new bombers, new submarines, new cruise missiles, at very high levels, greater accuracy, greater range, and the effect is that our security and their security is going to be reduced at an enormous cost, and the costs are astronomical now, and will deflect from other programs as well.

But at enormous cost what we are going to purchase is reduced security.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pipes, did you have a thought about that?

Mr. PIPES. I have a slightly different point of view on the subject. To answer your first question, Mr. Chairman, I think that arms control is a means, not an end, and if arms control is temporarily upset by this program, other things being of merit, this is not in itself bad.

I think the strategic defense initiative as now envisaged is essential for two reasons. One is that the Soviet Union has a commanding lead in offensive weapons. It is widening that lead. It is now experimenting with a fifth generation of ICBM's. We are just experimenting with the fourth, and even that is in doubt. There is disturbing progress being made by the Russians in ASW [antisubmarine warfare], as well as in defense.

Second, the strategic defense initiative is the only thing that promises some kind of light at the end of the tunnel. It is the only thing that will give us hope that in the 21st century perhaps we will not have these weapons hanging over our heads.

It is my impression that when all three layers are deployed it will be virtually impossible for any attacker to significantly overcome the defenses. That is, it does not matter how much the Russians increase the number of missiles and warheads—short of reaching some simply astronomical and impractical number, they cannot plan any coherent attack on hard targets.

Terminal defense alone, as Mr. Shulman proposes, would be, I think, deleterious. It is something I think the Russians already are experimenting with and they would settle for if they had to. Terminal defenses would not stop very many of the incoming missiles, and if we confined ourselves to that it is almost certain we would not be allowed to proceed with the two other layers, including the space layer, which are the most promising, where the technology is the most advanced.

Ambassador **Eagleburger**. Mr. Chairman, now you see why I am sitting in the middle. I am certainly less pessimistic about the arms control negotiations about to begin than I think either of my colleagues is. At least at this point it seems to me a case not proven.

We need to get back to talking about what we think is right before we decide whether we have to adjust what we think is right to negotiating tactics. The Soviets have said many times before that certain things were unacceptable. They walked away from the arms control negotiating table within the last year with certain preconditions stated before they would return.

As I said earlier, they are now back at the table, those preconditions not having been met. It is clear that the Soviets do not like the SDI. It is, in my judgment, clearly one of the overwhelming reasons that they came back to the table. It is not yet proved, however, that you cannot reach some sort of arms control agreement having to do with strategic weapons or with the intermediate range nuclear weapons in the absence of some agreement on SDI.

We also have to ask ourselves, for example, when the Soviets say if the INF deployments continue there can be no agreement, why did we decide to put those weapons into Europe in the first place. We decided to do so in response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20's.

So let's get back to some first causes here, and if the Soviets say they are not prepared to proceed on the INF issue unless we stop the deployments in Western Europe, so be it, until they are prepared to deal with the question of SS-20's deployed or aimed at Europe.

On the SDI issue itself, a lot more has to be debated and discussed before any of us can make reasonable judgments. I tend, at this point, to be more on the Pipes side of the argument than on the Shulman side in the sense that it seems to me that if the debate in this country over the course of the last several years about nuclear weapons has proved nothing else, it begins to make me at least wonder whether in this democracy of ours over the course of any long period of time we can continue to defend the concept of piling one new offensive nuclear system on top of another. I do not see any alternative to beginning to look at other possibilities of finding ways off the treadmill.

Now I am not sure that SDI is it, but I am sure that there needs to be a great deal more discussion as to technical feasibility, et cetera. All of us need to keep the concept in mind, with all of the problems that I concede to you it can create in terms of Soviet response, in the sense that I do believe we cannot much longer defend to the body politic in this country and indeed probably in Western Europe the concept of one new nuclear system on top of another, despite the fact that that concept of deterrence has served us well for the last 40 years.

And as we debate SDI we need to be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water; we need to remember that the deterrent concept we have had for the last 40 years has worked, that SDI under the best of circumstances is some years away, and that therefore we have to get from now to then, even if we decide to proceed with the SDI.

Because the Soviets have said we will not do X unless you do Y does not lead me to decide that what goes on in Geneva in the course of the next months is hopeless. I do not believe that yet, and I am inclined to think that the Soviets have, as all three of us have said, some very compelling reasons to try to reach some agreements.

We ought to go to Geneva having decided what we think is right and see if we can reach an agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Let me ask members of the committee how many would wish to return at 12 noon or shortly thereafter, as we might arrange it, to have a round of questioning with the witnesses? Are there members who would be able to do that in their schedules today at noontime?

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd, would you like to come back at noon?

Senator DODD. I may be the only one, Mr. Chairman. If we can do it, I would like to do it.

Senator MATHIAS. How do the witnesses feel about that?

Mr. SHULMAN. Sure. We would be glad to do that.

Ambassador EAGLEBURGER. As always, Senator, we are at your disposal.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will return, then, at noon or as shortly thereafter as we can, to commence the hearing. I am going to ask Senator Dodd, as the next ranking member who has not asked a question today, to proceed with his questioning for 5 minutes. At 10:30 we will recess for Mrs. Thatcher's appearance until noontime. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am delighted to see our three witnesses here today. Larry, I am particularly delighted to see you back in Washington.

Much of the discussion has been focused on arms control issues. I would like to move to some of the other foreign policy areas where there have been numerous references to Soviet involvement, and ask all three of you to comment on the level of that involvement, and how significant it may be.

I will turn first to Central America. As Soviet specialists, I wonder if you might share with the committee what role you believe the Soviets are playing, how significant that role is, particularly with regard to Nicaragua and El Salvador? How dependent are the insurgents in El Salvador on Soviet assistance and help; how deeply entwined is the present Government of Nicaragua with the Soviet Union? To what extent do you see the Sandinista government being dependent upon Soviet policy considerations in other parts of the world?

Let me end it there and ask all three of you to respond.

Mr. **Shulman**. Senator, as a general proposition, I think it is the case that the sources of political upheaval in Central America, as in other parts of the world, are primarily local in origin, and I believe the Soviet Union is a complicating factor, rather than a prime cause; that its presence is not of such a substantial order that it can be regarded as the primary source of disturbance; that even if there were—and I do not know what the actual level of the flow of weapons may be, and I am not a specialist in Central American politics—but my impression is that this is a secondary consideration and this is not the heart of the problem; that even if the flow of Soviet weapons to the area were zero, we would still have serious political problems in the area.

It is generally true, I believe, in most parts of the world, that the Soviet Union has to be regarded as a complicating factor, rather than a prime cause of local political upheavals.

The fact that we do not really understand the local cultures, local history, local languages adequately, makes us regard most of these local situations in East-West competitive terms when, in fact, in order to address them effectively we ought to understand better than we do the local factors.

That is, I think, particularly the case in Central America today.

Senator **Dodd**. Thank you.

Ambassador **Eagleburger**. Senator, I said in my opening statement that I thought in dealing with the Soviet Union over the next 4 or 5 years we might well discover that the problems of dealing with instabilities around the world, whether it is the debt problem, developing nations, or indeed Nicaragua, are going to be more important to the management of the relationship with the Soviet Union than some of the bilateral issues we will be dealing with. In the last analysis, the United States and the Soviets, recognizing that war and peace rest in our hands, will both tend to be reasonably careful in the way we deal with each other; it is these other areas around the world that may prove to be the points of both conflict and potentially also, if we are wise, the points against which we can put some pressure on the Soviets.

To get off Nicaragua for just a moment, I happen to believe deeply that the way in which we deal with economic development in the developing world is clearly an area where, if we are wise—and I am not at all sure we will be—but if we are wise, we can begin to put pressure on the Soviets by bringing Mozambique, Angola, any number of countries, to a different economic system, a different relationship with the West.

It also applies to Nicaragua, it seems to me. I have great difficulty with making a distinction between the agreement that it is primarily a local issue, and the Soviets play on the edges of it; or, conversely, it is basically an East-West issue and we must deal with it in that context.

I think both are relevant to the Nicaraguan case. I would not dispute for a minute that the problems of Nicaragua and Central America are essentially problems of the area itself, whether it be of unequal distribution of income, political oppression, or whatever.

Having said that, I am equally convinced that the issues in Central America would be far more easily dealt with on our part, were it not for the fact that the Soviet Union and Cuba, which is clearly acting as a Soviet surrogate, were deeply involved in Nicaragua and had supplied tons of arms to the Nicaraguans.

That is not to say there aren't social, economic, and political issues in Central America that need to be dealt with. It is to say that the Soviet Union plays in that game and therefore we have to deal with the issue of Nicaragua, both as an East-West issue and as a local issue.

The **Chairman**. I regret that before Mr. Pipes gives his answer, I must intrude. If you will hold that answer, Mr. Pipes, until noon, we would appreciate it.

Senator **Mathias**. Mr. Chairman, would you suspend the gavel for just a moment? I will not be able to get back at noon.

The **Chairman**. Senator Mathias.

Senator **Mathias**. I did use part of the Lincoln Day recess to reflect on Lincoln and on the question of how Lincoln viewed Russia.

It caused me a considerable amount of regret and unhappiness to reflect that Russia was a very close friend of the United States during the Civil War period. In the middle of the Civil War, Secretary Seward said that Russia was the preferred friend of the United States, favored above all other European powers.

How different the scene is today and how different the scene was as I viewed it in Moscow 2 weeks ago. It was apparent to me then that the scars of the last dozen years—and I would agree with Mr. Shulman, it has been about a dozen years, not just 4 or 5—are very visible. They are still very raw, very bare, and we have a hard road ahead of us, one that is going to require a great deal of patience as well as a great deal of firmness.

Mr. Chairman, I don't want to detain the committee, but I wanted to thank Professor Pipes, Secretary Eagleburger, and Mr. Shulman for being with us.

I regret very much I will not be able to return at noon.

The **Chairman**. We share that appreciation and let the record show that at least 11 Senators have already participated in the hearing, and others will be back at noon.

We are recessed until noon.

[Whereupon, at 10:34 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at noon, this same day.]

The **Chairman**. This hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee has been resumed. I have been advised that there has been a very lively visit with witnesses by the staff during the last hour and a half.

Ambassador **Eagleburger**. We are all talked out, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Well, our procedures will be invigorated, as they usually are, by word that comes to us from our loyal staff members.

But now the committee indeed is reassembled, and I would like to call upon Senator Evans for his questioning. By consent, we will have a limit of 10 minutes to the questions. And since at the moment there are only two of us, we will not be constrained in due course if you have additional questions.

Senator Evans.

Senator **Evans**. I may not even take the full 10 minutes, Mr. Chairman. I might give some time back to you.

Mr. Pipes, I believe you indicated your feeling, or you talked about China and the course we have followed in our relationship with China, and suggested, I believe, that our relationships with the Soviet Union could follow the same course.

Is that essentially what I heard you say?

Mr. PIPES. Yes. I assume that the Soviet Union would have to follow a similar course of internal reforms that China has adopted, and for the same reasons.

Senator EVANS. I have not recently visited either nation. In fact, it goes back about 8 or 10 years since the last time I have had a real opportunity to spend a significant amount of time in each country.

It seemed to me then that traditions, people, circumstances, history, all of the elements that go into making up the psyche of the people are so different that you couldn't easily translate what happens in China to what is remotely possible in the Soviet Union.

Is that off base?

Mr. PIPES. No, that is true. They have very different cultures. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental similarity deriving from the fact that both countries were violently forced into a Stalinst straitjacket and adopted the Stalinist political system, Stalinist ideology, the Stalinist economic system, and the Stalinist social system.

That system is transferrable from country to country. Granted, it assumes somewhat different forms elsewhere, but once a country goes Communist, it becomes very much like any other Communist country.

My argument rests on the premise that China began to evolve toward different forms, which had all these repercussions on foreign policy, not because of some deep cultural factors making for it, but because the Chinese leadership realized that if it continued along the road indicated by Stalin and Mao, it faced a downhill course.

I was in China twice—in 1978 and again last June. In each case there was an enormous amount of self-criticism, people telling you that their economy was no good. I spent a day with a Chinese regiment and the political commissar told me afterward, this regiment is good for nothing because we don't have the equipment, and so on.

This was indicative to me of a need to change the system, and therefore foreign policy, because the system was failing.

Senator EVANS. I heard the same thing in China, including some quite candid observations that we are not very far along in economic development in this area or that, or we have a lot to learn, comments which I never heard in the Soviet Union. The comments I heard in the Soviet Union were that everything was invented here, everything here came first, et cetera.

It seems to me while we might like to see that parallel development, it didn't take very long, really, comparatively in China. It seems to me it hasn't shown very many signs of occurring yet, at least in the Soviet Union.

Mr. PIPES. It is a striking fact that in China everybody in a position of power or authority would feel free to criticize the system and say how far behind they are, and no one in Russia would ever do that. That is the cultural difference you alluded to, Senator.

But the objective factors are the same in both cases and there is a great deal of talk in the Soviet Union, for example, much of which is leaked to us and also appears in journals, stressing the imperative need for economic reform. And implicit in it is a serious cutback in military expenditures. They cannot talk in the Soviet Union freely on cutting back on military expenditures, but it is clearly implicit.

Senator EVANS. Would you suggest that there is also a parallel movement in the Soviet Union to that which apparently is occurring in China toward a mixed economy of capitalism or free enterprise? Or is that beyond Soviet thinking at the moment?

Mr. PIPES. I think you cannot improve a Communist economy without giving at least a certain amount of free play to private enterprise.

I think that China is heading, and Russia probably would have to eventually, toward a mixed economy where the government controls heavy industry and transports, mining, energy resources, and so on, and leaves most of the consumer sector, including food and the services to private enterprise.

In China, food has really been turned over to private enterprise to a large extent.

Senator EVANS. Your description made me smile because it sounds a lot like Britain under the Labor Government. [Laughter.]

Would there be a comment on that same question from either Ambassador Eagleburger or Mr. Shulman?

Mr. SHULMAN. Senator, Professor Pipes and I are old friends, but we disagree about many things. And I think perhaps this goes to the most central disagreement that we have.

The line of argument that Professor Pipes followed this morning was that the Soviet Union is so inherently aggressive by virtue of the nature of the system that the only thing we can do about it is to bring pressure to reform, to change the nature of the system, and thereby become less aggressive.

He then went on to argue that we ought to follow the parallel course that we have with China to bring about the kind of policy the Chinese now have.

Now, it seems to me it is wrong on several counts. First of all, I don't want to be understood as defending Soviet policy. I think it is aggressive and I think it is expansionist. But I think it has been possible for us to modify Soviet behavior in the past. Essentially containment has worked where we have applied it, and I don't think we have to change the Soviet system in a fundamental way in order to have less dangerous relations with them.

Second, there has been an interesting change in Chinese policy, but it didn't come about in that way. It wasn't because we applied the pressure on the Chinese and forced them to change. The changes that came about came about internally as a result of the workings of Chinese politics. They saw that the only rational course for them was to move in the direction of the policy that they are now following, that involves opening up some sectors of the economy to the private sector and decentralizing in some measure, allowing a more realistic price system and so on.

I think it is quite possible that the way the Chinese are going is the way the Russians may find themselves obliged to go. There are people in the Soviet Union who talk in these terms, but if they do it won't be because we force them to do it. It will be because the people who advocate that kind of reform will be strong enough politically to move in that direction.

The fundamental problem that concerns me on the Soviet side is if we follow the line of analysis that Professor Pipes follows, then it becomes the major objective of American policy to compel fundamental changes in the Soviet system.

I think that way lies disaster for us. In the first place, I don't think we can do it. By committing ourselves to that objective means that we will probably intensify the worst aspects of the Soviet regime.

It is not the way in which change came about in China, and it is not the way I think change is going to come about in the Soviet Union, if it comes.

Ambassador EAGLEBURGER. Mr. Chairman, may I comment, too?

Senator EVANS. Yes, please. And, Mr. Eagleburger, maybe you could expand your comments to the specific question I had relating to East European countries. It seems to me, that some and perhaps most of those countries, have tried with varying success to apply one or another parts of a mixed economy.

Can we do anything or provide any incentive to those East European countries to try this, or must they, as has been suggested, do it on their own?

Ambassador EAGLEBURGER. Senator, I will get to that, too. But I did want to comment on the Chinese question for just a minute. It is not usual that I find myself disagreeing with Mr. Shulman or Mr. Pipes, I guess. So I am in trouble here, because I am going to have an elegant variation on the Shulman theme. [Laughter.]

I would recommend you look at the latest issue of "The Economist" precisely on this question of China as a model for change in the Soviet Union. The editorial makes what I think is a very good point, which is that we would be wrong to draw too much from the Chinese experience for several reasons, one of which is that the Soviet bureaucracy has settled in over 60 years. The Chinese have had a good bit less than the 60 years, have gone through a cultural revolution which turned the bureaucracy upside down, and so the structures are quite different.

The Economist is, as am I, relatively pessimistic about the ability of the Soviet Union to reform itself, except perhaps over a very long period of time. I think we need therefore to look at what Mr. Pipes says about how the Soviets may develop with a great deal of caution, because—and it leads to the point I think Mr. Shulman has already made—the conclusion Mr. Pipes draws from this is, we ought to force the Soviets into change by denying them technology, et cetera.

I would certainly agree with regard to high technology, difficult as that is to define. We need to be as difficult to deal with on that subject as we can be. But at other levels of exchange, which I think Mr. Pipes would argue should be cut off, and credits which he specifically mentioned, here I have some problems that come from two directions.

First of all, control of technology is a boat that is leaky, in the sense that our allies are going to deal with the Soviets on credits and on trade, whether we like it or not. I do not believe we could stop them from doing so without such a cost to the alliance that it simply is not worth it. So it is going to happen.

And it would seem to me, as well, that if we are to regularize the relationship with the Soviets at all, there are some things we ought to be prepared to do. We are now clearly prepared to sell grain to them, and I have no problem with that.

It seems to me that normal commercial relationships probably give us more benefit than they do the Soviets. But I emphasize the word "normal." There are some things I would very clearly not be prepared to do, and one of them is with regard to high technology transfer.

So, again, my point is, I think I agree with Mr. Shulman. We cannot drive the Soviets to reform in the Chinese model by cutting ourselves off from them as completely as Mr. Pipes would recommend.

Having said that, to come to your Eastern European question briefly, again it seems to me this is an example of the dilemma we always have in trying to deal with the Soviet Union because, on the one hand, the United States certainly cannot accept for all time that Eastern Europe must be dominated by the Soviet Union; that its political definition, its development, political and economic, must be at the sufferance of the Soviets.

On the other hand, I don't know of anybody who would argue that an immediate attempt to break the ties between the Soviets and Eastern Europe would be anything but causus beli—potentially the cause of world war III.

We have to recognize, whether we like it or not, that the Soviet Union will react to what goes on in Eastern Europe in ways that could be extremely dangerous unless we play the game with some finesse. We have tried to play that game that way over the course of more than the last decade and more than one administration. It is called the policy of differentiation.

We try to deal with Eastern European countries in a differentiated way. Hungary, for example, is again in the process of trying to liberalize its internal system. I think that is worthy of some support from us, despite the fact it is a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact, despite the fact that when it comes to any number of international issues, we find the Hungarians extremely difficult to deal with.

Romania, on the other hand, as Stalinist a system as you can find internally, gives the Soviets certain problems because of its independent foreign policy. That is worth supporting up to a point, though we may not like the activities of the regime internally.

We have to play that game, recognizing that it is a long-term issue. It is something that can't be settled now. And, in fact, it would be dangerous were we to try to settle it quickly.

We should do what we can over time to provide the Eastern Europeans with a sense that there are alternatives. And when they are prepared to set the pace, we ought to be prepared to try to help them out where we can.

Senator EVANS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Evans.

When we left our previous hearing, we were ready for Mr. Pipes to respond to Senator Dodd's question. So I will recognize Senator Dodd again for a full 10-minute period and would ask if he would like to hear Mr. Pipes' response, if he can remember the question. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. If I can remember the question, that is even more important.

Mr. PIPES. I remember it.

Senator DODD. You remember it. I think it had to do with Nicaragua and El Salvador.

Mr. PIPES. Yes, it did.

Well, there are two things that one has to say about this. One is that my impression is that the Soviet Union initially did not wish to get itself involved in Communist activities in Central and Latin America, and this is for two reasons.

The one main reason was it felt the United States is extremely sensitive to developments in this area and that any Communist movement here beyond Cuba may lead to violent U.S. actions and to a deterioration of United States/Soviet relations.

The other reason was that they didn't see their prospects as being very glorious, particularly after the fiasco of Che Guevara and similar attempts. It was largely on a Cuban initiative, because Castro wants to carve out his own sphere of influence, that these various ventures were undertaken. Castro played a dominant role in Nicaragua. He played a dominant role in Grenada as well.

The Russians were pulled in, and particularly after the invasion of Afghanistan, when we began to impose serious sanctions, they decided to involve themselves there, in part to cause us trouble and in part to have maybe something to trade off.

Senator DODD. May I interrupt you for one moment? My minority leader is on the phone and I apologize. I will leave for just 2 minutes and come right back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask a question or two in your absence. Please go ahead.

Let me raise the question that Senator Evans, it seemed to me, was initiating. Let us say, hypothetically, that both Mr. Shulman and Mr. Pipes are correct in a sense, that the Soviet leadership, as does the leadership in many dictatorial regimes, tries to perpetuate itself, but perhaps through a new leader or set of leaders that seek to make their economy more efficient.

Is it possible that the Soviet Union can develop sufficient economic efficiency to really be able to meet the challenge of the United States in the intermediate run or the long run? Granted, that some might have questions about our efficiency and our rate of growth, but we have had a pretty good run at it for a while, and the degree of strength, economically, of our country appears to be growing and is likely to continue under current policies, I would think.

How can the Soviets hope to match that under the current system? And if they cannot, and all of you have testified that they have some problems, is it possible that they can modify their system sufficiently to be competitive economically? And if they should do so, would this dilute their warlike, aggressive tendencies in the process?

In other words, if they become more market oriented, more capitalistic, more rational in that respect, is it possible for them to continue to exhibit the type of tendencies at least that we have condemned as aggressive and that Mr. Pipes has suggested are almost inevitable?

Looking over the next 20 years, is there a hopeful possibility of evolution?

Mr. Shulman, would you have a go at trying to "blue sky" that a little and see where we might head?

Mr. **Shulman**. I would be glad to, Senator. And it is a useful question to explore, even though we can only conjecture some of the answers to it.

There are both forces for change and also powerful resistances to change in the Soviet situation. It is very difficult to tell how it is going to work out. Certainly, if it does produce the kind of changes you are talking about, it is going to take a very long time.

In the Western literature on the Soviet Union, in the Western press, there isn't a great deal of attention to some of the pressures for change within the system. For example, if you get the journals published by the economic institutes out of Novosibirsk, I think it would surprise you to see the radicalness of some of the proposals that are made for reorganizing the Soviet economy. And they go very far. Some of them go in the direction of the Chinese, some of them go beyond that in terms of decentralization, use of market forces incentive, a more realistic pricing system, and so on.

Now, at the moment, there isn't much chance of those being enacted. The resistance to change is very strong. There is an entrenched bureaucracy. The party at the regional level and in the economic apparatus are, for the most part, people who love their perks and are in fear of being made obsolete by new-fangled ways of doing things, and resist it.

And, moreover, I think it should be said that the population as a whole is pretty conservative about it. It is very interesting. During the period of Andropov, when he was putting people in jail for taking time off from work for drunkenness and so on, there was a general support when it comes to putting pressure on other people, so that when you go to the store, the clerk is there, instead of at the hairdresser or at the Turkish bath.

But, on the other hand, if it applies to you, no, I would guess, just as an impressionistic thing, that if you put a poll to the Soviet people and they said would you rather have an efficient society, but it meant you would have to work every day and be there all day and work hard, or would you rather have things go on as they are, I think most people would say let's let them go on as they are.

So the environment is not very conducive to the introduction of efficiency, rationalization, or modernization that would make sense. But it is hard to guess.

Andropov looked as if he was on the way to doing some things about it, and if he had had long enough, or had consolidated his strength, it is conceivable he might have introduced a measure of rationality in the system, but we do not know what lies ahead.

It certainly at best will take a very long time, because it would take a political leadership that was strong enough and that could consolidate its position that was able to take on all of the resistances in the regional party sectors, the economic bureaucracy, the military, the police, and everybody else. That is a formidable job.

But it is conceivable that they could make the system function more rationally than it does. Now, in order to create incentives in the system so that people will take initiative and will introduce innovations, it would have to change pretty substantially to do it, and it would have to be a lot less centralized than it is.

If you make the most optimistic projections about that and say in 20 years that they do all that is possible, I think the answer is, they still would not be in a position to compete with the United States, if you mean as an industrial power, they still would be a long way from having the base of advance technology that would enable them to compete with us, especially in the new industrial revolution, the kinds of things that now account for perhaps 40 percent of the stuff we produce, things that did not exist a few decades ago, the new alloys, the computers, the automated processing, and the information processing, all that. That is where they really will have trouble, even under the most optimistic projections.

But if what you are asking is, will they be able to compete militarily, I say the answer is yes, although at great cost. Now, it is not that they can match us precisely. For example, in some of the advanced technological research that is projected, again, on the SDI, some of them go beyond present Soviet capabilities, but what they have done generally is to offset the things that we have done by things that they can do.

For example, in the refinement of our missile systems, what they did was to build the heavies, because they did not have the capability for the miniaturization, so they built more of what they could do, and it was folly from their point of view, but still, that was their response to competing with us.

My feeling is that despite the disadvantages, they will keep pace with us in the military field, no matter what it costs, even if it means it postpones the kinds of changes we are talking about and it hurts them in the consumer sector.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me continue along this line of questioning. The conventional wisdom, then, is that despite continuing deprivations in the consumer sector, the Soviet Union can, given sufficient political will on the part of its leadership and at very great cost, keep pace in the military field. In short, things will go on as before, with the Soviet Union matching any improvements in the U.S. military posture, if only by reacting to qualitative improvements on our part by greatly increasing the number of Soviet Systems.

But is this necessarily the case? Given some of the potential technological breakthroughs as a result of the SDI research effort, might the Soviet Union reach a stage where it cannot keep pace, a stage in which its ability to compensate quantitatively for U.S. qualitative improvements is clearly inadequate—a stage, in short, where a major overhaul of the Soviet system is essential if the Soviet Union is to remain a strategic competitor of the United States? Would such developments force the Soviet leadership to rationalize the political and economic system, or would they simply generate more irrational and bizarre behavior on the part of the Soviet Union?

Mr. **Shulman**. May I say a word to that? I realize I am taking Professor Pipes' time. Yes, I think it is quite possible that there can be forms of change, and in fact there have been in the past. If you ask, confronted with this disadvantageous situation, will they cave, will they capitulate, will they cry uncle, I think the answer is no.

But if you ask, is it conceivable that they could adapt their foreign policy and their military policy, I think the answer is possibly. We had an interesting experience in that regard. In the period leading up to their 24th Party Congress, which was in 1971, there was a big debate that went on for about 18 months in the Soviet Union.

It is particularly interesting because a lot of the materials in that debate were more open and accessible to us than most of their other exchanges, and in that period from about November 1969 until about February 1971, just before the Congress, the argument ran like this.

There were those who were saying, the thing to do is to pile on the weapons—the Americans are pulling ahead, and we have to be stronger than they.

Others were saying that that is a very shortsighted view. The real future of Soviet power is going to rest on our industrial capabilities. We have enough weapons. We can put in some more, but that will not be the priority. The important thing is to rectify the industrial base and build the economy.

And even some of the professional military people joined on that side of the argument. The direction it led them was to recognize that what they most need now is to have an importation of stuff from the West, management, capital, raw materials, advanced technology. The best way to get that is by a low tension policy, what they called the peaceful coexistence policy.

That was the side that prevailed. In February, Brezhnev signed onto a statement which meant that was it. That became the party line of the Congress, and that really became the prevailing strategy for the following period. So it is possible that they can adapt to reality in that way. But that in turn depends on what happens.

What is going on now in my judgment is a debate on whether that line was right or did it prove bankrupt. Partly, it did not have the payoffs they expected. Part of it was the kind of thing that Larry Eagleburger was talking about, that with Jackson-Vanik and the other restrictions it did not raise trade sufficiently.

Now, it depends in part on the interreaction with us whether we indicate that is a direction we would like to encourage, and will do what is necessary to encourage them to move in that direction or not. We will face, sometime in the foreseeable future, a situation in which a younger leadership will come to power.

We do not know what they are going to be like. It would be a mistake to assume that because they are younger, they are more liberal or more flexible. They may or may not be. But there will come a time when they are going to be reexamining their options, which way to go. Does it make sense to go that way, or does it make sense to go this way and tighten the belt and go all out with the military?

We cannot really determine their choice, but the important thing we can do is to make it clear that if they see their own self-interest in terms of damping down the military competition and trying to ease the relationship, the tensions, and make things a little bit less dangerous to themselves and us, that at least we have not slammed the door on that option. I think that is a very real possibility for us.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pipes, my time has expired, but with the indulgence of my colleagues for a moment, would you comment, please, as I suspect you would want to?

Mr. PIPES. Yes. To begin with, I do not think the Soviet Union can ever be a first rate industrial power. There are many reasons for that. The people who lead it have always opted for military power.

There is a wonderful passage in the memoirs of Sergei Witte, who was the Minister of Finance at the end of the 19th century and then Prime Minister, in which he says, if you look back on Russian history, the only reason we ever were respected as a great power was because of our military might. We were never respected for anything else, not for our economy, not for our culture.

So this is imbedded in the system, unfortunately, in the geographic location of the country, and so on. The reason why, I believe, the Russians will have to move toward reform, however, has to do with the simple imperatives of the situation in which they find themselves. In the past three 5-year plans, they have had to rob the capital investment sector to pay for the military sector.

The Soviet economy consists of three sectors: The capital investment sector, the consumer sector, and the military sector. Generally, they try to maintain an equal rate of growth in all three, but in the early seventies, they found they did not have sufficient resources, and so they began to rob the capital investment sector so as to put the money into the military sector.

They did this again under the next 5-year plan, and they have done it in the most recent 5-year plan. Now, there are people in the Soviet Union who do not have to be geniuses and do not have to be liberals to realize that if you keep on doing this, then your industrial base erodes, and when your industrial base erodes, your military power erodes as well, because it rests upon it.

Therefore they argue increasingly that reform is essential. Now, what does reform entail? Reform entails two things, at least. It entails removing the party from a great deal of economic decisionmaking and transferring that authority to the managers. That, of course, weakens the power of the party, and means allowing a greater play to free enterprise, that is, the incentive system.

Both reforms will weaken the power of the party, and for that reason they are violently resisted by the party. Nevertheless facts are stubborn things, as somebody has remarked, and sooner or later the party will have to make this concession or it will face dire consequences because it dare not rob the consumer sector; this can lead to explosions such as have happened in Poland, and indeed also in many cities in the Soviet Union where industrial strikes broke out for lack of food.

So, it can only keep on either continuing the transfer of resources from the capital investment to the military sector or it can start reducing the military and start building up again capital investment. To my mind, this is a reality that has nothing to do with what people want. This is a reality that stares them in the face, and they will have to do something about it, if not this year, then next year or the next year or the year thereafter.

If I just may complete my answer to Senator Dodd's question, all I wanted to say is that once the Soviet Union has gotten itself involved in Central America, it involved all kinds of groups which have nothing to do with the region, such as the PLO, which is very dependent on the Soviet Union, the North Koreans, and so on.

When I was in Government, I had access to all of the classified data, and it left no doubt in my mind as to the depth of their involvement in this region.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd, do you have any further questions?

Senator DODD. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if you are through.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Well, I do not question their involvement. I suppose that has to do more with the degree of success of the insurgency in El Salvador, along with the military, political, and economic successes of the Sandinistas.

I gather, Mr. Pipes, your view is that it is more of a Cuban connection rather than a Moscow connection and the obvious Havana-Moscow connection is self-evident. But I believe you said that the impetus comes more from Castro.

Mr. PIPES. It is really hard to say, but I think originally it did come from Castro, yes. I would like to call your attention to a Soviet strategy in this region as well as in other Third World regions.

They are finding themselves more and more constrained in funding states in the Third World which either go Communist or become Communist surrogates. They are just short of hard currency. They have given the following advice to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in open sources.

The man who gave this advice is the son of Mikoyan, the editor of the journal. A few years ago he wrote to them and said, look, you have to conduct a sensible economic policy. Seize all the levers of political power. Do not let the bourgeoisie anywhere near them. Cut them out of it totally. But cooperate with your bourgeoisie and the Americans and the Europeans in the economic sphere, because we cannot fund you.

That was their advice. Incidentally, the same advice was given to the Grenadians, because we have the Grenadians' confidential and secret papers which have recently been published, and it is very much the same policy. Keep the bourgeoisie, you know—it is a pitiful bourgeoisie in Grenada, but keep it out of politics and involve it in economics.

Now, what has been the result? Daniel Ortega was here in the fall, and he said, "we have very grave economic straits, during the preceding 12 months, the Nicaraguan Government got 465 million dollars' worth of loans and credits. Of this $65 million came from the 'socialist camp,' that is, essentially the Communist bloc, and $400 million came from the 'capitalist' bloc."

So, I call attention again to what I mean by the economics of all of this. Our allies, even Western European allies, because I do not think American banks are involved, are essentially helping to subsidize the Sandinista government exactly the way the Soviet Government wants it. This way it is very cheap for the Soviet Union.

If the Soviet Union had to fund the Sandinista government exclusively, this would become a very heavy burden.

Senator DODD. Is there any possibility the sphere of influence argument that you alluded to, wherein Eastern Europe—I think the Reagan administration with regard to Poland specifically, despite the rhetoric, showed some remarkable restraint.

Some might refer to it as more than restraint, given the rhetoric of candidate Reagan, and then, while occupying the Oval Office, but then showed remarkable restraint, in fact, ultimately lifting the sanctions.

Mr. PIPES. Well, some, though not all. Some are still there.

Senator DODD. How is that viewed? Have we made any appeals that you are aware of, that in light of our demonstrated restraint with regard to Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe, they would reciprocate in kind in our own sphere of influence as the administration sees it?

Mr. PIPES. I think you would have to ask Mr. Eagleburger about that, because he is more familiar with their responses to this. I do not think they regard our response as very moderate. The Polish Government claims that our sanctions have cost it so far $13 billion.

Senator DODD. I know that, but if you ask them to add it up, it does not amount to two.

Mr. PIPES. I do not think it does, but they claim they hurt. They claim it represents a terrible interference in their affairs. Moscow certainly feels that our assistance to the Afghan rebels is critical, in that if we withdrew that assistance, it would collapse.

So, they could say that we are indeed interfering. Radio Free Europe is very much a thorn in their side. There is little doubt in my mind if we agreed to shut down Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, refused to give assistance to the Afghan Mujahhedin and lifted the sanctions on Poland, they would be willing to clear out of Nicaragua in no time at all. They would give up Nicaragua. They would not perhaps give up Cuba, but Nicaragua they would toss to us.

We have never, I think, played that game, but it is what they would like, because—well, we tried it at Yalta. They always operate on the principle, as President Kennedy would say, of what is mine is mine, what is yours is negotiable.

In other words, once they establish a sphere of influence, it is theirs, we must not muck around with it, but the rest of it is open for their conquest. They say "these are natural processes, wars of national liberation. We do not start them. They start spontaneously. We have to help them."

So, I do not think we have done it, and I do not think we should do it, but maybe Mr. Eagleburger knows more about this than I.

Senator DODD. Larry, have you moved to Connecticut yet?

Ambassador EAGLEBURGER. Yes, sir, Senator. You must recognize I am now a constituent of yours.

Senator **Dodd**. Two of the three are.

Mr. **Shulman**. So am I.

Senator **Dodd**. You wondered why I am sitting here that long.

Ambassador **Eagleburger**. Senator, let me only say that to my knowledge we have not made that argument with the Soviets. I would agree with Dr. Pipes that they would not consider that we have been particularly restrained in the way we have acted on Poland. But even if they felt we had been restrained, I suspect they would say to themselves, well, if the Americans are prepared to be that constrained, that is nice, but that does not mean we will be as constrained where we are active.

Senator **Dodd**. Let me jump to another subject matter, and I apologize for moving quickly from one part of the world to another, but I just spent 3½ weeks in the People's Republic of China, the Philippines and Japan. I have tried to take credit for the Chinese moving away from Marxism, though nobody wants to give me credit for it. I have tried on several occasions but it does not seem to fly. [Laughter.]

I wonder if the three of you might comment on the Soviet reaction to what is going on now in China? How are they responding? What do you see, if anything, happening internally with regard to Sino-Soviet relations as a result of these changes, both in the short and long term?

Whoever wants to start, please do so.

Mr. **Shulman**. Well, the Soviets regard the changes with some apprehension. There has recently been a visit by Deputy Prime Minister Arkhipov to Peking and he went as far as he could to be polite as a guest, and he referred to the changes as something like magnificent, but it did not carry very much conviction.

He did succeed in improving economic relations. He signed some agreements which will, over perhaps a 3-year period, add up to a rather considerable increase in the flow of trade, and the main thing from a Chinese point of view is, they got agreement from Arkhipov, who had been in charge of the Soviet economic projects in China before the withdrawal in 1959.

He got an agreement that they would send in spare parts and technicians who would help put the facilities into better repair and make them work better, but he did not make any progress on the political front. The Chinese were very clear that they did not take back any of the three conditions that they had put forward for an improvement of political relations.

The three conditions are the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, as you know, the withdrawal of the Soviet forces on the border with China, and an obligation imposed on the Vietnamese to pull out of Kampuchea, and on those issues there was no progress, and the relations at the political level are still pretty poor.

The basic thrust of your question had to do with the effects of the changes in China in the Soviet Union. It is the case that it would make sense to go toward what in the Russian experience is known as the NEP [new economic policy] that they followed in 1920.

But their official position on these changes in China is that that way lies disaster, that it would lead to a weakening of the party, and there does not appear to be any movement in that direction.

Senator DODD. Larry, do you have a comment?

Ambassador EAGLEBURGER. I cannot help but believe, Senator, that what the Soviets see happening in China must be profoundly disturbing to them. I think they, like many of us, wonder whether the present Chinese regime will stay in power long enough to really put the roots of those changes into the system.

But I have to believe that the Soviets look with great disquiet on a China that they see 20 years from now economically much more vibrant, active, and competitive. What that might mean in terms of their policy is hard to predict at this point, other than to say they must be very nervous about it and I think with good reason.

It leads me, if I may, because I think it is related, back to the question the chairman asked about the Soviets and their ability to reform. Since I left the Government and have had time to think, and that is a point I make only with regard to the executive branch, not to the legislative branch——

[Laughter.]

Ambassador EAGLEBURGER [continuing]. I have become increasingly fascinated by the general question of technology and its effects upon not only American society but foreign policy questions over the course of, say, the next 20 years. I think it is relevant to the question of the Soviets.

I strangely enough am more pessimistic than either of my colleagues here on the Soviet ability to adapt and reform. For example, it seems to me fairly evident that over the course of the next 20 to 30 years, the Western World in general and the United States in particular is going to become much more computer and PC dependent, and I think it is also going to have a quantum effect upon the way in which technology begins to move in the United States.

I also think this is an issue that might cause us real problems with Western Europeans if they cannot keep up. With the Soviets, I am convinced they cannot keep up, and I am convinced that if they try, it so profoundly changes the system in terms of information flow that they may not be up to making the necessary change.

This may be profoundly destabilizing over the course of the next several decades, and to adopt would require such changes in the way in which the Soviet system operates that it may well mean that for Soviet leaders at the time they are committing suicide. I am not sure they are prepared to do that.

I hope I am wrong, and 20 years from now is a long time, but I think one of the things that we all ought to be thinking more about is the question of technology over the next 20 to 30 years, and one very relevant part of that is the question of whether the Soviets can adapt.

I have very serious questions about whether they can. The Chinese, by having begun to make the kinds of institutional changes they are making now, may well be able to manage that sort of process: but that, too, could be fundamentally destabilizing 20 or 30 years from now if the Soviets see the People's Republic of China as a vibrant economy that is able to deal not only with issues of consumer demand, but with weapons sophistication as well.

These questions are also relevant to thinking through how we deal with the rest of the world; over the next 20 to 30 years the potential changes in the way in which we live and how we produce and what we produce may set us very much apart from most of the rest of the world.

Senator DODD. Professor Pipes.

Mr. PIPES. On how the Soviet Union views the changes in China, I think they are less afraid of China now probably than they were 20 years ago. They were really paranoid then. But I think they are deeply concerned, not just about China, because they do not see China in isolation.

They see looming in the east a kind of tripartite alliance of the United States, China, and Japan, in which China provides inexhaustible manpower and discipline, and Japan and the United States the technology and the capital. All of a sudden they see themselves outflanked on a front in the Far East where their capacity to operate is for geographic reasons, much smaller.

Now, let me comment on Mr. Eagleburger's remarks about the influence of technology. I agree with everything he says about the importance of computers and the enormous difficulties which computers will present for a Soviet type society, but I draw a very different conclusion than he does.

I think he would agree that if his premises are correct, the computer presents a mortal danger to Soviet society. Now, they have two choices. They can keep computers out, in which case they condemn themselves to being a third rate power, or they introduce them, in which case they have to suffer all kinds of political consequences.

Now, history is replete with examples of dominant classes that have faced a similar problem. Let me mention only the English aristocracy which at the beginning of the 19th century completely dominated the political process because it controlled the franchise. The majority of the country was disenfranchised.

The aristocracy concluded in the middle of the 19th century and then again, better with the middle class, toward the end of the 19th century, that it was imperative in order to prevent a revolution from occurring in England to grant the franchise to the lower middle class and to the working class, thus England made the transition very nicely toward a modern social democracy.

Now, there are countries in which the ruling classes do not have this intelligence and they collapse. The Russian ruling class in 1917 did not have it, and it collapsed, and we see countries in Latin America today where they do not have it and they might well collapse.

The Chinese leadership may be blessed with some very good people, because they have seen the need for it. I am not predicting whether this will occur in Russia, but I think that these forces confront the Soviet leadership with the question, and there are very intelligent people among them who see this as they look ahead, that they either have to reform or they are condemning themselves to being a third rate power in every respect, including the military.

I believe they will choose the path of reform, just as the Chinese have.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Do you have any further questions, Senator Evans?

Senator **Evans**. I have one short comment and then perhaps one short question of Ambassador Eagleburger. I don't think it is totally facetious to say that the transformation you suggested would come from the computer revolution probably will be just as difficult and may affect those of us in this country over 30 as much as it does our relationships with other countries.

I think we had better understand that we are facing that revolution, too, in terms of our future ways of operating internally. Many who are in a position of leadership today or close to it may not survive the change. It is going to be an interesting phenomenon both internally and externally.

Do you think it would be of any value at all to proceed with ratification of any of the several treaties which have been negotiated over the last few years but remain unratified. I am thinking particularly in terms of the arms control negotiations and the overall relationships to the Soviets?

Senator **Dodd**. Dan, would you add the Genocide Convention to that list?

Senator **Evans**. Yes. In fact, I would include it.

Ambassador **Eagleburger**. I would have to distinguish between my own personal view of that and what I think my advice would be. My personal view would be that it is totally illogical, that we have not ratified the Genocide Convention. I find it difficult to understand why we have not. But I might say that about several other of the treaties that are hanging fire.

Having said that, I think the answer I would give is that you really ought to be addressing that question to the administration. I say this because it seems to me now we have to try to come to grips with dealing with the Soviet Union from some conceptual framework. And if the administration thinks it is helpful to move on these treaties, I would do it.

If the administration thinks at the moment it is not helpful, then I would not act on them

Having said that, a number of the treaties, genocide being one, I think should have been ratified. If I could go from that rather useless piece of advice to comment on the computer thing, it is not just computers. It is high technology—particularly communications technology—in general.

I could not agree with you more, Senator, that there is a revolution in the offing for the whole world on this issue. It is a revolution which can tend to make the difference between the have's and the have-not's, and even among the have's, much more glaring. In terms of how we manage our own society and our foreign policy over the next 20 or 30 years, it is a very serious question that we need to begin to think about.

I happen to believe that the United States is the most revolutionary society in the world. It is the only permanent revolution. We will probably be able to cope with the inevitable changes. Certainly we will be able to cope with those changes far more adequately than most of the rest of the world, including specifically the Soviet Union.

I am not drawing any conclusions at this point. Maybe the Soviets can manage it. I do say, though, that I think we need to think about the instabilities that are almost inevitably inherent in that process as it goes on in the next several decades, and I think it can be very dangerous.

Senator **Evans**. Does it not also have the opportunity to dramatize the difference between the have's and the have-not's? There is the potential also to do just the opposite, is there not?

Ambassador **Eagleburger**. That is correct.

Mr. **Shulman**. Senator, may I say just a word on the treaty ratification?

Senator **Evans**. Yes.

Mr. **Shulman**. My reaction would be different from Larry Eagleburger's. Genocide, without a doubt there is no good reason for not doing that.

In the arms control field there are two treaties that are natural candidates for consideration by the Congress, by the Senate. One is the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the other is the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. There are others, but those two have both practical and symbolic significance, and I would say it would make sense to ratify them. They are both in our interest if you construe our interest to be to try to damp things down, rather than to let them get out of hand.

The argument that is made against the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty is the question of verification, whether it is adequately verifiable, and there is some sentiment around town to make some addenda to that treaty in particular. It is conceivable that we could get acceptance of it, although I am not sure.

In fact, in my own judgment I would have thought it would have made sense to go beyond that to a comprehensive test ban treaty. But at the time, this was all that was feasible.

It was interesting that in the Soviet view, when Chernenko gave an interview to the Washington Post in the course of the last year, he listed that as one of the sign posts he looked to in his effort to try to read the intentions of the American administration and said, if they are serious about arms control, why do they not do that, as one of the four things he enumerated?

I do not think there is a good answer. Even if, at the worst, you acknowledged that there could be some problems in the verification, of whether you could verify 150 kilotons under certain conditions, certain kinds of turf, certain kinds of distances, and so on, the margins are not great. They are not militarily significant, and in fact it is pretty clear that we can successfully test things that the Chiefs want to test within that threshold anyway.

So it does not really cost us very much, and I think it would make sense to do it.

On the other one, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, there is not even an argument about it that I can see.

Senator **Evans**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Evans.

Senator Dodd, do you have an additional question?

Senator **Dodd**. Just one more if I can, Mr. Chairman.

I am very much interested in hearing particularly Professor Pipes and Mr. Shulman, since they are university professors. I was startled to discover; as the result of a GAO study that, excluding Cuba in the Caribbean Basin, which includes the western Caribbean and some of the Central American countries, there are some 2,500 to 3,000 students from that region alone, excluding Cuba, who are studying behind the Iron Curtain on full scholarships: tuition, transportation, room and board.

From that same region, under a similar type of program, full scholarships, there are less than 25 students studying in the United States. Now, we have a lot of students who come from affluent families and so forth over here, but on a full scholarship kind of program.

I could not believe the numbers, but I am told there has been that order of magnitude. That is mind-boggling to me. What I wanted to ask you is, first, whether or not the Soviets have utilized this kind of program effectively? Is it an integral part of their foreign policy, long-term foreign policy objectives? How effective is it in your own minds?

Is it something that we ought to be paying far more attention to? How effective is it and how much a part of their foreign policy is it?

Mr. PIPES. Well, how effective is it and should we do the same thing, I think are two separate questions, because if we did it we would be doing it in a different way and for different purposes.

They use these things primarily for political purposes. That is, to build up cadres of supporters, and within these cadres to identify KGB agents who will work for the Soviet Government.

Frankly, when you look at the Third World—and they have been doing this for some time—I do not think you will find many people prominent in politics with this kind of background. In fact, Sekou Toure once said that if he wants one of his men to be pro-Communist he sends him to Paris; he sends them to Moscow to become anti-Communist. Proximity to Moscow and experience with Soviet life does not, on the whole, produce a great deal of sympathy among these people. There are more pro-Communists among the Paris-educated ones than among the Moscow-educated ones.

So yes, they do find some agents, undoubtedly agents of influence, espionage agents. But on the whole I do not think it has paid off a great deal.

I witnessed with my own eyes a month before the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968—I was there in July. I saw a graduation at the Prague University Law School. About 30 blacks were graduated with Czech law degrees. Now, what these poor people can ever do with these degrees I have no idea. They got them, they went back, and they probably became lawyers. But clearly the usefulness of this process escapes me.

Now, we do have an immense number of foreign students in our country. But as you say, they often come from affluent families, and if we could initiate a major program of fellowships with a not so much professional, but more political orientation—that is, say under the Program for Democracy, to educate people from these areas in democratic procedures, so that when they went back—they would go back, presumably, because they would not find any benefit in staying here—they could push their countries in a different direction; that would be very beneficial.

I think the National Endowment for Democracy may want to consider such an endeavor. But we could not do it, probably, on their scale because of the amount of money that would be involved.

Mr. SHULMAN. Might I respond, Senator?

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. SHULMAN. I am jolted by the figures you cited, too. It is just astonishing to me.

As to the first question, how effective is it, it is true, as Dick says, that it often works against the Soviets, and sometimes in Moscow I run into students who are there from Africa at Lumumba University, which is for the Africans. Quite often their attitude is very negative. Their experiences are bad, there is racial tension, and they often come away quite negative.

With others, perhaps it takes. I do not know. I cannot observe. The other side of their cultural programs, though, are sometimes very effective. I mean, in New Delhi, for example, they are profligate in the resources they make available for bookstores, periodicals, and so on. My impression is that that does make a difference. It is not just the exchanges, but also the other aspects of the cultural program.

Should we do something like it? Of course we should. It is very hard now for students coming to the United States. The expenses are enormous. I have talked recently with some people from Barbados and although it would be their first choice to come here, they simply cannot afford it.

Some of them go to Canada. It is a little easier for them to arrange and now the costs can be financed in a way that is difficult in this country.

But it obviously does make a difference how the younger elites develop, where they go to study, what they study. It would make sense for us to do more on that side of our cultural affairs program around the world, not only against the Soviets, but generally to help people in the nation-building problems that they have to face.

In the long run, they will sometimes be helped. I just had a contrary thought that went through my mind, and that is several years ago before the fall of the Shah I had occasion to visit Tehran, and they had a meeting at which the whole cabinet was lined up, and of them all but about one were graduates of American universities, mostly Berkeley and Chicago. There was one fellow from Paris.

But the unhappy thing was that most of what they learned in the United States was not very helpful to them and not very applicable. It was not long after that before the system collapsed. So what matters are not only the numbers, but how you do what you do.

Mr. PIPES. If I may add a footnote to this, to what Marshall Shulman mentioned, I think one thing that we could do and it would not cost a great deal is to start a program of subsidized book sales abroad, because American books are simply out of the reach of people anywhere in the world, and now even in Western Europe.

I talked to people at the University of Paris a couple of years ago and they said that with the dollar doubling, they simply could not afford to buy American books. They were begging for some kind of subsidy from this country which would make these books available.

So a subsidized program for exporting American books—hardcover, paperback, academic, and so on—would not cost anywhere as much as these ambitious programs for students. It would have an enormous effect. I am talking primarily about scientific books, scholarly books, serious literature and so on. This would be very useful.

Senator DODD. Larry, did you want to comment on this at all?

Ambassador EAGLEBURGER. I had a Nigerian Ambassador friend of mine who once said that sending Nigerians to the University of Moscow brought them back convinced free enterprisers. And if Dr. Pipes will excuse me, he said the only place they had trouble was when they sent them to the London School of Economics or to Harvard. He did not mention Paris. [Laughter.]

I have an association with the University of South Carolina, and in fact we are now in the process of trying to develop a Caribbean Center. I therefore am generally familiar with the statistics, and they are horrible. We need to do a great deal more.

One of the things we are going to try to do, in fact, is bring some Caribbean students up to the University of South Carolina. One of the other things we are trying to do is what Dick Pipes mentioned. Prime Minister Seaga has tried for some time to develop in Jamaica a kind of Institute for Democracy, where people would be brought in and taught the mechanics of political parties: How do you poll, how do you get the vote out, how do you do some of these things that you are all familiar with?

Again, it is the sort of thing that I think we could usefully spend a great deal more time on than we do.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the testimony of our witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Gentlemen, we appreciate especially your patience and your endurance. It is now 1:15 and you started early this morning, but this has been a most helpful hearing for this committee and we hope for the American people as they read the testimony and hear it in various forms. We hope that you will stay close to us in our deliberations.

And for this time our hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 11 a.m. Monday, February 25, 1985.]

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1985

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:07 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Helms, Kassebaum, Evans, Cranston, Dodd, and Kerry.

The **Chairman**. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Let me state at the outset that the members of the committee will be assuming a responsibility later today in the management of legislation on the floor of the Senate. It is my understanding that, although a standing order calls for the famine relief bill to come before the Senate at about 1 o'clock this afternoon, the need for budget waiver may push that time back to 1:30 or thereabouts. Therefore, we will try to commence this hearing promptly and conclude it by 1 o'clock, so that members who have responsibility on the floor will be able to take up those responsibilities at about 1:30.

We resume this morning the series of comprehensive hearings by the Foreign Relations Committee on the future of American foreign policy. This hearing this morning constitutes the third of a four-part series devoted to the theme of Soviet-American relations and arms control.

Tomorrow morning the committee will hear from Ambassador Paul Nitze and the three negotiators nominated by the President to lead our arms control negotiations in Geneva next month.

Arms control negotiations and potential agreements must be viewed as part of a broad range of policies and actions designed to promote and protect U.S. interests in a world where Soviet power has been steadily increasing and Soviet ambitions are actively asserted. The U.S. purpose must be to see to it that the uses of Soviet power are restrained and that the Soviet leaders recognize the risks of assertive and aggrandizing uses of power outweigh any potential benefits.

Although arms control currently captures popular attention, Soviet-American relations encompass a vast complex of interconnected issues. While many hope that solid, verifiable arms control agreements can emerge from the new talks, most experts agree that arms control alone cannot carry the burden of moving both countries toward a more stable, longer term, and less threatening relationship.

Issues of current concern beyond arms control calling for U.S. policy and program responses include: The Soviet strategic and theater modernization efforts and resulting force structure improvements; Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and involvement in regional disputes such as Angola and Ethiopia, directly or through the use of surrogates; and Soviet bloc involvement in international terrorist activities.

Trade issues straddle the security and economic spheres to include the issue of technology transfer. Soviet violation of elementary human rights remains a source of major dissent in the bilateral relationship. And finally, the problem of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements and other international treaty obligations requires an assessment of possible impact on the U.S. military programs and corresponding adjustments in defense policy.

Thus, the committee believes it important that we consider United States responses beyond arms control to the strategic competition with the Soviet Union. We need a full appreciation of the differences between the American and Soviet approaches to defining strategic goals and for managing the competition.

The committee is pleased to welcome back this morning Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. We look forward to your thoughts.

Let me ask at this point if there are opening comments by either Senator Kassebaum or Senator Kerry.

Senator **Kassebaum**. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Kerry**. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Very well. We will proceed now to the testimony. We will call first upon Hon. Richard Perle for his testimony, followed by Hon. Richard Burt.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. **Perle**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss with you America's national security objectives, the United States-Soviet relationship, and some aspects of U.S. defense policy. I would also like to commend you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee, for your effort in this series of hearings "to seek and find and strengthen an American consensus for clear and achievable foreign policy."

In this regard I share, Mr. Chairman, the optimism you expressed in your January 23 address to the National Press Club, that:

> The great majority of the American people agrees upon several basic truths about American foreign policy: A sense of realism about the Soviet Union; an appreciation of the need for a strong defense; solidarity with allies and friends; openness to discussions and negotiations with adversaries; and a strong commitment to justice, human dignity, and economic well-being for all people.

It remains our duty to strengthen that consensus by continuously providing the American people the facts with regard to the realities, challenges, and dangers we face as a nation.

In the post-Stalin period the Soviet Union has become more sophisticated in its methods of repression at home and abroad, but it has never abandoned its long-held objective to bring about a world in which no important decision can be made that is contrary to the will and preferences of the Soviet Union.

As the people of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Poland—and one could add others—are well aware, the Soviets are willing to put into practice, whenever given the opportunity, their long-held doctrinal commitment to spread throughout the world a Communist system, led by and responsive to Moscow. In pursuit of that ambition, they have since the early 1970's conducted a massive and unrelenting military build-up.

President Reagan has not shrunk from stating the truth about these harsh realities of Soviet behavior, while at the same time seeking out new opportunities for realistic and meaningful cooperation and negotiations. When they elected him to office in 1980 and again in 1984, the American people indicated they shared President Reagan's sober assessment of the Soviet Union.

The administration's election signaled a clear consensus on the part of the American people that something needed to be done immediately to redress the serious imbalance created by an ambitious Soviet military build-up, coupled with U.S. restraint in the 1970's. It is my strong belief that the American people continue to share that concern and assessment.

They overwhelmingly support the President's commitment to continue upgrading U.S. military capabilities in order to meet the enlarged Soviet threat and to restore an adequate measure to United States and allied deterrent capabilities.

I must say I find patronizing and absurd the suggestion, now fashionable among editorialists and columnists who have never shared the President's clear and forthright judgment about the Soviet Union, that Ronald Reagan will now embrace the demonstrably false theory of détente of the 1970's in order to assure his "place in history."

That theory of détente, in which the Soviets were to be adroitly enmeshed in a web of relationships, expressed in terms of agreements across a broad range of political, cultural, economic, and military relationships, will doubtless earn its own place in history as an experiment that failed.

For when the haze that surrounded the détente policy of the early and mid-1970's was dissipated by the winds of Soviet internal repression, subversion in the Third World, war in Afghanistan, technological espionage on a grand scale, and unprecedented military programs, it became clear that it was we, and not the Soviets, who became enmeshed in a web of unrealistic expectations, commercial greed, self-imposed inhibitions on the President's freedom to protect our security, and military vigilance diminished, along with shrinking defense budgets, to a dangerous indifference.

An unfaltering commitment to the President's defense programs in its essentials remains the best strategy to protect America's interests. This also represents the best strategy to promote the reduction or, better yet, the elimination of nuclear weapons, and enable us to work with the Soviet Union for our mutual benefit if the Soviets will work with us on an equitable and fair basis.

It is often said of the Soviets that they are conservative and disciplined to take risks. With this assessment I agree. But curiously, the view of the Soviets as averse to risk taking is frequently put forward as a reason why the United States need not carry out its defense modernization program.

With this I most strenuously disagree. For there is a clear relationship between our military potential and the willingness of the Soviet Union to take risks. Soviet perception of our willingness to defend our interests or those of our allies will depend on their assessment of the military balance.

The Soviet Union took actions in the 1970's that it would not have taken in the 1960's. Such actions were less risky for the Soviets in the mid-to-late 1970's because the military balance had substantially changed in their favor. It is the nature of the military relationship that determines, above all else, whether a course is risky for the Soviets or safe.

Until the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, the Soviets had become accustomed to riskless adventure and subversion. The importance of the President's action in Grenada was that it marked the end of an era in which the Soviet leadership, emboldened by the declining strength and will of the United States, would engage in aggression and subversion with little or no fear that they would elicit an American response.

This administration has also set about reversing the trend in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union—a trend that steadily diminished the capacity of the United States and its allies to deter hostile Soviet activity, thereby limiting the risks the Soviets would assume in exploiting opportunities for aggression and subversion.

Let me cite a few examples of the different United States and Soviet trends in weapons development over the past two decades. The last of our B–52 bombers rolled off the production line in 1962, 23 years ago. And there are, by the way, in the current strategic bomber inventory aircraft built as long ago as 1956.

We began deploying our newest land-based intercontinental ballistic missile 15 years ago. During the same year, we began deploying the Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

We did not field another new strategic system until 1978, when we began deploying the Trident I submarine-launched ballistic missile. Since then we have begun to deploy air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and to build the Trident I ballistic missile-carrying submarine at the rate of about one a year.

By contrast, the Soviet Union since 1971 has developed at least three, and possibly four, new types of ICBM's—the SS–17, SS–18, SS–19, and probably the SS–16—eight improved versions of existing ICBM's, five new types of ballistic missile-carrying submarines, four new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, five improved versions of existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles, and a new intercontinental bomber. And the Soviet Union is continuing to develop new strategic weapons of all types.

But the introduction of new strategic systems only tells part of the story. Let us now turn to numbers of strategic forces. The United States did not deploy a single new ballistic missile-carrying submarine between 1966 and 1981. In fact, our SSBN force declined by one-fourth, from 41 boats to 31. In the same period, the Soviet Union deployed 62 new SSBN's and has introduced still newer ones since then.

The United States has not increased the number of its deployed ICBM's since 1967. During the same period, the Soviet Union has added about 800 ICBM's, for a total force almost one and a half times larger than that of the United States.

Almost 700 of these Soviet ICBM's, the SS-18's and SS-19's, have the prompt hard target kill capability which the current U.S. force lacks. The SS-19 has roughly the throw-weight of the MX Peacekeeper, the SS-18 nearly twice as much.

I believe that we will not have a safer world if the Soviet Union is allowed to maintain a monopoly of effective strategic counterforce capability—the ability to destroy hardened military targets. We will not improve international security by letting our ICBM force remain vulnerable to Soviet attack and by failing to modernize our bombers so that they can survive a Soviet first strike and penetrate a massive system of Soviet air defenses.

Under current circumstances, we do not have an adequate retaliatory capability against hardened Soviet military command and political targets. Our modernization program—the MX, the B-1, the advanced technology bomber, submarine-launched cruise missiles, and the Trident II missile—that program is designed to give us such a capability.

And it is designed to, I might say, Mr. Chairman, to reflect the increasing obsolescence of much of the U.S. strategic force, built 15 and 20 years ago.

In the long run, however, we seek to change fundamentally the current situation of enormous vulnerability to nuclear attack through the strategic defense initiative. Through the development of advanced defensive systems, we would hope very substantially to reduce, if not eliminate, the current ability to launch devastating strategic nuclear strikes. The development of such technology would facilitate a transition toward arms control agreements that are based on the principle of mutual assured survival, rather than mutual assured destruction.

Thus, the SDI, if it works, will give us the possibility to shift our current position of vulnerability and dependence on offensive deterrence to a more stable posture, based upon a much greater emphasis on defense. This is potentially a new and effective tool for managing United States-Soviet relations.

The Soviets see arms control negotiations not in terms of negotiating mutually beneficial agreements to limit the risks and the consequences of war, but as an opportunity to inhibit U.S. programs, create divisions within the Western alliance, and prevent the exploitation of advanced U.S. technology to balance Soviet quantitative advantages in military systems.

It is clear that the Soviets do not desire agreements that would substantially limit strategic counterforce capabilities on both sides. They have consistently resisted limitations on ballistic missile throw-weight and other qualitative characteristics related to destroying hard targets.

Their position on such limitations reflects the fact that they do not expect the United States will deploy all that it is permitted by existing arms control treaties. For example, they obviously do not expect us to deploy the 820 MX missiles that we could deploy without violating SALT II. If they did, their attitude toward limitations on ICBM's in START would be very different indeed.

Our experience with the Soviets in SALT I, SALT II, the INF negotiations, and START suggests that they will continue to resist proposals for deep cuts in what we would characterize as destabilizing systems. Instead, the Soviets will likely endorse the concept of sharp reductions in strategic offensive forces, only to encourage political opposition to the President's strategic defense initiative.

They have already suggested that only the SDI stands in the way of radical reductions in strategic offensive arms. However, when one reads the fine print in their position, the Gromyko interview, for example, one finds that sharp reductions do not include any reductions in heavy missiles.

This administration's approach to arms control has been to put forward proposals which, if accepted, would significantly improve the stability of the strategic relationship. Such proposals are always vulnerable to the charge that we are asking too much, proposing reductions that are too demanding.

One particularly shallow criticism along this line holds that we must not ask the Soviets to reduce their strategic forces by more than we reduce ours, even though the Soviets, by building relentlessly for more than a decade, have accumulated more and larger forces than we possess.

I should have thought that the fundamental principle of equality—not in the extent of the reductions, but in the ceilings under which both sides must remain—is the point worth negotiating to achieve. Indeed, it was the Congress of the United States that in 1972 laid down the principle of equality as the guiding objective for future negotiations. It is a principle to which we enthusiastically adhere.

With this in mind, the question becomes one of the level at which equality will be established. We prefer a low level, the lowest level to which the Soviets will agree, provided that any strategic arms agreement achieves deep reductions from present levels of weapons.

We will not repeat the mistakes of 1972 and 1979: Agreements that permitted significant increases in strategic weapons and, because they left multiple avenues for continuing buildup, actually stimulated the deployment of new weapons systems.

Such an approach requires patience. It will not be easy to persuade the Soviets to agree to deep reductions in strategic forces. They will certainly not do so if they believe that pressure at home to achieve an agreement, any agreement, will cause our negotiators merely to superintend a march of concessions toward the Soviet position.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude with a few words about the NATO alliance. We welcome the recent steps taken by our NATO allies in concert with us to strengthen the conventional defenses of the alliance. These measures, agreed just last December, include a large increase in funding for the infrastructure program, expanding holdings of critical ammunition stocks, and adopting a set of force goals meant to provide compensation by the other allies for possible U.S. deployment outside the NATO area.

In addition, ministers set in motion an effort to organize a coherent longer-term approach to further improvements in the alliance conventional deterrent. This emphasis on the improvement of conventional forces and the shift away from an undue reliance on the nuclear forces of the alliance is a fundamental effort that this administration has launched and intends to carry forward.

We recognize that many allies continue to have serious economic problems—unemployment is an important example—and it is too early to predict how many or how soon additional resources can be brought to bear in this effort. However, our allies do share our belief that alliance conventional defenses must be strengthened if we are to ensure the continued validity and credibility of NATO's flexible response strategy.

I believe that the North Atlantic Alliance has been successful even beyond the great vision of its wise founders. It has kept the peace. It has provided a far more formidable deterrent force than the United States could provide alone. It has enabled us to defend the security of our Nation far forward, on the Eurasian land mass, close to the enemy and far from our shores.

I urge you to be patient when, from time to time, it appears that some of our allies are doing less than we deem their fair share. In the main, they have done well, and the most recent decisions in NATO to which I have referred are a heartening indication that they can summon the will to meet the demands of an effective collective defense.

Mr. Chairman, it should be clear in what I have had to say that I regard the Soviet Union as a dangerous adversary with which we must deal from a foundation of strength and realism. Those of us who hold that view are every bit as deeply committed to peace as those of our critics who hold a more sanguine view of the nature of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is, in George Orwell's words, a place "where yesterday's weather can be changed by decree," a totalitarian state that has failed in virtually every respect except the ownership of the means of destruction. It tolerates no freedom, no dissent at home, and where it casts its shadow there is neither liberty nor joy.

Those privileged few on this Earth who are free remain so because we are strong of will and means and purpose. This administration intends to build and nurture and protect that strength, through a combination of sober judgment, sound military programs, and wise diplomacy. For if we fail in any of these, we will ultimately fail in all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Perle.

We will now proceed with the testimony of Secretary Burt.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. BURT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am delighted to be with you today to have the opportunity to discuss our global strategic competition with the Soviet Union. I intend to concentrate on the political side of that competition, as Richard Perle has effectively dealt with the military questions.

Nevertheless, I believe that in talking about the competition with our principal adversary it is misleading to draw a hard and fast distinction between the political and the military. It is absolutely essential, as we look at the overall strategic competition, to see that all of its many facets are interrelated.

All too often, we find ourselves talking about the strategic competition without defining carefully what we mean by it. Americans in particular sometimes appear to have difficulty coming to grips with strategic concepts. For our purposes, the strategic competition represents the interplay of all the different elements of national power.

Specifically, our global competition with the Soviets takes place across military, economic, ideological, covert, and diplomatic dimensions. We make a serious analytical mistake if we try to disaggregate these five elements as we chart our approach to the Soviet Union.

In the debate in this country over foreign policy, one often hears it said that we should be seeking diplomatic, rather than military, solutions to various problems. These sentiments in my judgment reveal a fundamental misconception about foreign policy, because the diplomatic and the military elements are two sides of the same coin.

The interconnections between the political and military areas of the United States-Soviet competition yield a constantly shifting array of forces, and an appreciation of how they play out is what sound strategy is all about. The Soviet Union understands this clearly and seeks to integrate all of these areas in their own strategy, and they weigh them all carefully as they assess the changing "correlation of forces."

Theirs is not a narrow technical or mechanical concept. Rather, it is a broad-gauged, nuanced historical assessment. In order for our diplomacy to succeed in the face of an adversary with a long-term strategic view, we must by necessity be able to compete in different realms simultaneously.

Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than the Soviet decision to return to the bargaining table at Geneva. This was not prompted by a Soviet change in heart, but by continued American support for military modernization and a strong cohesive Western alliance. Faced with these realities, the Soviets dropped the unacceptable conditions which they had imposed to the resumption of the negotiations.

Thus, President Reagan's vigorous program of military modernization has created new diplomatic opportunities in dealing with Moscow. That is the lesson to be learned from the Soviet walk-out in 1983.

You have received a briefing from the CIA on the nature and extent of the Soviet threat, and I will not retrace that ground. I do believe, however, that a brief review of the military tools for competition which the Soviets have developed and are pursuing is useful.

As Richard Perle has pointed out, the Soviet across-the-board military build-up is truly impressive. Particularly dramatic is the growth of its nuclear arsenal. In the past 20 years, the Soviets have moved from nuclear inferiority to parity, to what Senator Sam Nunn has called "parity plus." They have also greatly enhanced the potential leverage of their conventional forces in Europe and in Asia through the regional build-up of SS–20 and other intermediate-range nuclear forces.

All of these developments taken together have yielded a vastly different strategic situation than that obtained in the fifties, sixties, and on into the early seventies. In that earlier era, the United States was able to rely on its strategic nuclear superiority to balance off Soviet regional nuclear and conventional superiority.

Now, while Soviet superiority in those areas continues, we find ourselves running hard to maintain strategic nuclear parity with the Soviet Union. This is clearly not a comfortable set of circumstances.

The emergence of the Soviet Union as a global military power has enabled the Soviet leadership to pursue a forward strategy. Accordingly, the Soviets are active in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Central America.

In all of these regions, they continue to hone and wield the tools they put into play with some success in the previous decade. The massive use of arms supplies, reliance on proxy forces where it is convenient, access to foreign military and naval facilities, and a willingness to back up Soviet interests with force when necessary.

They have, of course, also been active on the ideological or psychological side of the competition. They continue, as they have for years, to wage propaganda campaigns in support of their foreign policy objectives. Frequently, Soviet undertakings in the psychological field appear in the form of disinformation designed to confuse public opinion, create dissent, and embarrass the United States. These are often focused on the Third World and are sometimes extremely crude, but nonetheless they are effective.

A more sophisticated side of Soviet psychological warfare is their attempt to manipulate language in a self-serving way that can only be described as Orwellian. Here the Soviets are able to play upon a fundamental asymmetry between East and West.

Since there is no public opinion in the Soviet Union, the United States and the Soviet Union end up competing for the allegiance of public opinion in the West, and the Soviets invariably craft their propaganda efforts to manipulate well-meaning but ill-informed audiences in the West.

Although the campaign in Western Europe to block INF deployments failed, we now find ourselves in the midst of a new propaganda effort directed at the strategic defense initiative. The Soviet campaign against SDI offers a particularly egregious example of how language can be twisted to serve Soviet political ends.

They have wrapped their propaganda effort in the mantle of preventing the militarization of outer space. But the reality is that the Soviet Union was the first to test intercontinental ballistic missiles, which traverse space to reach their targets. In the 1960's it was the Soviets who developed the fractional orbital bombardment system using an orbiting nuclear warhead, the only system of its kind in the world.

They have deployed the only antiballistic missile system in existence and that system, if used, would require the detonation of nuclear warheads in space. They have deployed the only operational antisatellite weapons and continue to maintain their monopoly on such systems. And they maintain a full-fledged research program into some of the more advanced technologies now being explored here.

This recitation of the record makes clear that, if anybody bears responsibility for the militarization of space, it is the Soviets themselves.

Much has been written about Soviet economic problems, and these problems are real. Because the Soviet system is plagued by difficulties, its rigid and inefficient economy, and its uncertain process for political succession, some observers have suggested that we should seek to channel our competition with the Soviets into those areas in which we are strong. They argue that we should compete across the political, economic, and cultural dimensions, but not the military.

This argument in my view demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of the nature of our competition with the Soviets, for we can only enjoy the luxury of competing with the Soviets on grounds of our own choosing if we have successfully neutralized their advantage in the military sphere.

What does this mean in more concrete terms? In the near term, it means that we must maintain a system of balanced deterrence and flexible response. In order to accomplish this objective, we must modernize and strengthen both our nuclear and our conventional forces.

The MX program in particular is essential. In the debate over the MX, survivability and basing are important issues, but it is hard to understand why we should permit a situation in which the Soviets have fixed land-based ICBM's capable of destroying our land-based forces, while we deny ourselves a similar capability.

Over the longer term, as Mr. Perle has pointed out, we must explore the possibilities of moving toward a more stable system of deterrence by engaging in a strategic defense initiative research program.

We can bolster our position in the strategic competition with the Soviet Union by taking steps on our own, but unilateral military measures will not bring us success. They are a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition. We must also work with our friends to maintain an alliance structure that has maintained the peace since World War II.

Alliance management is a vital task which requires time, hard work, understanding, and patience. It is an undertaking to which the Reagan administration remains committed. Consultations are one important element of proper and effective alliance management. This administration has done more in that area than any of its predecessors, and it will do more in the future.

Nonetheless, management of our alliance relationships is not limited to political consultations. It also encompasses economic and trade issues which can and do spill over into the security area. The alliance has wrestled with difficult economic questions in the past and has generally been successful in handling them.

In the economic area of our competition with the Soviets, we are prepared to pursue trade with the Soviet Union, but only with proper COCOM and other safeguards. This is an area where much useful work has been done over the past few years, but it is an area which will command our future attention for some years to come.

We must also recognize the importance of ideas and values. We should never be afraid to express our beliefs and to stand up for them. In our competition with the Soviets, nothing is more dramatic than the contrast between our commitment to freedom, democracy, and private initiative and the Soviet exaltation of the all knowing and all-powerful state.

Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America have long been involved in providing the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with accurate news and information. The U.S. Information Agency's efforts have also been notable, and its Director, Charles Wick, deserves great credit for revitalizing American public diplomacy.

On the diplomatic front, we must continue to take the lead in seeking peaceful change and solutions to regional problems, as we have in southern Africa and the Middle East. I should emphasize that solutions are to be found less in direct contact with the Soviets than in making sure that we are working on the side of peaceful change, as we are in many troubled regions.

Peaceful change diminishes the possibilities for meddlesome Soviet behavior. While the United States has been pushing for political settlements around the world, the Soviets, given the fact that they really have only arms to offer the Third World, have assumed the role of spoilers.

We must continue our efforts at using creative diplomacy, but on occasion we will find that we have to become involved directly in military action, as in Grenada, or provide military support for those who are fighting for freedom. As Secretary Shultz said in his February 22 speech in San Francisco: "We support those who fight for freedom around the world because when we fail to do so both our national security and our global interests suffer."

In Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and its clients are facing genuinely popular uprisings. As the President has said: We cannot fail to make clear that we want a future of freedom for all these nations and peoples.

The key to managing the United States-Soviet relationship is to have an overall cohesive global strategy that brings into play all of the elements that I have discussed today. Frequently, that strategy will yield apparent inconsistencies or contradictions. That is inevitable. But we should be clear on our long-term goal.

That goal is to create an environment where, on the one hand, there exist real incentives for the Soviets to show restraint and to seek cooperative approaches. On the other hand, if that proves impossible we must be absolutely sure that in the absence of Soviet restraint we can protect our interests and those of our friends and allies.

This is not an easy strategy to pursue. It does not provide any tangible payoffs in the short term, and it cannot be encapsulated in a single phrase like "containment" or "détente."

Most important, such a strategy requires patience. That is perhaps the hardest quality for a democracy to practice in the conduct of its foreign policy. Many of our problems in dealings with the Soviet Union over the course of the past 20 years have been self-generated. There has been a tendency for the public, the Congress, and policymakers to swing between unwarranted euphoria and undue pessimism.

In the 1970's, we saw the overly excessive expectations generated by détente give way to gloom as a pattern of aggressive Soviet actions ate away at the fabric of the relationship. That gloom deepened in the period leading up to INF deployments at the end of 1983, when many people spoke of a new ice age in superpower relations. These predictions were obviously wrong.

But we are now running the risk of another round of euphoria as we move toward the opening of the new arms control negotiations in Geneva. The Soviets understand this, and it probably explains why, having failed in their effort at deliberate intimidation of the United States and its Western allies, we are now witnessing the early stages of a new peace offensive.

Nothing could be more damaging to our ability to construct a more productive relationship with the Soviet Union than misunderstanding the meaning of this "new" Soviet policy. In particular, we must guard against the buildup of expectations which the Soviets are surely seeking to manipulate.

We must understand that only steadiness and patience over the long haul, and not oscillation between exhilaration and pessimism, will bring the results that we all seek.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Burt's prepared statement follows:]

Statement by Richard Burt
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
February 25, 1985

Mr. Chairman,

I am delighted to be with you today and to have the opportunity to discuss our global strategic competition with the Soviet Union. I intend to concentrate on the political side of that competition and leave to my colleague, Richard Perle, the task of dealing with the military questions. Nonetheless, I believe that in talking about the competition with our major adversary, it is misleading to draw a hard and fast distinction between the political and the military. It is absolutely essential, as we look at the overall strategic competition, to see that all of its many facets are interrelated.

All too often, we find ourselves talking about the strategic competition without defining carefully what we mean by it. Americans in particular, sometimes appear to have difficulty coming to grips with strategic concepts. For our purposes, the strategic competition represents the interplay of all the different elements of national power.

Specifically, our global competition with the Soviets takes place across military, economic, ideological, covert, and diplomatic dimensions. We make a serious analytical mistake if we try to disaggregate these five elements as we chart our approach to the Soviet Union. In the debate in this country over foreign policy, one often hears it said that we should be seeking diplomatic rather than military solutions to various problems. These sentiments reveal a fundamental misconception about foreign policy, because the diplomatic and military elements are two sides of the same coin.

The interconnections between the political and military areas of the US-Soviet competition yield a constantly shifting array of forces and an appreciation of how they play out is what sound strategy is all about. The Soviets understand this clearly and seek to integrate all of these areas in their own strategy and they weigh them all carefully as they assess the changing "correlation of forces." Theirs is not a narrow, technical, or mechanical concept; rather, it is a broad-gauged, nuanced, historical assessment. In order for our diplomacy to succeed in the face of an adversary with a long-term, strategic view we must, by necessity, be able to compete in different realms simultaneously.

Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than the Soviet decision to return to the bargaining table at Geneva. This was prompted not by a Soviet change in heart, but by continued US support for military modernization and a strong, cohesive Western Alliance. Faced with these realities, the Soviets dropped the unacceptable conditions which they had posed to the resumption of negotiations. Thus, President Reagan's vigorous program of military modernization has created new diplomatic opportunities in dealing with Moscow. That is the lesson to be learned from the Soviet walkout of 1983.

You have received a briefing from the CIA on the nature and extent of the Soviet threat and I will not retrace that ground. I do believe, however, that a brief review of the military tools for competition which the Soviets have developed and are pursuing is useful. In historical terms, the across-the-board Soviet military buildup is truly impressive. At the end of World War II, the Soviets were a Eurasian landpower with 11 million men under arms. The Red Army cast a shadow over Western Europe and sought to hold hostage, with its conventional military power, those parts of Europe which were not already occupied by Soviet forces. Since that time, the Soviets have continued to maintain their conventional advantages in the European heartland, while at the same time deploying huge forces along the border with the People's Republic of China and, more recently, upgranding their forces facing Southwest Asia.

They have become a truly global military power with a blue-water navy, acquiring the ability to project force in Third World contingencies with increased air and sea-lift capability.

Soviet nuclear capabilities have also developed in dramatic fashion. In the past twenty years, the Soviets have moved from nuclear inferiority, to parity, to what Senator Sam Nunn has called "parity plus." They have also greatly enhanced the potential leverage of their conventional forces in Europe and Asia, through the regional build-up of SS-20 and other intermediate-range nuclear forces. All of these developments taken together have yielded a vastly different historical situation than that which obtained in the fifties, sixties, and on into the early seventies. In that earlier era, the United States was able to rely on its strategic nuclear superiority to balance off Soviet regional nuclear and conventional superiority. Now, while Soviet superiority in those areas continues, we find ourselves running hard to maintain strategic nuclear parity with the USSR. This is clearly not a comfortable set of circumstances.

The emergence of the Soviet Union as a global military power has enabled the Soviet leadership to pursue a forward strategy.

In 1971, Foreign Minister Gromyko told the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party that, "there is not a single question of any importance in the world at present, that can be solved without the Soviet Union, or against its will."

Accordingly, the Soviets are active in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Central America. In all of these regions, they continue to hone and wield the tools they put into play with some success in the previous decade -- massive use of arms supplies, reliance on proxy forces where it is convenient, access to foreign military and naval facilities, and willingness to back up Soviet interests with force when necessary.

In Nicaragua, the Soviets have doubled their arms deliveries to the Sandinista regime from 1983 to 1984. The Soviets have increased their growing presence in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, a facility they have in effect "rented" from Vietnam in exchange for approximately a billion dollars a year in aid. It is this aid which allows their Vietnamese clients to pursue their ccupation of Cambodia. The Soviet Union's massive resupply of Syria in the aftermath of the 1982 conflict in Lebanon contributed to Syrian intransigence in the face of our efforts to find a negotiated solution to the fighting. In Angola and Ethiopia, the Soviets have continued their massive military supply relationships in the face of famine and civil war.

Finally, in Afghanistan, the Soviets have pursued what Zbigniew Brzezinski has correctly called a "scorched earth policy" in pursuit of their political goals.

On the ideological/psychological side of the competition, the Soviets continue, as they have for years, to wage propaganda campaigns in support of their foreign policy objectives. Frequently, Soviet undertakings in the psychological field appear in the form of disinformation designed to confuse public opinion, create dissent and embarrass the United States. These are often focused on the Third World and are sometimes extremely crude, but nonetheless effective.

A more sophisticated side of Soviet psychological warfare, is their attempt to manipulate language in a self-serving way that can only be described as Orwellian. Here the Soviets are able to play upon a fundamental asymmetry between East and West. Since there is no public opinion dimension to Soviet foreign policy, both sides end up competing for the allegiance of public opinion in the West. And the Soviets invariably craft their propaganda efforts to manipulate well-meaning, but ill-informed audiences in the West. Although the campaign in Western Europe to block the INF deployments failed, we now find ourselves in the midst of a new propaganda effort directed at the Strategic Defense Inititative.

The Soviet campaign against SDI offers a particularly egregious example of how language can be twisted to serve Soviet political ends. They have wrapped their propaganda effort in the mantle of "preventing the militarization of space," but the reality is that the Soviets were the first to test intercontinental ballistic missiles which traverse space to reach their targets. In the 1960's, it was the Soviets who developed the fractional orbital bombardment system using an orbiting nuclear warhead -- the only system of its kind in the world. They have deployed the only anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) in existence, and that system, if used, would require the detonation of nuclear warheads in space. They have deployed the only operational anti-satellite weapons and continue to maintain their monopoly on such systems, and they maintain a full-fledged research program into some of the more advanced technologies now being explored here. This recitation of the record makes clear that if anybody bears responsibility for the "militarization of space" it is the Soviets themselves.

Nonetheless, these self-serving Soviet efforts undoubtedly have a real effect both in Europe and the United States. When he visited London, Mr. Gorbachev spent some seven hours attacking SDI. When a Soviet parliamentary delegation visits Washington next month, we can expect them to pursue the same line.

They will continue to push this massive public effort against SDI without regard to the real Soviet view of defensive weapons as demonstrated by their own behavior. It is worth recalling that in 1967 when the Soviets were asked about their own ABM system, then Soviet Premier Kosygin argued that defenses were stabilizing and that no Soviet leader would ever abandon projects which held out the possibility of protecting the Soviet people. "The anti-missile system is not a weapon of aggression, of attack," he said; "it is a defensive system."

Much has been written about Soviet economic problems, and those problems are real. At the same time we should keep in mind that the Soviet Union today produces more oil and gas than any other country in the world, and that their economy, despite its limitations, permit the maintenance of the world's largest military establishment. In addition, it is worth noting that the dollar value of Soviet trade with the Third World has increased over the past fifteen years, and these Soviet trade ties with LDC's have even begun to yield sizable export earnings for the Soviets.

But because the Soviet system _is_ plagued by difficulties -- its rigid, inefficient economy and its uncertain process for political succession -- some observers have suggested that we should seek to channel our competition with the Soviets into only those areas where we are strong.

They argue that we should compete across the political, economic, and cultural dimensions, but not the military. This argument demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of the nature of our competition with the Soviets. We can only enjoy the luxury of competing with the Soviets on grounds of our own choosing if we have successfully neutralized their advantage in the military sphere.

What does this mean in concrete terms? In the near term, it means that we must maintain a system of balanced deterrence and flexible response. In order to accomplish this objective we must modernize and strengthen both our nuclear and our conventional forces. The MX program, in particular, is essential. In the debate over the MX, survivability and basing are important issues, but it is hard to understand why we should permit a situation in which the Soviets have fixed, land-based ICBMs capable of destroying our land-based forces, while we deny ourselves a similar capability. Over the longer term, we must explore the possibilities of moving toward a more stable system of deterrence by engaging in a strategic defense research program.

We can bolster our position in the strategic competition with the Soviet Union by taking steps on our own, but unilateral military measures alone cannot bring us success.

They are a necessary, but not sufficient condition. We must also work with our friends to maintain an alliance structure that has maintained the peace since World War II. Alliance cohesion in Europe and Asia is one of the real unheralded success stories of this Administration, and is a key to our success in the global competition. The successful implementation of the December 1979 dual-track decision on INF, the emergence of a global consensus of like-minded countries in the economic summit format, and the joint statement on security issued at the Williamsburg Summit in 1983, are products of these successful efforts. This pattern of coordination and cooperation cannot be taken for granted. As we approach a new set of negotiations on nuclear arms we must be ready to counter renewed Soviet efforts at wedge-driving between us and our Allies.

Alliance management is a vital task which requires time, hard work, understanding and patience. It is an undertaking to which the Reagan Administration remains committed. Consultations are one important element of proper alliance management. This Administration has done more in that area than any of its predecessors and it will do more in the future. Nonetheless, management of our alliance relationships is not limited to political consultations. It also encompasses economic and trade issues which can spill over into the security area.

The Alliance has wrestled with difficult economic questions in the past and has generally been successful in handling them. In the economic area of our competition with the Soviets, we are prepared to pursue trade with the Soviet Union, but only with proper COCOM and other safeguards. This is an area where much useful work has been done over the past few years. Nonetheless, it is an issue which will require our continued attention.

We must also recognize the importance of ideas and values. We should never be afraid to express our beliefs and to stand up for them. In our competition with the Soviets nothing is more dramatic than the contrast between our commitment to freedom, democracy, and private initiative and the Soviet exaltation of the all-knowing and all-powerful state. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America have long been involved in providing the peoples of Eastern Europe with accurate news and information. The United States Information Agency's efforts have also been notable and its director, Charles Wick, deserves great credit for revitalizing American public diplomacy. In recent years we have become more alert to this informational element of our competition and, on the basis of the initiative by the President and a bipartisan group from our political parties, unions, and business, the National Endowment for Democracy is helping a variety of democratic groups in a number of countries to develop the skills and institutions which democracy requires. The NED is engaged in the business of putting the universal and American ideals of democracy into practice.

The intelligence dimension of our global competition with the Soviet Union is also vital. Our ability to collect information, analyze it, and when necessary to act on it, is an essential element of a successful strategy. The Soviets understand this very well. Their frequent use of forgery, disinformation, and "active measures" offers eloquent testimony to this. The Soviets were bemused by the fact that we allowed our intelligence service to be virtually dismantled during the 1970s. In order to compete successfully with the Soviet Union in many parts of the world, we have to be especially vigilant about monitoring and countering their disinformation efforts. We must also ensure that our intelligence services have the support that enables them to do the job we need them to do.

On the diplomatic front, we must continue to take the lead in seeking peaceful change and solutions to regional problems as we have in southern Africa and the Middle East. I should emphasize that solutions are to be found less in direct contact with the Soviets, than in making sure that we are working on the side of peaceful change -- as we are -- in troubled regions. Peaceful change diminishes the possibilities for meddlesome Soviet behavior.

In the past five years the Soviets have not added to the list of clients they acquired in the 1970s. This is due, no doubt to a combination of economic constraints, leadership uncertainties, as well as renewed US strength. But we must be prepared for Soviet actions around the world which we find repugnant and inimical to our interests.

While the United States has been pushing for political settlements around the world, the Soviets, given the fact that they have only arms to offer, have assumed the role of spoilers. We must continue our efforts at using creative diplomacy, but on occassion we will find that we have to become involved directly in military action, as in Grenada, or provide military support for those who are fighting for freedom. As Secretary Shultz said in his February 22 speech in San Francisco, we support those who fight for freedom around the world because, when we fail to to do so, both our national security and our global interests suffer. In Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and its clients are facing genuinely popular uprisings. As the President has said, we cannot fail to make clear that we want a future of freedom for all these nations and peoples.

The key to managing the US-Soviet relationship is to have an overall, cohesive, global strategy that brings into play all of the elements I have discussed today. Frequently, that strategy will yield apparent inconsistencies or contradictions. That is inevitable, but we should be clear on our long-term goal. That goal is to create an environment where, on the one hand, there exist real incentives for the Soviets to show restraint and to seek cooperative approaches. On the other hand, if that proves imposssible, we must be sure that in the absence of Soviet restraint, we can protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies.

This is not an easy strategy to pursue. It does not provide any tangible payoffs in the short term and it can not be encapsulated in a single phrase like "containment" or "détente." Most important, such a strategy requires patience. That is perhaps the hardest quality for a democracy to practice in the conduct of its foreign policy. Many of our problems in dealings with the Soviet Union over the course of the past 20 years have been self-generated. There has been a tendency for the public, the Congress, and policy-makers to swing between unwarranted euphoria and undue pessimism. In the 1970s we saw the excessive expectations generated by "détente" give way to gloom, as a pattern of aggressive Soviet actions ate away at the fabric of the relationship.

That gloom deepened in the period leading up to the INF deployments, when many people spoke of a new "ice age" in superpower relations. Those predictions were obviously wrong, but we are now running the risk of another round of euphoria as we move toward the opening of the new arms control negotiations in Geneva. The Soviets understand this and it probably explains why, having failed in their effort at deliberate intimidation of the US and its Western allies, we are now witnessing the early stages of a new "peace offensive."

Nothing could be more damaging to our ability to construct a more productive relationship with the Soviet Union than misunderstanding the meaning of this "new" Soviet policy. In particular, we must guard against the buildup of expectations which the Soviets are surely seeking to manipulate. We must understand that only steadiness and patience over the long haul, and not oscillation between exhilaration and pessimism, will bring the results that we all seek.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Burt.

The committee will now question the witnesses, with a time limit of 10 minutes for each Senator, as we proceed in rotation.

Gentlemen, during the negotiations that are to commence in Geneva on March 12, it is widely anticipated on our side that the Soviet Union may well try to split us off from our NATO allies again. One of the encouraging factors of recent discussions of the SDI was a suggestion that we might share with European nations some of the research opportunities that the SDI implies and, furthermore, that we should think through constructively with our European allies how the strategic defense initiative would pertain to their defense and bring about even greater solidarity of NATO, as opposed to a specific defense for us and a different one for the Europeans.

Would you please offer a comment on specifically what occurred in those discussions, how we might envisage a procedure that would lead toward a sharing of the research and certainly a common understanding of how NATO would be strengthened by the SDI?

Mr. PERLE. Mr. Chairman, Rick and I both participated in the discussions to which you refer, which were held in Munich about a week ago. But I must say, I found them very encouraging, by contrast with similar discussions even as recently as a year earlier. The seriousness with which SDI was discussed reflected a change from a knee-jerk opposition to a much more thoughtful and more constructive appraisal.

We are presently at work within the Department of Defense examining ways in which this very sizable research and development program might be opened up to the participation of our allies. I think it is clear that if we are going to succeed we need all the help we can get, all of the scientific and engineering and technical and industrial talent that the free nations of the world collectively possess.

And so we are looking at options as to how that might best be organized, whether through government-to-Government agreements or the enlargement of the bidding process to permit European and other entities to compete for contracts that constitute part of the research program.

We heard everywhere in the course of that meeting and in subsequent discussions in Europe of a keen interest on the part of our allies to participate in the program. We also heard expressions of allied concern that the program develop in such a manner as to provide not only for the defense of the continental United States, but for the defense of Europe as well.

And we were able to assure our allies that the technologies that are of greatest interest and most promising are technologies that would entail the interception of ballistic missiles in their boost phase, and that at that stage an SS-20 aimed at London or Paris is as vulnerable as an SS-18 aimed at the United States. So I believe they are assured by that, although this will be a continuing discussion between us.

I think Rick could usefully say a word about the really quite extraordinary pattern of consultations, in which he is very much involved, that exists among the allies in this regard.

Mr. Burt. Mr. Chairman, I would really like to make two points. The second will be to discuss what we have already done and what we plan to do to consult on the strategic defense initiative as we move ahead.

The first point I would like to make is simply to respond to a point you made, and that is the potential for Soviet wedge-driving as we enter new negotiations on the subject of the strategic defense initiative.

I would just argue that that wedge-driving campaign has already begun, and that the Soviet conceptual approach to these new negotiations—that is, one that links agreement in any one of the three areas under negotiation in Geneva—that is, the strategic arms, the intermediate range arms, or the space and defensive arms areas—one that links an agreement in one of those areas to the need for agreement in all three—is designed to hold progress in the INF or the START area hostage to concessions on our part on the strategic defense initiative.

And very soon, in fact the day after Secretary Shultz and Andrei Gromyko met in Geneva, Paul Nitze and I went to Brussels to point out on consultations with the North Atlantic Council this very real risk of an effort by the Soviet Union to hold these negotiations hostage, to dangle possible agreements in the offensive nuclear forces area in front of the Europeans and the Congress and others in an effort to bring pressure to bear on the administration to make concessions on the subject of the strategic defense initiative.

We are very much aware of this potential and this has been a key part of our discussions with our allies, and I can report to you that the allies are sensitive to this very real risk. And I can also say with some confidence that when we enter the negotiations on March 12 that there will be a united front shown by the alliance.

In fact, our three negotiators are planning to visit Brussels on March 11 to brief the North Atlantic Council on our approach to those negotiations in order to sustain our consultative approach.

I would only add to that that, in addition to a number of informal meetings and sessions such as the conference which was held, or private meetings such as the conference which was held in Munich a few weeks back that Mr. Perle alluded to, we have had several formal consultative meetings in Brussels and in Washington to discuss the strategic defense initiative, designed to dissipate or to demystify several aspects of the strategic defense initiative.

Mr. Perle mentioned the European concern over decoupling or the possibility that any strategic defense system would not protect Europe. We are dealing effectively with that concern. We are dealing effectively with the concern that somehow this is going to undermine or undercut a strategy of deterrence and that it is going to lower the possibilities for progress in arms control.

So I am quite sure that as time goes by there will be an alliance consensus on this issue, which will have the effect of not only preserving alliance harmony, of taking advantage of their skills and expertise in this area, but finally, enhancing our bargaining position at the negotiating table in Geneva.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Secretary Burt, in your opening statement you mentioned the speech of Secretary Shultz on February 22, last Friday, in San Francisco, and likewise the comments made by the President of the United States during his press conference the day before with respect to the United States providing military support for those who are fighting for freedom. Specifically, you mentioned in your statement Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, where the Soviet Union and its clients are facing genuinely popular uprisings.

Although indeed there has been activity on the part of our Government to help people who are fighting for freedom in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, does the Secretary's speech represent the articulation of a new policy? I take the speech to mean that, as a point of national policy, we are going to support people fighting for freedom, and we are prepared to talk about that overtly and to discuss it with the American people and the rest of the world.

Can you give us any illumination today about the formulation of policy in that regard and whether that may presage attempts by the administration to approach this committee and the Congress for implementing means that make possible this type of support for those who are fighting for freedom in these countries or additional ones?

Mr. BURT. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would not call it the enunciation of a new policy, but I would say it represents an important evolution in our policy. I think that over time we, like others, have come to recognize that the Soviet Union and its clients around the world are resisting change, and that the forces of democracy and freedom are asserting themselves at this point, and that we have nothing to be ashamed about in voicing our support for these forces and, where it is appropriate, providing them with direct or indirect support, in the hope that these movements, these forces, these freedom-fighters, will achieve their objective.

I do not think that that is necessarily new. The President for a long time has talked about freedom-fighters. I do think that the Secretary of State's speech in San Francisco reflected some long and hard thought that he has been doing about this problem, and I think that you will see on the part of the administration a continuing effort to make the American people aware of the fact that the forces of freedom are not on the defensive worldwide, but they are on the offensive, and that we have a responsibility, where we can, to provide them with assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Dodd, do you have questions for the witnesses?

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our two witnesses.

Senator Cranston was here for a minute and left. He and I both are interested in a question that has been asked by many people with regard to the two of you.

There are many differences, as any administration tries to fashion a position on something as delicate and sensitive as arms control. And there have been many reports concerning the differences between the Department of State, and the Defense Department, and particularly between the two of you, with regard to your respective positions in these matters.

Can both of you say that as of this hour the State Department and the Defense Department are in total agreement as to the position of the United States with regard to the arms control negotiations that begin in 2 weeks in Geneva?

Is our administration of one mind as we enter these negotiations?

Mr. PERLE. Senator Dodd, some of the decisions necessary to develop the details of the negotiating position have not yet been taken.

It has frequently been the case in the past that in the development of a national position there have been differences in the advice given by Departments to the President. I think that is only right and only natural. We have different outlooks, different orientations, different missions to perform, different expertise. I think it would be a great disservice to the President to deprive him of the full spectrum of opinion on the many difficult issues he has to decide.

In each and every case in which decisions have had to be made, the differences between the Departments have been resolved by the President and the National Security Council and a single U.S. national position has emerged that all departments have supported to the very best of their abilities.

In any case, I think it fair to say that the reports of differences among us have been greatly exaggerated. There were frequently differences that could be called tactical in nature, nuances of how an approach ought to be made, questions of timing and manner of presentation, and the like.

Let me put it this way: In all of the differences that Rick and I have discussed with each other and in the interagency process in the last 4 years, the differences between us in relation to the differences between either of our positions and the Soviets were so slight that if one put the Soviets along a spectrum at the 10 point, the differences between Rick and I are the differences between 1.0 and 1.1.

So they have not been nearly as great as advertised. I have no doubt that as we complete the work in preparation for the opening of the Geneva talks there will be a meeting of the minds, much assisted by the President's own thinking in this regard.

Senator DODD. Secretary Burt, did you want to comment on that?

Mr. BURT. Senator, it is very hard for me to improve on that very eloquent statement by Mr. Perle.

Senator DODD. I thought you might want to say some nice things about him. [Laughter.]

Mr. BURT. I would just simply say that I totally agree with his statement that any possible differences between the two of us or between our two Departments have been wildly exaggerated for a variety of different political purposes.

But I would also make the point that, as we prepare for the new negotiations on March 12, the President has put into place an organization, a team, a process, for making decisions that I think is designed not only to gather in a variety of different views, but to make decisions and then to ensure that they are carried through. So, to use the vernacular, this administration has its act together on arms control.

Senator Dodd. We have, despite the President's opposition to the SALT II agreement, lived within the SALT II parameters over the last 4 years. Yet, there have been questions raised, I think by both of you, as to whether or not the Soviets have complied with that as well. You may want to address that point in response to my question.

This August we will be confronted with the decision of whether or not to retain the position we have had over the past 4 years when the *Alaska*, the Trident submarine, goes to sea trials. The President in his press conference the other night did not really answer; he has not made a decision on what he will do.

In a January 2 article in the Washington Post, Mr. Perle, you indicated that we should not live with the SALT II parameters, that that was not in our interests to do so. I wonder if you might expand on that

Secretary Burt, I would like to ask you whether or not you agree with Mr. Perle on that and whether or not the State Department and the Defense Department will be advising the President come this August to break the parameters of SALT II, rather than reduce the number of missiles or pull off some of the Poseidon's, which is what we would have to do if we were going to live within the parameters.

Mr. Perle. Senator Dodd, let me say first that no decision has been made, as the President indicated.

We in the Department of Defense have taken the necessary action to enable the President, should he choose to do so, to continue to comply with the terms of the SALT II agreement. That is, those preparatory actions that would be necessary have been taken and are being taken.

Second, I think the issue will have to be faced, not in August, but rather later in the year.

Third, I would observe that the treaty to which you refer, which was never ratified, would, had it been ratified, expire on December 31 this year. So the precise date on which the *Alaska* goes to sea trials, which could in fact occur after the end of the year, may have a bearing on the decision that is ultimately taken.

With respect to my own view, what I sought to say earlier is that I think it is a great mistake for us to permit a double standard to develop, that is, a standard according to which the Soviets violate rather abundantly even quite important provisions of the treaties that exist between us, while we for our part not only adhere to those provisions but even adhere to some quite extraordinarily restrictive interpretations of them.

I think the inevitable effect of a double standard will be to encourage a continuation of what is already a disturbing pattern of Soviet violations. If they believe that they can play fast and loose with these treaties and that we will in response adhere to every crossed "t" and dotted "i", then I think the problem is only going to get worse and not better.

So it seems to me that the time to make it clear, however, we decide this question of whether to dismantle submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the time has come to make it clear that we will not accept a double standard of compliance.

Finally, if I might observe, the Soviets have been dismantling submarines of the kind that we would be required to dismantle by the date on which the *Alaska* goes to sea trials. But, far from our expectation that these provisions would lead to a reduction in the number of military submarines in the world, the Soviets have for the most part been replacing these ballistic missile launching submarines with cruise missile launching submarines, with the result that one of the purposes and expectations of the SALT II Treaty has been entirely frustrated, as they have simply substituted one nuclear military system for another nuclear military system and called it compliance.

Senator DODD. Before you answer, Secretary Burt, let me ask this question.

As I hear you, Mr. Perle, it is your opinion that, without any question of a doubt, the Soviets have violated the parameters of SALT II?

Mr. PERLE. Without any question of a doubt.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Would you respond to those questions as well, including that last one?

Mr. BURT. Well, Senator, let me begin by saying that in my view the Soviet Union has violated aspects of SALT II without any question of a doubt.

Senator HELMS. Would you repeat that, please? I did not hear you.

Mr. BURT. That the Soviet Union has violated various aspects of SALT II without any question of a doubt. That is not just my view or Richard Perle's view. That is the judgment of the President of the United States, and he has publicly said that.

I would just agree with Mr. Perle on approaching this overall problem and the various points he made. It really is, I think, almost a classical problem in trying to find some measure of territory where we can cooperate with the Soviets on arms control without harming our own interests. There is not simply the difficulty of outright Soviet violation.

There is the more detailed problem, as Mr. Perle pointed out, that on submarine conversions, while you might argue the Soviets have not technically violated the submarine conversions aspect of the treaty, they are certainly undermining or circumventing it by equipping those submarines with cruise missiles as opposed to ballistic missiles. And these make it enormously difficult for us to exercise unilateral restraint on our behalf.

As Mr. Perle said, the decision on future observation or continuing observation of our so-called no-undercut policy—that is how I think we describe it, as we decided not to undercut the agreement, as opposed to abide by it; and I am not a lawyer, so I cannot explain the detailed differences—but will be based, I am quite sure, on the record of Soviet violations and any efforts they might make to clear up these problems, will be based on any progress that we may or may not make in the new negotiations, and will be based on our own military planning requirements.

And I am not prepared at this point to try to predict or speculate on what the President might decide to do, and I certainly do not want to close off his options by giving you recommendations on my behalf or on behalf of any other State Department official here in public.

Senator DODD. My time has expired, but I would like to come back if we get around to a second round.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let us go a little bit further, Secretary Burt. I agree with you that there is no question, based on the research that I have done, about Soviet violations. But let me clear up one bit of confusion that I have.

I think it was in June 1982, maybe the 18th or 19th, when, according to press reports, there was an agreement entered into by then Secretary Haig and Mr. Gromyko that the Soviet Union would be relieved of its obligation under SALT II to deactivate over 250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Was there a U.S. agreement that the Soviets did not have to deactivate these 250 strategic nuclear vehicles?

Mr. BURT. Senator, I am not aware of any such agreement, no.

Senator HELMS. Well, would you be if it had been done?

Mr. BURT. I assume I would be.

Senator HELMS. Would you check on that and let me know?

Mr. BURT. I will.

Senator HELMS. I am in sort of a tenuous position, Mr. Chairman, because I think I know what did happen and I do not believe I want to pursue this line of questioning because it does involve——

Mr. BURT. Could I ask the Senator a question, because I just want to clarify something?

Senator HELMS. Sure.

Mr. BURT. Is this—are you referring—and I do not have the dates in the back of my mind. Are you referring to the—and I am just remembering the press reports myself—to this Jack Anderson column about the Haig-Gromyko discussions in New York on this subject?

Senator HELMS. I do not know about Jack Anderson, but my recollection was from the New York Times.

Mr. BURT. Well, what I can tell you, and I think I can tell you in open forum, is that I am aware—and I was not present, but I am aware of a meeting, one of the series of meetings that Secretary of State Alexander Haig had with Foreign Minister Gromyko where the Soviets—where Gromyko announced his intention, the Soviet intention, to unilaterally abide by or not to undercut certain positions of the SALT II agreement.

But they, Gromyko made very clear that they would not abide by the provision of that agreement which said over a period of 6 months, I believe it was—I cannot remember it precisely under the treaty, but it was a period of 6 months or so—that they would reduce their forces from some, I think, 2,400 down to 2,250.

He made that point, that this was unilateral Soviet policy. I am not aware that the Secretary of State agreed to that or that there was any written agreement or verbal agreement. That was just a Soviet announcement.

But I do not know if that took place in June 1982. I cannot say.

Senator **Helms**. Well, it was in June 1982. I tell you what we better do, both of us. You check and see if I am correct.

Mr. **Burt**. That there was an agreement?

Senator **Helms**. Between Haig and Gromyko, yes.

Mr. **Burt**. A verbal, written?

Senator **Helms**. Well, let us not go too far. You find out and then we will discuss it. Maybe we will have to go into executive session to get that question resolved, but we will find out, whether it is classified or not.

I believe I will yield back the balance of my time.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Kerry.

Senator **Kerry**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perle, I think we all accept the notion that we are driven by a moral and logical desire to try to do away with the nuclear threat, obviously, and I think, were it possible, would accept the desire of the President to render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

But I am personally, and I think I share this with others, personally deeply troubled about the thinking that leads us to believe that Star Wars, as it is popularly called, is going to do that. I wonder if we could think about it a little bit here.

Let me ask you, first of all, what your feelings are about the nuclear winter theory? Do you accept that theory or do you place any stock in it at all?

Mr. **Perle**. Well, it depends on what you mean by "the nuclear winter theory." I have seen some studies that drive to the conclusion that, if one were to detonate a sufficient number of nuclear weapons on the cities of the world, cities that contain vast quantities of burnable material, that the smoke that would rise into the atmosphere as a consequence of those detonations would bring about atmospheric changes. I think it is entirely possible that, given the scenarios posited in those studies, there would indeed be atmospheric changes.

But I think the range of uncertainty is very great indeed.

Senator **Kerry**. But it goes beyond smoke. It goes into dust, debris, and a host of other things, does it not, as well?

Mr. **Perle**. That is right, but I believe that smoke is the principal phenomenon.

And I also believe that some of the scenarios that were used as the basis for these studies are quite absurd, and appear to be designed principally to generate smoke. The dropping of nuclear weapons on New Delhi and Bombay, for example, in the context of a United States-Soviet strategic exchange would not seem to me to make a great deal of sense.

Senator **Kerry**. But there are serious theories, limited to the possibility with respect to an attack on the United States alone, are there not? The National Academy of Science in fact endorsed that particular report, I believe, is that not correct?

Mr. **Perle**. There are theories. There is a great range of uncertainty, and I do not know responsible scientists who are prepared to say that they can define the levels at which atmospheric change would take place.

Senator KERRY. Then, stepping beyond that for a moment, most of the spokespeople who have testified before the Congress to this date I believe have stated that there is a general acceptance that if SDI were to be deployed, we would not expect it to be a 100-percent shield. Is that correct? I believe you would accept that?

Mr. PERLE. I think it is very difficult to achieve perfection in any human endeavor.

Senator KERRY. If that is true, then, when SDI is deployed after whatever billions it might ultimately cost, were we to deploy it, if we are still then left assessing the level of damage inflicted and the level of damage imposed are we not still dealing with a theory of mutual assured destruction [MAD]?

Are we not still making an assessment about what they destroy and what we destroy, which means that, after all is said and done, all we are doing is altering the present equation of deterrence but not doing away with it?

Mr. PERLE. Let me say first that one of the important qualities of a strategic defense in my judgment would be its contribution to deterrence. That is, by enabling us, if we were able to deploy such a system, to intercept a significant fraction of the weapons aimed at our retaliatory forces as well as our cities, that would leave the Soviet Union uncertain as to whether it could carry out an effective preemptive attack.

In that sense it would greatly strengthen deterrence.

Second, the weapons that those who have studied nuclear winter are most concerned about—and I share their concern; this is something we need to study and define very carefully—most of those weapons are weapons that might well be intercepted by a strategic defense, thereby saving the world from a nuclear winter.

It seems to me that one who is concerned about nuclear winter should be enthusiastic about the prospect of having for the first time a capacity to prevent that by intercepting the weapons that would otherwise cause it.

But I take your point, there is a residual element of deterrence in a post-SDI world. I think that is obviously the case, because even a 100-percent effective strategic defense would not prevent the delivery of other kinds of nuclear weapons.

But it does seem to me to make a great deal of difference whether one is concerned about a very small number of nuclear weapons or a very large number of nuclear weapons. It makes a difference to the survivors, it makes a difference to the world, and it certainly makes a difference if the theories of nuclear winter turn out to be true.

Senator KERRY. But that really makes a presumption that we are going to stay with the same assumptions that we have today on what weapons they will be launching and what we will be using to deter them, whereas, absent any other change in our relationship with the Soviet Union or any other change in the current set of arsenals, there would be a natural tendency on both sides to simply continue to design a new system to go around or to massively overwhelm the level that Star Wars is capable of deterring.

Mr. PERLE. I think that would depend in part on what the Soviet strategic objective is. If all the Soviets desire is the capacity to inflict significant damage on the United States as a deterrent to an

American first strike, then I believe those levels of damage could be inflicted with arsenals vastly smaller than the Soviets have constructed.

That is what causes us concern, the fact that the Soviets have gone well beyond the requirements of deterrence to build an offensive capability that appears to us to have no justification other than to threaten the retaliatory capability on which a stable deterrent relationship must ultimately depend.

Had the Soviets stopped building when Robert McNamara thought they would stop or when Harold Brown thought they would stop, we would face a quite different situation today. But they have gone right ahead and they now possess a force sufficient to destroy virtually all of our land-based ICBM's, many of our submarines, certainly all of those who are not at sea, a sizable fraction of the bases from which our bombers launch, and so on.

And it is that relentless Soviet building and the prospect of having to find a way to deal with it that has led the President and others to conclude that a defensive response would be safer and more stabilizing and in the long run more promising than the proliferation of offensive weapons.

Senator KERRY. But again—and I think this is important to reiterate—you are in point of fact highlighting the past years of Soviet response, which has been to build.

So absent a change in United States-Soviet relations or a change in how this policy of building, there is nothing to say that they would not continue to simply build and to try to circumvent whatever it is that SDI could accomplish? Is that not logical?

Mr. PERLE. Well, that is one course they might take. Another might be a different attitude toward the negotiation of limitations than we have seen in the past. That is, a real effort to achieve limitations.

Senator KERRY. Why would that suddenly happen, where today there are many who believe that this could already happen given the current level of capacity for destruction?

Mr. PERLE. Well, the evidence thus far has been that they have been unwilling to agree to significant reductions, not least of all, it seems to me, because we have not had a program that could deprive them of the fruits of the forces they have been building.

If you posit the possibility of a strategic defense that could neutralize much of that Soviet program, their interest in pursuing it may decline. I do not think we can tell now, and it is one of the purposes of this negotiation, and in particular the space and defensive arms part of it, to explore with the Soviets the relationship between offensive and defensive forces.

I happen to believe that, had we in 1972 provided in the ABM Treaty for a defensive response to the growth of offensive forces, which we did not do, we might have seen a much more hesitant Soviet expansion of offensive forces. As it is, no one in the Soviet Union who is opposed to building those additional thousands of missiles had a very good argument for that position.

If we had had a defense, anyone, if anyone existed, who was opposed to that Soviet program might have been able to say to the Politburo: You know, if you fellows go ahead with SS-18's and SS-19's and build these thousands of weapons at enormous expense, the Americans are simply going to offset that development by expanding their defenses. So why make that investment?

But there was no one put in a position to say that, because we had agreed that, by treaty, that no matter how much they expanded their offenses, we would not respond to neutralize that offense with a defense of our own. So I do not think we fully understand the dynamics of the offense-defense relationship where there is a real prospect for the development of defensive forces. This SDI program will at least enable us to determine what the technical possibilities are.

Senator KERRY. If the nuclear winter theory were to be proven through deeper study to be borne out at least with respect to attack against the United States and against hardened silos and military targets, not necessarily including, as you describe, Bombay and other cities, but an attack scenario which you found more militarily acceptable, if that is true, would that not render the whole SDI concept futile and wasteful?

Mr. PERLE. Well, if what you are saying is that it can be established that if the Soviets were to launch an attack against our retaliatory forces they would thereby create a nuclear winter that would cause their death and destruction, then I think they would be rather less inclined to initiate that attack, and we might then conclude that a defense against an attack on that scale was not needed.

Senator KERRY. Would it not then be more sensible for the United States now to be spending its research money on discovering that, rather than putting $3.7 billion into a program that might in fact be irrelevant?

Mr. PERLE. Well, I do not think they are mutually exclusive. We are doing both. We are putting sizable funds into exploring the nuclear winter phenomenon and into the provision of defenses.

But it seems to me the defense would be an awfully good hedge against the possibility that we may become persuaded of the consequences of a nuclear attack along the lines of the nuclear winter theories, but the Soviets may not share our view.

There is an old line in a poem by Hillaire Beloc that goes: "Pale Ebenezer thought it wrong to fight, but Roaring Bill who killed him thought it right." I do not know whether Soviet scientists, whether Soviet leaders, will be persuaded even if we become persuaded that a Soviet attack would trigger a nuclear winter that would destroy the Soviet Union.

I do not know how one could ever establish that they had accepted that proposition, even if it turns out to be true. So I think there is a strong case for defenses as a hedge against the Soviets failing to accept that proposition, for whatever reason.

And of course, the proposition may turn out to be wrong.

Senator KERRY. Well, if it were to happen it would not really matter whether they accepted it or not. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

You mentioned, Secretary Perle, that the Soviet Union is a dangerous adversary. I do not think anyone would disagree with that. Very few people even in the United States might. We should have no illusions about the Soviets as we attempt to find some means of negotiation with them.

It seems to me arms control efforts are going to be with us for a long time, whether it is offensive or defensive. I would like to explore with you some other avenues rather than arms control that might be open to us with the Soviets.

It seems to me if we focus all of our energies and our initiative just on this, we could easily wear all parties down and, more importantly perhaps, get the Soviets back into a corner where there is no other avenue for them to vent their frustrations.

Before I do that I would just like to ask you how you would feel about it if the ABM Treaty were set aside and we moved to a defensive system that would protect our own missiles as they exist today?

Mr. PERLE. Well, Senator Kassebaum, I would have preferred that the original ABM Treaty be structured along those lines and that there was consideration given to that. Unfortunately, that view did not prevail, although I believe it would have been negotiable in 1972.

As you know, we are conducting our own SDI program within the terms of the ABM Treaty and will continue to do so.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But at some point, of course, we would have to face the fact that it would not be within the treaty.

Mr. PERLE. If we arrive at the point where we are persuaded that a defense is both technically and financially feasible, then we would expect, under the terms of the treaty, to consult with the Soviets about changes or amendments to the treaty. Whether this would be one such change to bring to them I do not know, because I do not know how the technology would evolve.

But I think we would have been a lot better off these last 14 years or 15 years if, at every point at which the Soviets made the decision to invest billions in additional offenses, they had had to face the prospect that we could offset that by the investment by rather less funds in offsetting defenses.

I think we would have achieved a degree of stability that unfortunately, because we could not resort to the deployment of defenses, we have failed to achieve.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I think there are some serious questions of compliance. Do either one of you give any real credence to the Standing Consultative Commission [SCC]? Is this a body that would be a good forum for serious Soviet-United States comments on compliance?

Mr. BURT. Senator, as you know, that body was created by the so-called SALT I agreements, both the ABM Treaty and the interm agreement on offensive forces. We have taken up compliance concerns in that body since those agreements. I think that we have reluctantly had to recognize that, while there have been some issues that we have been able to clarify, as we were discussing a little earlier today, it certainly has not prevented the Soviet Union from violating other agreements. Nor has it been a necessarily effective mechanism for curbing or trying to change Soviet behavior in many of these areas.

Now, that has not led us to abandon the mechanism, but I think it has been clear in recent years that it has led us to complement that mechanism with other steps. For example, we have begun for the first time in my knowledge to raise these problems in diplomatic channels, in conversations with the Soviets, and at times in very senior levels in our conversations with the Soviets, so that they cannot treat this as a technical confidential matter in one mechanism.

We have made sure that the Soviets have heard from us in other channels about our concern. In addition we have, as you know, gone public. We have addressed these problems publicly, and again with the hope that this will cause the Soviets to recognize how serious an issue this is.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I realize that. I think both sides have been a little desultory, perhaps, in how they view the Commission. I was wondering more as a forum with which both sides might bring, not necessarily successful conclusions, but some top initiative and skilled people to quiet, patient efforts in that particular forum.

Mr. **Burt**. Let me say, Senator, as I have said, that we have not abandoned that forum and we have worked very hard in attempting to use that forum effectively. Our commissioner, former Gen. Richard Ellis, is technically and politically respected. He has been given, I think, the access he needs to do his job.

We have spent a considerable amount of time at senior levels in the administration discussing how to raise issues there, and I think we have tried persistently and patiently to use the SCC as an effective forum for resolving those issues. Unfortunately, so far they show very meager results.

Mr. **Perle**. May I add a point, please? The last session of the SCC ran 10 weeks, and for a period of 10 weeks we had approximately 20 American officials in Geneva, 200 man-weeks. And when they came home I asked the deputy commissioner if he could summarize the new information elicited from the Soviet Union that might allay our concerns about the violations that we had raised with them in the SCC.

He said, "Yes, he could do it and it would be a short report." I said, "How short?" He said, "Less than a page." Now, that seems to me a rather large effort for a rather small result.

The important point is to recognize what the SCC is and what it is not. It is not a negotiating forum. It is not a place where political decisions can be taken. It is not a place to resolve differences between us.

It is a place for the exchange of information, and it may be the most inefficient institution for the exchange of information in recorded history, if all we got was six lines.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Well then, we should not keep it going, or perhaps we should change it in such a way that it might be more efficient. I am just asking you if it has any real merit or if you have given any thought to any other forums.

We have not gotten very far with East-West trade, because we always run into the question of technologies. Is there any possibility of, say, medical concerns? I am wondering, just moving away totally from arms control, what forum, if any, there might be.

Mr. BURT. Senator, let me comment on that very briefly. Let me say that, first of all, we very much share your view that it is a major mistake to allow arms control to monopolize the United States-Soviet dialog, and we have worked really consistently for more than 4 years now to make sure that it does not simply monopolize the United States-Soviet dialog, because by and large the Soviet Union would like to make, for I think a lot of political and propaganda purposes, arms control the really only important issue between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We have taken a number of concrete initiatives to try to broaden the dialog. For example, the President in his U.N. General Assembly speech last fall suggested regular consultations on regional political issues or regional problems.

We have had conversations with the Soviets on such issues as southern Africa, and more recently, as you know, there was a meeting in Vienna on the Middle East. While these meetings do not necessarily produce much—in fact, they probably produce very little—as I indicated, I think, in my opening statement, we see some value in having those discussions, if only just to make it very clear to the Soviet Union what our views are and to lower possible chances for miscalculation.

In the bilateral area, we have taken a number of steps to try to reinvigorate United States-Soviet ties. We are attempting now to negotiate a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union which would give us greater access, give American entertainers, give American spokesmen greater access, to the Soviet Union. We do not kid ourselves. This is going to be an enormously difficult undertaking. But we have undertaken that initiative.

There were a number of joint agreements that were signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in areas like health, in areas like housing, and we have told the Soviet Union that we are prepared to take another look at those agreements and are prepared to get back into conversations with them.

But I think one thing has been shown, and that is that Soviet misbehavior and adventurism, whether it is in regional areas, like its role in the imposition of marshal law in Poland or its direct military invasion of Afghanistan or its deplorable human rights record—and we have not said anything really today about that abysmal human rights problem, the growing anti-Semitism, neo-Stalinism in the Soviet Union—that these fundamentally undercut the political consensus in this country that is necessary to go forward with these broad-based efforts to have a dialog with the Soviet Union.

That is one of the first things we have to do, convey that to the Soviet leadership.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I could not agree with you more.

I have some further questions. I will wait for the second round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, to Secretary Perle, I think you mentioned, as I remember, in a portion of your earlier testimony the potential of using the SDI in defense of Europe as a way to gain additional support from our European allies for the strategic defense initiative.

If the Soviets were to institute an attack on Europe, how long would a missile fly? How much time is there?

Mr. PERLE. Well, it would depend on the missile. An SS-20, for example, would in its boost phase we think be vulnerable to the kind of boost phase intercept system that we are now exploring. But the flight time for an SS-20 is on the order of 12 to 15 minutes.

Senator EVANS. How long in the boost phase?

Mr. PERLE. The boost phase is some minutes of that total.

Senator EVANS. Seven minutes?

Mr. PERLE. Some minutes. I cannot compute the exact number of minutes now.

Senator EVANS. So less than 10 to 12 minutes?

Mr. PERLE. Yes.

Senator EVANS. Under what circumstances or how would we conceivably provide decisionmaking within that short period of time that would allow the best decision on how to use these weapons to be made?

Mr. PERLE. Well, the systems we are talking about are nonnuclear systems.

Senator EVANS. I understand.

Mr. PERLE. So that the decision to intercept a ballistic missile, the destination of which may not be known at the point of launch—and a ballistic missile, by the way, that may be aimed at the defense itself—that decision I believe can be preprogrammed without giving rise to the concern that one would naturally have if the issue were the launch of offensive weapons that would produce nuclear explosions on the surface of the Earth.

Because if a mistake has been made and what is believed to be the launch of a ballistic missile turns out not to be the launch of a ballistic missile, then no effect of any kind would be evident. In other words, the system would seek out and destroy a ballistic missile in the atmosphere and that is all it would do.

Senator EVANS. So you think that there is the possibility of an actual missile launch or perhaps several missile launches without triggering a war?

Mr. PERLE. If a space-based boost phase intercept system were to sense a launch of ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union—and it could be programmed for the level of that attack—and if it were to intercept those missiles, I do not think that would necessarily lead to a war. In fact, it might bring what otherwise would be a devastating war to a very rapid conclusion with no loss of life.

Senator EVANS. But the program then would have this inaction or reaction that would not be triggered by any human decision, but rather by preprogrammed?

Mr. PERLE. Well, the system does not exist yet, so we are talking theoretically.

Senator EVANS. I understand.

Mr. PERLE. I am trying to respond on the basis of what is the case that gives some people the most difficulty. That is, where there is no human intervention between the time the event is sensed and the defense takes action. There is a lot of time for quite deliberate decisions in the design of the system and the instructions to the system.

I think as a practical matter, Senator Evans, this notion of the decision time, which under any circumstances is a matter of minutes, is often discussed in a manner that is misleading. We have designed our strategic forces so that they can ride out an attack, precisely so that no President is put in the position of having to respond in 10 or 15 minutes.

I frankly feel a lot safer knowing that a decision which could lead to destruction on an unprecedented scale would have to be made in a period of 10 to 15 minutes. It seems to me there is a great deal to be said for blunting an attack without causing any loss of life, and then, in the tranquility of the aftermath, making a decision about how to respond to the event that has taken place.

Senator EVANS. I am not sure I would go along with the word tranquility, but some other adjective that is similar might be suitable.

Mr. PERLE. It would beat the alternative. [Laughter.]

Senator EVANS. You mentioned—and I hope this is an accurate paraphrase of your statement—in talking about the concepts of MAD, that the Soviets would require massively smaller numbers of weapons to handle an American first strike than those they are now generating. Is that reasonably accurate?

Mr. PERLE. Yes. The capacity of the United States to attack even the fixed land-based silos of the Soviet Union is extremely limited.

Senator EVANS. Are you saying we need a massively smaller number for deterrence if we do not use a first strike? If so, then it seems to me we are placed in the position that you were suggesting the Soviets were in in handling our first strike.

Mr. PERLE. It is inconceivable to me that this country would launch a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union out of the blue and with the full weight of our strategic forces. I do not think democracies are capable of that kind of action. There are some people who believe we are incapable even of retaliating. I do not think that.

So the situation is a little different. God knows what decisions might be made in the totalitarian structure of the Soviet Union.

The fact is that much of our land-based deterrent would be destroyed if the Soviets attacked first. If we were confident that we would not be attacked, we could get by with a very much smaller force than the one that we have now. If we could achieve a significant reduction in Soviet offensive capability, we could get by with a very much smaller force than the one we have now, and that in a sentence is the underlying logic of our approach to the Soviets in Geneva as we seek deep reductions that would leave us with a more secure retaliatory capability at vastly lower levels on both sides.

Senator EVANS. That leads me to a third question, which relates to the principle of equality. You also said the Soviets, by building relentlessly for more than a decade, have accumulated more and larger forces than we possess. Do you think it is conceivable that we can reach an arms control agreement with the Soviets based on equality at any level when the end result of that would be for them to have to reduce while we presumably could stay at current levels or even increase to get to whatever level of equality we are talking about?

It seems to me pretty hard to assume that they would agree to such a proposal under any set of circumstances.

Mr. PERLE. I think if the situation were a static one I would share that conclusion. First, let me say that I hope that the levels we will propose to the Soviets will entail a reduction on both sides.

Senator EVANS. Oh, I would hope so, too.

Mr. PERLE. Now, obviously in some categories it will mean a deeper reduction on the Soviet side than on the American side, because the Soviets have surpassed us in those categories. And if the principle is equality, then it seems to me there is no alternative but to ask a deeper cut on the Soviet side.

Whether they would agree to that or not turns on a lot of considerations, one of which is what that balance will look like in the absence of an agreement if the United States carries forward its capability to put additional forces into the field.

I think the Soviets make very hard-headed calculations on these things. They look at their situation with and without an agreement and they have clear preferences for whatever advantage they might achieve, and if they think they can get an advantage in relative terms by agreeing, rather than permitting the competition to continue, they will opt for that.

They would rather get something for nothing, of course. This is where the support of the Congress is absolutely vital to our conduct of the negotiations. If they believe that they can appeal to our allies and to the Congress and surround and isolate the negotiators sent by the Government of the United States to represent us, then I think they will be very difficult indeed and in the end we will not produce satisfactory agreements.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Evans.

The Chair would like to announce, because I know many members of the committee are deeply interested in our bill on African famine and drought relief, that the Senate as a whole will be considering it shortly.

The majority leader has sent word to me that he will call for a recess of the Senate at 1 o'clock, probably to last until 2:30. We deeply appreciate this accommodation of our schedule.

In this round, could we have unanimous consent that we will have a 5-minute limit on questioning, and see whether that will accommodate many of the followup questions. And if not, we will try another round after that.

Senator Dodd, would you proceed, please.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if I just might go back to my last question, on the compliance with the provisions of the SALT II agreement. Secretary Perle, you mentioned the cruise missile issue as one. Of course, that was a part of the protocols and the protocols expired in 1982.

Could you be more specific with the committee as to exactly where you see Soviet violations of SALT II, in addition to the cruise missile?

Mr. Burt. Senator, let me clarify, at least for myself, and then Mr. Perle can speak for himself, my point concerning the cruise missile issue. And that was I was trying to distinguish between, say, violations of the letter of the agreement and violations of the spirit. And I think that the problem with the deployment of cruise missiles on Soviet submarines fits in more with the violation of the spirit aspect of the agreement.

In order for the Soviet Union to comply with both the numerical restrictions of the 1972 interim agreement as well as the quantitative levels of the SALT II agreement, they have taken old Y-class or Yankee class submarines and decommissioned them as ballistic missile submarines. But, as Mr. Perle pointed out, they have in the process modernized submarines so that they could carry, deploy, and presumably launch long-range cruise missiles.

It was certainly never in the view of the drafters of either the interim agreement or SALT II the intent to give the Soviet Union an additional number of cruise missile platforms. I think that the point is here that that action, regardless of whether it is a violation of the letter of the agreement, enhances overall Soviet strategic capability and tends to undercut the sort of residual or minimal political trust that is necessary to make the arms control process move ahead, and that that is the problem that is worth considering.

But as for violations of the letter, the most outstanding example, of course, is the ABM radar, which the President has judged is a violation. That radar is a large phased array radar. It is not fixed at the periphery of the Soviet Union and it is not pointed outwards. It is very hard to make a case that in any way that radar is consistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty.

The other I think important example of a violation is the Soviet practice of telemetry encryption, which has grown dramatically since the SALT II Treaty was signed by the Carter administration, to the point where there are many cases where we are not able to obtain any useful telemetry, which is of course necessary for our ability to verify the terms of the SALT II agreement, particularly the limitation placed on the development and deployment of new missiles.

That, by the way, is a third area where it is unambiguous in our view that the Soviet Union has gone forward and violated the terms of the treaty, deploying at least two new, totally new ICBM's, when the clear language of the SALT II Treaty was to permit only one new missile, one new land-based missile on both sides.

Now, we have examined some 20-odd different cases, and in many of these we have said that there is a probable violation or a possible violation. I have just given you three examples where we have drawn fairly firm conclusions about violations.

Senator Dodd. One was ABM. The other two were more in spirit than the actual——

Mr. Burt. No, no. The ABM radar, the telemetry encryption is a violation of the letter, and the development and deployment of new missile types in our view is a violation of the letter.

Senator Dodd. Mr. Perle, did you want to expand on that at all?

Mr. Perle. Well, there were other issues. The SS-16 is a missile the Soviets had agreed not to deploy. We believe there is evidence that it is in fact deployed, in contravention of the agreement.

When you talk about the spirit of the agreement, I think "spirit" does not do justice to the set of expectations that have evolved over many years of negotiations. Their violations have been very considerable indeed, beginning with the SALT I agreement, where the Soviets in some cases deliberately delayed the testing of new systems until the agreement was signed, because they had negotiated loopholes in those agreements that permitted those new systems to emerge, and because they knew that had we observed those systems before we signed we would have insisted on structuring the agreement differently.

It is a dismal record, and it is a record that is best summarized, I suppose, by looking at what was said in 1972 when this process began about our expectations for the future. In 1972 Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of Defense Laird, and President Nixon all described the agreement on offensive forces as a freeze, a freeze in the momentum of the Soviet buildup.

Since that time the Soviets have added 8,000 warheads on strategic systems. So it was not a freeze. It did not halt the momentum and, through a variety of devices, violations of the letter and the spirit of those agreements, we have seen an essentially unimpeded upward growth in Soviet strategic forces.

This has led people like Paul Nitze, who will be testifying tomorrow, who was involved in those negotiations, to reflect now, these years later, on the failure of that earlier negotiating effort. So we are now trying to do things differently, trying to insist on reductions as the only sure measure.

And I hope we will have the political support we need to remain patient long enough to see whether those reductions can be achieved.

Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I realize my time has run out. I have a luncheon engagement I was supposed to be at 20 minutes ago. Would my colleagues mind if I just pursued one more line and then leave a couple of written questions?

The Chairman. I do not see any frowns. Why do you not proceed.

Senator Dodd. Thank you.

I just tried to place a call to Secretary Baldrige at the Department of Commerce. Last week there were stories that he had sent letters to both the Department of Defense and State, and maybe others, regarding a subject that in fact you and I have discussed, Secretary Perle, at some length. It concerned the leakage of technology to the Soviet Union.

One, have you responded to his letters? I was surprised at the public discussion of all of this and his, and from what I interpreted, frustration over getting a response from the respective agencies, both at State and Defense, in this matter.

Have you responded to his letters? What is being done about his concern?

Mr. Perle. I believe we have responded. In any case, not long after the letter came in I was involved in assisting in the drafting of a response. We are very concerned about the problem he identifies.

Under the law, as I understand it, studies of a nonclassified nature done by the Department of Defense, every last one of them, must be turned over to the National Technical Information Service and disseminated freely to anyone who wishes to receive them. The Soviet Union, needless to say, is the single largest consumer of the reports made available by the National Technical Information Service.

The reason for that is that, in an effort to minimize the interference with free scientific communication in this country, a purpose with which I agree, we have tended over the years to relax the system of classification so that a tremendous amount of scientific research that bears directly on issues of national security is conducted in universities and in laboratories on an unclassified basis. Now, to put that on computer tape and transmit it to the Soviet Union seems to me absurd.

Secretary Baldrige takes the position that the law gives him no alternative but to make this material available, and if the Soviets are subscribers to the National Technical Information Service he has no choice but to convey these documents.

This administration, recognizing the problem, began early on to see whether it might not be possible to create a new classification, below the level of confidential, that could be applied after the fact to those unclassified studies that turned out to bear fundamentally on questions of military security.

In the several egregious cases cited by Secretary Baldrige in his letter to Secretary Weinberger, all but one took place before this administration came into office, and before we were able to put this new system into effect.

So we have taken steps to try to stop this among many sources by which the Soviets are acquiring extremely sensitive information that is being used against us and driving our defense budgets up. So we are sympathetic and delighted that he shares our concern. In some other areas, like the sale of technology, he has not always shared our concern, and if we are getting together now, after 4 years, I think that is a good thing.

Senator DODD. I think you and I agreed on the whole question of the contract sanctity question. I wish he had been strong in his views on that matter.

Do you have any comments at all on this, Secretary Burt?

Mr. BURT. No, I do not, Senator.

Senator DODD. Are you familiar with the situation?

Mr. BURT. Yes, I am familiar with it, and I know that we at the State Department take the problem very seriously. I think our view is precisely that of the Defense Department.

Mr. PERLE. We would, if I may say, since this seems an appropriate place to make the point, very much like to be relieved of the legal requirement to publish everything willy-nilly and without regard to the security implications. If we were given the legal authority to withhold from publication through the National Technical Information Service, we think that would be a very useful thing, because the alternative, frankly, is to return to a system in which more and more research is carried on under classified contracts.

The scientific community does not like that. The university community does not like that. We do not like it either. We are an open society, but we do not have to be damn fools.

And to require that something be disseminated without any serious review except a review for security classification seems to us to have gone much too far. And it is part of that general category of post-Watergate legislation that really deserves comprehensive review.

Senator DODD. I agree with you on that. We might not quite agree on the specifics, but I certainly could not agree with you more about this readily made available information that does compromise the security interests of our country.

Mr. Chairman, I am deeply grateful to you and to my colleagues for tolerating an additional 5 minutes. I have a couple of other questions that I will submit in writing. We did not get into the MX-Minuteman issue, which is a major issue for me. I apologize to both of you for having to leave a little early.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would like to follow up for a moment on the human rights question that you raised, Secretary Burt. Do you think the Jackson-Vanik amendment has been effective?

Mr. BURT. Well, it is very difficult to prove that one way or the other. I would just simply say that we certainly do support the general thrust and continue to support the general thrust of that amendment, and that is that we should make it very clear to the Soviet Union that there will not be improvements in other spheres of the United States-Soviet relationship, including trade and the economic area, unless there is real improvement in such areas as Jewish emigration.

Senator KASSEBAUM. This troubles me a little bit, because I do not think it has improved any, and yet, of course trade continues. And being from a wheat state, I would really not be the first to say that we should cut off the selling of wheat and so forth.

But I think the figures show that actually emigration of Soviet Jews has declined. If this is the case—and for instance, the Helsinki accords, which have been constantly violated, I really wonder why we continue to pay lip service.

Does this serve as an effective leverage? Or perhaps, if we recognize that it has not worked, should we try some other options and call a spade and spade?

Mr. BURT. Well, I think you have raised a very big and important area of U.S. policy versus the Soviet Union, and I will try to make some points. I know Mr. Perle, of course, who was involved earlier on with the Jackson-Vanik amendment, would like to make some points as well.

I think it is a major mistake to conclude that the philosophy behind Jackson-Vanik or this administration's current strategy or policy toward the Soviet Union in the human rights area has failed because numbers of emigrants has declined. I think it would be wrong-headed and immoral to allow the Soviet Union to treat people who would like to leave the Soviet Union as virtual hostages to favors or to U.S. economic payoffs.

I think we have, first of all, to recognize, as I was arguing before, that the Soviet Union for its very own reasons has enforced an across-the-board crackdown in its own country, that we are seeing a new period of virtual neo-Stalinism that is not only directed against the Jewish community in the Soviet Union, but has been directed against a number of people who are looking for greater freedom.

I think it is a mistake to give the Soviet Union the impression that these people can be used for bargaining purposes or for hostages. I think if you look at the facts about the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the numbers, you can make just about any case you would like to make about whether or not this led to an improvement or to a decline.

I think that the best way to assure the Soviet Union—or, rather, to assure that some progress will be made on this area in the Soviet Union is to make sure that they at the very highest level recognize that there cannot be considerable progress in any of the other important areas of the relationship—arms control, the regional aspects of the relationship, or the bilateral trade relationships—unless there is some progress in the human rights area.

It is not that this is a firm mechanistic linkage strategy, but it is a political fact of life that the American people, including the Congress and the President, pay attention to the human rights situation there.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I agree with you. I am just saying, what leverage do you believe would work? I guess I hear you saying that we really could say we would not pursue arms control efforts or trade and so forth. If indeed this linkage could be made, I do not know that I see any major shift in their human rights policy.

And I think you would agree they have violated the same human rights standards that have been embedded in the Helsinki accords—if we are not going to call their bluff, it becomes very much, I think, a paper tiger.

Mr. **Burt**. We have called their bluff on Helsinki. The real issue on Helsinki it seems to me is a tactical one: Do we want to abandon this agreement and this process, which in fact, as you know because you were in Stockholm only last year, you know is a very useful instrument for us to call the Soviet Union to account.

I think that the Soviet Union regrets having ever gone forward and signing the Helsinki Final Act, because I do not think they anticipated the extent to which they have given us a continuing instrument for publicly addressing their abuses in the human rights area.

We have upcoming meetings, for example, in Budapest on cultural issues. We have a meeting upcoming in Ottawa of human rights experts. This gives us a continuing instrument to explain to our own peoples what the Soviets have and have not done in the human rights area and to put the Soviet Union in the docket, so to speak.

So I think that is our major thinking about the Helsinki agreement. It is a continuing way to focus world attention on the problem.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, I have run out of time. I have not gotten to ask the question I really started out to ask. Do you mind if I just touch on it for a moment?

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed.

Senator KASSEBAUM. What means do you see by which we could enhance the independence, the relative independence of the Eastern European countries, without causing further Soviet repression?

Mr. BURT. I think the best way, Senator, with all due respect, is not to talk about it publicly.

Senator KASSEBAUM. To what?

Mr. BURT. To not talk about our strategy for enhancing the relative independence of the Eastern Europeans publicly.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But that is easy to say.

Mr. BURT. Well, the more we talk about it, the more we run the risk of bringing the Soviets down on the Eastern Europeans.

I will say that we have a strategy that we call differentiation, which allows us to recognize that there are important differences between the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries, and that there are important differences among the Eastern European countries. This is a policy approved by the President.

It gives us the ability in cultural areas, in human contacts, in trade, and in other fields to recognize that these differences exist, because the really fundamental basis or assumption of this policy is that the growth in national identity and the growth or the desire or the yearning for freedom that is so obvious and so evident in Eastern Europe is a genuinely historical development.

It is something that is not going to dissipate tomorrow. It is going to continue, and we need a policy that recognizes that. But to be very candid, it is something that we should not go into too much detail in public on and we should not try to crow about or we should not try to embarrass anybody about.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you. I very much agree. That is a thoughtful answer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

And thank you, Senator Kerry, for your indulgence. We will give you 10 minutes so that you will not have to run over the 5. [Laughter.]

Senator KERRY. I wish I could use it all, but unfortunately I have time constraints also.

Secretary Burt, I wonder if you would comment for a moment on the status of your discussions, if they are still ongoing, with Canada with respect to reciprocity on our businesses' capacity to invest and trade? Where does that stand at this time?

Mr. BURT. As a man once said, I am glad you asked me that question. This has been a concern of the Reagan administration for over 4 years, and I know it is a concern of many American businessmen.

The concern is directed mainly, I think, to two different pieces of Canadian legislation. One is the Foreign Investment Review Act [FIRA], and the other is the NEP [National Energy Policy].

As you know, there is a new Government in Canada, Prime Minister Mulroney's Conservative Government. They are undertaking an important review of both of these policies at the current time, and we expect some changes in their policies in both of these areas in the near future.

As you may know, they have already said, and Prime Minister Mulroney has gone public to say, that he wants to take the Foreign Investment Review Act and make it a much more flexible instrument for foreign investors. In other words, he wants to reduce the number of impediments and obstacles for foreign capital, including American capital, in Canada. We welcome those changes.

Next month, in about 2½ weeks, the President will be in Canada visiting with Mr. Mulroney at Quebec City. This is an issue that we have already agreed with the Canadians will be on our agenda. We are very satisfied with the progress that has been made to date.

Mr. Mulroney has said not only that he wants to give the United States the benefit of the doubt, but he has also announced that Canada is open for business again. So we will continue to talk to the Canadians in a firm but friendly fashion about the desire for reciprocity on both sides of the border, and we expect that we will make some progress in this area in the not too distant future.

Senator KERRY. Are we contemplating any particular stringent measures of any sort in order to try to guarantee that, or is that too early at this point?

Mr. BURT. Frankly, we do not think that is the way you treat a very close friend and neighbor. Mr. Mulroney has clearly signaled a philosophical departure from the policies of the earlier Trudeau period, the economic nationalism, the effort to keep American investment out, to artificially stimulate Canadian growth.

We felt for some time that that policy did not work. We told the previous Government in Canada we did not think it worked. But we do not have that problem now. There is not a philosophical argument with the current government. It is a new government. They are undertaking this review, and I think that we ought to wait and see what they come up with.

I expect what they come up with will be something that we can live with and that we will like.

Senator KERRY. With respect to the subject that Secretary Perle and I were talking about earlier, I asked this question the other day of the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain in order to sense what the British response was. But I would like to ask it to you, particularly in view of where you might be residing shortly.

The early theory with respect to the deployment of Pershing II's and cruise was to try to assure our allies and guarantee to people that, with respect to that region, the United States would be there in the event of some kind of confrontation, and also to provide them with a relative element of independence in their own choices.

If we deploy SDI, were it to be successful, et cetera, et cetera, in terms of assumptions, why would we not have then simply returned Europe to where it was before the deployment of cruise and Pershing II and put it in the position of once again being the potential first line battlefield?

Mr. BURT. That is a question which a number of people have asked and are asking in Europe, and I think this is a good opportunity for us to begin providing some answers. I think the first answer involves the whole question of U.S. vulnerability, and that is whether or not a vulnerable United States is likely to be a more or less credible ally to the Europeans.

Now, remember, the high water mark really of the credibility of the U.S. guarantee to Europe was in the 1950's, when the United States for all practical purposes was invulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack. Nobody doubted the readiness and the ability of the United States to go to war to defend Europe at a time when the United States was for the most part invulnerable to attack.

In fact, the key reason that questions have arisen about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe and led to, as you pointed out, in part the December 1979 decision to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing II systems in Europe in the absence of an arms control agreement was the fact that the Soviet Union engaged in a massive nuclear buildup, which caused some people to question the willingness of the United States to go to war for the Europeans.

Now, that raises a question. If the United States becomes less vulnerable to attack, does that not make the U.S. nuclear umbrella or guarantee more reliable, rather than less? I mean, the logic in my mind is very clear.

A second answer is that—and I just reiterate here what Richard Perle has said and, more importantly, what the President has said since March 1983, which is that the SDI program is not a go-it-alone program. What we have in mind here is not some kind of umbrella, some kind of system of continental defense for the United States alone, but a system that could be used to provide defense for all the allies.

I think there is an assumption—it was in part inherent, I think, in what Senator Evans was asking earlier—that it would be more difficult to defend our allies than ourselves. Well, in fact that is not true. In some cases, it is much easier to defend against shorter-range tactical ballistic missiles than intercontinental range systems. A terminal defense is easier, given the nature of the angle of attack of those systems.

So we have not ruled out and will not rule out the possibility——

Senator KERRY. Is it easier under SDI as currently contemplated?

Mr. BURT. Well, when you say "under SDI as currently contemplated," I think we all have to recognize that what we are talking about is not one specific system. We are talking about a family of programs and technologies that involve everything from boost phase intercept, that run the gamut all the way to terminal defense.

Nobody, not even General Abrahamson, who is head of the SDI office at the Pentagon, is able to tell you right now what a deployable SDI system might look like. But what is clear is that we are not only going to, one, consult closely with the allies on our approach to both the system and arms control implications; but, two, that we are going to involve them, where we can, in the research effort to explore this area; and three, they are going to be beneficiaries of SDI.

I might point out that they are a lot more familiar and comfortable with the concept of defense than we are. They have an air defense capability, many of the Europeans. We have virtually none in the United States. So they I think are more comfortable with the concept, and it is more compatible with a lot of their existing defense programs than it is with ours.

Senator KERRY. If I could just follow up on that a little with Secretary Perle. I gather the current plans contemplate a long period of transition or a relatively long period of transition between offense and defense. I wonder why in fact during that period there would not be a greater propensity for a first strike as a consequence of somebody's perception that they are in fact capable of firing and then, because of the presence of the transition, more capable of returning a counterforce attack, and therefore feeling this is the moment to do it.

I mean, if you are dealing with these kinds of assumptions, and say you are going to deliver these systems in the first place, why is it not realistic to also deal with those assumptions at the midline process and to say, wait a minute, we are actually less stable now than we were before?

Mr. PERLE. I think it is a fair point. The most difficult set of issues to make judgments about is the period of transition, although I rather doubt that the Soviets would be inclined to initiate a nuclear war because they feared that at some point in the future we would have deployed systems that would degrade their offensive capability. And indeed, as you were suggesting a moment ago, they would be more likely, if they felt bound to respond to the SDI by increasing their offensive forces, to make that sort of response with a view to neutralizing the SDI rather than initiating a nuclear war that would have the consequences we know a nuclear war would have.

Whether they go as far as a nuclear winter or not, they would be devastating on both sides. So I think we can get through a transitional period and we can manage a transitional period. It may even be the case that we can manage it on a fairly cooperative basis. That remains to be seen. I do not think we will know that until we get rather more deeply into these negotiations. But I think you are right to identify the transition phase as one about which we need to do a great deal of thinking.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PERLE. Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether you intend to continue or not, but I did want to say a word about Jackson-Vanik if I might.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as a continuation of Senator Kassebaum's last question, please make a comment.

Mr. PERLE. I think it is important, Senator Kassebaum, to remember the origin of Jackson-Vanik and to remember what freedom it provides the President. It is of course the law of the land and this administration intends to implement that law fully. It has no plans whatever to alter the law or to come to Congress and propose any change to it.

If you look back over the numbers of visas issued from the time that the amendment was first introduced in June 1972—and in June 1972 we were on the verge of a complete cutoff, because the Soviets at that point introduced an education tax and they were simply not issuing visas to anyone who had even a grade school education.

The numbers have gone up and down over the years. While Jackson-Vanik was pending in the Congress, the number rose steadily and achieved a high of approximately 50,000 in the year that Jackson-Vanik passed. The number then declined in the immediate aftermath of Jackson-Vanik, and ultimately it rose again and achieved 50,000 in the 1980's.

So about the only conclusion one can draw is that the Soviets are both capricious and malicious in the way that they issue visas according to some alchemy that we do not understand. It applies, by the way, not only to Russian Jews, but to the Volga Germans, for example, and other nationalities.

Now, the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the law provides that the President may grant the benefits that are otherwise denied to the Soviet Union and to some other countries—that is, most-favored-nation status and credits—if the Soviets will give assurances that they will take steps to liberalize their emigration practices.

That amendment to the amendment was agreed upon following a lengthy negotiation between the executive and legislative branches, between Senator Jackson and some other Senators on the one side and Henry Kissinger on the other. If one looks back at an exchange of letters between Kissinger and Jackson dated October 18, 1983, you will see that a significant negotiation took place between the United States and the Soviet Union with the Jackson-Vanik amendment pending.

The Soviets made certain commitments in the course of that negotiation that are reflected in statements made by Henry Kissinger to Senator Jackson and in the response from Senator Jackson to Henry Kissinger. Subsequent to that exchange of letters, Kissinger testified to the effect that an agreement had in fact been reached, according to which the amendment would be modified to permit the President to waive the provisions in response to a Soviet commitment to permit a sizable outflow and under certain specified conditions. That agreement remains valid if and when the Soviets wish to implement their half of it.

So I think it is fair to say that the current situation is one in which, if the Soviets wish to receive most-favored-nation status and credits from the U.S. Government, the mechanism is perfectly clear. They need only implement the agreement that was reached now a decade ago. And I am confident that under those circumstances the President would make the necessary waiver and forward the necessary assurances to Congress.

I believe—and I have met literally hundreds of people who believe, although I think there are thousands of them—that there are people living in freedom today who owe their freedom to that amendment, to the proposition it put forward, which was that if we were going to make trade concessions—and credits and MFN are concessions—then we had a right to expect something in return, and what we expected in return was a chance for freedom for some thousands of Soviet citizens.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum, do you have additional questions of the witnesses?

Senator KASSEBAUM. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry?

Senator KERRY. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. On behalf of the committee, I thank both of the witnesses. We appreciate your articulate responses and your willingness to stay with us until 1:30.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, February. 26, 1985.]

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1985

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Mathias, Boschwitz, Pressler, Trible, Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, and Kerry.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

We resume this morning the series of comprehensive hearings by the Foreign Relations Committee on the future of American foreign policy. For the past week, the committee has devoted its attention to the theme of Soviet-American relations and arms control.

Last week the committee considered the overall Soviet-American relationship in an effort to understand more fully where arms control fits into the overall bilateral relationship, and to determine the prospects for arms control in the development of a longer term political relationship with the Soviet Union.

Yesterday, the committee heard from Richard Perle and Richard Burt with respect to the strategic competition with the Soviet Union and the differences between the American and Soviet approaches to defining and implementing strategic goals, and for managing that competition.

This morning the committee turns its attention to the upcoming arms control talks. Our negotiators will be departing soon for Geneva to begin a new round of negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms reductions.

The expanded Soviet role and influence in the world, undergirded by growing Soviet military power, leads to the conclusion that we have no choice in the foreseeable future but to maintain our military strength. However, if the United States is perceived as possessing the political will to use it in defense of our vital interests, there can still be considerable scope for policies, including arms control, that contribute to restrained and even constructive relationships with the Soviet Union.

However, progress in arms control is likely to be very limited unless the United States and its allies are clear among themselves and make it clear to the Soviet Union that assertive uses of power and efforts to shift the geopolitical balance are fundamentally incompatible with productive and constructive relations in other respects.

The issue of "restructuring" Soviet-American relations has been at the heart of some recent efforts to "thaw" relations between the two countries. Since early 1984, the administration has undertaken a broad reconsideration of the role of arms control, attempting in some ways to integrate arms control more fully into U.S. defense planning and military policy and within a broader design for Soviet-American relations.

However, when one surveys Soviet-American relations today, there would appear to be little left of them except arms control. While there are obvious dangers to an "arms control-bound" Soviet-American dialog, the Geneva talks commencing on March 12 will provide us with the first opportunity in several years to test Soviet willingness to move toward a more stable, longer term, and less threatening relationship.

The committee is pleased to welcome this morning Ambassador Paul Nitze and the three arms control negotiators nominated by the President to conduct the tripartite talks in Geneva: Ambassador Max Kampelman, Senator John Tower, and Ambassador Maynard Glitman.

Ambassador Kampelman has been nominated to head the overall effort as well as the space and defensive arms talks. Senator Tower has been nominated to head the strategic arms reduction talks. And Ambassador Glitman has been nominated to head the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Yesterday the President formally nominated the latter three gentlemen to these positions. The Department of State has provided the committee with a portion of the background information that the committee requires of all nominees prior to action being taken on the nominations.

We are still awaiting documentation from the Office of Government Ethics. However, I have asked committee members to utilize this hearing this morning to tender to the three nominees any questions relating to the confirmation process. An additional hearing could be called, of course, should committee members so desire.

The Chair will first call upon Ambassador Nitze to offer testimony, and following questions put to Ambassador Nitze by the committee, I will then ask the three nominees to join him at the witness table so that we might have an opportunity to question all of them.

Before asking Ambassador Nitze to proceed with his testimony, I would normally call upon Senator Pell, the ranking minority member, but he has been temporarily delayed this morning. He may have a statement later when he appears.

Senator Trible, do you have any opening comment to the hearing this morning?

Senator TRIBLE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I do not, as a junior member, usually have this opportunity, so I will seize it.

I want to welcome these distinguished gentlemen to the committee hearing this morning, and observe that an arms reduction treaty that is fair and enforceable will not be easily achieved, and it will call for great patience and skill on the part of this negotiating team and our Nation.

I am pleased with the President's choices. In these four gentlemen we have rare experience and expertise. I wish you well. I want to especially welcome my friend, John Tower, back to the U.S. Senate.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Trible.

Ambassador Nitze, would you proceed with your testimony?

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL NITZE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador NITZE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to be with you this morning to discuss the U.S. strategic concept for the upcoming Geneva negotiations, and some of my thoughts as to the substance of those negotiations. In preparing for January's meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, we developed a strategic concept encompassing our view of how we would like to see the United States-Soviet strategic relationship evolve.

That concept, which is at the heart of our approach to next month's talks, can be summarized in four sentences. During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space.

We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of nonnuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms.

This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

This concept entails three time phases, the near term, a transition phase, and an ultimate phase. For the near term, at least the next 10 years, we will continue to base deterrence on the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation. Today's technology provides no alternative. That being said, we will press for radical cuts in the number and power of strategic and intermediate range nuclear arms.

Nuclear arsenals are entirely too high, and potentially destructive, particularly in the more destabilizing categories such as the large MIRV'ed Soviet ICBM's and SS-20 forces. At the same time, we will seek to reverse the erosion that has occurred in the ABM Treaty regime as a result of Soviet actions.

These include, for example, construction of a large phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. For the near term, we intend to pursue the SDI research program in full compliance with the ABM Treaty which permits such research. Likewise, we expect the Soviets will continue their investigation of the possibilities of new defensive technologies as they have intensively for many years.

Should new defensive technologies prove feasible in the future, we would want to make a transition to a more stable and reliable balance based on a mix of offensive and defensive systems. We have offered to begin discussions with the Soviets now, in the upcoming talks, as to how we might together manage such a transition.

I should note that the criteria by which we will judge the feasibility of new defensive technologies will be demanding. The technologies must produce defensive systems that are reasonably survivable. If not, the defenses would themselves be tempting targets for a first strike. This would decrease rather than enhance stability.

Moreover, new defenses should be cost effective at the margin. That is, effective enough and cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability to overcome the defense.

Otherwise, the defensive systems could, if not restrained by mutual agreement, encourage a proliferation of countermeasures and offensive weapons to overcome deployed defenses instead of a redirection of effort from offense to defense.

If the new technologies cannot meet these standards, we would not deploy them. We would then continue to base deterrence on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation. However, we hope and have high expectations that the scientific community can respond to the challenge.

Should a transition be possible, arms control would play an important role. We would, for example, seek continued reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Concurrently, we would envisage the sides beginning to test, develop, and deploy survivable and cost effective defenses, with particular emphasis on nonnuclear defenses.

Deterrence would thus begin to rely more on a mix of offensive nuclear and defensive systems instead of on the threat of offensive nuclear arms alone. This transition would continue for some time, perhaps decades.

As the United States and Soviet strategic intermediate range nuclear arsenals declined significantly, we would seek to negotiate reductions in other types of nuclear weapons, and involve in some manner the other nuclear powers.

Given the right technical and political conditions, we would hope to be able to continue the reduction of all nuclear weapons down to zero. This, of course, would have far-reaching implications for the military balance at all levels.

For example, absent a nuclear deterrent, a stable conventional balance would be far more important than today. We would have to devote particular attention to how, together with our allies, we might counter and diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances.

The total elimination of nuclear weapons would be accompanied by widespread deployments of effective nonnuclear defenses. These would provide assurance that were one country to cheat, for example, by clandestinely building ballistic missiles, it would not gain an exploitable military advantage.

To overcome the defenses, cheating would have to be conducted on a large scale, of too great a magnitude to pass unnoticed before appropriate countermeasures could be taken. Were we to reach the ultimate phase, deterrence would be based on the ability of the defense to deny success to a potential aggressor's attack, whether nuclear or conventional. The strategic relationship could then be characterized as one of mutual assured security.

Having outlined our strategic concept, let me offer some comments on it. First, the concept is wholly consistent with deterrence, not only in the near term, but in both the transition and ultimate phases as well.

Deterrence would continue to provide the basis for the United States-Soviet strategic relationship. Deterrence requires that a potential opponent be convinced that the risks and costs of aggression far outweigh the gains he might hope to achieve. The popular view of deterrence has been that it is a matter of posing to an aggressor high potential costs through the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation.

But deterrence can also function effectively if one has the ability to deny the attacker the gains he might otherwise have hoped to realize. Our intent is to shift the deterrent balance from one based primarily on the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation to one in which nuclear arms are greatly reduced on both sides and nonnuclear defenses play a greater and greater role.

We believe the latter would provide a far sounder basis for a stable and reliable strategic relationship. Let me note, however, that for the foreseeable future, even in the early stages of a possible transition, offensive nuclear forces will be the key element of deterrence.

I thus urge you to support the strategic modernization program.

Second, we recognize that the transition period, if defensive technologies prove feasible, and we decide to move in that direction, could be tricky. We would have to bring about a mix of survivable offensive and defensive systems that over time would steadily reduce incentives in a crisis for a first strike.

That is why we would seek to make the transition a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets, and have offered now to begin talking with them about the issues that would have to be dealt with.

My third comment is that even as we endeavor to achieve our goal of a world from which nuclear weapons have been eliminated, we realize that there would still be major risks. The technique of making nuclear weapons is well known, and cannot be excised. The danger of breakout or cheating would continue.

Moreover, there would also be the potential problem of suitcase nuclear bombs and the like, but even if all risks cannot be eliminated, they can be greatly reduced. Nothing is wholly risk-free. One must compare the alternatives. It seems to me that the risks posed by cheating or suitcase bombs in a world from which nuclear arms had been eliminated from military arsenals would be orders of magnitude less than the risks and potential costs posed by a possible breakdown in the present deterrence regime based solely upon the ultimate threat of massive nuclear retaliation.

This concept underpins our approach to next month's Geneva negotiations. In those talks, we will advance positions consistent with and designed to further the concept I have just outlined.

The administration is now engaged in an intensive process to develop U.S. positions for each of the three areas of those negotiations, strategic nuclear arms, intermediate range nuclear arms, and defense and space arms.

Based on the exchanges between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Gromyko in January and subsequent Soviet public commentary, it is clear that there are major substantive differences between the approaches of the two sides.

On strategic arms, the Soviets speak of readiness to consider "radical reductions" and the renunciation of new types of strategic weapons such as long-range cruise missiles, ICBM's, SLBM's, and bombers. It is unclear whether the Soviets have accepted "radical reductions" in the sense that we have proposed.

Their offer to renounce new types of strategic weapons appears to be little more than a repackaging of the Soviet nuclear freeze proposal. On INF, the Soviets repeat familiar elements of their position, for example, that U.S. LRINF missiles are "strategic systems" and that British and French systems must be taken into account.

They can be expected to call for a halt to United States deployments and Soviet "countermeasures" to be followed by reductions in medium-range missiles in Europe. The Soviets have not demanded withdrawal of already deployed U.S. missile systems as a precondition for negotiations.

It is unclear whether they continue to rule out the possibility of an agreement permitting some U.S. INF deployments.

As to the third area, the Soviets insist on the "nonmilitarization" of space. They explain they mean by that a ban on all arms in space that are "designed to" attack objects on space or on Earth and all systems on Earth that are "designed to" attack objects in space.

They have expressed opposition to research efforts into such systems in spite of their own sizable efforts in this field, which include the only currently operational ABM and antisatellite systems. There has been some speculation about the near term possibilities for new limitations in this area.

We will, of course, listen and assess carefully any Soviet proposals in this area, but I take the personal view that those possibilities are at this time limited. Let me explain in some detail.

The defense and space negotiations cannot be viewed as being comparable to bartering a number of rugs for a camel. It will be a quite different and more serious type of negotiation. Most of the defense and space issues were negotiated and agreed many years ago. At this time there is not that much to negotiate about.

Soviet talk about nonmilitarization of space is nonsense. There are numerous military satellites in space, most of them Soviet. I would add that some of these military satellites on both sides, such as warning, communications, and national technical means satellites, serve extremely useful purposes.

Stationing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in space is banned by the Outer Space Treaty. Testing of nuclear explosions in space is banned by the Limited Test Ban Treaty. All systems which can counter strategic ballistic missile RV's, whether in space or otherwise, are controlled by the ABM Treaty.

That treaty prohibits the deployment of ABM systems in space or on Earth except for precisely limited fixed land based elements. ABM systems otherwise permitted by the ABM Treaty but based upon other physical principles are subject to agreed statement D of the treaty. Such systems cannot be deployed without prior consultation and amendment to the treaty.

This covers high energy lasers, neutral particle beam systems, kinetic energy systems, et cetera. Thus the ABM Treaty provides a basis should new defensive technologies prove feasible for discussing how those systems might be integrated in the sides' force structures.

Research cannot be monitored or controlled by agreement. I believe the Soviets share this view. The only space activity that remains to be negotiated about is ASAT systems not covered by the above. This is a restricted class.

Exo-atmospheric ABM systems, including the existing Galosh ABM systems deployed near Moscow, have an inherent capability as ASAT systems. Satellites tend to be softer than RV's and travel on a predictable course. They thus are more vulnerable than RV's on ballistic trajectory.

ASAT's with an ABM capability are already limited by the ABM Treaty. In fact, any ballistic missile capable of launching a nuclear warhead into space to orbital altitudes has some potential ASAT capability.

The principal ASAT capabilities not covered by existing limitations are nonnuclear systems capable of attacking satellites but uncapable of countering ICBM RV's. This restricted class of systems includes the operational Soviet coorbital ASAT and the aircraft-launched miniature vehicle system now under development by the United States.

Observation of testing is essential to assessing a system's capabilities. However, once a system such as the Soviet coorbital ASAT has been sufficiently tested to be operational, its deployment is far more difficult to monitor.

In sum, banning all ASAT systems is a very difficult, if not impossible proposition. I am personally skeptical whether we can achieve a militarily significant and verifiable ban on the testing and deployment of nonnuclear systems capable of attacking satellites but incapable of countering RV's.

I therefore believe that the far more important issue for the defense and space forum is whether in the short run the Soviets can be persuaded to recognize the importance of their abiding by the ABM Treaty and ceasing to undermine or erode the assumptions upon which it was based.

As to the longer term, this is the forum in which we will have an opportunity to discuss with them the advantages to them as well as to us of agreeing on the way in which advanced defense systems, should they prove feasible, could be incorporated into the forces of the two sides to our long-run mutual advantage.

In addition to our substantive differences, we and the Soviets disagree on the relationship between the three subject areas. The Soviets maintain that the three areas, strategic nuclear, intermediate range nuclear, and defense and space arms, must not only be discussed in their interrelationship, but that it is not possible to implement an agreement in one area without agreement in the others.

We believe otherwise. If the sides come to agreement in one area, we see no sense in a self-denying rule that would prevent the sides from implementing an agreement that would serve the interests of both.

As you can see, the negotiators have their work cut out for them. The process will be complex and possibly lengthy. I do not expect the Soviets to accept immediately our viewpoint or our concept as to how the future strategic relationship should evolve, but with persistence, patience, and constructive ideas, we hope the Soviets will come themselves to see the merits of our position, that it will serve their national interests as well as ours.

It is important that we keep our expectations in check, and that we prepare ourselves and the public for a long process. January's agreement to begin new negotiations in Geneva has not changed our complicated and genuinely competitive relationship with the Soviets. If anything, the January discussions confirmed that these negotiations will be difficult ones.

As I described to you, the Soviets made a major effort to establish an interrelationship between those areas of the negotiation where they will try to use Western interest in prompt progress in the negotiations as leverage. The fact that the Soviets have agreed to these talks does not mean that they are ready to drop their unacceptable substantive positions at the table, or to give up their propaganda campaign outside the conference room.

It is likely therefore that in the new negotiations the Soviets will at some time attempt to hold progress on intermediate range and strategic nuclear arms hostage to our movement in the defense and space forum where they clearly want to inhibit the U.S. research program on strategic defense.

In doing so, they will seek every opportunity to exploit any divisions within the NATO Alliance and within the United States, just as in 1983, Moscow will attempt to appeal to Western publics over the heads of Western governments. I am confident that, as in 1983, they will fail.

This will, of course, require a coordinated effort on our part, both at home and with friends abroad, to ensure that the Soviets are forced to conclude that there is no alternative but to negotiate seriously. In particular, congressional support will be vital to convincing the Soviets that their public campaign cannot bear fruit, that they must join with us in serious bargaining.

Since the Soviets walked out of the Geneva talks in late 1983, we have made clear that we were ready to return without preconditions. One can only speculate on what prompted the Soviets to join us in new negotiations without insisting on a number of things they had very strongly promoted in the interim.

One plausible motive, however, is that they wished to recreate the instrument for putting pressure on the United States that negotiations uniquely provide. Contrary to their expectations, their walkouts in late 1983 made it more difficult for them to mobilize public opinion in Europe and America against the U.S. approach on a whole range of security and arms control issues.

We can expect them to use the fact of renewed negotiations to argue once again that U.S. programs and approach will jeopardize the prospects for success in the negotiations. We believe that the argument is baseless. On the contrary, just as alliance, solidarity, and the strength of support in the Congress for the U.S. defense modernization effort at home and abroad are key factors in explaining our success thus far, we believe that they will be critical to the prospect of achieving the kind of effective and verifiable arms control agreements that we hope will emerge from the process that is about to begin.

For these reasons, I believe it would be unwise to reverse course and curtail our commitment to our strategic modernization programs, particularly the MX missile. To do so would send a signal of weakness and lack of resolve to the Soviet Union at just the time when we need to show strength of commitment and unity of purpose and deny the United States and its allies an important capability.

It would also be most unwise to curtail research in strategic defenses. This research, fully consistent with the ABM Treaty, is a down payment on a future we all hope we can achieve, the radical reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. As such, it is a vital part of our coherent national security program, both modernization and arms control.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Nitze.

The procedure for the committee, which the chairman announced at the beginning of the hearing, will be as follows. We will have questions of Ambassador Nitze at this point, with a 10-minute rule for each Senator.

This will take us approximately to 11:25 if every Senator utilizes all 10 minutes, and no one must do that. Then we will call the three nominees to the table.

I am advised that Ambassador Kampelman will make a statement, and that the other two nominees will submit their statements for the record; we will then proceed to 10-minute questioning of the nominees.

It is the intention of the Chair to proceed right through to the end of the hearing, because legislation that has been offered by our committee is on the floor. Debate on the floor will commence again at 2 o'clock, following the party caucuses.

So, with that in mind, I will proceed with the questioning at this point. Ambassador Nitze, I note that in your discussion of the strategic defense initiative, you have offered criteria by which we would judge the feasibility of the new defensive technologies. Although this may have appeared before, this is the most explicit rendering that I have seen.

You have suggested that the technologies must produce defensive systems that are reasonably survivable, and second, that new defenses should be cost-effective at the margin—that is, effective enough and cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability.

Now, both of those points are important, I suppose, in terms of your observations with respect to the longer term future with the Soviets. In your own judgment, given the very tough position the Soviets have taken publicly since the beginning of the SDI discussion, in what time period is it reasonable to assume that they might take a different position on the mutually advantageous aspects of defensive systems?

From your experience as a negotiator, you appreciate more so than any of us the tedious quality of and the slow movement in arms reduction negotiations. But if you were to advise the American people as to possible time frames in which initial talks began to consider the mutually useful aspects which defensive weapons might have in combination with offensive weapons, how long is this likely to take, and when might the Soviets likely show any recognition of the validity of this idea?

Ambassador NITZE. It is really very hard to predict what the evolution of thought will be, particularly in the Politburo and in the organs which control Soviet policy on all important matters, including arms control. This is not just a matter of the negotiators on the other side of the table, but of the people who make the fundamental decisions in the U.S.S.R.

So, the best I can do, really, is to try to look at the problem from Moscow, putting myself in the position, say of an adviser to the staff of the Central Committee in Moscow; how would I then look at it? I think I would look at the whole range of problems that we, now speaking for the Soviet Union, face.

And I would look at what is going on in the rest of the world, what is going on in the Third World, what is going on in Europe, what is going on in the United States, what is going on in China. I think I would pay perhaps more attention to what is going on in China than any place else. I would also consider what is going on internally within the Soviet Union. Then I would try to judge what is the best policy for us in Moscow.

Is it better for us to try to work out with the United States some way in which we could get out of this tremendously dangerous and expensive, not just in terms of money situation—the Soviets do not look at things just from the standpoint of expense in money, but they do look at it from the standpoint of expense in talented manpower, in basic resources, and what alternate things they could do with those resources.

Certainly they have been making an immense sacrifice in order to maintain the military establishment that they now have. If there were, in fact, and if they came to conclude that there was, a sound basis by which it would be possible to terminate these expenditures and reduce the risks that are inherent in the current situation, I think I, as an advisor to the staff of the Central Committee, would come to the conclusion that this is something we Soviets ought to take seriously.

Now, how long, before, and whether they will come to such a conclusion, how long that would take, frankly, I do not know that anybody could put a timeframe upon it. What I was discussing today is a long-term view.

I think it is important to get this long-term view out on the table and have it understood. So it is not just a question of next week or next month or 6 months from now, but it is a question of moving toward an understandable long-term objective which does not differ that much from what the Soviets have said.

They always use language in a way which means something, or which can mean something, different from what the words mean to us. But still, they have been in favor of, for a long period of time, of the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. They talk about radical reductions. They talk about most of the things that are contained in the U.S. program. I think it would be difficult for them to move rapidly in the direction we advocate, but not impossible.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Nitze, as discussion has occurred on the strategic defense initiative, one of the reasons advanced in favor of it is that it may provide the only opportunity to move away from the increasingly unacceptable notion of mutual assured destruction; that in the absence of some movement toward a mixture of offensive and defensive weapons systems designed to enhance deterrence, both parties are condemned to continue perfection of offensive nuclear weapons as the main element of their strategic competition to the detriment of nuclear deterrence and international stability.

If we are not successful with the strategic defense initiative, are there alternative means for shoring up deterrence other than primary reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation?

Ambassador NITZE. I think one can reduce the risks involved in the current situation. The only thing we know how to do today is to base deterrence ultimately upon the threat of nuclear retaliation.

I think one can reduce the risks of such a relationship by radical reductions in offensive systems, particularly of those that have the greatest first strike capability, the highly effective and accurate Soviet MIRV'ed systems.

That is what we have been doing for some period of time, and that is the essence of our program with respect to the Strategic Force Reduction Program, and that is what one of our delegations is addressing itself to. One cannot count on the fact that our technology will in fact produce survivable and cost-effective defensive systems and therefore one also has to deal with the contingency that we have to continue to live with the kind of deterrence that we are now facing.

In our opinion, this would not be as good a solution as the kind of mix of offensive and defensive systems that one could envisage in the transition phase, and certainly is much less sound than the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, but one may not be able to achieve that. Therefore one has to continue to plan and try to get a mitigation of the risks that are involved in the mutual assured destruction kind of deterrence.

The CHAIRMAN. From your experience as a negotiator in arms control talks, would you describe for the benefit of the committee and the American public what is likely to be the pace of these talks? What can we anticipate in the first few weeks or months or even years of what you have described as a very long procedure?

I ask this question because I suspect that many Americans are impatient to get on with negotiations, to strike a balance, to split the middle, and you have pointed out that that is not the type of negotiation that will likely prove conducive to that approach.

What is the nature of these negotiations? Can you give us some description of what you foresee?

Ambassador NITZE. I might quote from our opposite number during SALT I, Soviet Ambassador Semenov. Once when we were discussing a similar question with respect to the SALT I negotiations, he said, well, in a negotiation of this type, about a third of the business is done in the first 2 or 3 months, and about a third of the business is done during the next 2 years, and a third of the business is done in the last 20 minutes.

Now, as it turned out in SALT I he was off somewhat, but not that far off. It was not the last 20 minutes, but it was the last 3 days in the SALT I negotiations where the final tradeoffs were made.

Now, I do not know whether that bears upon what one can look to in the future of these negotiations. I just quote this from my Soviet friend as to the way that he looked at a serious negotiation of this type.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator Pell, do you have questions for Ambassador Nitze?

Senator PELL. Thank you. Are we on the 5-minute rule?

The CHAIRMAN. The 10-minute rule.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First there is a short statement that I would like to make to the effect that I am very glad, as we all are, that we have these three prospective negotiators and Ambassador Nitze with us today.

Ambassadors Kampelman and Glitman have already done a good job as negotiators with the Russians, and our esteemed colleague, Senator Tower, is a master from his responsibilities in the Senate. I do not think the Soviets will find any of our negotiators a soft touch, and all of you, when confirmed, will play key roles in determining whether there is to be any arms control success by the administration in the next 4 years.

I think it right, though, that arms control meet high standards, because our national security, our very lives and being are at stake. However, we must understand that our defense programs and arms control can go together to form a strong national security fabric.

With only arms control and weak defenses, we would be helpless before our adversaries, and they are indeed strong and unrelenting. Without arms control and with only defense programs, we will spend our national treasure with no certainty that we will increase our security one jot.

We now face, as we all know, a wonderful new opportunity. The stage has been set for success in the Geneva talks if the administration wants that success and if the Soviets want that success. We have proved we will go ahead with missile deployments in Europe absent an agreement.

We have proved in two administrations there is a broad consensus for a strong defense. The Soviets themselves profess that they are now willing to seek agreement. The chance is waiting to be seized. I hope that opportunity will be seized. I know each of you will bring a different perspective to the problem, and I know how differing perspectives can affect the final outcome.

But as ranking member of this committee and cochairman of the Senate Arms Control Observers Group, I hope the administration will work honestly and assiduously to bring about the kind of compromise in the negotiations which can lead to good and productive agreements.

In these negotiations, I think we would be very wise to recall what President Kennedy displayed at the time of the Cuban missile crisis when he seized on the positive and built on that rather than seizing on the negative.

I am reminded here, too, that when it came to the Soviet proposals on space, when the Soviets proposed that there be a moratorium which was to their advantage, we clamped on that and ignored their suggestion that there should be a dismantling of weapons in space.

That was an example in reverse of what we should have done. We focused on the negative, and there actually was no result. What I hope happens in Geneva is that we will find the positive proposals and focus on them and build on them.

I fear that each side will make negative comments for rhetoric and political reasons, or for whatever reason, but I do hope that the emphasis on the positive that Kennedy displayed at the time of the Bay of Pigs crisis, will be followed.

Now, forgive that short statement. I would now like to get to questions.

I would like to ask Ambassador Nitze, who has done such a wonderful job in this field for so many years, what is being done now to consult with our allies on SDI, and will the allies be part of the process, or will they merely be informed?

Ambassador NITZE. We have done a great deal in consulting with our allies on SDI. The principal forum for consultation has been the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. We sent teams, including General Abrahamson and his team, which included people from the State Department and the Defense Department. They have done briefings there. They have also gone to capitals because the individual governments have wanted to be briefed on these problems.

Now, the consultation between the allies and ourselves goes on continuously. After these briefings at the North Atlantic Council, there are sessions at which each country is invited to bring experts, and those experts meet after, or on the margin of, the NAC meetings. So I think there is a procedure arrived at which was developed earlier in connection with the START negotiations.

The INF consultation has been of a slightly different nature, because of the fact that the INF weapons are all on the territory of the European NATO countries, and they have an immediate interest in what happens. Therefore nothing has been done in that field without prior full and detailed agreement between all of the deploying countries and NATO as a whole.

With respect to START, it has been more a method of consultation prior to action rather than requiring a unanimous consensus.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I have one other question, Mr. Ambassador. Do you believe that we should continue our policy of not undercutting SALT after the expiration date on December 31?

Ambassador NITZE. This is a decision which has not been made yet, and I would prefer not to comment on it. A rule that I learned from Chip Bohlen was to avoid commenting on decisions which were in the process of being made in the executive branch.

Senator PELL. A very good rule indeed. I have no further questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Nitze, I would like to thank you for a statement which is marked by the care and the precision that are your hallmarks. I think in giving us this statement today you have made a very valuable contribution to the national dialog on what is certainly the most vital conversation that we have had in our generation. I am grateful to you for it.

I would like to revert to your description of your fictional role as an advisor to the Central Committee looking at long-term policy. Let me ask you, in your agricultural operations in southern Maryland, are you familiar with that instrument of high technology known as the hay wagon?

Ambassador NITZE. I am indeed.

Senator MATHIAS. And you are aware that the object of using the hay wagon is to get hay from the field into safe, dry storage in the barn?

Ambassador NITZE. Yes, indeed.

Senator MATHIAS. And in order to get the hay in, you have to calculate how much you can safely transport on the wagon. You have to calculate the factor of how powerful your tractor is, if you use a tractor. I can remember in southern Maryland when they still used oxen, but I assume we are beyond that.

How powerful is your tractor? How strong is your wagon? How much hay will it carry? How much can you bring up the ramp to the barn? How much can you unload? It seems to me these are pertinent questions in determining how much we can load onto the process of negotiation as well.

How much can your Soviet advisor persuade his masters they ought to be accepted in Moscow? We know that there is some kind of transition in process. How fast, how radical, it is hard to estimate, but something is going on in the leadership situation in Moscow.

We know there are other factors that limit the ability of the Soviet Union to effect changes in policy. Now, what is your thinking on this equation of how much we can load on the hay wagon, or at what point do we make the kind of offers which really disconnect from the Soviet ability to seriously consider them?

Ambassador NITZE. I would suggest, first of all, if one takes the analogy of the hay wagon, the first thing you want to determine is the route you ought to take. You are at a given point with a given amount of hay in the field, and you want to be sure that there is space in the barn, and you are going to head for that barn.

Senator MATHIAS. You are sure you do not want to go to your neighbor's barn.

Ambassador NITZE. You do not want to go to your neighbor's barn. You want to know what you are doing. Therefore, I think the first requirement in farming and in negotiation is knowing where you want to be headed yourself. Then you look to the possible obstacles in that course and the limitations thereon.

But I think the first requirement is some degree of clarity as to what your aim is. Then you look at what the limitations in the way are.

Senator **Mathias**. I think you covered that well this morning.

Ambassador **Nitze**. Then you look at the limitations. I think it is immensely important to get Soviet concurrence to the program which I have outlined. Now, to know exactly how far one can go and what is too far and what is too great a burden is something you can only tell as the negotiations progress.

I would hope, as I suggested, that there would be those on the Soviet side who look at it in the way I suggested I might if I were an advisor to the Central Committee. In that event, it would be a question of overcoming the very real difficulties that would exist even amongst fully cooperating partners in order to make this thing work and be wholly reliable, and with high confidence on both sides; that is not easy to do.

So, there are difficulties even amongst fully cooperating partners, and when there are differences in basic aim these can be very difficult indeed. So it is hard to say how far we can go, but I think we ought to aim high. I do not see any objection to aiming high. The question at issue is, to what extent do you sacrifice the good for the better?

Senator **Mathias**. Now, you say there is no objection to aiming too high, but is there not in fact a danger of aiming too high? In March 1977, the United States, which had been engaged in the process of arms control negotiations and had made substantial progress at Vladivostok, went back to Moscow and made a new proposal which may have overloaded the circuits.

Ambassador **Nitze**. I have a different view of that episode in 1977. If one looks back on the offer that we made to the Soviets in 1977, it was in fact a very fair offer. I have talked to some of my Soviet counterparts since that time; they have said that they have looked back on that offer in 1977 and rather kick themselves that they did not accept it. It was, in fact, a completely fair offer. The problem was, we did not stick with it long enough.

Senator **Mathias**. The problem may not be with the fairness of it, but whether it was more than the hay wagon would carry at that moment.

Ambassador **Nitze**. I think we tried to force it too soon, and we backed off of it too soon.

Senator **Mathias**. You would have added an extra horse to the wagon and kept going?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I would have.

Senator **Mathias**. How do you think we can best determine this question of what the system can absorb?

Ambassador **Nitze**. That is what a negotiation is about; is it not?

Senator **Mathias**. Yes, it is what a negotiation is about. But there are some limits that are imposed by circumstances as to how far you can usefully carry the conversation. Is your feeling that you should go just as far as is possible?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I think so, because I think the program that I have outlined is one which should be to the Soviet interest as well as ours.

Senator **Mathias**. How do you think that philosophy will play, given the rules that they have laid down, that we have to have movement in all three arenas in order to get movement in one?

Ambassador **Nitze**. We have always believed that there was an interrelationship between these three subject matters, the strategic, the intermediate, and the space defense subject matters. You will recall that in 1972, when we signed the ABM Treaty, we accompanied that with a unilateral statement saying that we anticipated that it would be possible to negotiate a comprehensive treaty limiting the offense which would parallel the ABM Treaty, and both sides had agreed to try to do that. We put the Soviets on notice that if we failed to achieve such a comprehensive treaty of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty, we reserved the right to use the withdrawal clause, the clause which permits withdrawal on grounds of supreme national interest. So at that time we were emphasizing our view that offense and defense are intimately related, and one ought to have comprehensive treaties on both.

Today, the Soviets really are saying more or less the same thing in reverse. So we do not disagree with the Soviets that there is an objective interrelationship between offense and defense. The problem is a different one. The Soviets suggested that we should have a self-denying rule under which, even if we were to arrive at an agreement on, say, START, or on INF, and sign such an agreement, it should not go into effect until we had made similar progress in the other two fields.

Our view is that such a self-denying rule does not make any sense. If the United States and the U.S.S.R. decide that we have been able to arrive at an agreement which benefits us and benefits them, there is no reason why we cannot then agree to put it into effect despite whatever we had said beforehand. Furthermore, if you are dealing with a complicated issue, the intelligent way to go at it is to try to break it into some manageable number of pieces and do them piece by piece, bearing in mind that when you have dealt with just a piece, you have not dealt with the whole. You should bear in mind the totality of the problem while you are dealing with it piece by piece.

So, let us say, for instance, that if the Soviets were to come forward with a very attractive proposition on INF, my suggestion would be, we ought to sign up on it, and execute the agreement. They might say, well, we do not want to have it implemented, and we would say, well, we regret that, but let us get on with negotiating the next thing, the START agreement; if you will be equally forthcoming on that, why not sign up on that? And then if they refuse to implement that, we would say let us get on with the space defense, and try to arrive at a solution to that.

I do not believe this is as immense a problem as it has been made out to be. The differences between the two sides is not that great on the issue.

Senator **Mathias**. I generally agree with what you have said, and hope you are right in your conclusion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Mathias.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, would you agree that a strategy of deterrence based on defense, which is what I take it SDI would move us to, would require, if not perfection, at least near-perfection and a very high level of confidence in that high level of effectiveness if we were going to go to that concept.

Ambassador NITZE. I do not believe so, no. I believe that it would be desirable, certainly when one gets to the third phase, but I think one has to look at this from the question of what phase one is looking at.

Senator SARBANES. I am talking about the third phase now.

Ambassador NITZE. In the third phase, when all nuclear weapons have been removed from the nuclear arsenals of both sides, or in the world, as a matter of fact, then I think the problem faced by the defenses is much less than it was before and than it is today, much less, because the type of arsenal that a terrorist could put together or a mad colonel could put together in some third country would be quite different than the SS-20's, the SS-18's, the SS-17's, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

So, the problem faced by a defense would be infinitely less than it is today, so we would expect that one could aspire to a very high level of effectiveness under those circumstances, even of a nonnuclear defense.

Senator SARBANES. You have to have some high level of assurance as you move toward defense strategy that it will have a high degree of effectiveness in screening out nuclear weapons.

Ambassador NITZE. By screening out, do you mean countering them?

Senator SARBANES. Yes.

Ambassador NITZE. It depends on what one means by high level. I would think an aggressor would have very little confidence in an attack in which he was uncertain that he could get more than 10 percent of the weapons he sent off to the targets that he had had in mind. I think it would be quite a different thing than it is today, where, for instance, we have no effective defenses where he can assume that every one of his weapons will hit the target. If you say that only a tenth could, I think that would have an immense effect on the planning of a potential aggressor.

Senator SARBANES. So you are assuming that 10 percent of their nuclear weapons would get through to the targets even with a defensive strategy?

Ambassador NITZE. No; I am not. I am just taking that as an example of an imperfect defense, which I still think could have a very great impact upon any potential attacker, and therefore could greatly strengthen deterrence from what it is today.

Senator SARBANES. Confronted with a move on the part of the United States toward a defensive strategy, why would the Soviets agree to put limits on their offensive weapons, since those limitations on their offensive weapons may eventually confront them with a situation in which they would not be able to penetrate our defense?

Is it not really an invitation to them to maintain or even expand their offensive weapon ability in order to deal either with the potentiality or the reality of a defensive shield?

Ambassador NITZE. This is one of the reasons why I have emphasized the question of the criterion of cost effectiveness. If what we are talking about is only systems which were cost effective, in other words, where the incremental cost of the defense was less than that of expanding the offense, it really would not be a very sensible thing for them to do so.

I think they would be better off switching to cooperating with us in trying to make this defensive shield neutral.

Senator SARBANES. The way you have it phrased, and I am looking at your prepared testimony, in the near term you press for radical cuts in number and power of strategic and intermediate range nuclear arms. Why do not the transition period and what we would seek to do there and the ultimate period run at counterpurposes with what you set out in the near term?

In other words, why, not knowing where the defensive strategy is going to go, would they agree up front to limit the offensive weapons which they may later see that they need in terms of how they address the defensive shield?

Ambassador NITZE. My point was that expenditures on expanding the offense would prove to be unwise if we actually were in a position to have cost-effective defenses, that it would be better for them to redirect their effort to other forms of effort.

Senator SARBANES. But you do not know at this point whether you can have cost-effective defenses and yet the issue that is on the agenda is the cuts in the offensive weapons. How could you get that up front, not knowing the answer to the other question?

Ambassador NITZE. Because there are two possibilities. One is that these techniques will not be effective, in which event both sides for the indefinite future, will have to, live in a regime which includes heavy reliance upon nuclear retaliatory destruction.

Now, that is the situation which existed when we started the START negotiations. That is the situation which existed when we started the SALT I offensive negotiations. That is what the two sides have been about all along in trying to arrive at mutual agreements which would make it easier and more secure to live in a world where both sides are in effect living in a regime of assured massive destruction.

Now, that can be made more livable through arms control limitations and through reductions from the levels which exist today. This is the type of negotiation which has been going on, and we think should go on, should continue to go on, and must go on, because you cannot yet be sure there is another alternative.

Senator SARBANES. Would you envision the United States moving to a strategy of deterrence based on defense unilaterally?

Ambassador NITZE. Certainly this is not contemplated by the statement I have made today.

Senator SARBANES. I am taking you, I think, perhaps a step beyond your statement. Would you envision that being done unilaterally?

Ambassador NITZE. I do not envisage that; we are hopeful of cooperative Soviet effort. I think that unilaterally it would be very difficult.

Senator SARBANES. Very difficult?

Ambassador NITZE. Yes.

Senator Sarbanes. My concern, at least as the President phrases it, and he tends to phrase it in a much more broad and sweeping way than you are phrasing it in your statement before the committee today, is, it represents a fundamental shift in strategic nuclear doctrine, and my concern is the end result of it all may be not as you suggest, an eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive, but an escalation in the nuclear arms race, both offensive and defensive, in other words, in which each side moves up offensively to counter the defensive efforts of the other side, and each side moves up defensively to counter the offensive efforts of the other side.

Ambassador Nitze. We have had experience now since the ABM Treaty went into effect in 1972, and that is 13 years ago. After that treaty went into effect, we first of all dismantled those parts of the second site which we had under construction in 1972, and later we dismantled the first site as well.

So, we have completely dismantled our defenses. But has that been accompanied by any diminution in the Soviet buildup? It has not. So clearly the Soviet buildup in offensive systems has not been in reaction to the buildup of any defenses of ours. We do not have any.

I think one can see clearly what the Soviets have in train at the present time. They have in train a further buildup of their offense right today. The rate at which they are deploying offensive missiles today has not gone down. Every week you see evidence of new deployments, so it is wrong, I think, to say that this is just a reaction to defenses.

Senator Sarbanes. They have built up their offensive weapons, and we have sought in some respects to respond to that. There is an argument about whether they were building them up to catch up or go ahead, and we are building them up as well. That still leaves you with a regime that seeks to bring the arms race under control through limitations on offensive weaponry.

In fact, as I understand it, that is what you are going to be seeking in the near term. Isn't that correct?

Ambassador Nitze. We are indeed going to seek in the near term as well as the long term, a limitation on offensive weaponry.

Senator Sarbanes. The question that I am raising, because I think we are dealing here—although we have not yet had a full national debate on it— with a fundamental shift in nuclear strategy, and we may be moving in the direction in which, in effect, we confront escalation not only with offensive weapons and the need to place that under a regime of limitation and restriction, but also the possibility of a comparable escalation with respect to defensive weapons.

Ambassador Nitze. The defensive weapons are limited by the ABM Treaty. Our concern is, that quite apart from any SDI effort on our part, the Soviets have been going forward for many years on the development of their defenses. In fact, I am told that of their expenditures for strategic systems, about 40 percent are for defensive systems, and 40 percent for offense, and 20 percent you cannot quite allocate between either.

Now, granted that a good part of that is for their air defense systems, another large part of it is with respect to their ABM systems.

They have been going forward to the full extent that they are permitted to do under the ABM Treaty, and in fact we believe beyond that with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar.

So, if you are looking for limitations on defense, the limitations are already there in the ABM Treaty. The question at issue is whether they are being abided by, by the other side. There is the real problem.

Senator SARBANES. We have been engaged in research as well, as permitted by the ABM Treaty, and it is now proposed to significantly expand that research.

Ambassador NITZE. I am not talking about research. I am talking about actual deployments.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes, I will need to call time at this particular moment.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome Mr. Nitze here today.

Despite the great deal that has been written about the lack of intention of this administration to deal in arms control, I have been convinced all along of the administration's serious intention, and one of the reasons for my belief is because of your presence and your continuing presence on the negotiating team. I am confident that this administration is very much convinced of the necessity for vigorously pursuing an arms control agreement.

Also I agree with their approach to first enhance our defense establishment, and I voted often at the request and influence of the new negotiator from Texas along the lines of increasing and enhancing the defense establishment.

I note that from 1968 to 1974, in nominal dollars we actually had a decline in outlays on defense, despite our involvement in Vietnam during that period. In an analysis I once made from 1968 through 1983, I noted that if our defense expenditures had only kept up with inflation, we would have spent during that 16-year period $500 billion more than was actually spent.

So I was sympathetic and cast my votes along the lines of enhancing our defense expenditures in the last few years. I am now confronted with a conflict between the defense expenditures and the necessity of balancing the budget, but feel nevertheless that we have gone in the right way.

Unfortunately, I will be unable to stay for the next panel, but would like to say that I think that our hand and position is considerably strengthened by the appointment of these very imminent negotiators to the group that will be involved in negotiating these agreements.

Certainly Ambassador Kampelman is well known to all of us, and has been successful in his negotiations, and I think is a most imminent leader among the group. Senator Tower is an extraordinary addition to the negotiating team as well. Certainly any agreement that he is involved with will be seriously considered by his former colleagues.

I notice in the description of his background that it indicates he has no language ability. I presume that speaks of other languages, since there is not a one of us who would not say, having heard him many times on the floor of the Senate and in committee, that his language ability, his negotiating ability and his mental toughness ensures that any agreement that comes back with his stamp on it, has been well considered and one that will go a long way toward securing confirmation here in the Senate.

Not only do we and the American people recognize this fact, but the Soviets recognize that as well. So, in this regard, the negotiating team is greatly enhanced, and able in my judgment, to undertake these negotiations.

I do not know Mr. Glitman as well as his two colleagues. I notice that he has been our Ambassador to the MBFR negotiations, and I am sure that he, too, will enhance this entire team.

Again, I believe these appointments clearly demonstrate the seriousness of purpose this administration has in negotiating these treaties. Not only are they serious about negotiations, but seriously committed to securing confirmation of those treaties that will come about.

As you note, Dr. Nitze, those treaties take a long time to negotiate.

Let me pursue the same line of thought that the Senator from Maryland was using when he spoke about the hay wagon and how much the system can absorb or bear. There was an interesting article in Sunday's Washington Post about confidence-building measures. I believe it was written by a fellow named Olrey. I have not yet fully read it, but understand it had to do with establishing an ongoing group of Russians and Americans from both the military and the civilian sectors. In our SALT I negotiations as I recall them, it was important to have both the military and civilian personnel present. A confidence-building center should be established in both Washington and Moscow for the purpose of dealing with the problems of proliferation and other problems that arise between the two countries. So that in the event another airliner strays and, God forbid, is once again shot down, or something occurs in some part of the world, there would be immediate communications and an immediate forum in which to exchange information perhaps toning down or lessening existing tensions.

Would such confidence-building measures enhance what the system can absorb? How much could be put on the hay wagon? What we can negotiate about?

Ambassador **Nitze**. We have taken seriously the question of confidence-building measures. This was an item of negotiation in the START negotiations and in the INF negotiations. It has also been on the table in the Stockholm negotiations that Mr. Goodby is conducting.

So, my first point is that our attitude toward such is positive. Now, you suggest a confidence-building measure in the form of a center located some place where there would be various representatives from the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Two centers. Sometimes the idea has been that there should be one in Geneva, but I think I would prefer two.

Ambassador **Nitze**. There the question arises as to how much that could add to the hotline and the other methods of communication that do exist between Moscow and the United States. Maybe it could maybe not; these are things we are looking at. I am not sure that that has been thoroughly resolved as yet.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Are those questions now being pursued, and would it be correct to say that what the system would be capable of absorbing might be enhanced by such measures?

Ambassador NITZE. One of the difficulties that we have run into, for instance, both in the INF and the START negotiations, is that the Russians indicated they did not disagree with us about certain confidence-building measures associated with the INF systems and other confidence measures associated with the START systems, but they have insisted that any such agreement should be incorporated into an INF treaty or a START treaty and made a part thereof.

In other words, they refused to separate them out from the heavier load. In other words, they viewed this as a small package of straw which they would not disassociate from the great big bales.

So, it does not really, I think, answer the question that both you and Senator Mathias were leading to, would this not be an easier thing to get through, not because we would not be prepared to do it, but because the Soviets are unprepared to disassociate the confidence-building measures from broader measures.

Senator MATHIAS. If you would yield for a comment, your response really concerns me, because the very fact that the March 1977 proposal was fair and equitable and ultimately perceived as desirable by some Russians would indicate that something was wrong in the delivery mechanism—that the wagon did not get it there in good shape and in good time. It is that capacity of the wagon that I worry about.

Ambassador NITZE. I agree with you. I did not think it was delivered correctly. I thought the problem was, the wagon did not stay there long enough.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, just as long as you and the negotiators are aware of the need to have the wagon in good order and properly calculated to do the job, then I feel reassured.

Thank you for yielding.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boschwitz.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I join with my colleagues in welcoming you and expressing, needless to say, our hopes that you will have great success.

In your comments today and, I think, also in your speech in Philadelphia, you set out the criteria by which you would judge the deployment of this SDI system. I wonder, first of all, if survivability and cost effectiveness at the margins are the only criteria by which you would judge it. Are there others?

Ambassador NITZE. Not that I can think of.

Senator KERRY. Assuming those two are met, is it fair to say that we are irrevocably on a course where we will now shift from offense to defense? Are we forever leaving behind the notion that we will have the world of nuclear weapons based on offensive threat?

Ambassador NITZE. I do not believe that because in order to carry out the program which I have outlined in my remarks a number of other factors have to be accomplished.

In the first place, one has to work out with the Soviet Union the way in which the transition period could be handled so as to not open up instabilities during the course of the transition.

Senator KERRY. Let me pursue that for a moment. If we were to build a very effective defense, and I understand there is no accepted measure of what very effective is, 5 percent missile breakthrough, 10 percent, but operating, for instance, with the 10 percent we have heard thrown out as a figure in a number of hearings and even today, why should we not believe that a world where we have reduced our level of damage to 10 percent per nation, why should we not believe that that is a world which is in fact a world with less deterrence rather than more?

Is there not more deterrence in the totality of destruction rather than a world in which you will retain some capacity for destruction?

Ambassador NITZE. As I was trying to explain in my prepared remarks, we have always viewed deterrence as having two components. One is just the threat of destruction, and the other is the ability to deny the other side military success.

So, it is the combination of those two, and certainly defensive systems do contribute to denying the other side any hope of military success, and therefore do contribute to deterrence.

Senator KERRY. Why, then, do you not create a situation where if you deny some nuclear deterrence, you raise the ante on the capacity for superpower conventional confrontation? Why do you not perhaps come to the brink faster than we have in these recent years?

Ambassador NITZE. I think one does. This is why I pointed out that as one progressed toward the third phase, one would need to address oneself to the conventional forces of both ourselves and our allies.

Senator KERRY. But it seems to me that, and I think my colleague, the distinguished Senator Sarbanes, raised this, and I share his skepticism about it, you have spoken eloquently and clearly over the years on the relentlessness of the Soviet buildup and of their expansionism and their designs on the world.

Surely over the history of the arms race we have seen a process of both sides building and building and repeating each other's efforts to match each other.

Given the history of one technology leading to another, and given the comments that we have heard from a number of people talking about SDI about the perfection eroding over a period of time, I wonder what there is in your experience, which is long and distinguished, as a negotiator that says to you, there is something different in this system, given the nature of the Soviet force you have described and its relentlessness, that will suddenly change their desire to try to erode perfection.

Why will they not simply turn around and try to design a system that penetrates, increase their effort? What is there in your negotiating that says that will not happen?

Ambassador NITZE. Well, I remember during the SALT I negotiations when we were negotiating the ABM Treaty, my opposite numbers in the military, and also the minister of the radio industry was one of our counterparts, and he and his military associates took the view that unless we arrived at an ABM Treaty, and if they were to try to produce an effective ABM defense with the then technology, he said, all of us would be without shirts. We would not have enough left to clothe the populace, let alone other kinds of things. It would be a fantastically expensive enterprise.

They are not without economic limitations. After all, they are spending 13 to 14 percent of their GNP, which is double what we are, on defense, and this is not without great sacrifice. I do not believe that it is easy for them, whether they would welcome a substantial increase in their expenditure of resources at this time.

Senator **Kerry**. But it does not have to be a short-term, massive thing. It can be over time, correct?

Ambassador **Nitze**. It could be over time, and I think they would welcome that no more. They would not welcome that, either. So that certainly they have the opportunity, I mean, if they wish to, to say that now we will try to defeat this, and we will try to continue our effort to have not only a superior offense capability, but also a superior defense capability. That is what they have today.

Now, today we do not have any defense capability, and they have—granted, it is limited by the ABM Treaty and therefore the number of interceptors is small, but the radar base that they have created is really quite big, so there is a substantial danger that they could break out from that with the proliferation of interceptors and radars.

Senator **Kerry**. Since you have raised the question of the Krasnoyarsk radar, I understand that radar will not be turned on until 1987 or thereabouts.

Ambassador **Nitze**. I believe that is correct.

Senator **Kerry**. But I think our current schedule of research with respect to SDI calls for us actually to have some booster phase testing which involves actual deployment of portions of it, which I thought was in fact prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Therefore are we not going to be the first to abrogate it?

Ambassador **Nitze**. No, I do not believe we intend to undertake tests or deployments in violation of the ABM Treaty.

Senator **Kerry**. Well, does not the current testing as General Abrahamson has put it forward include that?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I believe these are demonstrations which are not in violation of the treaty.

Senator **Kerry**. But the demonstration involves an actual deployment of part of the system?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I do not believe so.

Senator **Kerry**. How do you distinguish that?

Ambassador **Nitze**. Well, a deployment is generally meant to mean the deployment of an operational system. I do not believe it is deployment.

Senator **Kerry**. Well, it is development, then. It is clearly R&D, development, and the D part of that is forbidden under the ABM Treaty.

Ambassador **Nitze**. R&D is permitted up to a certain point under the ABM Treaty. This was a matter for considerable discussion between us and the Soviets as to the cutoff point between what was permitted development and research and what was prohibited development under the ABM Treaty.

And it was agreed by both sides that basic research and conceptual research and development and the testing, the proving of technologies, that sort of thing, which was done in laboratories, by and large that was permitted.

What was not permitted was when one got to the engineering development phase and one tested components which were intended to be part of an operational system. That was prohibited.

Now, I think the tests that are contemplated are not within the definition of the ABM Treaty as I understand it.

Senator KERRY. If I could just ask one more question before my time runs out, Secretaries Ikle and Weinberger have both said that Star Wars is not negotiable, yet I think the President has said that everything is on the table. I wonder if you could clarify for us the administration position. Is it on the table or is it not on the table?

Ambassador NITZE. Well, the SDI, as a research program, I think both the Soviet Union and ourselves agree, cannot be limited by agreement. As to research, there is no way you can identify research related to a given program as opposed to research related to another program. There is no way that you can verify that.

This all goes on in laboratories where in the Soviet Union it is not visible to us and not visible to them in the United States. Granted, they can read about part of it in congressional testimony or in Aviation Week, but they have more access than we do to what goes on in research, but both sides have agreed that research per se is not limitable by an agreement.

So, in that sense the SDI research program is not negotiable, and that is not at issue with the Soviet Union. They do not propose an agreement limiting research. The real difficulty would come in the event that we want to test or deploy these systems in violation of the ABM Treaty. That would require consultation and amendment of the treaty before it would become legal for us to do that. That would require Soviet concurrence.

So in the sense of the long-term future of the SDI program in the sense that it contemplates the eventual testing and deployment of these systems, full-scale testing and deployment, there it does require consultation and agreement with the Soviet Union before you can do that under the ABM Treaty. This we anticipate negotiating.

Senator KERRY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.

With the committee's indulgence, and particularly with the permission of Senator Trible and Senator Dodd, the Chair would like to propose this type of format. Given that it is now 20 minutes to 12, we would call to the table the three nominees. Two of them are going to submit statements for the record, and Ambassador Kampelman will make a short statement.

With all four at the table, the 10-minute question period for Senator Trible and Senator Dodd would proceed. In the event that Senators have additional questions, we will have another round. I will pass with regard to my time, so that we may at least get the nominees before us, and members would have an opportunity to question all four.

Is there objection to that procedure, Senator Pell?

Senator **Pell**. Mr. Chairman, if other Senators who are not here wish to question the three negotiators, will there be an opportunity extended to them in the afternoon?

The **Chairman**. Well, the Chair's plans are to push on to conclusion of the hearing. Given the fact that we have S. 457 on the floor, which is our bill, I think we have a duty to be present, even though we appreciate some of the amendments that will be offered have more of an agricultural content than a foreign policy content at this point.

For that reason, if both of our staffs could alert Senators that questioning of the nominees is about to proceed, that might be helpful.

Senator **Pell**. Right, and I would think if more time is needed, the Ethiopian bill, the farm bill could get along without us.

The **Chairman**. Well, that is conceivable. I am not quite certain how we could do that, but it is conceivable. Let us try to see if we can wind up the hearing this morning, if possible. I announced the procedure earlier. I think the nine Senators who were present had an idea that this was what we were going to do, and have apparently decided to leave without raising additional questions.

So, without objection, would the three nominees now please come to the table? They are, of course, Max Kampelman, John Tower, and Maynard Glitman.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your being with us today for this hearing, and also for the initial purposes of your confirmation as nominees.

Senator **Tower**. do you have an opening statement?

[Senator Tower's biographical data follows:]

Biographical Data of Hon. John Goodwin Tower

Present Position: United States Negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms.
Office Address: Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Born: September 29, 1925, Houston, Texas.
Legal Residence: Wichita Falls, Texas.
Marital Status: Married.
Family: Wife: former Lilla Burt Cummings, Children: Peggy Wiesley, Marian Tower, and Jeanne Cox.
Home Address: 2011 Berkley, Wichita Falls, Texas.
Education: B.A. 1948, Southwestern University; M.A. 1953, Southern Methodist University; Graduate Study, London School of Economics and Political Science (London).
Language Ability: None.
Experience: Military 1943-46—United States Navy (Naval Reserve 1946-present).
Non-Government:
1948—Radio Announcer, KFDM, Beaumont, Texas.
1948-49—Radio Announcer, KTAE, Taylor, Texas.
1950-51—Insurance Agent, Preston Hale, Dallas, Texas.
1951-60—Assistant Professor of History and Political Science, Northwestern University, Wichita Falls, Texas.
Government:
1961-85—United States Senator from the State of Texas.
1985 to present—United States Negotiator on Stragetic Nuclear Arms, Department of State.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN G. TOWER, ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATOR-DESIGNATE

Senator **Tower**. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement which I will submit for incorporation into the record, and will simply respond to questions. Let me say that I am delighted to be back in the presence of my old colleagues.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much. Your statement will be made a part of the record in full.

[Senator Tower's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. John G. Tower

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Our objective in the new negotiations on strategic nuclear arms is clear and consistent. We seek substantial, stabilizing reductions in strategic arsenals through a sound, equitable and verifiable agreement leading to a stable strategic nuclear balance at significantly lower levels.

We are not interested in obtaining a cosmetic agreement. Our experience has taught us the value of patience and perseverance in the pursuit of a sound agreement which results in real reductions and enhanced stability, an agreement that will prove to be in our national security interest, and that of our Allies who depend on us for strategic deterrence.

While the United States has exercised unilateral restraint, and even made reductions in the number and overall yield of its nuclear stockpile, the Soviets through a relentless buildup, have achieved a destabilizing advantage in key areas of the strategic balance—notably in multiple warhead ICBMs which threaten U.S. deterrent forces.

In order to restore a stable strategic balance at the lowest possible level we must pursue a sound coherent security policy which includes both arms reduction negotiations and strategic forces modernization. It is unrealistic to expect the Soviets to agree to reductions in destabilizing weapons unless they are convinced we have the will to maintain the strength and effectiveness of our own forces. The U.S. strategic modernization program—particularly the MX—is designed to help restore a stable balance and provide important incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for genuine arms reductions.

In our quest for significant reductions, we are prepared to discuss trade-offs, taking into account Soviet and U.S. advantages, in ways that provide each side flexibility consistent with movement towards a more stable strategic balance. If the Soviets are prepared to engage in the serious give-and-take of real negotiations, they will not find us wanting in seeking compromises leading to a mutually agreeable outcome.

My instructions will come directly from the President and it is to him that I will report. There is no one who desires a meaningful agreement at reduced, stabilizing levels of forces more than the President. I look forward to working with Ambassadors Kampelman and Glitman. I look forward to close cooperation with my former colleagues in the Congress as we embark on this mission, and I earnestly solicit your encouragement, your support, and your good counsel.

The **Chairman**. Ambassador Glitman, do you have an initial statement?

[Ambassador Glitman's biographical data follows:]

Biographical Data of Hon. Maynard W. Glitman

Present Position: United States Negotiator on Intermediate Range Nuclear Arms.

Office Address: Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Born: December 8, 1933, Chicago, Illinois.

Legal Residence: Fletcher, Vermont.

Marital Status: Married.

Family: Wife: former G. Christine Amundsen; Children: Russell, Erik, Karen, Matthew and Rebecca.

Home address: (temporary) Columbia Plaza, 2301 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Education: B.A. 1955, University of Illinois; M.A. 1956, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Language Ability: French (3+/4, tested).

Experience: Military 1957—United States Army.

Government:

1956-57—Economic Officer, Department of State; FSO-6.

1957-59—Fiscal and Financial Officer, Department.

1959-61—Consular and Economic Officer, Nassau.

1961-65—Economic Officer, Ottawa.

1962—FSO-5.

1965—FSO-4.

1965-66—Attended, Atlantic Affairs Studies, University of California (on detail).

1966-67—Senior Economic Officer, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department.

1967—FSO-3.

1967-68—Adviser of European Affairs, United States Mission to the United Nations, New York City.

1968—Staff Officer, National Security Council, The White House.

1968-73—Political Officer, Paris.

1973—FSO-2.

1973-74—Director of the Office of International Trade, Department.

1974-76—Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Trade Policy, Department.

1976—FSO-1.

1976-77—Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (on detail).

1977-81—Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels.

1981—Appointed a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor.

1981-84—Department of State Representative and Deputy Head of the United States Delegation to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (since 1982 with the rank of Ambassador), Geneva.

1984-85—Representative of the United States of America for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador, Vienna.

1985-present—United States Negotiator on Intermediate Range Nuclear Arms.

Awards: Phi Beta Kappa, University of Illinois, 1955; Department of Defense Outstanding Public Service Medal, 1977; Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal, 1980.

STATEMENT OF HON. MAYNARD W. GLITMAN, ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATOR-DESIGNATE

Ambassador **Glitman**. Mr. Chairman, I am also pleased to be here. I have a short statement which I will also put into the record.

The **Chairman**. The record will reflect your statement in full. We are very pleased to have you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Glitman follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Maynard W. Glitman

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to appear before the committee today.

The issue of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, INF, has been an important factor in United States foreign and security policy for several years. It is a particularly important element of our relations with our NATO allies and of our mutual ability to maintain freedom and peace.

As you know, NATO's December 1979 decision called for both the deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles and for INF arms control negotiations. We and our Allies agreed that NATO's INF requirements would be examined in the light of concrete results reached in negotiation.

The effort to achieve concrete negotiating results was suspended when the Soviet negotiators left the negotiating table in November of 1983. Now we are about to embark on a fresh endeavor to achieve such results.

I cannot speak for the Soviet negotiators. Only time will tell what positions they will bring to Geneva.

I can say that the United States for its part will be approaching these talks with a determination to seek an effective equal and verifiable INF agreement which will strengthen our security and that of our Allies and enhance stability and reduce the risk of war for both the West and the Soviet Union.

I look forward to the challenge, and if confirmed, to undertaking this important task.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Kampelman, may we have your opening statement?

[Ambassador Kampelman's biographical data follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF HON. MAX M. KAMPELMAN

Position for which considered: Ambassador to the United States Office for Arms Reduction Negotiations in Geneva.

Present Position: United States Negotiator on Defense and Space, and Head of the United States Delegation to the Arms Reduction Negotiations in Geneva.

Office Address: Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Born: November 7, 1920, New York, New York.

Legal Residence: Washington, D.C.

Marital Status: Married.

Family: Wife: former Marjorie Buetow; Children: Ann, Jeffrey, Julia, David, and Sarah.

Home Address: 3154 Highland Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Education: B.A. 1940, J.D. 1945, New York University; M.A. 1946, Ph.D. 1954, University of Minnesota.

Language Ability: None.

Experience:

Non-Government

1941-43—Law Clerk in the law firm of Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin and Krim (New York).

1943-46—Civilian Public Service, American Friends Service Committee.

1946-48—Instructor, University of Minnesota.

1948-50—Member of Faculty, Bennington College (Vermont).

1955 to present—Attorney in the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Kampelman (Washington, New York, and London), Washington, D.C.

Government

1949-55—Legislative Counsel to United States Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.

1980-83—Co-Chairman, with personal rank of Ambassador, then Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Department of State.

1985 to present—United States Negotiator on Defense and Space, and Head of the United States Delegation to the Arms Reduction Negotiations in Geneva.

Also: Alternate Member, President's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations; Senior Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations; Chairman, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Co-Chairman, United States Delegation to Observe the Elections in El Salvador and Consultant, Department of State.

STATEMENT OF HON. MAX M. KAMPELMAN, ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATOR-DESIGNATE

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I begin my statement, I would like to express my satisfaction in being associated with two highly qualified public servants in the forthcoming Geneva negotiations.

Senator John Tower has been one of the Senate's leading defense experts for more than two decades. His experience and his expertise will be a major asset in our endeavors. Ambassador Maynard Glitman is one of the leading experts on defense and arms control in the U.S. Foreign Service.

It is an honor to appear before this committee in what I expect to be the first of a series of formal and informal consultations among us as we proceed with the serious task of negotiating and seeking an agreement with the Soviet Union designed to reduce nuclear arms and move the world toward greater stability.

It is important on this occasion to remind ourselves that the object of diplomacy is peace. It is the supreme achievement of statesmanship. In this nuclear age, the significance of these words is overwhelming. Diplomacy today faces a new and unparalleled dimension of challenge and responsibility.

History has demonstrated that diplomacy can fail and frequently has failed. The price of that failure in the past has too often been a loss of human life, the destruction of property, and the erosion of human values, but that price, tragic as it was, did not include the direct threat to our civilization and perhaps to our planet, costs that could well be extracted for the failures of diplomacy today and tomorrow.

Peace with dignity must be our highest national priority. We are a strong people living in a strong nation. This strength gives us the assurance that we can always afford to seek peace and indeed have the duty to do so. Arrogance and petulance are the defenses of the weak and insecure. Those who have advised us never to fear to negotiate have given us good advice.

Secretary of State Shultz has demonstrated a commitment to this understanding. We negotiate because we have hope for a better tomorrow, and the vision to strive for it, we hope, but if we are to be prudent, we cannot trust. We must negotiate, but we must be strong and firm if our negotiating message is to be credible.

Mr. Chairman, at the same time as we reaffirm a commitment to peace with liberty and to the negotiating process designed to achieve it, we also understand the need to face certain realities as well.

The Soviet Union is today a major threat to our security and values. It is an aggressive society seeking with its massive military and police power to expand its influence, and a repressive society determined to defend totalitarian power at great human cost.

I suspect that we and our friends who value freedom will experience great strains and even anguish as we come to grips with this reality, and seek to do so constructively. We must learn how to live with Soviet military power, meet it, challenge it, and simultaneously strive to maintain the peace with liberty that we seek.

There are some who may respond to the danger to us represented by Soviet military power and theology by ignoring or denying their existence, and that would be fatal for us. There are others who are so overwhelmed by the difficulties as to place all of their trust in military power and its use alone. That carries with it the seeds of tragedy as well.

We dare not and cannot blow the Soviet Union away. We cannot wish it away. It is here, and it is militarily powerful. We share the same globe. We must try to find a formula under which we can live together in dignity. We must engage in that pursuit of peace without illusion, but with persistence regardless of provocation.

The leadership of the Soviet Union is serious. Its diplomats are well trained. Both we and they must appreciate that negotiation means more than talking. It means listening as well. Two monologs do not make a dialog.

Furthermore, I respectfully suggest that we should both appreciate that our superpower status does not necessarily confer upon us super wisdom. It is also important that the negotiating process be continuous and cumulative. In that connection, we must make a greater effort to see to it that arms control does not become a political theater.

I look upon the President's assignment, Mr. Chairman, as providing me the most important public responsibility I have ever assumed. I will, subject to Senate confirmation, fulfill those responsibilities with the utmost seriousness.

I conclude, Mr. Chairman, with the observation that diplomacy in a democracy requires broad public support if it is to be effective. We should approach the problem of national security free of partisan considerations. Furthermore, no democracy can achieve the broad domestic consensus required for its foreign policy to proceed unless that policy is grounded in moral principles.

We need to reassert American moral and intellectual leadership across the full range of foreign policy problems and prospects. President Reagan's energetic search for a new dimension of international relationship in which the threat of nuclear annihilation is replaced by a common effort toward mutual assured security will help restore us to the moral leadership role that our commitment to peace warrants.

Our objective is to reach toward an agreement for a sense of mutual responsibility by both us and the Soviet Union under which we jointly hold ourselves responsible for the lives of all people and their right to be free of the threat of nuclear annihilation.

This objective can unify and broaden the understanding and the will of the American people and of our allies. It is also an extraordinarily important message to communicate to peoples everywhere. San Francisco, Turtle Bay, Helsinki, Belgrade, Moscow, Vienna, Washington, Madrid, Geneva, these are but steps on a long road. The problems that divide us are real and numerous.

We trust our negotiating efforts will produce early results. By the nature of things, however, we understand that even with agreement, we will still be nearer to the beginning than to the end of our pursuit of peace with liberty. We must be relentless in that search. We must have patience. We must be clearheaded.

The American delegation to Geneva is so instructed by the President of the United States, and will be so guided.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Ambassador Kampelman, for a very eloquent statement.

Senator Trible, will you proceed with your questioning?

Senator **Trible**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, the administration has accused the Soviet Union of violating the provisions of SALT II. Will the issue of Soviet violations be raised in the talks? And what can we do to assure compliance with any new agreement?

Ambassador **Nitze**. May I answer the question?

Senator **Trible**. Please.

Ambassador **Nitze**. Yes, I do anticipate that questions of compliance with past agreements will be raised in the negotiations. They have been raised, of course, in the Standing Consultative Commission [SCC], under the SALT agreement, and under the ABM Treaty.

The SCC is the organization in which complaints of this kind should be raised, but in addition to that they do present political problems which bear upon the other problems which will be the subject of the negotiations by Mr. Kampelman's delegation.

So, we do anticipate that these will arise in their political sense in the negotiations there.

Senator **Trible**. I would invite you to address the second part of the question that deals with future compliance. How do we go about ensuring that the Soviets live up to their promises?

For example, do you envision a new mechanism other than the Standing Consultative Commission as a means of achieving that end, or is this too early in the game to ask specific questions?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I think it is a little early, frankly, to ask specific questions of that nature. I would, however, comment that I personally do not contemplate that we will raise questions of a new organization to substitute for the SCC.

Senator **Trible**. Well, let me try another approach, gentlemen. Mr. Kampelman, I would address this question to you and to Mr. Glitman.

Specifically, what in your view would be the effect on our negotiating position if the Congress decides not to deploy the MX? We know where our distinguished friend, John Tower, stands on that. We have heard from Mr. Nitze. I would like for the record for you to respond to that question for the benefit of our colleagues here today and the colleagues who are not here but should hear your views.

Ambassador **Kampleman**. In my opinion, Senator, I think it would be damaging to our position in the negotiation were this Congress to decide not to fund the MX proposals that are now before it.

I want to refer, if I may, for the moment to a similar question asked earlier of Ambassador Nitze, which relates really to how do we anticipate or expect the negotiation to proceed.

It strikes me that if I were in the Soviet Union, sitting in Moscow, and found that some items on the table which I hoped to get from the other side were removed from that table without the requirement for me and Moscow to make a single concession in the negotiating process, I would be far less likely to be considering making those suggestions until I saw the evolution of the movement to otherwise remove those issues from the table.

I think that as a negotiator I would like to have as much on my side of the table as is practical and reasonable and responsible to have, so that I can use those ingredients as part of a very serious negotiation.

Senator **Trible**. Mr. Glitman?

Ambassador **Glitman**. Thank you, Senator. I can only but second that point, and would add that much of what affects a negotiation happens not only inside but outside the negotiating room. For the Soviets, the overall correlation of forces is of great importance in their judgment as to what can or cannot get on that famous hay wagon.

In that context, things like the MX vote are of extreme importance to us. The Soviets judge whether our will is there and how serious we are about defending ourselves by such things. So, in that context I think it is important.

Thank you.

Senator **Trible**. Mr. Kampelman, from your experience and insight gained in this negotiating process with the Soviet Union, what in your judgment were the factors that led the Soviets to return to the negotiating table?

Actually, any of your distinguished colleagues that would be willing to take that on, I would say please do, sir.

Ambassador **Nitze**. When the Soviets walked out of the INF negotiations and the START negotiations they indicated why they were doing so, at least they did with respect to the START negotiations. They said they were not setting a date for resumption because they wanted to review their policy in the light of the deployment by the United States of the INF missiles.

In the course of that review I am sure that one of the factors they took into account was that they were disappointed in the extent that they could exploit politically those INF deployments by the United States in behalf of the two-track NATO decision.

They had hoped that this would be the occasion for widespread protest riots and would be the means by which they could stimulate some very divisive political actions in Germany, in England, and in the rest of Europe, and stimulate divisions between NATO and the United States. They were disappointed in that.

In fact, they found that the protest movement declined, the divisions in Europe declined, and the unity of the North Atlantic Alliance survived and was strengthened during the process.

So having been disappointed in the political consequences of the walkout, I think that was a serious factor in bringing them back or trying to find a way back to the negotiating table. They wanted this to be new negotiations, and we agreed that they should be new negotiations in order to make it clear that they were not just walking back but there was a new framework for these negotiations.

But in addition to that, I think also that the President's SDI clearly was an additional factor which brought them back to the table. Finally, I think the fact that it is likely that the MX will be approved by the Senate for deployment was another factor which brought them back to the table.

Senator **Trible**. How would you characterize the state of Soviet leadership and its ability or capacity to make the hard and decisive decisions essential to the success of this venture?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. We do not know enough about it, Senator. I do feel this. If I can speak conceptually and in long-range terms, the relationship that exists today of tension and instability in the world will in time require imaginative, bold action as we come to grips with how do we remove ourselves from terror into a more productive and constructive relationship.

This requires a secure leadership. The extent to which that secure leadership is absent today in the Soviet Union, and we do not know the dimensions of that, to that extent must it be a consideration in the equation. We have lived now for a number of years with what appears to be instability in at least the top leadership or the single top leadership.

There is, of course, a mechanism, a cadre of leadership which continues to exist. But to the extent that we do know it, I do contemplate in the negotiation that this is a factor that could lead to the prolongation of the negotiation.

Senator **Trible**. Gentlemen, let me conclude by saying that peace is what we all seek in this Nation, regardless of our politics. Yours is a difficult task and I certainly wish you well. I pledge to play a constructive role in the process as a member of this committee and the Senate, and I trust my colleagues will undertake that responsibility responsibly.

It is apparent to me from your statements and from the little I know about the world of international politics that this process will call for strength and patience, skill and a degree of toughness on your part and I wish you well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Trible.

Senator DODD.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if I might ask all four of our witnesses this point. Senator Tower, it is a pleasure to see you.

Senator TOWER. Thank you so much.

Senator DODD. It has been raised earlier today, but since all four of you are here you might shed some light on it. It is the question of the SDI. The President in his press conference the other night left me with the impression that the SDI might be negotiable. I may have misinterpreted his remarks. Earlier statements from Secretary Weinberger and others have indicated that it is off the table and no longer negotiable.

Could you tell the committee today, if, as we enter these negotiations, it is negotiable or, it is not negotiable at this stage, and, secondly, should there be a single spokesperson on the SDI?

We are getting a lot of confusing signals on what the status of that particular defense system will be, as a part of these negotiations which begin in a week or so. Let us begin with you, Senator Tower.

Senator TOWER. Actually I think Ambassador Nitze has already answered that question. The fact is SDI is a research program. Research as such is difficult to verify. So I think to that extent it is not an item of negotiation. But the question of deployment again is something else.

But I think it should be clearly understood that we are not talking about deployments in SDI. We do not know what the ultimate result of our research is going to be, what it is going to produce in the way of systems that have any efficacy as effective defensive weapons.

Senator DODD. Mr. Nitze, I know you answered. I heard your response, and I apologize, but I was unclear as to whether or not you would agree with Senator Tower that at this juncture it would not be negotiable. Did I misinterpret the President's statements the other night that it is open for negotiation?

Ambassador NITZE. I thoroughly agree with what Senator Tower has just said, and that is, in summary, that as a research program it is not negotiable, and the Soviets are not trying to make it negotiable. I mean, they agree with that. But as to the long run, with respect to the eventual deployment of such system, there we very much do intend to negotiate with the Soviets about that subject.

Senator DODD. Do the other two distinguished members of our panel have any disagreement, or would you both agree with that statement?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. I agree with it, Senator. The only thing I would say to make a contribution to this process of clarity is that I would prefer myself to address these questions when I meet with the Soviets so as not to contribute to the very thing you are talking about, which is different voices.

We will speak with one voice in Geneva in a serious effort to try to establish the parameters for that negotiation and hopefully to move toward some kind of understanding.

Senator **Dodd**. So you would not rule it out even in the research phase?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. I agree fully with what has already been said.

Senator **Dodd**. I am just trying to get some clarity from your standpoint.

Ambassador **Glitman**. I am tempted, Senator, to begin implementing your final point, and that is to say there ought to be a single spokesman, and I do not volunteer for it, but I certainly agree with the gentlemen who have spoken.

Senator **Dodd**. All right. Thank you.

I would like to go back to the question raised by Senator Trible with regard to the competency of Soviet leadership. We have seen television broadcasts in the last 24 hours or so of Mr. Chernenko apparently showing up to vote in the local election, not in the greatest of health. We have seen as you have noted, changes in the authority and power in the Soviet Union over the last 4 or 5 years that are unprecedented in the history of the Soviet Union.

I am somewhat disturbed by the answer, with all due respect, Mr. Kampelman, that we do not understand the Soviet ability to make substantial concessions in light of this confusion with Soviet leadership. Could you expand on that a bit further? What do we expect?

Is there any indication at all that the Soviets will be in a position, in light of the shaky condition of the leadership, to actually make concessions. Do you anticipate that we will be going through a period of some months before anything substantial can be anticipated as a result of the weakening leadership structure of the Soviet Union?

Senator **Tower**. Senator, I think what has to be understood is the Soviet Union, to begin with, is not an absolute dictatorship. It is an oligarchy. It is run by a committee, and that Soviet doctrine and policy is sufficiently institutionalized that it tends to survive changes in leadership at the top.

At the moment I would not anticipate that it would either have a dilatory effect on the conduct of the negotiations or that any leadership changes would result in any dramatic changes in policy. I would have to say that is speculation on my part.

Senator **Dodd**. Ambassador Nitze, do you want to comment on that?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I would support what Senator Tower has said.

Ambassador **Glitman**. As do I.

Senator **Dodd**. Then do you speak with one voice?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Well, it is speculation. We just have to understand that. I mean it is interesting to talk about, but if we want to be realistic about it, it is speculation.

Senator DODD. But in light of what Senator Tower has noted, the distinction, would you anticipate the Soviets to be able to make concessions even though the health condition of Mr. Chernenko is somewhat in question?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I hope so, Senator. I do not know. I hope so. I do not know how substantial those will be. I just hope they will be, but I do not know.

Senator DODD. Mr. Kampelman, you wrote an article recently with two other distinguished authors on the SDI Program in which you cited some rather specific figures concerning the cost of the program. It was put at $60 billion for a two-layered defense to be built by the early 1990's.

I have tried to find out if anyone in the Pentagon can give any specific numbers as to the cost, given the lack of clarity as to what SDI would ultimately include. I am very curious in what manner you arrived at the numbers in that article and on what basis you relied on that information.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Senator, this article was written by me as a coauthor.

Senator DODD. Correct.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Without the benefit of any classified information. It was before I had any idea that I would be asked to fulfill this responsibility. It was based on interviews and considerations with serious scientists who were interviewed by us, including Professor Jastrow. We tried, if you look at the article rather carefully, to hedge the question of cost and to permit margins in it.

We also pointed out the rationale and the reasons for those figures.

Senator DODD. I understand that, and I appreciate that they are ballpark figures.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I certainly did not get these figures as official figures from any agency of the United States.

Senator DODD. I appreciate that. You do mention ballpark figures of $60 billion, and I should have used that word because that is the word used in the article. But you do talk about $15 billion; to include $10 billion for 5,000 interceptors, plus $5 billion for 10 aircraft carrying instruments for tracking Soviet warheads. That is very specific.

I am curious, in light of the statements made by the administration, particularly the President, with regard to what SDI ultimately would include. The research part of this program will ultimately determine that. I am curious as to whether or not you believe that the program is further along conceptually in the research phase than we have been led to believe.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. You will notice that the figures used, Senator, and the discussion to which you refer, if we could use Ambassador Nitze's reference, referred really to the first phase, not the ultimate phase. This was the judgment of responsible scientists with whom we talked. We communicated this figure here. We thought it was a ballpark figure.

We also had an additional sentence in here, Senator, which indicated the margin of error might be quite serious because of the uncertainty of it. It did not have the complete specificity and accuracy which would be available once the research phase of it were completed.

Senator DODD. I see. Let me ask one more question.

Senator Tower, concerning the SALT II Treaty, you expressed strong opposition to the ratification, and one of the key points you raised was verification at that particular time. I wonder if you would share with the committee your concept of verification short of onsite inspection. What would be acceptable verification?

Would you cite some examples of what would be acceptable verification short of the onsite inspection which is clearly the most appealing, and ultimately the most satisfactory form of verification? But short of that, given the Soviet intransigence on that issue, is it possible to have acceptable verification?

Senator TOWER. I hope that it is possible to have acceptable verification. Of course, the short answer to your question is any verification would be adequate if it is verification in which you can have high confidence. Now I do not think we can get into how you measure that at this point.

Obviously aspects of verification would be subject to negotiation. I would say that I do not believe that national technical means alone are sufficient, that some other forms of verification would have to be employed, including some kind of intrusive form. I think that we can have perhaps some cause for optimism, though I do not want to sound too optimistic but certainly there has been a good sign recently in the willingness of the Soviets to permit inspection of some of their nonmilitary nuclear establishments.

But I would not want to speculate on that at this time and try to get specific on what we might consider to be adequate verification measures.

Senator DODD. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

I will pass on this round of questioning. I will call upon Senator Pell. Do you have questions for the witnesses?

Senator PELL. Thank you, I do.

In the first place, the Soviets have, as I recall it, a total of about 18 years of negotiating experience. Our three delegates, as you know, have less experience negotiating on arms control. I am curious. I think it is 18 years versus 4 years in negotiating fora on arms control with the Russians. How do you propose to compensate for that need for familiarity with the Soviet outlook and views that can be acquired in the process of negotiations?

I will address that question to Mr. Kampelman.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Senator, I feel quite comfortable about facing the task of the negotiating process. I did spend 3 years in active negotiations with the Soviets. In addition to those 3 years and as part of it I spent more than 400 hours in private negotiations with the leadership of the Soviet delegation.

I also feel quite comfortable in connection with the geopolitical issues of our relationships. I have followed and studied the activities of the Soviet Union for many years. I taught the subject at the

University of Minnesota many years ago, and I feel comfortable in that task as well.

The substance of this negotiation is highly technical and I am engaged in a very active, and have been for some time, active study and briefings related to it, not for the first time but for many years. But there is a difference between thinking you know a subject, Senator, and feeling secure about the mastery of the subject for the negotiating process.

I have, therefore, intensified my activities and my studies in that area. I feel sufficiently confident, Senator, that I accepted this assignment. I would not have accepted the assignment if I felt that I would be inadequate to the task.

Senator PELL. Oh, I have the most profound respect for you. I worked with you when you were head of the U.S. delegation to the Helsinki review conference.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I know that.

Senator PELL. I recognize that. But nevertheless 18 years of negotiating on the subject of arms control is the composite total that the Soviet negotiators will have. I did not know if we were taking some steps to compensate in that regard.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. Well, one of the things I will try to suggest to the Soviet negotiators is that maybe they forget some of that 18-year experience and begin to think also in fresh terms about the immense responsibility we have to try to turn this world into a more rational and civilized international relationship.

Senator PELL. Then moving along somewhat on the same subject, as you know, Ambassador Kampelman, better than I, negotiation involves both substance and process. I am wondering if you are familiar with the work that is being done by some of the think tanks around the country. Particularly I am thinking of the one at Harvard University where they have engaged in a negotiating process, which I think is a good idea.

I am curious as to what your thoughts are there.

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I am, Senator. As a matter of fact, I was invited by the people handling this process at the law school at Harvard University to come up and participate in such a program, which I did. I have also talked since with Professor Fisher, who handles this program, and have told him that when he is next in Washington I would like to sit down and talk further with him. I expect that I will be hearing from him to set up such an appointment.

Senator PELL. While obviously we cannot hope to emulate the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which I think from start to finish the negotiations took about 3 or 4 weeks because the ground was very well paved, do you have any feeling if we are talking in terms of months, years, or decades as you move into this job?

Ambassador KAMPELMAN. I do not. The only feeling that I do have is that the immenseness of the task deserves the investment of any time required in order to pursue that task. The problems are serious and I do not expect quick fixes to serious problems.

I would also say that I think it is essential for the American negotiating team to be prepared to stay at the negotiating table for at least a day longer than the Soviets are prepared to stay. I think we must have patience. We must not permit impatience to interfere either with the clarity of our thought or the urgency of our objectives.

Senator **Pell**. Coming down to more specific questions, from an organizational viewpoint how long do you expect this first round to last in Geneva?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. The first item on the agenda of our discussions when we reach Geneva over the weekend of March 9 will be to discuss with them some rational method of proceeding with our negotiations, a schedule. How many days a week? How do we divide up? We have three negotiations, each of which will be handled by three different negotiators, and they have three different negotiators. How do we make these compatible in scheduling, for example, and staff requirements?

We will discuss this. We will also discuss the duration of it. I would far prefer, Senator, not to go there with an announced position which takes the form of a kind of requirement. I do not want to argue about the shape of the table or the duration of how many weeks. I would much rather we talked about this in an informal manner and tried informally to come to a schedule which reflects a seriousness of purpose on both of our parts to pursue the negotiating process.

So we are not going to be going there with a set schedule or calendar.

Senator **Pell**. I can see with three separate negotiating groups you do not want it to become a three-ring circus, with too much public activity.

Are the delegations that will be backstopping the three separate groups being assembled now and are they in place in Washington?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Yes, Senator, and the interagency process is working quite well. I must say also in connection with a response to one of your earlier questions of me the backup is superb from what I can see, and our staff will be fully experienced in all three of the areas of the negotiation.

Senator **Pell**. As you know, in ACDA there are two slots for what are called special representatives for arms control and disarmament negotiations, presently filled, I think, by Ambassador Nitze and General Rowny. Will those continue to be filled by Ambassador Nitze and General Rowny, or will Ambassador Kampelman and one of the negotiators be moving into those positions?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I anticipate that I will be continuing in my job, and so will General Rowny.

Senator **Pell**. Right, but the special representatives technically are supposed to be for negotiating differences more than advisory; is that not correct?

Ambassador **Nitze**. Yes; that is correct.

Senator **Pell**. I am very glad you are staying, so I will not pursue that question any further. I am glad at the anomaly.

How will the reporting procedures run? Ambassador Kampelman, to whom will you report and will Ambassadors Tower and Glitman be reporting to you or to the Secretary of State? How will that work?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. All three of us, of course, are following instructions from the President of the United States. We will all be reporting back to Washington from our own individual negotiating fora.

Senator **Pell**. And when it comes to verifiability of proposals is there a backstop single office for that in Washington, or will that question be examined by three different groups?

Ambassador **Nitze**. The ACDA will be the backstopping organization and it will chair an interdepartmental committee which will bring in the other parts of the executive branch, and it in turn will operate closely in conjunction with the Senior Arms Control Group, and they in turn with the NSC.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Trible.

Senator **Trible**. I have no further questions, thank you.

The **Chairman**. Senator Kerry.

Senator **Kerry**. I have one question and I apologize, gentlemen, if I am belaboring this point. But the distinguished Senator from Connecticut and I conversed and we are still somewhat in doubt as to one portion of the answer to the question on the SDI negotiability.

I understand totally what you have said about the research portion of that project. I understand that is separate and that is not restrained under the ABM Treaty and perhaps I should phrase my question a little bit differently.

In the INF talks we made an offer to restrain ourselves in future deployment for Soviet reductions in currently deployed missiles. My question goes back to the irrevocable nature of our shifting from offense to defense. Is SDI on the table?

Could it be traded in the same way as the INF proposals were made—future deployment, allowing us to continue present research but would they, if the Soviet Union made offers that you found interesting and verifiable and other things with respect to intermediate forces and long-range forces, in those circumstances would it be on the table, particularly in light of your comments about the SDI having been so important to the Soviets coming back to the table?

Clearly it is something they want to talk about. In that light, would you trade conceivably the future deployment, apart from research?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I can only repeat what the President said, and that is that everything will be on the table. In other words, it is not excluded.

Senator **Kerry**. So the answer to that is yes?

Ambassador **Nitze**. Yes.

Senator **Kerry**. Do you agree with that?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. Yes.

Senator **Kerry**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. I have one further question to Ambassador Kampelman. What do you envision is the role of the Congress, the observers and so forth, in this process?

Ambassador **Kampelman**. I referred in the beginning of my statement to my expectation that this exchange today is the first of a series of both formal and informal exchanges and consultations that we might have.

There is, as you know, a group of Members of the Senate and also another group of Members of the House who will be in Geneva during the first few days of our presence in Geneva to begin the negotiations. I interpret that as a gesture by those Members of the Congress who are going to be there to demonstrate (a) an interest and (b) support for a united American position, and we will do what we can before we go to Geneva and while this group is in Geneva to provide a basis for consultation and exchanges, knowing full well, however, that there is not going to be that much to say before the negotiations have begun.

But I would hope that after the negotiations begin during our recesses and returns to Washington for consultation with the President and with the Secretary of State and with the executive branch that we would also provide for those consultations with the appropriate committees and interested individuals of the Congress.

We would also hope that during the course of the negotiations individual Senators, perhaps in more manageable numbers than will be coming out at the outset, would come to Geneva and meet with us and be kept informed and participate with us in our own inside deliberations as we prepare for the negotiations.

So I am hoping what will evolve out of all of this is a growing closeness so that you know what we know and we have the benefit of your own experience and judgments.

Senator PELL. My understanding of the role of the observers is that they are to act in a way to kind of bat the ball back and forth with you, to actually come up with ideas and to be quite informed, because basically if an agreement is reached, as we all hope it is, they will have much of a load to make sure that the Senate does consent to it.

I know from having been an observer in past negotiations how helpful it is, and I realize that the first wave of Members of Congress is going to be rather overwhelming, but when things are settled I would hope very much that you will carry on the old practice that I recall, which is when one or two Members of Congress turned up they actually sat in on the session itself. They did not participate in the back room, but when there were little coffee breaks after the rather boring set speeches on each side they were able to participate in it.

I realize this is a little bit up in the air at the moment, but when the numbers are manageable I hope that we will move in that direction. We got more out of those little coffee klatches than we did out of the whole rest of the day, I thought.

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Gentlemen, I think you know the evolution of the observer group and its deliberations have proceeded, but for the record let me simply say that the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate, acting upon an invitation by the President of the United States, have appointed a 10-member Senate observer group with four cochairmen—Senator Stevens, Senator Nunn, Senator Pell, and me.

This arrangement was designed to reflect the fact that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has primary jurisdiction over the subject matter; that is, if there is a treaty to be ratified, it will come to the Foreign Relations Committee initially. Senator Pell and I, in our capacities as chairman and ranking minority member of this committee, wanted to make certain that this fact was recognized from the outset, and we are pleased to serve as cochairmen with Senators Stevens and Nunn of this observer group.

Some members of this group may in fact appear in Geneva at the start of the negotiations, and indeed, as Ambassador Kampelman suggested, individual members of the group may appear at different intervals during the course of negotiations. This committee looks forward to working with the observer group as well as with the American negotiators.

We believe that a constructive dialog can occur with the American negotiating team during the periods when the negotiations are in recess and the negotiators return to Washington for consultations, as well as with the Secretary of State and with other officials of our Government who are in Washington more or less permanently but who will remain closely in touch with our negotiating team in Geneva. In this manner, we expect to remain informed about the course of the negotiations.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, thank you, but I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trible.

Senator TRIBLE. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, this really is something like a confirmation hearing, and it seems to me that we are prepared to move at an appropriate time with these nominations.

The CHAIRMAN. With the permission of the distinguished ranking member, I would propose that at 11 o'clock on Thursday, during the hearing that is scheduled for that day, which hopefully will attract many members of the committee, we conduct a short business meeting at which time the confirmation of these nominees might be on the agenda.

Would that meet with your approval?

Senator PELL. It does, and this is on the assumption that all the papers are now up to us.

The CHAIRMAN. By 11 o'clock on Thursday I think we would make that assumption.

As I announced at the outset of the hearing today, we have substantially the papers that are required, but the Office of Government Ethics has not yet filed its final report, and I think we ought to have that for the record.

Senator PELL. Yes, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we deeply appreciate your staying with us through these questions. You have all been forthcoming and it has been very constructive.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

NUCLEAR STRATEGY, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, AND ARMS CONTROL

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1985

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 9:38 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Lugar, (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Helms, Mathias, Kassebaum, Pressler, Murkowski, Evans, Pell, Biden, Cranston, Dodd, and Kerry.

The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is now called to order.

The committee this morning initiates a three-part series of hearings devoted to the general theme of "Nuclear Strategy, Ballistic Missile Defense, and Arms Control."

We are pleased to welcome this morning the distinguished Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, to commence these discussions.

For purposes of members' schedules, I might mention the second component of these hearings will take place on November 7, at 10 a.m., when our witnesses will be Gen. Brent Scowcroft, James Schlesinger, and Walt Slocombe.

The concluding session in these hearings will take place on the morning of November 12, when our witnesses will be Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, Ambassador Gerard Smith, and Mr. John Rhinelander.

At the outset, I might note what these hearings are not. They are not about the ongoing Geneva arms control negotiations; nor are these hearings to be devoted to the Soviet-American summit on November 19 and 20. Members of the committee have consistently displayed a proper sensitivity and appreciation of both ongoing arms control negotiations and preparations for the summit.

Rather, this set of hearings has been called in order to provide for a better understanding of what U.S. nuclear strategy is today, why it has not provided for a ballistic missile defense role in the past, and why the administration now proposes that it should.

Any national debate about ballistic missile defense technologies should take place in the context of the larger issues of national security strategy.

On the one hand, any BMD development and deployment should be carried out to fulfill the requirements of a coherent nuclear strategy. The answer to the question of whether the United States can build a BMD system will depend in part on how good a BMD system the country needs. By the same token, how good a system the country needs depends upon what U.S. strategy would require the system to do.

On the other hand, the emergence of BMD-related technologies may suggest that new strategies, once infeasible, might become available. The administration's strategic defense initiative stems from both a dissatisfaction with our existing nuclear strategy and from a belief that changes in strategy might be made technically feasible.

In short, the issue of what is technologically possible must be embedded in a debate over what is strategically desirable and practical.

Thus, there exists an interrelationship between questions concerning the kinds of ballistic missile defense, if any, the United States would want if it could have it and questions concerning the kind of defense it can have.

The committee is fortunate to have as its initial witness the Secretary of Defense. We have asked the Secretary to review with us current U.S. nuclear strategy and the reasons for an absence of a role for ballistic missile defense in that strategy. A key question to be considered initially is not whether the United States could build a BMD system but, rather, the related question of why the United States should want to build such a system and how capable it would have to be.

By the same token, there is a need to review the various levels of BMD capability that might be available to the United States and the Soviet Union and to examine the various ways in which such capabilities might serve various strategic goals.

A second key question, then, concerns how various postulated levels of BMD performance might either enhance the current nuclear deterrent posture of the United States or promote movement toward a different strategy.

The subsequent hearings will explore some of the possible consequences that BMD might have for crisis stability, arms competition stability, and arms control.

Mr. Secretary, I realize this is a tall order, but it is my hope that these hearings can help the committee to frame the appropriate terms of reference for future debate, a debate that must be informed by U.S. strategic objectives.

Before I ask you to proceed, I would ask the distinguished ranking member, Senator Pell, if he has an opening statement this morning.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly join you in welcoming Secretary Weinberger, a Cabinet officer of very real intelligence and integrity.

Mr. Secretary, I am one of those who believes that weapons programs and arms control are both essential ingredients of a sound national security policy. But recent statements and reports from your Department have led me to question whether we have not, indeed, lost sight of the value of arms control.

Some of us wonder whether the DOD has not taken on the role of opposition to prospective arms control, and to existing arms control as well.

In my mind, it is absolutely legitimate for the Department of Defense to participate in all arms control decisions in order to make sure our national security interests are truly protected. It is not legitimate, however, for the Department to sink into obstructionism, and I trust that has not happened.

To help clear the air, Mr. Secretary, I hope, and I am sure, you will be forthcoming letting the committee know your views on the arms control agenda.

Are you prepared, for example, to actively press for arms control agreements, even if they should stymie or block cherished programs, if that should be on the agenda emerging from the summit?

Would the Department of Defense be prepared to put portions of SDI on the table if that would gain valuable Soviet reductions in strategic offensive arms?

Would the Department of Defense be willing to push for the kinds of reductions that both sides could live with?

And, most important to my mind, would you be willing to allow progress on the test ban issue, which can play such a role in developing a world where nuclear weapons may be weapons of the past, both because of the fact that you are limited in developing new warheads unless you can test and also the old warheads have to be systematically and periodically tested if you are not to lose confidence in their reliability.

These are the questions that we hope you will address today.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

The Chair would mention that this hearing must conclude by noon, and, therefore, we will proceed with the Secretary's statement.

The Chair will ask for unanimous consent that there be a 10 minute limit on questions of members and, following Secretary Weinberger's statement, we will proceed with the questions.

Secretary Weinberger.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary **Weinberger**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I am very appreciative of the honor of your invitation and of being here to have the opportunity to talk about these critically important matters. I certainly appreciate the spirit in which the committee is approaching them. I will try to respond to the questions that you and Senator Pell have posed.

I have a short statement, a relatively short statement, and I would like to present that because it goes into some history without which I think we cannot really properly appreciate the policies of today. Then, if I do not cover your questions, sir; I will be delighted to try to do so in the questioning period.

You have invited me to address the broad issues of nuclear strategy and how missile defense fits into that strategy and how our objectives for offensive and defensive forces relate to our goals for arms reduction.

I think it is helpful to recognize that our own nuclear strategy has not been static, but has evolved from decade to decade to cope with vast changes in the threat and in technology.

Some people allege that the President's Strategic Defense Initiative is upsetting a stable order which has lasted for 40 years. The strategic order has really been far from stable. In a very broad sense, to be sure, our approach to protecting the peace has been remarkably consistent since the beginning of the nuclear age.

Since 1945, we have always sought the same thing, and that is to deter aggression against us or against our allies by possessing sufficient military strength to convince any potential enemy that the cost of aggression would far outweigh its benefits.

But, in speaking of deterrence since then, we have created a kind of misimpression that it is an unchanging, totally stable, arrangement. In reality, our nuclear doctrine is one of constant change and evolution, as, indeed, I think it has to be.

In the first 4 years following World War II, when we had a total and complete monopoly, the purpose of our policy was to continue deterrence of any major Soviet conventional assault on our European allies. The strategy then was that if deterrence failed, plans called for allied forces to defeat the Red Army in the same way we had defeated the Wehrmacht, and the U.S. nuclear weapons would have been used against targets in the Soviet Union in an attempt to destroy in a single, knockout blow their ability to continue to support the war.

But then the Soviets developed atomic weapons and the means to deliver them against NATO allies, and that created the need to deter Soviet nuclear attack on those allies and on United States forces stationed in Europe. Initially, the Eisenhower administration sought to accomplish both this and the prevention of major Soviet conventional attacks by relying almost exclusively on nuclear forces that could, in the event of any Soviet aggression, strike quickly and simultaneously a combination of key military, political, and industrial targets in the Soviet Union. This policy called for rapid escalation to nuclear weapons. In the 1950's, the U.S.S.R. then began to develop the intercontinental missile and the bomber force, long anticipated by our analysts. This required that our doctrine be adjusted again.

The first United States response to an invasion of Europe, we said then, would be large-scale employment of tactical nuclear weapons. If that failed to halt the invasion, then a nuclear attack would be launched against the Soviet Union.

After 1960, the administration again had to develop a new strategy in order to maintain the credibility of our deterrent in Europe, despite the continued growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities. That new doctrine was called "flexible response, 'and it had two principal thrusts, which were, first, to decrease the reliance on early use of nuclear weapons by placing renewed emphasis on improved conventional forces and, second, to enhance the possibility of ending the war quickly, without causing massive destruction.

Our plans were revised so that the President was given limited nuclear responses.

The alliance, as a whole, did not adopt this new strategy until about 6 years later, after prolonged, and sometimes very difficult, consultations, I am told.

While the overall set of strategic military, political, and industrial targets did not change significantly, the planning now permitted the President to attack targets sequentially, if he wished. The idea that nuclear war might occur as a series of nuclear strikes and counterstrikes, rather than a single, massive, United States attack in response to Soviet aggression, reinforced the need to make our strategic forces survivable, even during a war.

Clearly, United States forces had to survive a Soviet attack for potentially extended periods of time if the President were to be able to coerce the Soviets to halt the war by "withholding" or threatening to execute a portion of the United States response.

Subsequently, as the Soviet Union developed an increasing capacity for destroying our nuclear forces, new options were built into our plans. Our planners sought to provide more credible responses for any level of aggression in order to strengthen the basic deterrence.

While the basic role of strategic offensive forces, to impose unacceptable costs in response to aggression, has been relatively constant—that has been the theme that ran through it all—this has not been true of the role of strategic defensive forces.

As the Soviet threat to the United States developed in the 1950's, the Eisenhower administration reacted by strengthening our Nation's strategic defenses.

The North American Air Defense Program was expanded. By the early 1960's, the United States had 2,000 aircraft dedicated to that role, and 3,000 surface-to-air missiles.

In 1960, the Defense Department spent just about as much for strategic defense as for strategic offense. Strategic air defense did influence Soviet planning. The Soviet leadership was dissuaded from building a new strategic bomber and concentrated, instead, on ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Union built a new intercontinental bomber only after we had abandoned air defense. So, it appears that the absence of strategic defense stimulated a Soviet buildup.

Our policy on defensive forces soon changed.

We concluded in the early 1960's that, for technical reasons, the ABM network then under consideration could not defend the United States adequately against a projected Soviet missile threat, and we cut back our proposed ABM system.

We spent about a billion dollars on it, as a matter of fact, and gave that up. And we sought to place arms control limits on such systems.

We also slashed our air defenses since the unobstructed missile threat had made them too vulnerable.

So, the negotiation of the ABM Treaty then led to the belief in the United States that we had reached an understanding with the Soviet Union to keep our nations vulnerable to each other's nuclear attacks.

We did think the Soviet Union would join us in maintaining this mutual vulnerability as a stable order, a strategic order that would render a further buildup in offensive forces unnecessary.

In fact, the belief was widely held in the West that this agreed vulnerability was the best, indeed the only, way to slow down the Soviet buildup in offensive nuclear arms.

As it turned out, that consensus was illusory and wrong.

Our theory about a United States-Soviet consensus on a stable, mutual vulnerability had nothing to do with the way the Soviets viewed nuclear weapons. Despite lip service to the contrary, the Soviets went right ahead and built up and expanded their missile forces. They enhanced their air defenses. They worked vigorously on ballistic missile defense. And they expended a great deal of effort to prepare underground shelters for political and military leadership. They hardened their assets.

Since the signing of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union has spent as much on strategic defense as it has on strategic offense.

Currently, the Soviets have nearly 12,000 surface-to-air missile launchers at over 1,200 sites. They have 10,000 air defense radars, and more than 1,200 interceptor aircraft dedicated to air defense, and an additional 2,800 interceptors are assigned to the Soviet air forces and could also be employed in air defense missions, if necessary.

This defensive network is continually being modernized and expanded, particularly, of course, around Moscow.

The Soviet Union also maintains an active program on ballistic missile defense, both of a traditional type and using advanced technology.

I think it is very instructive to note that shortly after the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, the Soviet Defense Minister, Mr. Grechko, stated that the treaty, and this is a quote:

> Places no limitations whatsoever on the conducting of research and experimental work directed toward solving the problem of defending the country from nuclear missile strikes.

He thus confirmed that, despite the signing of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Government had not abandoned the concept of ballistic missile defense as an option for the future.

In the area of traditional ballistic missile defenses, the Soviets maintain the world's only operational ABM system around Moscow now, and that system is being expanded and modernized. The Soviet Union for many years has been engaged also in the construction of an extensive nationwide network of large, phased array ballistic missile detection and tracking radars, which is of particular concern when linked with other Soviet ABM activities.

The Krasnoyarsk radar, an important part of this large Soviet radar network, is in clear violation of the ABM Treaty. In addition, the SA-10 and the SA-X-12 SAM systems may have the potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles, giving the Soviets some nationwide ABM capability.

There have been, Mr. Chairman, strategic theorists in the West who have argued that to deter nuclear aggression, the United States needed only a capability to retaliate by destroying Soviet cities. This view, of course, has never governed U.S. policy. We have wisely continued to maintain deterrence by holding at risk the military forces and specific assets valued by the Kremlin.

The Soviet Union certainly did not rely on a doctrine threatening merely the destruction of American cities, as is shown by their efforts throughout the 1970's to acquire a capability of destroying our land-based ICBM silos.

So, when this administration took office in 1981, we were confronted with a serious deterioration in our strategic nuclear capabilities. The Soviets had built a force of SS-18's and SS-19's, with sufficient numbers of highly accurate warheads to pose, at the very least, a major threat against our ICBM force.

Their hardening programs of their targets had, in the absence of any U.S. improvements to our forces, created virtual sanctuaries for their ICBM's, the launch control facilities, and many leadership shelters.

Their air defenses were becoming sufficiently sophisticated so that the ability of our old B-52's to penetrate would at least be severely jeopardized in the near term.

And, most seriously of all, our own strategic command, control, and communications network had become highly vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack.

Our response, in 1981, had to be vigorous. Building on the valuable elements in some existing programs, President Reagan fashioned a Strategic Modernization Program to repair our deterrent. That was placed before the Congress in October 1981. This deterrent of ours will grow very much stronger in the years ahead, with the Peacekeeper/MX missile, the new, small ICBM, the Trident submarines and the Trident II missile with the accuracy and the yield now to destroy Soviet hardened targets, two bomber programs, and, of particular importance, a long overdue effort to make our command and control systems more usable and more survivable.

But our Strategic Modernization Program, started in 1981, is not a sufficient response for the long term. We should not remain locked into an approach that will always demand an indefinite competition in offensive arms.

As the President stated just a week ago to the United Nations:

> If we are destined by history to compete, militarily, to keep the peace, then let us compete in systems that defend our society rather than competing in weapons which can destroy us both, and much of God's creation along with us.

That was the President at the United Nations.

Some 3 years ago, as the President reviewed the future development of our nuclear forces and strategy, he explored with his advisors the contribution that a defense against ballistic missiles could make to our long-term security. This was the first time in over a decade that the question of strategic defense was seriously addressed in the White House.

The President determined that promising technologies had now advanced to such an extent as to reverse the Johnson administration's conclusions that ballistic missile defense was technically impossible. The President concluded that we needed to begin a high priority effort to develop advanced antiballistic missile systems, not only as a hedge against similar Soviet efforts, but, more importantly, as a means to build a safer strategic order for the future.

It has been suggested that ballistic missile defenses will create a conflict with the objectives of deterrence, and that such defenses would undermine strategic stability.

This is not the case.

I have just reviewed with you, as briefly as possible, the 40-year history of this nuclear strategy precisely to show that the relationship of offensive and defensive forces has really been anything but stable. The essence of deterrence is to make it clearly less attractive to a potential enemy to attack than not to attack, in times of peace as well as in times of any conceivable crisis. To prevent nuclear war, we must not only be able to deter deliberate attack, we must also avert the initiation of war as a result of a technical accident, human error, or a combination of catastrophic mishaps.

Seen in this broader context, the potential contribution of strategic defense for our long-term security looks even more important.

Now I would like to turn for a moment to the question of the transition to strategic defense from the current situation with our exclusive reliance on nuclear offensive forces—an exclusive reliance we know is not shared by the Soviet Union.

By openly discussing our program on strategic defense, we in the United States took a course very different from that of the Soviet Union. We do not conceal the fact that we are engaged in research on missile defense. We do not violate treaties. We brief all our allies and consult extensively with them.

As I think you know, Mr. Chairman, I have just returned from that type of consultation in Brussels yesterday. We also have a standing offer in Geneva to discuss with the Soviets how we could cooperate to establish a more secure strategic order in the long-term through an agreed, safe transition toward decreasing reliance on offensive nuclear arms.

Now, as we seek to achieve a strategic order based on defense, we must not neglect the offensive deterrent systems. That has been the point the President has made regularly, since October 1981, and, of course, for many years before that.

These offensive deterrent systems are necessary to insure deterrence while the strategic defense research progresses and, indeed, during a transition period.

For some time to come, then, our alliance will have to modernize its deterrent forces to make them less vulnerable and overcome weaknesses in their communication systems. A complete defensive system, of course, could not be deployed overnight. It might take many years between the time that the first missile defenses are deployed and the time a multilayered system as envisioned by us could be in place.

Some have alleged that this transition would be a very dangerous period, that it would upset the present deterrent strategy without putting an adequate substitute in its place. We have studied for some time in the Defense Department and elsewhere how to develop our strategy and forces for such a transition, and we have found that these concerns are really not warranted.

Far from being destabilizing, I think it turns out that the initial defensive capabilities, if properly planned and phased, can strengthen the present deterrent capability of our alliance. Even partially effective defenses can help deny Soviet planners the objective of a missile attack and reduce their confidence that they could achieve that objective, and hence it would serve to strengthen deterrence.

We cannot say today, of course, how long the transition would take. It would require less time and effort if the Soviet Union joined us in reducing the threat of nuclear mass destruction and in phasing in defenses that can protect all of us.

This is what we seek to negotiate in Geneva. The transition would be more difficult and more prolonged if the Soviet Union persisted in expanding its missile arsenals and rejected the road of cooperation to move ahead to a safer world.

What can be said about the Soviet motivation to choose either road?

Those critical of strategic defense argue that a cooperative transition would never be accepted by the Soviet rulers. These critics are convinced that the Soviet rulers would rather forego a chance to protect their own country than to give up their capability to threaten our alliance with mass destruction.

But, according to these same critics, the same Soviet rulers would readily settle for what would be the equivalent of "a plague on both your houses"—that is, they would settle down with us in an equilibrium of mutual vulnerability and mutual terror and keep it indefinitely on the theory that that would maintain stability.

I wonder if we have not learned during the last 15 years that by abstaining ourselves from missile defenses we do not halt the Soviet buildup in offensive missiles nor do we halt their defensive efforts.

So I think the opposite really is more plausible than the more pessimistic formulation.

If the time comes when the Soviet rulers are willing to abide by an understanding on strategic arms control, it seems unlikely that this would be to preserve indefinitely the target of mutual mass destruction or, as seen from Moscow, to preserve the threat of destruction of the Soviet Union.

A genuine understanding of strategic arms control must give promise both to the Soviet Union and to our own alliance that it will serve to reduce and eventually to eliminate this horrible threat.

I would like, if I might, Mr. Chairman, to respond to the question you asked as to why we have not had a ballistic missile defense before. The answer is clear. We have not had one that we thought would work. Now we are working on one that we think will.

With respect to Senator Pell's questions, and I will repeat this when he comes back, if he likes, I would say that we certainly have no opposition whatever to arms reduction. We have found that arms control agreements in the past have not brought about reductions in the Soviet Union. Their verification has not been adequate. These agreements have been violated, and we certainly do not have any desire whatever, nor is there any intention, to block or attempt to oppose arms reduction efforts or agreements that bring about a genuine reduction in arms. But we think no one is well served, certainly not the United States, if we delude ourselves into believing that any agreement is necessarily a good agreement. We have to look at the contents. It has to provide major reductions, down to parity on both sides, and be thoroughly verifiable.

That is the kind of agreement we support and support vigorously. There is no arms system so cherished that we would not be delighted to give it up if we could get that kind of agreement. But we would not trade away and we would not negotiate away strategic defense. It is too high a priority for the President. It is too much to give up a chance to alter the only means we have had thus far to safeguard the peace, which is, in effect, a mutual suicide pact. The President will not give that chance up.

Thank you very much, sir.

[Secretary Weinberger's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CASPAR W. WEINBERGER

MR. CHAIRMAN, I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOUR COMMITTEE. YOU HAVE INVITED ME TO ADDRESS BROAD ISSUES OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY: HOW MISSILE DEFENSE FITS INTO OUR STRATEGY, AND HOW OUR OBJECTIVES FOR OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC FORCES RELATE TO OUR GOALS FOR ARMS CONTROL.

TO THIS END, IT IS HELPFUL TO RECOGNIZE THAT OUR OWN NUCLEAR STRATEGY HAS NOT BEEN STATIC, BUT HAS EVOLVED FROM DECADE TO DECADE TO COPE WITH THE VAST CHANGES IN THE THREAT AND IN TECHNOLOGY.

SOME PEOPLE ALLEGE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE IS UPSETTING A STABLE ORDER WHICH HAS LASTED FOR FORTY YEARS. IN FACT, THE STRATEGIC ORDER HAS BEEN FAR FROM STABLE. IN A VERY BROAD SENSE, TO BE SURE, AMERICA'S APPROACH TO PROTECTING THE PEACE HAS BEEN REMARKABLY CONSISTENT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE. SINCE 1945, WE HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO DETER AGGRESSION AGAINST US OR OUR ALLIES BY POSSESSING SUFFICIENT MILITARY STRENGTH TO CONVINCE ANY POTENTIAL ENEMY THAT THE COST OF AGGRESSION WOULD OUTWEIGH ITS BENEFITS. BUT IN SPEAKING OF "DETERRENCE" SINCE THEN, WE MAY HAVE CREATED A MISIMPRESSION THAT IT IS SOME SORT OF UNCHANGING STABLE ARRANGEMENT.

In reality, the history of U.S. nuclear doctrine is one of constant change and evolution. In the first five years following World War II, the purpose of U.S. nuclear policy was to contribute to deterrence of a major Soviet conventional assault on our European allies. If deterrence failed, plans called for allied forces to defeat the Red Army in a manner similar to our defeat of the Wehrmacht, and U.S. nuclear weapons would have been used against targets in the Soviet Union in an attempt to destroy, in a single "knock-out blow," the USSR's ability to continue to support the war.

Soviet development of atomic weapons and the means to deliver them against NATO allies created the need to deter Soviet nuclear attack on those allies and on U.S. forces stationed in Europe. Initially, the Eisenhower Administration sought to accomplish both this and prevention of major Soviet conventional attacks by relying almost exclusively on nuclear forces that could, in the event of any Soviet aggression, strike quickly and simultaneously a combination of key military, political and industrial targets in the Soviet Union.

As the Soviet capability to devastate Western Europe with nuclear missiles and bombers increased in the 1950s -- and as the USSR began to develop, as well, the intercontinental missile and bomber force long anticipated by U.S. analysts -- U.S. strategic

DOCTRINE HAD TO BE ADJUSTED AGAIN. IN PART BECAUSE WE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN DEVELOPING TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS, AND IN PART BECAUSE THE SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL FORCES WERE EMERGING, THE FIRST U.S. RESPONSE TO AN INVASION OF EUROPE WOULD HAVE BEEN LARGE-SCALE EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DESTROY THE RED ARMY'S ATTACK. IF THAT FAILED TO HALT THE INVASION, OR IF WE RECEIVED CLEAR WARNING IN SUCH A WAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READYING ITS INTERCONTINENTAL FORCES, A NUCLEAR ATTACK AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED.

AFTER 1960, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AGAIN HAD TO DEVELOP A NEW STRATEGY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENT IN EUROPE DESPITE THE CONTINUED GROWTH OF SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. WOULD THE THREAT OF IMMEDIATE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMAIN AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AGAINST A LARGE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK IN EUROPE? THE ADMINISTRATION'S ANSWER, THE NEW DOCTRINE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, HAD TWO PRINCIPAL THRUSTS: FIRST, IN ORDER TO DECREASE THE RELIANCE ON EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE U.S. (AND ITS ALLIES) WOULD PLACE RENEWED EMPHASIS ON IMPROVING CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSE. SECOND, TO ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF ENDING THE WAR QUICKLY WITHOUT CAUSING MASSIVE DESTRUCTION, U.S. WAR PLANS WERE REVISED TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH LIMITED NUCLEAR RESPONSES. THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE DID NOT ADOPT THIS NEW STRATEGY UNTIL SIX YEARS LATER, AFTER PROLONGED AND SOMETIMES DIFFICULT CONSULTATIONS.

WHILE THE OVERALL SET OF STRATEGIC MILITARY, POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL TARGETS DID NOT CHANGE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE PLANNING NOW PERMITTED THE PRESIDENT TO ATTACK TARGETS SEQUENTIALLY. THE IDEA THAT NUCLEAR WAR MIGHT OCCUR AS A SERIES OF NUCLEAR STRIKES AND COUNTERSTRIKES, RATHER THAN A SINGLE MASSIVE U.S. ATTACK IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET AGGRESSION, REINFORCED THE NEED TO MAKE OUR STRATEGIC FORCES SURVIVABLE, EVEN DURING A WAR. CLEARLY, U.S. FORCES HAD TO SURVIVE SOVIET ATTACKS FOR POTENTIALLY EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME IF THE PRESIDENT WAS TO BE ABLE TO COERCE THE SOVIETS TO HALT THE WAR BY "WITHHOLDING" (AND THREATENING TO EXECUTE IF TERMS WERE NOT MET) A PORTION OF THE U.S. RESPONSE.

SUBSEQUENTLY, AS THE SOVIET UNION DEVELOPED AN INCREASING CAPACITY FOR DESTROYING U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES, NEW OPTIONS WERE BUILT INTO OUR PLANS. OUR PLANNERS SOUGHT TO PROVIDE MORE CREDIBLE RESPONSES FOR ANY LEVEL OF AGGRESSION, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE.

WHILE THE BASIC ROLE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES--TO IMPOSE UNACCEPTABLE COSTS IN RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION--HAS BEEN RELATIVELY CONSTANT, THIS HAS NOT BEEN TRUE OF THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES.

AS THE SOVIET THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES DEVELOPED IN THE 1950S, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION REACTED BY STRENGTHENING

OUR NATION'S STRATEGIC DEFENSES. THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM WAS EXPANDED: BY THE EARLY 1960S, THE U.S. HAD 2,000 AIRCRAFT DEDICATED TO THIS ROLE AND 3,000 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES. IN 1960, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPENT ABOUT AS MUCH FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE AS FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. IN ADDITION, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION EMPHASIZED CIVIL DEFENSE PREPARATIONS. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THIS EMPHASIS ON STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE DID INFLUENCE SOVIET PLANNING: THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS DISSUADED FROM BUILDING A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER AND CONCENTRATED INSTEAD ON BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE SOVIET UNION BUILT A NEW INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBER ONLY AFTER WE HAD ABANDONED AIR DEFENSES. THUS, IT APPEARS THE ABSENCE OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE STIMULATED THIS SOVIET BUILD-UP.

HOWEVER, OUR POLICY ON DEFENSIVE FORCES SOON CHANGED. WE CONCLUDED IN THE EARLY 1960S THAT FOR TECHNICAL REASONS THE ABM NETWORK THEN UNDER CONSIDERATION COULD NOT DEFEND THE UNITED STATES ADEQUATELY AGAINST THE PROJECTED SOVIET MISSILE THREAT. HENCE, WE CUT BACK OUR PROPOSED ABM SYSTEM, AND SOUGHT TO PLACE ARMS CONTROL LIMITS ON SUCH SYSTEMS. WE ALSO SLASHED OUR AIR DEFENSES SINCE THE UNOBSTRUCTED MISSILE THREAT MADE THEM TOO VULNERABLE. AFTER WE HAD RATIFIED THE 1972 ABM TREATY, WE SOON BEGAN TO NEGLECT WHAT WAS LEFT OF NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE AND ABANDONED THE SINGLE, PERMITTED SITE FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.

The negotiation of the ABM Treaty led to the belief in the United States that we had reached an understanding with the Soviet Union to keep our nations vulnerable to each others nuclear attack. Moreover, we thought the Soviet Union would join us in maintaining this mutual vulnerability as a stable order -- a strategic order that would render a further build-up in offensive forces unnecessary. In fact, the belief was widely held in the West that this agreed vulnerability was the best, indeed the only, way to slow down the Soviet build-up in offensive nuclear arms. The 1972 treaty curbing ballistic missile defense -- the ABM Treaty -- was intended to preserve this consensus in perpetuity.

As it turned out the consensus was illusory. Our theory about a U.S.-Soviet consensus on a stable, mutual vulnerability had nothing to do with the way the Soviets viewed nuclear weapons. Despite lip service to the contrary, the Soviet Government went right ahead building up and expanding its missile forces, perfecting its air defenses, and working vigorously on ballistic missile defense. It also expended a great effort to prepare underground shelters for the political and military leadership. Since the signing of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union has spent as much on strategic defense as it has spent on strategic offensive forces.

Currently, the Soviets have nearly 12,000 surface-to-air missile launchers at over 1,200 sites, 10,000 air defense radars, and more than 1,200 interceptor aircraft dedicated to air defense. An additional 2,800 interceptors assigned to the Soviet air forces also could be employed in air defense missions if necessary. This defensive network is continually being modernized and expanded.

The Soviet Union also maintains an active program on ballistic missile defense, both of a traditional type and using advanced technology. Shortly after the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, the Soviet Defense Minister Grechko stated that the Treaty "places no limitations whatsoever on the conducting of research and experimental work directed towards solving the problem of defending the country from nuclear missile strikes." He thus confirmed that, despite the signing of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Government had not abandoned the concept of ballistic missile defense as an option for the future.

In the area of traditional ballistic missile defenses, the Soviets maintain the world's only operational ABM system around Moscow. That system is being expanded and modernized. The Soviet Union also has for many years been engaged in the construction of an extensive, nationwide network of large phased-array ballistic missile detection and tracking radars, WHICH IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN WHEN LINKED WITH OTHER SOVIET ABM ACTIVITIES. BECAUSE SUCH RADARS ARE IMPORTANT TO A NATIONWIDE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, THE ABM TREATY PLACED EMPHASIS ON REGULATING THEIR DEPLOYMENT -- LIMITING THEM TO LOCATIONS ON THE PERIPHERY OF U.S. AND SOVIET NATIONAL TERRITORY, AND ORIENTED OUTWARDS. THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, AN IMPORTANT PART OF THIS LARGE SOVIET RADAR NETWORK, IS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY. CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ABM TREATY, IT IS NOT LOCATED ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE SOVIET UNION -- BEING SOME 750 KILOMETERS FROM THE NEAREST BORDER -- NOR IS IT ORIENTED OUTWARD -- INSTEAD IT LOOKS ACROSS SOME 4,000 KILOMETERS OF SOVIET TERRITORY.

IN ADDITION, SOME EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SOVIET AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF THE SA-10 AND DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF THE SA-X-12 SAM SYSTEMS. THESE SYSTEMS MAY HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO INTERCEPT SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES -- GIVING THE SOVIETS SOME NATIONWIDE ABM CAPABILITY.

THERE HAVE BEEN STRATEGIC THEORISTS IN THE WEST WHO ARGUED THAT TO DETER NUCLEAR AGGRESSION, THE UNITED STATES NEEDED ONLY A CAPABILITY TO RETALIATE BY DESTROYING SOVIET CITIES. THIS VIEW, OF COURSE, HAS NEVER GOVERNED U.S. POLICY. WE HAVE WISELY CONTINUED

TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE BY HOLDING AT RISK THE MILITARY FORCES AND SPECIFIC ASSETS VALUED BY THE KREMLIN. AND THE SOVIET UNION CERTAINLY DID NOT NOT RELY ON A DOCTRINE THREATENING MERELY THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CITIES, AS SHOWN BY ITS EFFORT THROUGHOUT THE 1970S TO ACQUIRE A CAPABILITY FOR DESTROYING OUR LAND-BASED ICBMS.

THUS, WHEN THIS ADMINISTRATION CAME INTO OFFICE WE WERE CONFRONTED BY A SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES.

-- THE SOVIETS HAD BUILT A FORCE OF SS-18 AND SS-19 ICBMS WITH SUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF HIGHLY ACCURATE WARHEADS TO POSE A MAJOR THREAT AGAINST OUR ICBM FORCE.

-- SOVIET HARDENING PROGRAMS HAD, IN THE ABSENCE OF U.S. IMPROVEMENTS TO OUR FORCES, CREATED VIRTUAL SANCTUARIES FOR THEIR ICBMS, LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITIES, AND MANY LEADERSHIP SHELTERS.

-- SOVIET AIR DEFENSES WERE BECOMING SUFFICIENTLY SOPHISTICATED SO THAT THE ABILITY OF OUR OLD B-52S TO PENETRATE THEM WOULD BE SEVERELY JEOPARDIZED IN THE NEAR-TERM.

-- MOST SERIOUS OF ALL, OUR STRATEGIC COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS NET HAD BECOME HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO SOVIET NUCLEAR ATTACK.

OUR RESPONSE HAD TO BE VIGOROUS. BUILDING ON THE VALUABLE ELEMENTS IN SOME EXISTING PROGRAMS, PRESIDENT REAGAN FASHIONED

A STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM TO REPAIR OUR DETERRENT. IT IS ALREADY BEARING FRUIT, AND OUR DETERRENT WILL GROW MUCH STRONGER IN THE YEARS AHEAD WITH PEACEKEEPER/MX, THE NEW SMALL ICBM, TRIDENT SUBMARINES AND THE TRIDENT II MISSILE, THE TWO BOMBER PROGRAM, AND -- OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE -- A LONG OVERDUE EFFORT TO MAKE OUR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS MORE SURVIVABLE.

BUT OUR STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM STARTED IN 1981 IS NOT A SUFFICIENT RESPONSE FOR THE LONG-TERM. WE SHOULD NOT REMAIN LOCKED INTO AN APPROACH THAT WILL DEMAND AN INDEFINITE COMPETITION IN OFFENSIVE ARMS. AS THE PRESIDENT STATED IN HIS ADDRESS A WEEK AGO TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, "... IF WE ARE DESTINED BY HISTORY TO COMPETE, MILITARILY, TO KEEP THE PEACE, THEN LET US COMPETE IN SYSTEMS THAT DEFEND OUR SOCIETY RATHER THAN COMPETING IN WEAPONS WHICH CAN DESTROY US BOTH, AND MUCH OF GOD'S CREATION ALONG WITH US."

THE PROSPECT OF AN UNENDING REQUIREMENT FOR THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES TO COMPETE WITH A TOTALITARIAN REGIME BY CONSTANTLY ADDING TO AND PERFECTING THESE AWESOME WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IS AN UNAPPEALING VISION OF THE FUTURE. WOULD OUR DEMOCRACIES SUPPORT SUCH A COMPETITION INDEFINITELY?

SOME THREE YEARS AGO, AS THE PRESIDENT REVIEWED THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NUCLEAR FORCES AND STRATEGY HE EXPLORED WITH

HIS ADVISORS THE CONTRIBUTION THAT A DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES COULD MAKE TO OUR LONG-TERM SECURITY. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IN OVER A DECADE THAT THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE WAS SERIOUSLY ADDRESSED IN THE WHITE HOUSE. THE PRESIDENT DETERMINED THAT PROMISING TECHNOLOGIES HAD ADVANCED TO SUCH AN EXTENT AS TO REVERSE THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION'S CONCLUSION THAT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE WAS TECHNICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED THAT WE NEEDED TO BEGIN A HIGH PRIORITY EFFORT TO DEVELOP ADVANCED ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS -- NOT ONLY AS A HEDGE AGAINST SIMILAR SOVIET EFFORTS -- BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY AS A MEANS TO BUILD A SAFER STRATEGIC ORDER FOR THE FUTURE.

IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES WILL CREATE A CONFLICT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF DETERRENCE, AND THAT SUCH DEFENSES WOULD UNDERMINE STRATEGIC STABILITY. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. I HAVE BRIEFLY REVIEWED WITH YOU THE FORTY-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR NUCLEAR STRATEGY PRECISELY TO SHOW THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES HAS BEEN ANYTHING BUT STABLE. THE ESSENCE OF DETERRENCE IS TO MAKE IT CLEARLY LESS ATTRACTIVE TO A POTENTIAL ENEMY TO ATTACK THAN NOT TO ATTACK, IN TIME OF PEACE AS WELL AS IN ANY CONCEIVABLE CRISIS. MOREOVER, TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR WE MUST NOT ONLY DETER DELIBERATE ATTACK, WE MUST ALSO AVERT THE INITIATION OF WAR AS A RESULT OF A TECHNICAL ACCIDENT, HUMAN ERROR, OR A COMBINATION OF CATASTROPHIC MISHAPS. SEEN IN

THIS BROADER CONTEXT, THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE FOR OUR LONG-TERM SECURITY LOOKS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT.

NOW LET ME TURN TO THE QUESTION OF THE TRANSITION TO STRATEGIC DEFENSE FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH OUR EXCLUSIVE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE FORCES. BY OPENLY DISCUSSING OUR PROGRAM ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE, WE IN THE UNITED STATES TOOK A COURSE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE DO NOT CONCEAL THE FACT THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN RESEARCH ON MISSILE DEFENSE. WE DO NOT VIOLATE TREATIES. WE BRIEF ALL OUR ALLIES AND CONSULT EXTENSIVELY WITH THEM. IN FACT, I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM SUCH CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS. ALSO WE HAVE A STANDING OFFER IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS HOW WE COULD COOPERATE TO ESTABLISH A MORE SECURE STRATEGIC ORDER IN THE LONG TERM, THROUGH AN AGREED, SAFE TRANSITION TOWARD A DECREASING RELIANCE ON OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS.

AS WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE A STRATEGIC ORDER BASED ON DEFENSE, WE MUST NOT NEGLECT OUR OFFENSIVE DETERRENT SYSTEMS. THESE ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE DETERRENCE WHILE THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRESSES -- AND INDEED DURING A TRANSITION PERIOD. FOR SOME TIME TO COME, THEN, OUR ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO MODERNIZE ITS DETERRENT FORCES TO MAKE THEM LESS VULNERABLE AND TO OVERCOME WEAKNESSES IN THEIR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS. AS I HAVE EXPLAINED BEFORE, A COMPLETE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM COULD NOT BE DEPLOYED OVERNIGHT. IT MIGHT TAKE

MANY YEARS BETWEEN THE TIME THAT THE FIRST MISSILE DEFENSES ARE DEPLOYED AND THE TIME A MULTI-TIERED SYSTEM, AS ENVISIONED BY SDI, COULD BE IN PLACE. AND WE MUST, OF COURSE, EXPECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE ITS EMPHASIS ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES AND, OVER TIME, DEVELOP INCREASING CAPABILITIES FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.

NOW, SOME HAVE ALLEGED THAT THIS TRANSITION WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS PERIOD, THAT IT WOULD UPSET THE PRESENT DETERRENT STRATEGY WITHOUT PUTTING AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE IN ITS PLACE. WE HAVE STUDIED FOR SOME TIME IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HOW TO DEVELOP OUR STRATEGY AND FORCES FOR SUCH A TRANSITION PERIOD, AND WE FOUND THAT THESE CONCERNS ARE NOT WARRANTED.

FAR FROM BEING DESTABILIZING, IT TURNS OUT THAT THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, IF PROPERLY PLANNED AND PHASED, CAN ACTUALLY STRENGTHEN THE PRESENT DETERRENT CAPABILITY OF OUR ALLIANCE. EVEN PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE DEFENSES CAN HELP DENY SOVIET PLANNERS THE OBJECTIVE OF A MISSILE ATTACK AND HENCE SERVE TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE.

WE CANNOT SAY TODAY HOW LONG THIS TRANSITION WILL TAKE. IT WOULD REQUIRE LESS TIME AND EFFORT, OF COURSE, IF THE SOVIET UNION JOINED US IN REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR MASS DESTRUCTION AND IN PHASING IN DEFENSES THAT CAN PROTECT ALL OF US. THIS

IS WHAT WE SEEK TO NEGOTIATE IN GENEVA. THE TRANSITION WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT AND MORE PROLONGED IF THE SOVIET UNION PERSISTED IN EXPANDING ITS MISSILE ARSENALS AND REJECTED THE ROAD OF COOPERATION TO MOVE TO A SAFER WORLD.

WHAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT THE SOVIET MOTIVATION TO CHOOSE EITHER ROAD? THOSE CRITICAL OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE ARGUE THAT A COOPERATIVE TRANSITION WOULD NEVER BE ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIET RULERS. THESE CRITICS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET RULERS WOULD RATHER FORGO A CHANCE TO PROTECT THEIR OWN COUNTRY THAN TO GIVE UP THEIR CAPABILITY TO THREATEN OUR ALLIANCE WITH MASS DESTRUCTION. YET, ACCORDING TO THESE CRITICS, THESE SAME SOVIET RULERS WOULD READILY SETTLE FOR "A PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES" -- THAT IS, THEY WOULD SETTLE DOWN WITH US IN AN EQUILIBRIUM OF MUTUAL VULNERABILITY AND INDEFINITELY KEEP IT STABLE. HAVEN'T WE LEARNED DURING THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS THAT BY ABSTAINING FROM MISSILE DEFENSE OURSELVES WE DO NOT HALT THE SOVIET BUILD UP IN OFFENSIVE MISSILES NOR DO WE HALT THEIR DEFENSIVE EFFORTS.

ISN'T THE OPPOSITE MORE PLAUSIBLE? IF THE TIME COMES WHEN SOVIET RULERS ARE WILLING TO ABIDE BY AN UNDERSTANDING ON STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THIS WOULD BE TO PRESERVE INDEFINITELY THE THREAT OF MUTUAL MASS DESTRUCTION -- OR, AS SEEN FROM MOSCOW, TO PRESERVE THE THREAT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET UNION. A GENUINE UNDERSTANDING ON STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL MUST GIVE PROMISE TO BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND TO OUR ALLIANCE THAT IT WILL SERVE TO REDUCE, AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE THIS HORRIBLE THREAT.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Weinberger, for a very important and very comprehensive statement.

We will now begin with questions with a 10-minute time limit on each Senator.

I will commence the questioning.

Mr. Secretary, in your initial remarks today, you quoted the then Soviet Defense Minister Grechko shortly after the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, as saying that the treaty "places no limitations whatsoever on the conducting of research and experimental work directed toward solving the problem of defending the country from nuclear missile strikes." That is the end of the quote from Grechko.

You cited this statement as confirmation that, despite the signing of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union had not abandoned the concept of ballistic missile defense as an option for the future.

Recently, Soviet leaders have had much to say about the SDI and this subject. What is your comment with regard to their current affirmations in light of the comment that you made? To what extent was the Grechko comment a more valid idea of Soviet planning and the current statements part of the propaganda war of 1985?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think the original comment of Mr. Grechko was true: the ABM Treaty did not prevent research. He went a little farther. He talked about experimental work directed toward solving the problem of defending the country, and so on.

But as far as the Soviets' current position, I think the kindest way to describe it is the height of hypocrisy, because now they are contending that our research program violates the treaty. What they are really worried about, I think, is that it will offer the possibility of their losing their monopoly in this field. They have been working on this for about 15 to 16 years, and they clearly would go to any lengths in promising things to try to bring about the result of stopping our research program.

That is why I say the President would never trade that away.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you noted also in your remarks that the Soviet threat to the United States developed in the 1950's. As it developed, the Eisenhower administration reacted by strengthening the country's strategic defenses. You cited specifically the North American Air Defense Program and its expansion and noted that the emphasis on strategic air defense did influence Soviet planning by dissuading the Soviet leadership from building a new strategic bomber.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you attempting to draw an analogy between that situation and the development of the SDI presently? If so, would you expand on that, please.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The analogy is there for those who wish to see it, sir. It is, I think, unquestionably true that they have very long-range plans, and those long-range plans are based on their perception of what we are doing and what they think we will do. When they thought we were building very strong air defenses, they did not emphasize bombers, because they felt that that air defense would effectively defeat that approach.

They put in very strong air defenses themselves. We did nothing to replace the B-52's. They are now over 26 years old. So, all during that period they were building their own defenses against the strategic bombers we already had.

When it became quite apparent to them that we had reversed course and were not going to have air defense, that we were giving up the BMD that we were allowed under the ABM Treaty then they did develop a new bomber. As you know, that new bomber will be deployed fully very shortly.

So, yes, I think what we do influences what they do. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Some have argued, however, that the influence has worked the other way; that if we'd show some success with the SDI, that the Soviets would feel compelled to boost their offensive missile production in order to overcome that.

How do you meet those critics?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, that was one of the arguments that was made that I think influenced our decision not to put in an ABM system. It is true that the traditional ABM, of the kind we were talking about at Grand Forks and that some people still confuse with strategic defense, is a system that isn't very effective. To put it at its best, it is capable of being overwhelmed and saturated by a large increase in offensive missiles.

The strategic defense we are talking about now does not have that characteristic, that weakness. It is a system which, if we can put it into effect, would be a thoroughly reliable defense and would not be capable of being saturated or overcome by mere numbers. I think the Soviets know that and that is why, first of all, they are trying to get it themselves, and, secondly, why they are trying so desperately hard to prevent us from getting it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is an intriguing point. How can you assert that projected strategic defenses will be that uniquely different in quality that they could not be overcome.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Because the missile launchers that are the heart of the traditional ABM system are ground-based, in fixed silos, to protect certain points. The strategic defense we are working on can consist of three or four different kinds of systems, some of which would be space based, and all of which would have the ability, in a layered way, to intercept and destroy Soviet missiles from the moment of launch; and, if any were missed then, at the point when the warheads begin to separate from the missile; and if any were missed then, as the warheads pass through space and then, eventually, as they reenter the Earth's atmosphere.

As I say, we don't know if we can do this, but we are making very good progress. We have had extremely encouraging results. A lot of people who are working on it believe that it is much more possible now than they believed even a couple of years ago.

So, that is the sort of system, employing such things as directed energy, with a highly accurate and extremely competent system of computerized launching and targeting aids, which would not be capable of being overwhelmed. It would be dispersed, it would consist of a number of different methods, and it would be specifically designed to reach these missiles at different points in their trajectory.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you have argued that one of the conceptual underpinnings of the ABM Treaty, namely a consensus between Washington and Moscow to maintain mutual vulnerability to each other's nuclear attacks by curbing ballistic missile defense, was illusory, and that the idea of Soviet acceptance of the notion of mutual assured destruction was belied both by the way the Soviets viewed nuclear weapons and their efforts not only to build up offensive missile forces but also their efforts to perfect air defenses.

Yet, some would argue that the Soviets have become converts to the notion of mutual assured destruction, if only belatedly, in response to the SDI Research Program. Is there any evidence to be cited that would indicate a Soviet rethinking with regard to the notion of mutual assured destruction?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, quite the contrary. I think the efforts they are making to try to get us to stop our program would indicate that they are not converts to the mutual assured destruction idea at all, that they urgently want the vulnerability to be only in the United States.

As I say, the President, I think, is very well aware of that. He also feels, and it is one of his very highest priorities, that the ability to defend people and to have a system that destroys weapons and not people, is one of the greatest objectives for which he or anyone could strive, and that it is too great a possibility and an opportunity for history to be given up.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you have cited in response to my questions about the SDI, that it would be a multilayered system, many different types of systems.

What viewpoint can you give to us this morning with regard to the cost of this system? What might this mean in terms of a percentage of our defense budget or a percentage of our gross national product? In other words, is this something that we can afford? How do you rationalize the economic aspects even if the technical ones are to be met?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, the short, easy answer, Mr. Chairman, is that we can afford what is necessary to keep our peace and our freedom. We have always been able to do that in the past, and I hope we will always be able to do it in the future.

As far as actual costs are concerned, there is no way, really, of estimating the total costs. I have seen some wild estimates that are based on nothing whatever because they are not based on any knowledge of either the systems we are working on or the degree of progress we have made.

The Research Program will be expensive, but certainly nothing remotely resembling the cost of modernization and deployment of the offensive systems necessary to keep that balance of terror that is all we have now.

We have asked for $3.7 billion the current year. We will probably, with any luck, get about $2.7 billion. We will ask for more next year. But the amounts involved are dependent largely on the success and the results of the previous year's research.

As I say, it is going extremely well. Of course, the ultimate hope is—and this is why I think it can have a real effect on reducing budgets in the future—the ultimate hope is that the logic will compel the Soviets to realize that the joint development of defensive systems, of which the President has spoken many times, that is, that we would each have defensive systems, would lead inevitably to the conclusion that offensive systems no longer had anywhere near the effect or the usefulness and, therefore, could be reduced very substantially. In other words, an effective strategic defense could, I think, be one of the strongest inducements toward reducing offensive weapons, and that could have, obviously, a long-term effect, a good effect in reducing our budgets and perhaps even theirs.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I welcome you and thank you for taking the time to be with us.

I wonder if I could first ask you this: Ambassador Nitze in his speech in Philadelphia regarding SDI suggested a standard by which we would judge its possible deployment. Specifically, he said that new defensive systems must be cost-effective at the margin, cheap enough to add additional defensive capabilities so the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability. Second, he addressed the issue of survivability.

Do you agree with Ambassador Nitze's criteria?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I have to say, Senator, that I really do not know what "cost effective at the margins" means. It is one of those nice phrases that rolls fairly easily off the tongue and people nod approvingly because it sounds rather profound.

I have the greatest admiration for Ambassador Nitze, but I do not know what he specifically has in mind with that.

If he means is it less expensive to build strategic defenses than continually to engage in trying to add offensive systems, I would say that the syllogism proves itself. It is clearly less expensive because the defense can, in effect, ultimately, if it is as effective as we hope it is, make it quite apparent that further offensive systems are not useful.

So, if that is what is meant, I think the answer is, clearly, that it is cost-effective. I think it will be far more survivable——

Senator KERRY. Well, we cannot really say that yet, can we? We have no information on which to be able to say that today it is cost-effective by your definition.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, we have a great deal of information on what it costs to build offensive systems and, if I may say so, what it should have cost for us to modernize our offensive systems throughout the period when we did not do it. We had 10 years, a whole decade, in which we reduced military spending of all kinds, and we inherited a 26-year-old bomber system that was not going to be able to penetrate the Soviets very long. We inherited a Minuteman system that did not have the accuracy or the yield to destroy Soviet hardened targets, and we inherited submarines whose missiles were in the same category.

So, we had to do a great deal and we have had to spend a lot of money to correct that situation.

Senator KERRY. I understand that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I cannot conceive of strategic defense being more costly than the constant need to modernize and strengthen, as each side makes a move to which the other side has to make a response.

Stability comes with strategic defense.

Senator KERRY. I will accept that you cannot conceive of that. But if it turns out that it is more expensive, would you then change your mind?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir, I would not, because I would think the additional cost in protecting people's lives, in protecting this Nation, would be far worth anything that it would cost, rather than simply building systems that will hold the threat of destruction of the Soviet Union so that they can hold the threat of destruction of ourselves.

Senator KERRY. So it is your postulation, still, that this system will eliminate the threat of destruction, is that correct?

You are working with that hypothesis?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Depending on its effectivness, it will very greatly reduce it, and it will add to conventional deterrence, as we use the term, because it destroys or will seriously erode the Soviets' confidence in being able to launch a crippling first strike.

Senator KERRY. What does "very seriously reduce" mean in terms of nuclear weapons?

How many warheads are you willing to——

Secretary WEINBERGER. It's not a matter of warheads, Senator. It is a matter of Soviet perception.

The idea of simply measuring warheads and saying there we are safe because we have one more than somebody's standard has never been anything that appealed to me very much.

What we have to do is try to get inside the Soviet mind and find out what it is that will take away enough of their confidence in being able to put in a crippling first strike so that they won't do it. We try to do that by measuring these equations. They are very dangerous equations. They are very difficult equations to measure.

You are not allowed any margin for error at all. But that is what you have to try to do.

Now, if we had a system that was convincing to the Soviets—a system, incidentally, which they have been working to try to get for 15 years—where they could not launch that kind of strike because our defenses were so strong, then we would have added greatly to deterrence and to the safety of the country.

Senator KERRY. I want to ask a couple of questions about that.

Let me ask you if you have seen an advertisement which recently was run by the Coalition for SDI? I wonder if I could just play it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have not seen much support for it, as much as I would like. If you have some, I would like to see it.

Senator KERRY. Well, here is some terrific support for it. I would like to share this with you, if I can, and then ask you about it.

If you look to your left, there is a screen which will play this 30-second ad, providing our technology is up to it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Usually we are the ones that bring the visuals. This is a novelty. [Laughter.]

[The spoken words of the 30-second video follows:]

CONTEXT OF 30-Second Video on Star Wars

I asked my daddy what this Star wars stuff is all about. He said that right now we can't protect ourselves from nuclear weapons. That's why the President wants to build the peace shield. It would stop missiles in outer space, so that they couldn't hit our house. Then nobody could win a war. And if nobody could win a war, there's no reason to start one. My daddy's smart.

Senator KERRY. I understand there is a buy of some $1 million sum between now and the summit.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would say that that is a fair and accurate representation of what you are trying to get the Congress to buy? [Laughter.]

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I have so much trouble keeping up with government funded programs that I have no time at all for nongovernmental funded programs. That is the first time I happen to have seen that particular art form. But it strikes me as an attempt to represent what it is hoped can some day be achieved, that is, that the missiles will no longer be anything that would be of a destructive nature.

I have seen some other productions by various groups to save the ABM Treaty and things of that kind that might be treated similarly. But these are the products of our system of free speech. I have no competence to comment on them.

Senator KERRY. Well, I believe it is fraud in advertising, personally.

I would ask you why a statement that offers a peace shield and pretends that homes will be protected is even remotely a fair representation of what we are talking about.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, if you are asking that as opposed to this musical that we have just seen——

Senator KERRY. But that is what was in this.

Secretary WEINBERGER. [continuing.] The point is we don't know if we can develop that. But we think it is surely proper to examine that question. Indeed, if I might say, it is a very moral and noble enterprise to try to do that. That is exactly what we are trying to do.

If we are able to succeed, we would have a system that could destroy Soviet missiles outside the atmosphere of the Earth. If that could be done, then they would not get in and hit cities, missile silos, or other assets.

I think that is a very worthy enterprise. I think it is perhaps the most moral and most hopeful enterprise on which any of us have been or can be engaged.

And, yes, I am all for it.

Senator KERRY. If there is no mutuality in that effort—that is, the Soviet Union does not join with us—and we proceed unilaterally, the Soviets will certainly develop and deploy missiles that do not come in through outer space, delivered by subterfuge or clandestinely or by hugging the waters or the Earth, 10 feet above it. They would continue to pose a threat, would they not, in a nonmutually pursued posture?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I guess I will have to start farther back than I thought. We are not proceeding unilaterally on this program. From the evidence we have published—and we have published all of the evidence that we can——

Senator KERRY. No; let me say what I mean. We don't need to go over that ground because I don't argue with you——

Secretary **Weinberger**. But it is very important for me to correct an assumption that you seem to have that we are the only ones——

Senator **Kerry**. That is not the assumption that I am making. That is not the "unilateral" that I am referring to.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Then why do you use the term "unilateral"?

Senator **Kerry**. Unilateral in terms of separate, rather than mutually negotiated deployment, and unilateral in terms of countermeasures and offenses. You are quoted as saying you have decided that we should deploy this system and the Soviets should not have a veto over it. You wish to proceed unilaterally with its possible deployment—so you are quoted.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, let me read to you what the President said, with which I completely agree.

He said that:

> We have a team that, within the terms of the ABM Treaty, is researching to see if there is a defense, the possibility of a defensive weapon that could intercept missiles before they reached their target, instead of having a deterrent to war as we now have, which is both sides with massive weapons of destruction, nuclear missiles, and the only thing deterring war is the threat we represent to each other of killing millions and millions of citizens on both sides.
>
> Now, if we can come up with a defensive weapon and we know we have it, we know that it is there, that it is practical, that it will work, then my idea is that we go to the world, we go to our allies, we go to the Soviet Union, and we say we are not going just to start deploying this at the same time we maintain a nuclear arsenal. We think that this defensive weapon is something we would like to make available and let us have the world have this for their own protection, so that we can all eliminate our nuclear arsenals. The only reason then for having defensive weapons would be because since everyone in the world knows how to make one, we would all be protected in case some madman, some day down along the line, secrectly sets out to produce some with the idea of blackmailing the world, and the world would not be blackmailed because we would all be sitting here with that defense.

That is exactly what we all want to do. So, to talk about our unilaterally proceeding to get some sort of war-winning weapon is just totally wrong and gives a totally false impression to anybody listening.

The Soviets have been working on it 15 years and have made no such sharing offer.

Senator **Kerry**. I would be delighted if that, in fact, were our policy. The problem is it seems like there are more things out there.

In Defense Week, on February 5 of this year, I quote you, "Let us be very clear: I want to deploy the system."

General Abrahamson has said he does not think it is a question of whether, but when.

Now, are you backing away from that position and adopting the other one?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No; of course we want to deploy it.

Senator **Kerry**. You want to deploy it?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Of course we want to deploy it, if we can get it. But, before we deploy it, what we want to do is exactly what the President said here.

Senator **Kerry**. But do you still agree that we don't want the Soviets to have a veto?

Secretary **Weinberger**. We don't want the Soviets to have a unilateral defense because——

Senator **Kerry**. Well, if they don't negotiate mutual deployment through a negotiated transition to both sides having a mix of offenses and defenses, don't the Soviets have an automatic veto as to whether strategic defenses can protect our population?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No; Senator, if we both have it, if they are working on it and they should get it first, you can imagine, I hope, how much more dangerous a world it would be. If we are both working on it and we get there first—and we are certainly making very great progress now—the President has said repeatedly, as recently as just 2 days ago, that we would have the sharing arrangement that he talked about as a means of trying to eliminate or certainly sharply reduce the number of offensive weapons.

That is a goal, I think, that we should all perceive.

Of course, if we can get it, this is what we would do before we would deploy it, as I tried to read to you here in this statement of the President.

Senator **Kerry**. I have just one final question, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Kerry**. General Abrahamson has said repeatedly that we cannot build an umbrella. In Science magazine, he said a perfect astrodome defense is not a realistic thing. Even people in the administration have repeatedly asserted that this will be 90 percent or 95 percent effective, at best, that it cannot be made leakproof.

Assuming that we respect their judgment and agree with that, that leaves a 5 to 10 percent that gets through if you had best assumptions work in a situation that has never been tested and that has to work the first time.

We know that 5 to 10 percent will get through if we had a confrontation. Five to 10 percent of the current 9,000 warheads is 450 to 900. If additional offenses are built, it could be 3,000. That is enough warheads to do the job.

So isn't it absolutely incorrect to say that you have a new option of saving lives rather than avenging them? If you had a confrontation, 5 to 10 percent remains mutual assured destruction, and mutual assured destruction and the new term, mutual assured survival, are, in fact, one and the same thing?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, I do not think that is correct at all, Senator.

The point is you do not seem to give any credence to the fact that this confrontation you talk about is made far less likely. Indeed, the chances of it are sharply reduced if the Soviets know because of our defenses that they cannot put in a successful crippling first strike.

That is why any degree of success of the Strategic Defense Initiative is more than worth it.

But I am not familiar with the statements that say there is no way it can work or there is no way it can be more than 90 percent effective, and so on.

I have heard those statements from its opponents. I have not heard them from its proponents.

The answer is at the moment we simply do not know. We have very high hopes that we will, as we work on it with adequate research funds, be able to develop a system that is thoroughly reliable. That, I am absolutely convinced, will do vastly more in saving the world and its people and its cities than simply going on, adding, year after year, modernizing, improving, and strengthening offensive systems that constitute nothing more than a mutual suicide pact.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me.

I would like to ask if I could submit some written follow up to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would just mention that I think it has been a very helpful dialogue between Senator Kerry and the Secretary, but it went on for 15 minutes, and the Chair erred in allowing that, although it was useful. But in fairness to all members, the Chair will not err again, and after 10 minutes, we will have to stop because we must end the hearing at noon.

I will now recognize Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I recently had the great pleasure of visiting your home town. We met in San Francisco with members of the North Atlantic Assembly. On that occasion, we convened just at the time there was a debate underway within the administration on the interpretation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. It might be useful to consider that issue for a minute because we obviously unsettled our allies and friends who were gathered there at the North Atlantic Assembly and caused some consternation.

The upshot of the whole affair was that several administration spokesmen came to San Francisco and reinstated the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and on that basis, our allies were somewhat satisfied, but I think probably have had their outlook on the American interpretation of the ABM Treaty unsettled by that experience.

Now, as I understand it, Judge Sofaer has said that, in effect, because the Soviets succeeded in avoiding a broad binding commitment regarding the development and testing of mobile systems and components based on future technologies, we cannot properly be said to be bound by such a commitment.

That leaves us in a rather awkward situation if that is accepted because, then, doesn't it mean that the Nixon administration, the Ford administration, the Carter administration and at least the first term of the Reagan administration were all under some illusions about what the ABM Treaty really meant?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't know whether they were under some illusions or not, Senator. It was an academic question because they did not have any plans to do any defensive work during that time.

The authority that I prefer to quote is the President, and he has stated that, while we have the legal right to a broader interpretation—and there are a great many legal arguments that make that, I think, conclusive—we are, at the moment, continuing to conduct our strategic defense program in accordance with the more restrictive interpretation of the treaty. The current program that we have conforms with this more restrictive interpretation. So, we do not confront that issue.

But the President has said that we have the legal right to use the broader interpretation, and the legal argument I think is very clear. There is only one portion of the treaty that refers to systems based on technologies that were not in existence since 1972. With respect to those, it says that agreement on specific restraints on deployment would have to be worked out prior to such deployment, leaving those systems available for development and testing.

It is a very common, and simple, form of legal construction that the specific controls the general, and the only specific reference in the treaty to systems based after 1972 is in Agreed Statement (D).

That is the legal position. The President has quite correctly stated that we do have the legal right to do otherwise.

He also has correctly stated that we do not now run into that problem because we are continuing to conduct the program fully in accordance with a more restrictive interpretation of the treaty.

As far as new interpretations are concerned, the Supreme Court finds them quite frequently and makes decisions that seem to change previous understandings on more careful examination. In this case, it was a congressional inquiry that led to a very much more thorough review and the conclusion just as I have given it to you.

Senator **Mathias**. About a week ago, Ambassador Nitze was before the Subcommittee on Arms Control of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs—I believe on the 22d. He stated that he knew of no new evidence that the Soviet Union had gone beyond what you call a "restrictive interpretation" of the treaty.

I take his remarks to mean that there is no evidence that they have developed or tested any "exotic" ABM components or systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

I am wondering if that is in accord with your information or knowledge.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I don't know the timing or the exact wording of that statement, so I should not perhaps comment on it in detail. But we have published a book that has been distributed to you, a joint State and Defense production, which lists all of the information that we can make public that has been cleared by the intelligence community. It has been distributed, though I don't know if you have seen it or not.

It seems to me that it has very clear evidence of a great many more things being done than that, and there is additional evidence that is not cleared for publication.

So I would certainly think, without any attempt to contradict Paul Nitze that, as far as my information indicates, the Soviets have been working on a very broad range of strategic defense programs and continue to do so, and, indeed, have been doing so for about 15 or 16 years now. And, in some respects, some important respects, involving lasers, they are ahead of us.

Senator **Mathias**. Let me raise a question of procedure, having seen the disruptive effect of this public debate within the administration on our friends within the alliance.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I don't think there is any evasiveness, Senator, if I might interrupt for just a moment.

Senator **Mathias**. I did not say "evasiveness." I did not use the word "evasiveness."

Secretary **Weinberger**. What did you say?

Senator **Mathias**. I said "the disruptive effect."

Secretary **Weinberger**. Oh, I'm glad you did not use the word "evasive."

Senator **Mathias**. In fact, it was exceedingly open. There has been nothing evasive about it.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I had hoped so, yes.

Senator **Mathias**. That was the problem. [Laughter.]

Secretary **Weinberger**. We are candid, if nothing else. [Laughter.]

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, I don't think there should be any confusion or should be any worries about the allies. I met with them all in Brussels yesterday. The interpretation that we are talking about is an interpretation which, at the moment, is not one that we even reach. We don't have to reach it because all that we are doing is fully within a narrower interpretation.

Senator **Mathias**. Well, I just had a procedural question on that, as to whether or not it would not have been a good idea. This is not totally within your shop and I am not laying it on your shoulders, but I would ask whether or not it wouldn't have been a good idea to use the very mechanics that are provided within the ABM Treaty, say the Standing Consultative Commission, to debate a question of this sort, because a reinterpretation of a part of the treaty would be the kind of thing which could be considered by the Standing Consultative Commission.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, the consultative group I think was more oriented toward discussions of violations, and we have presented all of our evidence of the Krasnoyarsk radar violation to that group, with very little result.

But the interpretation of the treaty is a matter, I think, that is up to the parties, and there are certainly provisions in the ABM Treaty for revisions of that treaty at the initiation of either party. It is a matter of wherever one wants to present it.

Senator **Mathias**. Under Article XIII it is provided that the Commission is to consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous. It seems to me that if we were to follow that kind of procedure, it would lead to a more orderly and less disruptive kind of atmosphere on these matters.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, I don't know that there has been any real disruption, sir, but there certainly are differences of views, as there always are when words are construed. To the various legal authorities in the State Department and our department and in Justice who have looked at it, there does not seem to be much doubt that a very specific provision that discusses new systems based on technologies not in existence or not known in 1972 has to be given some weight.

But, at the moment, as I say, it is not a matter that we even reach because what we are doing is fully within the narrower interpretation of the treaty.

Senator MATHIAS. What is your estimate of the willingness of the Soviet Union, the intentions, if you will, of the Soviet Union, to devote resources to compete with us in this field?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, for 15 years they have devoted more resources to it than we have. They are now devoting about as much of their defenses resources, which are, of course, huge, to defense as well as to offense. My estimate is that they would probably continue along that line unless we can get some kind of verifiable agreements that can change that direction.

Senator MATHIAS. Won't it be easier for them to simply add on a little more to their offensive efforts?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is infinitely easier for them to do it than it is for us. Yes, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I see that I am right on time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Mathias.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in August, after the Soviets had declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, President Reagan indicated that he would be willing to consider a mutual moratorium when the current series of tests was completed.

In this regard, could you, Mr. Secretary, support a testing moratorium after this particular series of testing was done?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, I would certainly want to have very clear the ability to verify that, both with respect to the volume of the tests that would be permitted or to the fact that, indeed, there was to be no testing done at all.

We do not have a great deal of confidence in our ability to do that verification.

The problem is that a proposal of that kind, as is the case with so many Soviet proposals, leaves them with an advantage and us with a disadvantage, because they have tested a great many of their more modern systems than we have. These are systems we are now in the process of developing.

As you know, in the development of any systems It is vital, to do some testing if it is to have any usefulness at all.

Senator PELL. In other words, as I understand what you are saying, it is that if there is adequate provision for verification, you could support a test ban moratorium.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The other reason that I think is important to bear in mind, the other point that I tried to make, is that we would have to see where the current series of tests left us with respect to new systems that we have to have as a result of the Soviet additions during the period when we did not do any.

Senator PELL. We would all agree that a 150-kiloton test you can easily verify, but perhaps a 1 kiloton or a half kiloton one you could not. Would you support a treaty that is down to the limit below which verification could not be achieved?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The information I have, Senator, is that it is very difficult to verify the testing in those general ranges and that there have been a lot of questions raised as to whether or not tests were conducted during a time when there were attempts to limit it by tonnage and so on. There are different conditions in the areas in which they are tested, and we have never had any access to the Soviet Union, of course, so we have no way of verifying which particular types of ground or rock or other conditions they are using.

So, as I understand it, we have a great deal of trouble in having any confidence in verification under the situations that we have now.

Senator PELL. But, as you know, we were making progress at one point with the Soviets with regard to having an approach toward challenge inspections on demand, and also seismic monitoring stations, or black boxes.

So, as I understand it, if there were adequate verification, you would be in support of a test ban?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I would want to look at all the circumstances, Senator, and particularly what effect that would have on our required modernization. As you know, we did not do any modernization for a long time. During all of that period, the Soviets added enormously both to numbers and to accuracy and to survivability and all of those things, leaving them in a position that we worry about very much.

It is now our established policy to modernize our strategic Triad. We are doing it as rapidly as possible, with the cooperation of the Congress, and it is important that that modernization regain for us an effective deterrent.

It would be some time after that that I would think a consideration of this type of moratorium would be useful if, indeed, we were satisfied as to the verification procedures. I would have to say that thus far we have not obtained anything like the Soviet willingness to have us verify under circumstances that could give us any confidence.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

I appreciate the length of your reply, but I have several questions that I would like to get in during my very brief 10 minutes.

Would you be willing to support a decision to put SDI, beyond research, on the table if we could gain substantial, valuable Soviet reductions in strategic offensive arms?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No. I would not want to give up the strategic defense under any circumstances, Senator.

Senator PELL. Going back to the test ban for a moment, we have been living under the 150-kiloton ceiling of the threshold test ban, and the Soviets have been bound by this, too.

Now, I agree this is a high limit, but in your view, does this adherence hurt our security in any way? If so, would you cite an example.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I don't know of a specific example as to how it has increased our security. There is a desire, of course, to bring to a halt this offensive arms race. The Soviets have been in it alone for a long time.

It is necessary, in the absence of other means of deterrence, such as strategic defense, that we now regain a strategic deterrent capability which we are doing.

The various attempts to halt testing were based on an assumption that each side had relatively equal forces and would stop developing more.

I don't think that assumption, unfortunately, has been realized.

I did want, Senator—I don't want to use your time and maybe the Senator will give you a moment or two extra time—like to repeat what I said in your absence. You asked in your opening statement if we were just basically opposed to all arms control agreements or to the process. I wanted to assure you that we were not, that we are very much in favor of genuine arms reduction, a reduction down to equality on both sides that is thoroughly verifiable. We have to confess a certain disappointment in some of the agreements that have been made in the past in the name of that because we do not think that goal has been realized.

So we do favor, however, the process, and we favor very strongly the attempt to reach that kind of agreement. But we also think it is very dangerous to make agreements that ostensibly help us, but that simply permit, or at least the Soviets interpret them to permit, constant Soviet expansion.

Senator PELL. Are you optimistic, Mr. Secretary, that we will be able to find sufficient areas of compromise, areas, as the President puts it, "to be nurtured," that we can reach a compromise on?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I certainly hope so, sir.

So many of my predictions in the past have come out wrong that I am hesitant to make any predictions. We obviously hope very much that that will be the case, and that is the kind of agreement we seeek.

Senator PELL. I guess I am a little bit reassured if I can truly believe that you are hopeful that we do reach such an agreement. There are some of us who feel that the Defense Department in general is opposed, basically, to arms control.

Secretary WEINBERGER. No.

I think what that very improper characterization stems from is the fact that we have not felt that agreements in the past have resulted in Soviet reductions, and a lot of the agreements have actually, permitted Soviet expansions. It is very important I think that we get agreements that genuinely reduce arms very sharply to equality on both sides, that are thoroughly verifiable. Those are the kind of agreement we support vigorously. That would mean we could give up some of the systems that you referred to as "cherished" in your opening statement. They are only cherished because they help the security of the United States in the absence of such agreements.

Senator PELL. Could you give me an idea of your thought and the President's thought on the sharing of SDI if it surprised us all and worked?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think what the President has talked about is something that would add enormously to the security of the world. What he has said is—and I read it a few moments ago, so it is in the record and I will not read it all again—what he has said is if we can come up with a defensive system that works, that we would discuss with the Soviets and try to share the knowledge so that everyone would have a defensive system; that we are not trying to get it to win a war; that we are trying to get it to bring more stability and to remove, to the greatest extent we can, the reliance on steadily increasing offensive nuclear weapons. He said that he would consult with the Soviets and our allies before actual deployment, but that we would try in the meantime, in every way we could, to get a thoroughly reliable system.

We have discussed openly with them what we are doing, and they have not done that with us. We have had to find it out by all these means that are reported in this book [indicating] and in others that we have gathered.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Let me return to Senator Mathias' question. Do you believe that we have the legal right even to deploy SDI weapons?

Secretary WEINBERGER. As the President has stated, the legal position is, essentially, that we have the legal right to develop systems that are based on technologies not known and not in existence in 1972, when the treaty was signed. So, with respect to systems of that kind, as I say, there is a very strong legal argument that the treaty permits that because it specifically discusses those in Agreed Statement that states that restrictions on deployment, if any, would be worked out later.

But our research program at the moment does not reach that point. Our research program at the moment is fully within the more restrictive interpretation of the treaty.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow on two questions that have already been asked. One was Senator Kerry's question regarding Ambassador Nitze's comment that two criteria for judging new defense technology should be survivability and cost effectiveness and your response that cost effectiveness is no criterion for changing one's mind.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't think I said that, Senator. I don't want to interrupt your question before the question is finished, but what I said was, first of all, that I was not clear about what the extent of "cost effective at the margins" might mean; secondly, that I am totally convinced that the cost of getting an effective strategic defense system is bound to be considerably less than the cost of continually adding to the offensive systems, as we have had to do, but as we failed to do during the decade of the 1970's, and as we have to do now, and will have to do in the absence of getting strategic defense.

To that extent I think yes, it is cost effective.

But I also think that, if you can get a system that protects the people of the world from a strategic missile attack, then it is very hard for me to think of that in cost effective terms because I cannot value human lives.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, nobody can, of course.

But I think that obviously we would all agree that we are moving in the direction of defensive technologies. I think this is a given.

But what I really would like to know is your thinking about what point you might be willing to readjust the concept of SDI as a shield and so forth in the grand design and perhaps work for something that is a little less theoretical to a certain extent.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, really, only if I were convinced that we could not do it, and I certainly have yet to be convinced that we cannot do it.

In fact, the results of the research thus far are far more promising than we thought would be the case at this stage, and a lot of the things that were considered barriers are now described as falling, and that the research is proceeding well and rapidly.

Also, I have to tell you, Senator, I am quite skeptical about statements of things that we simply cannot do. We have very long lists of statements that were made flatly that said we could not do things that are now accepted as absolutely automatic and taken for granted.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That again is true. But I think it is very important and it seems to me a major responsibility that the Defense Department has to closely monitor along the way both the criteria of survivability and cost effectiveness. I think that is important for any systems development.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There is no question about the need to do that, and that is the way we are trying to conduct the program. But, in fact, as I mentioned a bit earlier in the hearing, we are talking about a totally different kind of defense than has ever been deployed, and certainly inherent in that is not only its survivability but its effectiveness.

I have trouble with the doctrine of cost effectiveness for the very reason I have cited: because if it can work, it seems to me to be worth a very, very great deal.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And I suppose there is the need to balance out the portion of the defense budget that this concept takes in relation to the other programs that may have to suffer, particularly the conventional readiness, as we look to the budget constraints that are being imposed under Gramm-Rudman.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is our responsibility to report to you the amounts we think are required, and it is our responsibility to urge as vigorously as we can, however unpleasant that may be, that we still need these amounts. It is obviosly very clear to everybody that we do not have strategic defense now. It is equally obvious that this is not becoming a less dangerous world. All of this leads us to submit the requests that we have and to fight as vigorously as we can for them.

That is our responsibility.

I still believe, without any question at all, that we can afford what we need for the defense of our freedom and our peace.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would like to follow on a bit on Senator Mathias' asking about the reinterpretation, so to speak, of the ABM Treaty.

It is my understanding that we are several years away in research at least of the point where we then would have to reassess the interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I cannot really make estimates about the time.

You know how this arose, Senator. Dr. Hicks, who is our research and engineering Under Secretary was before the Congress in a confirmation hearing and was asked a great many questions about the treaty and whether or not we could review its whole meaning and application to what we were doing. In the course of doing that and studying various articles that had been written about reinterpretations and all, these matters were developed and were then presented, as indeed, Dr. Hicks had to do, in response to those questions.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Those questions asking if we were at this point in time and——

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, questions asking whether the treaty did not ban what we were doing now and what it did ban; detailed legal questions that emerged during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Senator **Kassebaum**. And so, was it his finding that perhaps we were doing something that did bend, and we would have to reinterpret the——

Secretary **Weinberger**. No. It is his finding that we could do a very great deal more than people had previously thought under this treaty.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Well, I don't know that anybody had questioned that at this point, had they?

Secretary **Weinberger**. They asked for a full review of the treaty, and in the course of doing that review, these agreed statement (D) interpretations came to light.

But as I say, at the moment it is an academic question because, as the President has said, though we have the clear legal right to conduct the program in a manner consistent with the broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty, we are not now doing anything that would violate even the more restrictive interpretation of the treaty.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Because of this question at the hearing, is this the reason that the Department of Defense brought someone special in under contract for just a period of time to analyze the ABM Treaty?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No. We have people to advise us on a large number of questions, and that person was going to help prepare the written responses of Dr. Hicks' testimony. His research led him to published articles in other publications with respect to this interpretation.

It also led the State Department's Legal Advisor to make a similar examination because we coordinated our response with the State Department, with the National Security Council, the White House counsel, the Department of Justice, and so on.

As a former lawyer, let me say there was a remarkable degree of unanimity among the lawyers on this subject.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Well, it would seem to me in the future, when such a position is going to have to be assessed, I would think it would be very valuable to consult with our allies and, perhaps more importantly, since we, as a body here, have signed on to a treaty as we believed it to be interpreted, we would have to have a role, I think, in that redefining process.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We have felt it essential, as we always do, to respond to questions put to us in the hearings in writing or orally, and that is how the question immediately arose, in connection with that review.

We do not respond lightly to these questions, and we do want the response to be accurate and complete and coordinated, and that essentially is where this issue first arose.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That was one of the more thorough responses that I think the department has ever given to a question that has arisen at a hearing.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I will have to differ with you a little bit. I have seen some responses that are so thorough they take 10 or 12 pages.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I know it comes as no surprise to you that some of us are skeptical, not so much about SDI research but about the intent of the administration in terms of pursuing arms control.

I would like to pursue a couple of areas of my skepticism.

First, the President has announced that he favors and seeks deep cuts in offensive capability. Second, he suggests that he also favors, as you do, an SDI, a strategic defense initiative, to allow us to shed what he views as I think an immoral and obsolete doctrine of mutual assured destruction for mutual assured survival, which everybody is for, I think, mutual assured survival.

But then we all know—well, maybe I should not say we all know—my question is what is the incentive for the Soviet Union to agree to deep cuts in offensive weapons if they believe, as you believe, that we are at the point of breakout on the strategic defense initiative, that we will, in fact, be able to erect this—and this is my word, not yours, and I am not trying to be pejorative—nuclear umbrella that is going to render us safe? What possible incentive do they have if they believe, as you do, that we are as far along and have the capability that we have in this century to do that? Why would they possibly agree beforehand, if they thought that to be the case, to deep cuts?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Why they would have every incentive in the world, Senator, because by your postulations, if they think we are about to develop an effective system, and they have a similar potential, it would be quite clear to them that further investments in large, high-cost intercontinental or intermediate range nuclear missiles would not really be all that effective in the future, because of their defense and our defense. So, it seems to me it gives them every incentive in the world to agree to a reduction.

These are not the kinds of systems—and I don't know if you were here when I made the point earlier—these are not the kind of systems that, if they work, are capable of being overwhelmed by more and more offensive weapons. That is the old, traditional, ABM ground-based system which they have, the only deployed system. They would have every incentive in the world to agree to such reductions.

Senator BIDEN. So, assuming that they believe they have the capability to reach the point of the defense system with the thoroughness that you believe we are going to reach it, if they do not, are you recommending that we would give them that defense capability lock, stock, and barrel?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, what the President has said I think is quite clear, and I would be glad to read it again. What he has said is that we should develop this ourselves and before we would deploy it, we would discuss with our allies and the Soviets ways in which this kind of defense could be shared with the world. We also could discuss with the Soviets at that time the transition period, which we have been trying to do at Geneva for a couple of years now. We would hope to work out a system or a timing schedule, or whatever you like, under which both sides would be able to deploy thoroughly reliable defenses.

We believe that it will take a long time to do this, to get this kind of system—the Soviets have a 15-year lead in the matter and a lot of technology they have taken from us—and it is, I think, a concept of the President's that is both realistic and very proper.

Then it would be quite clear that neither side would have the ability to utilize this very strong defensive system for war-winning capabilities, but for actual defense of its people and to reduce, certainly, very drastically if not completely, the use of offensive systems.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you this question.

What would you be recommending to the President, do you believe, if you felt that we had not found the key to this defense technology but that the Soviets in fact had found it? What would you be recommending to the President, do you believe?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, that is the worst scenario that we can imagine. That is a living nightmare because that means that we no longer have any offensive capability that works, we have deliberately eschewed any defensive capability, and I guess you can answer your own question. It leaves us in a totally vulnerable position.

Senator BIDEN. What would you recommend, I said?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I would recommend that we do just as much as we could just as quickly as possible, but it would be a very, very difficult task, knowing how long it takes to put together some kind of systems that you do not have.

Senator BIDEN. Do in what way? Do in terms of continued defensive capability, or would you be suggesting to the President that we should run the risk of maybe being able to overwhelm, that we should build more MX missiles, that we should build more D-5's?

Secretary WEINBERGER. If you had postulated a continued Research Program which we are urging on the Congress, we might be close to getting it.

One way or another, we would urge the course that would best protect the United States.

But if the Soviets have an offensive system that they continually modernize and strengthen, putting in enormous amounts each year with no questions asked, and if they had, under your hypothesis, developed an effective defensive system, then we are in a terrible position. That is one of the most compelling reasons why we should continue to work on strategic defense. We cannot afford to be put into that position.

Senator BIDEN. Let me suggest to you that you would, I suspect—well, maybe not you, because I have been surprised by a lot of your recommendations—but I suspect most Secretaries would recommend that at least we do what we knew how, and that was to move forward with additional offensive capabilities while we were going forward with the research.

If you say that the U.S. defense system cannot be overwhelmed, then you are saying that it is going to be a perfect system. And I think that is preposterous.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Your hypothesis, Senator, was that the Soviets had developed the kind of system we are talking about——

Senator BIDEN. That's right, which is a perfect system.

Secretary WEINBERGER [continuing]. And had it deployed. So it would do no good whatever to try to overwhelm that with more and more offensive weapons. Besides, we probably could not get the appropration. Second, I think it would be essential that we work on, defense as rapidly as we could. That is why it is vital that we not stop our defensive preparations now.

Senator BIDEN. Let me make sure I understand.

You are suggesting that the SDI that you are now envisioning will be a perfect system, that it is totally incapable, as you envision it, of being overwhelmed. Therefore, that is, it is perfect, there is no hole.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, what we are working for is what we have said repeatedly, and that is a throughly reliable defensive system that will induce the Soviets to realize that there is no point in trying to launch a destructive, crippling first strike, and, thereby, you will have greatly aided deterrence and you will have greatly aided the chances of the world and ourselves to survive.

Senator BIDEN. My time is getting close.

Let me suggest to you that your analysis of how we have done so little in the past—I would suggest that the Soviets are not back at the table because of star wars. I would suggest that they are back at the table because of you and the previous two administrations moving forward, as you should have, on D-5 and on MX and putting them in a position where by the end of this decade their land-based system will be extremely vulnerable, and they have no choice, no choice, but to come back to the table, as a consequence.

Further, I would suggest to you that they also have no choice, no reasonable choice, but to move away from their heavy land-based systems to mobile land-based systems for that vulnerability will do nothing but increase on their side of the equation.

If that is true, and I believe it is, then I find it somewhat disingenuous that the administration is suggesting not only deep cuts, if it made sense in the context of a perfect star wars system as you envision—and I believe you believe that; I don't know how, but I believe you believe it—I would suggest to you that we are being somewhat disingenuous to further say, it's sort of a red herring here, that we are also going to insist that that deep cut be within certain systems. If, in fact, we all acknowledge that their vulnerability increases as every day goes by, every day that goes by their land-based system, by anybody's definition—I suspect even yours, Mr. Secretary—becomes more vulnerable, doesn't it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir: I don't agree to that because of the difficulty we have in getting the necessary appropriations to make that happen.

Senator BIDEN. I see.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The MX system has already been cut by 50 missiles.

Senator BIDEN. How about the D-5?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yesterday it came within two or three votes of being cut out completely. So we do not have the confidence that the Soviets can have every day that they can add whatever they need to their systems to keep them strong and modern.

Senator BIDEN. But, wait. Doesn't the D-5 make up half of our overall force?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, it will. But how long are you going to support the D-5? We never know.

Senator BIDEN. I have been doing it as long as I have been here. And, by the way, I supported the MX system when, in fact, it made sense and was a lot bigger, instead of putting it in these vulnerable holes you are putting them in.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, if you were supporting it at 250, it would be very helpful if you would support it at 100.

Senator BIDEN. I would support it at 250 if you would put it in a place where it is supposed to be and if you had the political courage to go out and put it back into a mode that, in fact, was——

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is not a matter of political courage, Senator, but digging 2,400 holes——

Senator BIDEN. I would suggest that it is.

Secretary WEINBERGER [continuing]. And moving it around on a railroad or some kind of truck and opening it up every January first to show it to the Soviets where it is, is not my idea of sustainability of a system.

Senator BIDEN. Well, putting it into a hole that we know damn well they can hit is not my idea of survivability either, Mr. Secretary.

You can see that the Secretary and I have different ideas——

Secretary WEINBERGER. We certainly do.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. And that is why there is vanilla and chocolate ice cream. [Laughter.]

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have been trying to run another crisis hearing over in the other building about farm credit, and I have to go back. I may ask questions that have been covered. If so, say so and I will move on to another area.

I understand that you briefed our NATO allies in Brussels this week on Soviet violations of SALT agreements.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Which SALT violations did you include in your briefing?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We included a number of violations that had been previously reported by the President to the Congress. We emphasized two violations particularly. One was a violation of the ABM Treaty; specifically, the Krasnoyarsk radar. The other was the development of a second new missile, the SS-25, forbidden by the SALT Treaty because they had already notified us that the SS-24 was to be their one new permitted missile.

We also briefed them on such things as encryption of launch data and a number of other violations of the SALT agreement which, as you know, is being adhered to under mutual understanding at the moment.

Senator HELMS. What kind of reaction did you get from our allies?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, the best reaction I guess is quoted in the communique. It said that:

> We received comprehensive briefings by the United States Secretary of Defense on the evidence of Soviet treaty violations. We take the most serious view of this and call on the new Soviet leadership to take the steps necessary to assure full compliance with its commitments. We noted in this connection that a double standard of compliance with arms control agreements would be unacceptable and would undermine the security of the alliance. In this key context, we reaffirm the requirement for an effective verification of and full compliance with all arms control agreements.

I would say that the reaction was that they were shocked and that they used very strong language. If you are familiar, and I know you are, with diplomatic language, "the most serious view" is a very much different formulation than "we note," or "we express some concern," or "we have been told by somebody that," and so on.

This is a very direct statement, "we take the most serious view" of these violations.

I think that they had the same reaction that you, I, or anybody would have when we see the incontrovertible evidence of these violations.

Senator HELMS. Well, that is encouraging.

Do our allies still believe, after this, that the United States should continue to comply with the unratified SALT II by dismantling Poseidon?

Secretary WEINBERGER. They did not express any opinion on that, Senator.

Senator HELMS. It did not come up?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; sir.

Senator HELMS. Senators Symms, McClure and I have just sent a letter to the President analyzing the implications of your confirmation—I believe it was on October 22—that the Soviets have indeed deployed their mobile SS-25, the second new type ICBM, in clear violation of SALT II.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is.

Senator HELMS. We believe that the violation which you outlined has resulted in a situation where there are four additional violations, and let me list them: the violation of SALT II ceilings on intercontinental missiles and bombers; the violation of the SALT II ceiling on MIRV'ed ICBM launchers; the defeating of the object and purpose of the SALT I Interim Agreement; and the violation of the SALT I ICBM dismantling procedures.

Can you confirm any of these new Soviet SALT I and SALT II violations on the eve of the summit?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, my problem at the moment is that I, quite frankly, cannot remember which of all of that material is classified and which is not.

So, what I would like to do would be to answer that question in writing, and if it is classified, if, as I suspect, some of the data on which we have formed the conclusions is classified, I would classify the letter.

Senator **Helms**. That is fair enough.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Some of that certainly is true. The ICBM, the SS-25, is a clear violation. It is not anything remotely resembling a modification of the SS-13, which is the Soviet claim, and it is the second new missile that they have developed since they formally notified us that the SS-24 was the first.

Senator **Helms**. I would like to have that letter, when you can get to it. I know you have a full slate.

Secretary **Weinberger**. All right, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

(Following are the relevant portions of the letter from Senators Helms, Symms and McClure to the President about which Secretary Weinberger was asked at the hearing, along with OSD responses.)

Statement from letter:

1. Credible press reports indicate that there are 45 mobile launchers for these forbidden SS-25s already deployed, with indications from new construction that upwards of 200 will ultimately be deployed. This indicates that the Soviets may already be exceeding the 2,504 number of missiles and bombers they had when SALT II was signed in 1979, and are grossly exceeding the 2,250 SALT II ceiling.

Response:

(S) The Soviet have [deleted] deployed [deleted] SS-25s. As the President's February 1985 Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance stated [deleted].

Statement from letter:

2. Since these 45 SS-25s are capable of carrying MIRV warheads, it appears that the Soviets must be in violation of the most important SALT II ceiling limiting MIRVed ICBM launchers to 820.

Response:

(U) The SS-25 which the Soviets recently deployed is a single-warhead missile. It is projected that the SS-25 follow-on, however, will be MIRVed. The Soviets are not now in violation of the SALT II ceiling limiting MIRVed ICBM launchers to 820; however, there is concern about the future.

Statement from letter:

3. Moreover, the deployment of the SS-25s defeats the object and purpose of the indefinitely-extended SALT I Interim Agreement.

Response:

(U) It is not clear why this would be the case, since the Interim Agreement did not prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBMs.

Statement from letter:

4. Finally, the deployment of SS-25s supported from old SS-7 ICBM facilities violates the SLAT I ICBM dismantling procedures.

Response:

(S/NF/WNINTEL) [Deleted.]

Senator **Helms**. I have one final thing.

Why do you think our allies wish to emasculate the SDI by trying to hold us to unfounded, restrictive interpretations of the ABM Treaty?

Why do our NATO allies, whom we defend, not want the United States to defend ourselves?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, sir, I suppose we could start at home and ask why so many people at home want us not to proceed with SDI. I suppose one reason is that it tends to violate the conventional wisdom and the accepted thinking that if you have defenses, you are somehow provocative or somehow leading to unstable situations.

There is also a widespread feeling that it cannot be done. As I mentioned earlier when you were not here this morning, I am very skeptical of statements that say we cannot do anything because I have seen so many of those statements proven to be very wrong.

I don't know that there are any other reasons. I know that there is an urgent desire for peace abroad, as there is here, and a kind of worry that strategic defense is somehow going to be provocative and unsettling.

But, of course, we have not only the intrinsic merits of the situation itself, which we think is a conclusive argument as to why we should do it, but we also have the undoubted fact that the Soviets are spending a great deal of time and effort and are making considerable progress in developing a system of their own.

As I tried to explain to your colleague a moment ago, we think that if we had a situation in which they had it first and we did not, this would be a far more perilous world than it is now.

Senator HELMS. Well, there are a lot of experts around on SDI who do not know a thing in the world about it.

I remember people saying that we could not get to the moon. They knew that. There were even observations that it was a fake, that all of the pictures were really taken out in the desert, in the Western part of the country.

You know, when they were developing the automobile, a renowed scientist said that if they ever got to a speed of 25 miles an hour, the passengers would suffocate because they could not breathe.

Good luck to you, Mr. Secretary.

Can we have that letter that you mentioned that you were sending before the summit?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We will try to get it up to you, sir, surely.

Senator HELMS. I hope you can.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The President has reported many of these violations earlier to the Congress. My problem this morning is I do not remember which particular violations are classified and which are not. But I will get it to you as soon as we can.

Senator HELMS. I have one final question, though maybe you do not want to discuss this publicly.

What was the tenor of your briefing with our allies? Did you debate with them?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; sir.

We made a presentation, and there were remarkably few questions. As I said, there had been a lot of predictions before the meeting that the only thing the ministers would want to do was to say that they had heard about this and that they took note of it or expressed some concern about it. But after the briefing, there did not seem to be any hesitancy in adopting this much stronger formulation that I read to you, that they take the most serious view of these violations.

Senator HELMS. They still have great concern about our desire to defend ourselves with SDI, then?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I did not encounter that, sir.

This was a meeting of the defense ministers, and they may have a somewhat different approach. But the defense ministers, as you will recall, at Luxembourg, a year ago, took the position that the research program was very much in NATO's security interest and should be continued. Something was attempted to be made of the fact that this was not repeated verbatim in this communique, but ministers did not seem to feel it necessary to resay it every time.

I don't pick up any kind of feeling from our allies that we shouldn't be doing what we are doing, and, indeed, from two or three of our allies, there was a rather urgent desire to enter into contracts and arrangements under which they can participate, which we would welcome.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Welcome home from Brussels.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. I am sure you were delighted to hurry back for this session with us today.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have been looking forward to it all week, sir. [Laughter]

Senator CRANSTON. Would any space-based defense itself be vulnerable to attack by Soviet counter-defense forces?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think that it is not really possible to say at this time. But what we are talking about is the kind of system that would certainly not be subject to being overwhelmed by the means that we have used or that have been suggested to overwhelm ground-based systems.

Given the variety of the different kinds of systems we are working on, it would seem to me to be—and seem to the people who are working on them and who know vastly more about them than I do—to be quite difficult and quite improbable that defenses against this kind of defense itself could be achieved.

Senator CRANSTON. I was really speaking about offensive acts against our shield, which is space-based.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, we do not have that shield yet. What we are working for is to get a system that is a thoroughly reliable defense, and, as I have said two or three times this morning, the progress on it has been extremely encouraging.

Senator CRANSTON. But if we were to deploy it, they might try two things: One is a defense against it. The other would be an attack to immobilize it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; that is what I had in mind when I spoke of the variety of systems that we are talking about. If the research program proves to be effective, it would make it very difficult for that kind of attack to be launched against it.

Senator CRANSTON. Are we not planning any particular defense against that kind of attack?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, it is inherent in what we are doing that we would want such a system to survive. And so, at the same time we work to develop it, we work for its survival. Yes, sir.

Senator **Cranston**. Could you explain the difference between this and an ABM in terms of the concerns that we would have about saturating an ABM, and you indicate that would not be true in the case of SDI?

Secretary **Weinberger**. An ABM, sir, is a system of ground-based, nuclear-tipped missiles, that is sited to protect a particular target. As you know, with those systems, if you can put in a heavy enough strike against them, you can neutralize or ultimately destroy them because they are not able to deal with a vast number of missiles coming in at once.

It has been said that a ground-based, what we call a traditional, ABM system is, therefore, capable of being overwhelmed or saturated because it cannot work to defeat a very large number of missiles coming in all at once against it.

It is not impossible to launch such an attack against a specific target.

That is why we have felt, and I believe it was one of the reasons why we ultimately gave up Grand Forks.

Senator **Cranston**. Do you actually envisage an SDI that would be 100 percent effective, no matter how many are thrown against it?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, sir, that point keeps being made all the time, I think in the hope of saying that nothing is perfect and all humans err and things of that kind.

We envisage a system that, as the President has said many times, would be so thoroughly reliable that it would convince the Soviets that a first strike would be not only useless but would lead to the conclusion that he wants to have, and that is that both sides have a defensive system so that we can, certainly at the very least, reduce in a major way our reliance, and I hope, ultimately, give up reliance on offensive systems.

That is the goal of the President.

Senator **Cranston**. The President in his U.N. speech referred to SDI being a defense against ballistic missiles, and that is generally what we hear about.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes.

Senator **Cranston**. Is it envisaged as being effective against bombers and cruise missiles?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, it is not an antiaircraft system, no, sir. And it is not, unfortunately, a means of ending war. It is a specific defense against a specific, and very terrible, perhaps the most terrible, weapon that is now around.

There are other defenses being worked on against cruise missiles, and we have had—we do not have now, but we have had—quite effective defenses against bombers and attacking weapons of that kind.

We are working, as the Soviets are working, on defenses against cruise missiles. But the strategic defense initiative is designed for intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles. We believe in the progress that we are making that it will succeed and that it will have some utility against those other threats too.

But we do not have such defenses yet.

Senator CRANSTON. The point is, I think, that if it worked against ballistic missiles, great; but we must fill in with other defenses against nuclear weapons delivered by other means.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir; of course. We have never felt that vulnerability is the answer.

Senator CRANSTON. What is your best estimate of the cost of a full-blown, deployed SDI?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Sir, I would not have really any way to make any estimate of that kind, and I think I would be misleading you if I did. Other people have not been so cautious, and it is very easy to throw around billion dollar figures or trillion dollar figures. But there is not any basis for making such an estimate.

We know that the research program is expensive. We know that it is being reduced. We know that in our opinion it should not be reduced. We should make every effort to see if we can achieve this system.

But I persist in the statement because I am convinced it is completely accurate, that whatever its cost, it is bound to be very much less than the constant cost of modernization and adding to offensive systems in response to the other side doing the same.

Senator CRANSTON. I would like you to clarify your views of the legal obligations under the ABM Treaty. Senator Pell raised this issue in his last question.

Specifically, what do you see as our legal rights under the ABM Treaty with regard to new kinds of systems for: one, research; two, development; three, testing; and four, deployment.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, deployment, Senator, is banned under any interpretation.

Senator CRANSTON. It is banned under the treaty.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Deployment, yes.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Under any interpretation, as we read it. But, on the other hand, the treaty provides that it may be revised or amended or notification given with respect to its provisions if the Nation's security interest requires it. So there is a clear recognition that changes can be made in it.

We think that with respect to new systems, systems based on "other physical principles," in the language of the treaty, that there are not the restraints that there are with respect to systems based on technologies known in 1972.

But, as the President has said, this means that we would have the legal right to do more of the work leading to deployment of those systems based on technologies, new technologies; but it also at this point is an academic question because we will not reach that point in our research program.

What we are doing is fully within the treaty under any interpretation, and that is our plan.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you believe that under the ABM Treaty we have the right to research, develop, and test?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. But not deploy?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator **Cranston**. I have one other question on the matter of sharing with the Soviets and others if we develop a system in which we have confidence.

Is the concept generally that we would reach the stage where we would be ready to deploy but then we would suggest a joint, simultaneous, phased deployment with the Soviets and others, so we would not proceed with the system on our own, if we proceeded in that sharing approach?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, I wonder if you would mind if I would read again the President's statement made yesterday or the day before. I did it once earlier in the hearing, but I think it is useful because it is a better phraseology than I can use.

What he says is this: first, that we have a team that, within the terms of the treaty, is researching to see if there is a defensive weapon or the possibility of a defensive weapon that could intercept missiles before they reached the target, instead of both sides with massive weapons of destruction and nuclear missiles and the only thing deterring war is the threat we represent to each other of killing millions and millions of citizens on both sides.

The President went on:

> Now, if we can come up with a defensive weapon, and we know that we have it, and that it is there, and that it is practical, and that it will work, then my idea is that we go to the world, we go to our allies, and we go to the Soviet Union, and we say we are not going just to start deploying this at the same time we maintain a nuclear arsenal. We think this defensive weapon is one we would like to make available, and let us have the world have this for their own protection, so that we can all eliminate our nuclear arsenals. And the only reason, then, for anyone having the defensive weapon would be because since everyone in the world knows how to make one, we would all be protected in case some madman, some day down along the line, secretly sets out to produce some with the idea of blackmailing the world, and the world wouldn't be blackmailed because we would all be here with our defense.

That essentially is the President's plan and the President's hope. That involves, of course, developing a system ourselves.

The other reason why we think we have to do it is because of the enormous amount of work the Soviets have done and are doing to develop the same kind of system without the slightest indication of any such sharing as the President has in mind.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Cranston.

Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, the question of the defensive or offensive nature of the SDI intrigues me. It is defined as a defensive system all the time, and in your words earlier this morning, it is a "moral, noble enterprise," and it is presented as a defensive effort. The problem I have is, if we have the capability of destroying a missile within seconds after it is launched, that same capability could be used offensively very easily.

Is it accurate, whether it is in a TV ad or anyplace else, to put it forward as a defensive system? It seems to me that both sides could use these systems offensively very easily, because the same equipment that can destroy or deliver the capability to destroy a missile upon seconds after it is launched would be the same system that could deliver that same weapon against human populations or elsewhere.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, I'm very glad you asked the question because it is not the same system that can destroy humans or be used against targets on earth.

The thing that we are working on is a system with any one of a number of different ways of projecting an ability to destroy a missile. But it is aimed at and is only usable for the purpose of destroying missiles.

It is not even in my opinion properly described as a weapon system because it is a system designed to destroy weapons. It is not a system that would hit targets on earth, nor is it designed to do so, nor would it have effect on those because it is designed specifically to intercept and destroy a missile in its casing immediately after launch or later in its trajectory.

The whole point of it, the whole thrust of it, is that it is designed to do only that. It is not designed to give any offensive capability in the form of destroying any targets on earth.

It is a system designed to destroy weapons and not people.

Senator **Pressler**. I'm not saying it would be wrong necessarily to build a system that would be offensive; but to refer to it not even as a weapon system seems unusual. Now, as I understand it, the incoming missiles under some plans would be destroyed within seconds after they were launched over enemy territory. Certainly a system that could deliver a destructive capability to destroy a missile at that point would be able to deliver a weapon or would be able to deliver a bomb or something else in the same timeframe, couldn't it?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Sir, they are totally different kinds of things. That is one of the difficulties that I think we have and why we have offered briefings on the subject many times. It is a very narrow, very focused, very small beam of directed energy, or laser, or x ray or any one of a number of things that is pointed and focused specifically at the trajectory of a missile.

Some people have raised the point that computers can err and supposing there is a computer error, it is fired where it is not intended to be. Well, absolutely nothing happens. It simply goes off into space and does not hit a missile.

But it is not a system which is designed to nor is it capable of hitting targets on earth.

We have a great many systems that are designed for that purpose, and we are trying to get a modern, strengthened system of weapons that can do just that, that can destroy targets on earth, because we have to. It is the only way we have of preserving deterrence now. This is a different thing.

Senator **Pressler**. But if this were aimed at a population center and it hit the population center, what would be the result?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I don't think it would be any result at all if it is a simple laser beam because the focus, the size of the beam, the very narrow point of impact and all, such that it is, it would not do that kind of damage. We are only working to develop the kind of system that would destroy ballistic missiles.

The whole aiming point is totally different. You are not trying to hit anything on earth. You are trying to hit things outside the atmosphere.

Senator **Pressler**. So then, in your system, no part of the SDI could conceivably be used in an offensive way?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, sir, not the way we are designing it. It's not what we are working on.

We have a great many offensive weapons that are designed specifically for that purpose, as we have to have to keep the balance. But the President wants to get away from that as the only method of keeping the balance.

Senator **Pressler**. Well, let me say that we are in disagreement on that point. I think there may well be a strong reason to build offensive weapons, but I would disagree with the definition that is being used, that it is purely defensive because surely, in my mind, something that is this elaborate, if it could not be converted very easily into an offensive system—I think it would probably have the capability to deliver an offensive weapon.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I would be very glad to provide additional briefings to you or any of the members of the committee that would like to hear them that would underline the point I have been making.

Senator **Pressler**. I would like to move on to another subject.

I, too, attended the NATO meeting referred to earlier by Senator Mathias. I am trying to follow up on the participation by allied countries.

What are the options for allied participation in the SDI? Does this mean that their companies would contract with the United States? Would we provide the money? Or does it mean that their countries would contribute money? Are we merely just offering contracts?

Secretary **Weinberger**. First of all, we want our allies to participate because we think that there reside in those countries some very great talents, energies, and abilities which we would like to have devoted to this program.

Second, we have said that we can do it any way they wish. We can do it by a government to government agreement, we can do it by individual contracts with their companies or with scientific or educational institutions that would like to bid on some of the specific research programs that we will be putting up for bid in the course of the next few years, assuming that we get the appropriations that are required.

It will be exactly the same kind of situation in which we have a number of people bidding for particular research tasks that we have underway now.

England has said that it would like to have a government-to-government contract, and we are very close to signing such an agreement, under which their companies would bid and we would make various arrangements with respect to facilitating that bid and facilitating the work to be done.

Other countries have said—and Canada is one—that they don't want to have a government-to-government agreement but they welcome their people participating and hope that they will participate and be awarded some contracts.

One country has said they don't even want people to think about it so they will not participate themselves and they won't let any of their companies participate.

We have a variety of different responses. But, for the most part, there seems to be very substantial interest in participation, particularly in England, in West Germany, and in Italy, and I believe also in Japan.

Senator **Pressler**. But in each case, the United States is providing financial support?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Oh, yes.

This is a U.S. program and we are putting up for bid contracts to do particular types of work that seem essential at that time. There is also considerable interest in this whole concept, and it would not surprise me a bit if many countries decided they wanted to do some work on their own. Indeed, France has talked about that.

The concept itself is new and it will take some time, of course, for countries to make up their minds as to the particular way they want to do it. But there is a great eagerness in some countries and contracts are being awarded every week. There is a great desire on their part to share in this.

Senator **Pressler**. Mr. Secretary, you have gone through many budgets and you are really an expert in that area since your days at OMB. What would you predict, looking down the road, when the SDI is in full force or full construction, after the research phase, what would you estimate the annual cost of the SDI to be, let's say based on current numbers and based on your estimation of what weapons systems cost?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, one of the things I always tried to do when I was at the Office of Management and Budget was only to make estimates based on facts and on reasonable bases for making estimates rather than pulling some number wildly out of the air.

I don't have any basis for telling you or anyone this morning what the total cost of the program will be or what the total cost of the research will be.

I think that the level at which we are proceeding now is a little below optimum levels because I think we could do more if the Congress had accepted, as I wished it had, the $3.7 billion request we made this year. It is always hazardous to predict, but it looks as if the final appropriation may be in the $2.7 or $2.8 billion range.

That will enable us to do quite a bit.

But we are at the stage now where a lot of these different paths we are pursuing are beginning to offer very great promise. Without giving any sort of preview of next year's budget or anything, it would seem to me very likely that we would ask for more next year than will be voted this year—simply because we would like to keep the program momentum up.

Also, Senator, I keep emphasizing this, not only because of the merits of the program itself but because of what the Soviets are doing, year after year, we simply cannot put ourselves into a position where they should get a system of this kind first without anything remotely resembling the sharing agreement the President is talking about. That would present a world in which you and I would have very few options.

Senator **Pressler**. I have one final question, perhaps for the record because I am out of time.

How comfortable are you with the thought that SDI might make computers, and not humans, the decisionmakers? As a practical matter, of course, maybe we have to come to it. The fact of the matter is that we will be at a time when we will depend on computers almost entirely for those kinds of decisions.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Oh, a computer would never make a decision, Senator. I am not worried about computer error or anything of the kind. In this case, if the computer makes an error, you are not launching a destructive power against people. You are pushing a power out into space that will not hit a missile because of a computer error. It does not have the dangers or the risks in it of any kind remotely resembling offensive systems.

There would never be a situation in which the computer would make decisions.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Pressler.

Senator Dodd.

Senator **Dodd**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, let me commend you for holding these hearings. I think they are extremely worthwhile and timely.

Mr. Secretary, welcome to the committee. I would like to touch on three or four subjects, although the time limit is constrained. You have been very patient this morning, and I will run through them as quickly as possible.

You have responded this morning that it is very difficult to estimate the costs of SDI with any degree of accuracy. But certainly no one would disagree that we are talking about a substantial investment.

You would not disagree with that, would you?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Oh, it is not a cost-free program. But it is, as I have said many times, infinitely lower in cost than the cost of constantly adding to offensive systems, as you have to do if that is the only alternative that you have.

Senator **Dodd**. Well, the reason I bring it up is because, as you know, there is a proposition circulating through the Halls of Congress called Gramm-Rudman; it is presently being debated between the House and the Senate in the conference committee.

I should tell you, quickly, that I was one of those people who supported Gramm-Rudman in the Senate. One of the reasons I supported it is becasue it offers an equitable program that covers almost all aspects of governmental spending, with the exception of Social Security.

Last week, in Human Events, you gave an interview in which you were quoted as saying that you did not believe Gramm-Rudman, as you interpreted it, to be restraining, or restrictive, with respect to the amounts thought necessary for defense spending.

Senator Rudman, I might add, one of the principal cosponsors of the proposition, in a significant and lengthy debate on a Saturday and Sunday here a few weeks ago, when asked by Senator Hart and others about this particular point said, and I am quoting him here, "Procurement bears its fair share, its equal share, and in the words of this amendment, its proportionate share of all reductions in this plan." He went on to further say, "Deficit targets get more stringent in the outyears and almost everything is covered," with the obvious exception of contracts.

I wonder if you might clarify for this committee exactly what is the administration's position with regard to defense spending under the Gramm-Rudman proposal.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The President has said many times, Senator, that the basis on which he accepted zero growth after inflation this year was the full commitment and promise that was made to him by many people in the leadership and otherwise that there would be a 3-percent real growth in defense next year and a 3-percent real growth in defense on top of that the following year.

The President has certain constitutional responsibilities to provide for and recommend the amounts necessary for the national security. He is the Commander in Chief. So, I have no doubt that he would recommend budgets that would fulfill the commitments and the promises made to him for those 2-year increases of 3 percent.

Senator DODD. But I am sure you——

Secretary WEINBERGER. If I could just finish on this, if the Congress behaves responsibly and makes the reductions necessary——

Senator DODD. And the President, I might add.

Secretary WEINBERGER [continuing]. If the Congress behaves responsibly and makes the reductions necessary to reduce the deficit, the Gramm-Rudman trigger never takes effect.

The other thing that you mentioned was an amendment that was put into the Gramm-Rudman proposal after the President endorsed it that makes it quite different. That amendment requires this reduction of all accounts in all ways proportionately, without the slightest ability to assign priorities to anything of any kind that would force uniform, ratable, reductions through the entire budget, through all the defense accounts.

That is not anything that was in the amendment when the President endorsed it, and that is not anything that will enable us——

Senator DODD. Let me just say right there——

Secretary WEINBERGER [continuing]. To make the kind of allocations of even the reduced amounts that might result in any kind of rational or reasonable way.

Senator DODD. Should I interpret your response, particularly the last part of that answer, to mean that you oppose or that the administration opposes Gramm-Rudman?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, Senator. You should interpret it exactly the way it was said.

What was said was that the amendment will not even come into effect——

Senator DODD. I understand that.

Secretary WEINBERGER [continuing]. If Congress behaves responsibly and reduces the total number of expenditures to the point where the trigger does not arise.

Senator DODD. But if the trigger does arise, and the Congress and the President do not act responsibly, is there any question in your mind today as to whether or not that trigger would cover the defense budget?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I have spent a great deal of time not answering hypothetical questions in my time here.

Senator DODD. Well, it is not hypothetical. It is legislation. It is words. I am sure your staff has looked at it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; you have one hypothesis that I cannot accept at all, and that is that the President does not act responsibly.

Senator DODD. No, no. I am just saying I am sure your staff has looked very carefully at the legislation. This is not hypothetical. We voted on it here and it is words and they were interpreted.

It was the understanding, I think, of the 75 Members who supported the proposition on the floor of the Senate, that if the trigger were put into effect, the defense budget would be covered, with the exceptions of contracts.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, certainly——

Senator DODD. What does your staff tell you? Is that also your interpretation, should the trigger be set off?

Now, put aside whether or not we act responsibly or whether or not the President works with us. Let's assume for a second that the trigger is about to be set off. Are you covered?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, you don't need a Gramm-Rudman amendment to cut defense. You have done that very effectively over the last year.

Senator DODD. Mr. Secretary, you are being a bit evasive.

Secretary WEINBERGER. So you can cut defense under any circumstances you want, whether there is a Gramm-Rudman in effect or not.

The important point here is this requirement that if there are reductions that have to be made, they have to be made uniformly without the slightest ability to set priorities or without the slightest ability to pick one program over another as being more important. That is a very serious interference with the Executive's ability to carry out the tasks assigned to him by the Constitution.

Senator DODD. But that is your interpretation of what the legislation proposes?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The legislation, as I understand it, proposes that there be an absolutely uniform reduction, without any ability to set priorities, if the trigger is reached, and that is the thing that Congress can avoid by acting responsibly so that we never even reach that trigger.

Senator DODD. But that would be the effect if we were not able to do that or would you oppose it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The amendment that I have mentioned is not, fortunately, final. But that is the amendment, as I understand it, that was put into it.

Senator DODD. And you would oppose that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. That amendment, I think, makes it impossible for any of us to carry out constitutional responsibilities, and that amendment was not part of the original proposal.

Senator DODD. And hence you oppose it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That amendment?

Senator DODD. Yes.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Oh, vigorously, yes.

Senator DODD. That part of the bill.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That amendment that forces that kind of automatic and ratable reduction, of course, it is opposed.

Senator DODD. And hence it would make the proposition so fundamentally flawed that it should not be signed into law if passed by the Congress?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Oh, no, no. You are going way beyond now what I said and trying to get a headline to the effect—

Senator DODD. No, no.

Secretary WEINBERGER [continuing]. That there is some difference in the administration, and we are not prepared to do that.

Senator DODD. Well, I will tell you right now that there is little or no likelihood that that amendment is going to be removed from the legislation before it goes to the President for his signature. But if it were included, your recommendation to the President would be not to sign the legislation?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Oh, I never give my recommendations to the President, I never answer hypothetical questions. I have told you, frankly and candidly, of the effect that I think that kind of proposal within the Gramm-Rudman would have. And I have also told you frankly and candidly that we don't even have to consider the subject if you will just act responsibly enough to cut the expenditures now.

Senator DODD. You and I don't disagree on that, Mr. Secretary. But that may not happen, given past history around here.

I do have a couple of other questions.

The Nuclear Agreement with the People's Republic of China—what is your recommendation to the President on that one?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I never reveal the recommendations I give to the President, sir. I regard those as totally confidential.

Senator DODD. What if he were to ask you for your recommendation on it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. He does frequently, and I always comply.

Senator DODD. And what have you recommended with regard to it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I never tell what I have recommended to the President, Senator.

I think that you would understand that.

Senator DODD. Well, then, what would you recommend to us? We have to consider it up here. What would you recommend to me? I cant ask you that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would discuss it with him first and I would present my recommendations to you as those of the administration, if I were asked so to do. But I cannot, and I don't think any adviser to the President under any circumstances, can disclose the advice that is given to the President because I think that is the most confidential kind of material we have to deal with.

Senator DODD. Well, how about giving us some advice? What would you recommend we do? We have to consider it. You are the Secretary of Defense. I would like to know what the Secretary of Defense thinks about an agreement with the People's Republic of China. Is it a good agreement or a bad agreement?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, when that question comes up, I would present to you the administration's position.

Senator DODD. But it is up. It is up. I promise you, it is up.

Secretary **Weinberger**. And it is proposed for ratification.

Senator **Dodd**. And do you agree with it?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes.

Senator **Dodd**. You think it should be approved?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I present the position that the administration has taken on the subject and I think it should be, yes. I think it is in our interest to have an improvement in the relationship that we are developing with the People's Republic, and we signed an agreement just a couple of days ago and presented it to the Congress that would help strengthen and modernize their defensive capability. I think this is important.

Senator **Dodd**. Let me see if I can—I have——

The **Chairman**. You have 1 more minute.

Senator **Dodd**. Well, I'm not going to make it. I was going to get into the question of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. I guess I had better ask you one short question.

How about this? One of the problems with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty as well as the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion agreement that the administration has had, is verification. Yesterday, several countries including Argentina, Greece, and a number of others, proposed that there be a moratorium and offered their good offices to assist in verification.

Does that kind of proposal have any appeal to you?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I think it is important——

Senator **Dodd**. Are you familiar with what I am talking about, by the way?

Secretary **Weinberger** [continuing]. I think it is important to note in that, as I mentioned to Senator Pell earlier, that we have to look at the status of our own programs and the effect on our security of such a moratorium, and knowing the Soviets have modernized and added a great many new weapon systems while we have not, and while we are in the process of doing so. I would have to take those factors into consideration.

So I don't think a blanket yes or no answer can be given to that.

What we have to do is look at its effect on individual systems and, therefore, on the totality of our own security.

Senator **Dodd**. I understand that. I meant, as well, the offer by these nonaligned countries, with many of whom we have a good relationship. There was an article yesterday about this proposal, where five or six countries had offered their good offices to assist in the verification. I am wondering if that kind of proposal has any appeal as a general proposition?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I think one that has more appeal for me is the one that the President made in which he invited Soviet scientists to come here and work on improving verification of an onsite nature. That offer is still open, and I think that would be more effective.

Senator **Dodd**. My time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

As the chair announced at the beginning of the hearing, the hearing will need to conclude at about noon. Senator Murkowski will have the final 10 minutes.

If there are Senators who have additional questions, and there may be, Secretary Weinberger, would you be prepared to answer questions submitted to you in writing by Senators who have not had an opportunity to raise all of those questions today?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I'm sorry, I did not hear you?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be willing to answer questions that are submitted to you in writing?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Oh, yes. Of course.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. May I simply ask also that the questions and the answers be printed in the record, be a part of the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, by unanimous consent, it is so ordered.

Senator KERRY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The questions and the answers will be printed in the record.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I would be willing, whatever remaining time I have, to provide to my colleague, Senator Kerry.

Mr. Secretary, my questions are on a little bit different line.

I am particularly interested in the implications of the Soviets' attitude toward our ballistic missile early warning systems as they have been established in Thule, Greenland, Fylingdales, England, and Clear, AK, and more specifically, the current announcement by the Soviets that if we initiate a program that delays the implementation of the upgrade of two of those facilities—and I believe those are Thule and Fylingdales—then the Soviets would—and I don't know whether this is totally correct, Mr. Secretary—cease construction on their radar at Krasnoyarsk.

Now it is my understanding that initially, under the ABM Treaty, the concept of this type of ballistic missile early warning system was to be stationed on the perimeters, and we felt that the Soviets were in violation with their Krasnoyarsk location because it was in the interior of the Soviet Union.

I am wondering what the attitude of the Department of Defense is toward this proposal. Specifically, since I assume the modernization would be specifically to extend the capability of the system, why it would be in our interest to have some type of exchange agreement. Then I have one more question on that subject.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, the attitude of the Department of Defense is that we were very pleased that the proposal or the offer was rejected because it is a very typical Soviet offer.

Let me run through the reasons.

The Krasnoyarsk radar, which is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty, both because of its location, its siting—it is nowhere near the perimeter of the Soviet Union—its orientation—not looking outward, but across some 4,000 kilometers of Soviet territory—its function—the inclination of the radar screen itself at 20 degrees—all of this indicates that it is radar that is prohibited under the ABM Treaty.

It also is practically completed externally. We would never be able to verify that they had ceased work inside.

The Fylingdales and Thule radars are legal. They were there prior to the time the ABM Treaty was signed. They are not even in the United States, so they are clearly on our periphery. They also do need modernization and modernization is permitted, and it is urgent that we do so in view of the increased Soviet air and missile capability.

So, if we were to give up the modernization and the strengthening of two needed, and perfectly legal, early warning radars of our own in return for their promising to stop work on a practically completed radar that violates the treaty, that is a way of amending the ABM Treaty that we don't think is a very effective one.

So we would reject that and we have rejected it. But, again, it is the kind of offer that is typical of the Soviets. It is an offer which is designed to appeal to the press and to the international public and world opinion, but it is an offer which, when you examine it carefully, is 100 percent in the Soviet favor and would injure our own security needs.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So it has been totally rejected?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I am curious—and this obviously is a little more sensitive to my constituency—about something. The Clear System—which is similar to the Thule and Fylingdales—was not mentioned by the Soviets in the proposal as being necessary to offset the termination of their program, and yet I believe it is to be upgraded as well.

I am curious to know why?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't have any idea. I have never really successfully gotten into the Soviet mind. But I would suspect that it is because the two radars involved are in other countries, and they would hope to make further appeal to the opinion in those countries by making this kind of offer.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do you know if the Department of Defense will still request the upgrade of the Clear System as a matter of priority?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; it is my understanding that that will be the case. We hope there will be an appropriation for it.

Senator MURKOWSKI. There is another question that is a bit more local.

In the Washington Post, in the New York Times, and virtually every time I have seen an application of the proposed diagram showing the SDI, it shows it emanating from the middle of our State. When we try to get a confirmation on that, they say it is an "artist's rendition."

Now I have no real problem with that, but some of my constituents are not convinced. Since the "horse" is here along with the "horse's mouth," I thought we might start there.

Secretary WEINBERGER. All right, sir.

The system is such that we are doing research on it to see what is the best way to do it. We do not have any plans, obviously, at this stage, for deployment, nor do we certainly have any plans for deployment of anything in any particular State. Pursuing as we are four or five different avenues to this goal, we could not tell you where it would be deployed if we reached that stage of our research. But, certainly, I don't know of anything that makes it more likely that it would be deployed in Alaska than in any one of the other states of the Union.

Senator MURKOWSKI. But it's safe to say that somebody's going to get it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, it's safe to say that the world may receive a very great boon and benefit, sir.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I would give my remaining time to my colleague, Senator Kerry.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, 3½ minutes remain. Senator Kerry is recognized.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank my colleague for his generosity.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to make clear at the outset, relative to our earlier exchange, that I am totally supportive of the notion that we ought to be doing some research and, in fact, voted for and supported the concept of the $1.4 billion in an additional sum.

I think the issue is whether or not we are merely engaged in research commensurate with our best judgment of what the Soviet Union is doing or whether or not we are proceeding headlong to try to create this system as rapidly as possible and to deploy it. There we probably differ.

All of us in this country have enormous faith in our technological ability. We have an ability to do things that were only once dreams. Senator Helms mentioned going to the moon.

If that is true then why isn't it just as easy to assume—and, indeed, we are currently working on—counter measures to our own "star wars" designs? Shouldn't we place the same faith in the technology of countermeasures? Shouldn't we assume that we will build countermeasures just as man has always done in the past for every single defense built, since mankind has been fighting wars? Why won't that same technology be applied by the Soviet Union and ourselves in an effort to overcome the new, perceived threat?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I think it may be attempted.

We have, at this point, systems that offer the promise of not being able to be overwhelmed. We are obviously working on ways to make those systems survivable. And, of course, I am sure the Soviets are, too.

The point that we are trying to make, Senator, is that we are trying to build into this system a degree of survivability that will give a great deal more confidence in its reliability.

Nobody can say what is ahead in 30, 40, or 100 years. Nobody can really say with any confidence what is ahead just a few years out. But the hope that this offers, the possibility that it offers, we think is too great to give up. And we do have in mind very clearly that attempts may be made to destroy it. If it were a ground-based system entirely, then the Soviets might well develop a capability of destroying it.

But we are working on, as I say, four or five different approaches to an effective defence, and we are also working at the same time on trying to make such a defense as survivable as possible. No one can say whether we will succeed. I think the effort has to be made and should be made, from every possible measure. And I think it does offer the kind of hope that we are talking about.

It does not offer certainty, but it does offer hope. And, if we can get the research program to the point where we believe it should be deployed, we would obviously notify all the nations the President mentioned in the quotation I have cited. But we would also then have achieved two things. We would have the opportunity to offer the world a vastly safer world, and we would also be able to remove the nightmare that we would be under if the Soviets had developed this kind of system first, without any slight suggestion of sharing it with anybody.

Senator KERRY. Well, I find it very hard to believe how, if we wound up sharing it—I know my time is up, and I went over the last time.

Why don't I follow up in the written questions. I don't want to abuse the red light, and I appreciate the time that I have been given.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I realize that the Secretary has to go, but I would like to make a statement. I don't want to hold him up, but before you adjourn, I would like to make just a two minute statement in the record regarding this hearing.

He is welcome to stay, but I don't want to hold him. I have no questions.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, if any statement is to be made, Senator, we would like very much to have a chance to hear it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Please proceed with your statement.

Senator BIDEN. I'd like to make several points if I can, and I understand and appreciate the Secretary's coming back from overseas in order to be here, and I realize his time is important.

But had we had more time, I would like to have pursued the following points.

First, if the Soviets are rational—and I think on their own terms they are—they are back at the negotiating table primarily because their strategic force is about to become vulnerable to the weapons system initiated by past administrations, that is the Trident D-5 missile. The Soviets, having some 1,300 missiles containing over two-thirds of their strategic capability, and with 1,300 missiles about to come under the threat of over 5,000 D—5 warheads, they have to respond and they are responding in two ways: by going mobile and by trying to negotiate mutual reductions.

Both of these are desirable developments, but I think they have nothing to do with the advent of "star wars."

Second, the idea that the U.S. defense system could be perfect I quite frankly believe is preposterous, and, if not perfect, it means it will be partially ineffective, at best. This means if we are going to begin to deploy it and the Soviets wish to preserve their deterrent capability, they will be impelled, as we would be under the same circumstances to try to insure that they have enough strike capability to get through the defenses, even if we hit them first and eliminate some of their offensive capability.

The bottom line is that we will have forced the Soviets to deploy, targeted against the American people, far more offensive capability than they otherwise would have deployed. And I am not sure my children are going to be too happy about that.

This brings me to my third and final point, which is that SDI, as it has been promulgated by the President, is not only fantastic, but basically constitutes, I believe, one of the most irresponsible acts by any leader in our modern history.

Both sides have been engaged in defensive research for a long time, and, indeed, it is perfectly conceivable that defensive research, if deployed for limited purposes along with offensive capability, could actually enhance stability. But that is not the dream that the President is putting forward to us and that he has promulgated.

I must say I have some sympathy with the Defense and State Departments because from my perspective, this fantastic dream was put forward in March 1983, and DOD and State seem to have been playing catchup ever since, trying to rationalize what the President said. Meanwhile, however, the consequences of this dream, which meanwhile we are now embracing and espousing with a kind of religious fervor, are deleterious in the extreme for the following reasons.

First, they have generated a sort of "feeding frenzy" in the military-industrial complex which fulfills the worst warnings of President Eisenhowever, in my view.

Second, we have given the Soviets a powerful incentive to increase their own programs in both defensive and offensive weaponry and thus stimulate rather than reduce the threat to the American people.

Third, we have cast grave doubt in the minds, I believe, of our European allies concerning the question of coupling, or whatever called, decoupling, of their interests, not to mention their doubts about what we are saying.

Last, I believe that by embracing this theology, we are imperiling the entire future of arms control at a time when that future is now very much in doubt.

In sum, we are reduced to having a theological debate about a fantasy, in my view, that seems to have been not heard in this room since Vietnam, when administration officials continued, year after year, to justify the premise that we were in Indonesia to halt the spread of Chinese communism.

As you can see, I don't have a strong opinion about this, but I would be delighted to hear a response, if the Secretary so wishes.

Secretary WEINBERGER. May I be indulged, Mr. Chairman, for a moment or two?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I didn't think there was anything to answer until Senator Biden got down to the point where he challenged the motives of the President, and that I think is not in any sense accurate.

Senator BIDEN. I didn't challenge his motives. I said it was irresponsible. That is not challenging his motives—well meaning.

In the Catholic school I went to, the nuns used to make us write the following: the road to hell is paved with good intentions. It has nothing to do with motivation.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The motives of the President are not only completely unchallengeable but it would serve us all very well if they could be realized.

On this predictability of what is and is not possible, there are a great many quotations I could put before you from very eminent people that have been proven totally and completely wrong. I recall to mind just one, and that was Dr. Vanovar Bush, who won Nobel prizes in physics and was instrumental in a great many of these activities in World War II and before. He said the idea that you could put a missile in one continent and launch it and hit a target in another continent was too preposterous even to consider.

And that was only in 1945.

So, it seems to me that we do not have to rely entirely on what the accepted wisdom or the popular view is. Indeed, the President has made quite a career out of not accepting the "accepted wisdom" and believing it is not really all that wise.

There was no need whatever for the Department of Defense to rush around and try to rationalize this program. We supported it from the beginning, prior to its beginning, and we are strongly in favor of it. In any Department that has 1.9 million civilians and 2.1 million military,, you can wander around the halls and find somebody who will support any view you wish. The Department does support it, has supported it, and is working on it as vigorously as Congress will permit.

It is not anything that will decouple us from Europe, as the various responses of the ministers at the meetings of NATO show. It is designed to deal with intermediate range weapons, and it is certainly not imperiling arms control. It offers for the first time the opportunity to have some kind of effective reduction in weapons, rather than a lot of agreements which permit the Soviets to expand.

I know your time is limited, Mr. Chairman, otherwise I would go on for 45 minutes.

Senator BIDEN. I think that is a very good response.

I thank the Secretary for it, and I look forward to pursuing this further. It is my deep, deep hope that the President is as canny as I think, and a good, good bargainer, and that when we get there, this is all going to be on the table.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I know the Secretary has overstayed and I appreciate that, but these hearings are important and this subject is important. What the Senator has said compels me to make just one comment if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, I know that a lot of very, very intelligent people are working on this and are thinking about it. I know that your intentions and those of all who are concerned with it are genuine in the hope of trying to do something about the scourge under which we live. But it is this Senator's perception that, absent a fundamental change in relationship with the Soviet Union—strategic defenses cannot protect our people from the threat of nuclear weapons. Senator Biden, I hope, is correct. This may be the great bargaining chip of all chips and the poker card of all poker cards. But suppose it is not. You yourself have said it should not be bargained away and will not be. Since the day we dropped the bomb, we have both responded to each other following our sense of perceived threat by the other nation. You are familiar with the ragged edge argument and all of the first strike scenarios that go with it. I would think the Soviet Union can only look at the SDI Program and, based on the same set of perceptions that have guided our relationship since the dropping of the first bomb, respond with not only the deployment of defenses, but additional offenses and countermeasures as well.

I think Senator Biden was getting at that in his initial questions.

Well, we are doing it. to. And I think, the response they will come up with is to try to build additional offensive systems, to try to overwhelm it. We are then locked into a whole new level of escalation of the arms race.

I hope I am wrong. I hope that it would have a different effect.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I not only hope you are wrong, Senator, I believe you're wrong. Their "response" to this, as you put it—and I would put it in quotes—started in the mid- to late 1960's. They are not in a situation where if we do it, they will then begin to do it. They have been at it——

Senator **Kerry**. We have both been doing it. I understand that.

Secretary **Weinberger** [continuing]. Fifteen years when we were not, and they have developed very substantial progress in that period.

Senator **Kerry**. The difference is, Mr. Secretary, that they say they are willing to abide by article V of the ABM Treaty. That is something that we know we can verify because field testing and development are, by most people's judgments, verifiable. Therefore, it seems that we would have the ability to remain within the guidelines of the ABM Treaty and have neither of us move into this new system. And there are some of us who just think that is a better route.

Secretary **Weinberger**. But, Senator, they have said so many things, including the fact that they would not deploy more than one new missile, just for a starter, that they would not build radars like Krasnoyarsk, for a second one, and so on. The problem is, though, that if you wait and hope that they are going to keep the promise this time, then you have a situation in which they may very well be quite ready for deployment and we, not having done anything by your hypothesis, would find ourselves with 15 or 16 years to go.

Senator **Kerry**. I am not saying not to do anything. I said I support research, Mr. Secretary. I support research commensurate with what they are doing.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, neither you nor your colleagues are going to be very interested in the amounts of money necessary for research if we are told in advance that it is not to be used, that it is to be put on a shelf, and that it really does not mean anything.

Senator **Kerry**. I think we are not saying that. What we are saying is we should abide by the ABM Treaty and not conduct field tests.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, we are. We are abiding completely by it. We would only hope that the Soviets would not violate it as many times as they have already, and we have to worry about what happens if they continue that course of conduct.

I think they are back at Geneva not for any of the reasons that have been stated but because it is apparent to them that it is in their economic and their national interest to be back there. That is the only time they ever move. Even though they have said many times that they would never come back to the table, they are there for a variety of reasons, most of which are because it is in their national interest to try to get some arms reduction. It is also in their national interest to try to maintain their monopoly in strategic defense. And it is very much in our national interest not to allow that to happen.

Senator **Kerry**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Secretary Weinberger for your appearance today.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

NUCLEAR STRATEGY, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1985

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:09 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Pressler, Murkowski, Evans, Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, and Kerry.

The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is now called to order.

Today's hearing on the theme of nuclear strategy, ballistic missile defense, and arms control, will seek to build on the discussion initiated by Secretary Weinberger last week, wherein the committee sought a better understanding of what U.S. nuclear strategy is today, why it has not provided for a ballistic missile defense role in the past, and why the administration now proposes that it should.

Like Secretary Weinberger, our witnesses today have been asked to review current U.S. nuclear strategy, its perceived strengths and weaknesses and the reasons for an absence of a role for ballistic missile defense in that strategy.

This Nation's strategic nuclear doctrine has continually evolved, but it has not been drastically changed in the past two decades. Various analysts have suggested either further modifications or major revisions to it to remedy perceived weaknesses.

In many cases, differing recommendations stem from differences in fundamental premises and values as well as different predictions of future capabilities and intentions.

In addition to those advocating modifications to current strategy, there are those who differ with basic assumptions central to that strategy and who, therefore, offer alternatives.

The Reagan administration differs from previous ones in its conception of the role that defenses might play in future nuclear strategy and its planning for BMD research and development. It has spoken of a "more stable and reliable balance based on a mix of offensive and defensive systems," and has initiated a broad-ranging investigation into the role of and possibilities for strategic defense.

However, it has not adopted a doctrine incorporating such defenses, believing that such a decision should await the completion of a BMD research and technology development program which could take at least 10 years.

The committee is pleased to welcome this morning three individuals who have played important roles in the development of U.S. nuclear strategy over the past two decades: Mr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; General Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor for President Ford; and Mr. Walter Slocombe, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under President Carter.

I am pleased that these three gentlemen have accepted our invitation to share with us this morning their thoughts on these important themes.

It is my hope this hearing can help the committee to frame the appropriate terms of reference for a proper deliberation of the potential role of ballistic missile defense in the Nation's national security strategy.

I will ask General Scowcroft to lead off, followed by Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Slocombe.

But before commencing their testimony, I would call upon the distinguished ranking member, Senator Pell, for his opening statement.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you. We are fortunate to have three distinguished gentlemen before us today.

We all share the conviction that necessary weapons programs and arms controls are each both essential if we are to have a sound national security policy. In the absence of effective arms control, weapons programs alone will not make us secure when we are faced by a determined adversary, and if our defenses are weak, arms control alone cannot save us from danger.

We must strive for both and in harmony.

Unfortunately, in the last 6 years, there have been no arms control successes, and current negotiations hold no certain promise. At the same time, threats to the existing fabric of arms control are growing. We must find a way to make significant and concrete progress in arms control, while peserving our fundamental national security interests. You gentlemen can be instrumental in helping us chart a course. I look forward very much to receiving your testimony.

In this regard, Mr. Chairman, I have to leave for a portion of the hearing, and thus would ask to leave some questions with you.

The **Chairman**. Very well.

Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

General Scowcroft, welcome again to the committee. Please proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT, PRESIDENT, ISI, AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER UNDER THE FORD ADMINISTRATION

General **Scowcroft**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is a great pleasure for me to be here to discuss with you so important a topic.

I think that your hearings are exactly on the right subject, the subject of our nuclear strategy and of deterrence.

Much of the discussion of SDI has been on technology, whether it would work, whether it would not work. Those are not the central questions that we need to deal with. The questions that you posed to us are indeed those with which we, as a nation, have to grapple as we decide where we should go from here.

First of all, I will make a very, very short statement in order to leave more time for questions.

I believe we are, in a sense, in a state of strategic confusion or disarray.

One of the basic problems for the United States since World War II and especially since the new look in defense in 1953 is that we have relied on nuclear weapons, rather than on adequate conventional forces, to defend our vital interests around the world.

Now this notion of the use of nuclear weapons to make up for other deficiencies rests heavily on concepts of deterrence.

I will not go through the evolution of our strategy from massive retaliation to assured destruction to selective nuclear response to the point where we are now. But let me simply say that SDI and statements about it and offensive forces by some members of the administration do leave the possible impression that our posture may no longer, or should no longer be based on traditional notions of deterrence.

Now what are the implications of that, given our historic reliance on nuclear weapons to defend our national interests?

If we assume, as I do, relatively flat defense budgets for the present time and some years into the future, massive funding for SDI—and nobody says it will not be increasingly expensive as we get even into the research further—will have to come, in a sense, out of "defense hide,"out of other programs, rather than as an add-on.

If the Soviets also deploy strategic defenses, will we not have to strengthen our own offensive forces in order to maintain our historic reliance on the uses of nuclear weapons, both in extended deterrence and for defense of the United States and peripheral areas?

If not, or even if so, we certainly will have to strengthen our conventional forces or SDI will have the effect of making the world safe for Soviet conventional aggression.

These are the basic facts in a monetary sense, if you will, in the decisions we have to make. So far as I know, we have not really focused on these kinds of implications in where we might be going.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will rest.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, General.

Secretary Schlesinger, would you please offer your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES SCHLESINGER, COUNSELOR TO THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, FORMER SECRETARY OF ENERGY, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. **Schlesinger**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for not having a formal statement which is my regular practice before this committee, but I returned last evening to Washington and was unable to prepare one.

I will devote my 10 minutes of comments to a history of the relationship between ballistic missile defense and strategy.

It seems to me that a recent attorney general of Connecticut had it right when he said if we don't know where we have been, we sure as hell are not going to know where we are going.

That applies in the area of strategic defense, where three distinct phases may be discerned. The earlist was the I pre-SALT era in the 1960's, during which both superpowers followed their natural inclinations to develop strategic defensive technologies and, if successful, to deploy those technologies to defend themselves. The proclivity of the Soviet Union toward strategic defense was particularly strong, with roots in their experiences in both world wars as well as even earlier Russian history.

In the mid-1960's, Secretary McNamara moved away from counterforce notions and developed the doctrine—underscore "doctrine—" of assured destruction. His reaction to the initial Soviet deployments of Soviet defenses around Moscow was to expand America's offensive capabilities. The MIRV program was developed for the specific purpose of penetrating Soviet defenses.

At Glassboro, in 1967, the United States attempted to persuade the Soviet Union that strategic defenses would simply lead to an escalation of offensive armaments on both sides. The Soviet Union was wedded to strategic defense at that time and rebuffed America's proposals. With the deployment by the United States of the Safeguard system which started in 1969, the Soviet Union had a change of heart, and began to move toward mutual restraint of strategic defenses on both sides.

The second historical phase I define as the SALT era. Its distinctive feature is the acceptance of mutual vulnerability by both sides. That is central to arms control.

In 1972, when I was preparing testimony on SALT I, the Nixon administration was delighted with its success in persuading the Soviet Union—a state wedded to Marxist doctrine and believing in the inevitability of Soviet triumph in any war—to accept its vulnerability to United States attack, and to accept it as a permanent feature of superpower relations.

This acceptance of mutual vulnerability, Mr. Chairman, was based upon reality, not upon a preference on the part of the United States. It reflected an understanding of the centrality of the offensive-defensive interaction. I shall come back to this in a few moments.

I should stress that acceptance of mutual vulnerability is not acceptance of the doctrine of assured destruction. There has been some confusion in the course of the last 18 months on that point. As General Scowcroft just indicated, in the early 1970's, America's doctrine shifted away from assured destruction toward selective strikes as the method for achieving deterrence, particularly deterrence of the Soviet Union in a possible conventional move against Western Europe. It is now stated and misstated that we have a choice between assured destruction and strategic defense. That is surely not the case. The United States has more than a decade ago abandoned assured destruction as the basis of its deterrence policies. Strategic defense and the strategic defense initiative do not provide us with an escape from mutual vulnerability.

The third historical phase began with the President's speech of 1983—in this phase the development of strategic defense has been the focus of American policy.

I should point out that this policy focus did not emerge from the departments and the defense bureaucracy; it was very much a private initiative of the President of the United States. It came as a surprise to the Department. Indeed, the Department of Defense to that point had been arguing that space defense capabilities were unachievable.

I should also point out that there are good reasons, Mr. Chairman, for a review of the policies of 1972. Technology has changed, and, in addition, the expectations of 1972 that the Soviet Union would limit its offensive forces and refrain from building a counterforce capability have not been boone out.

But it is important to note, Mr. Chairman, that in 1985 the United States has embraced the doctrine espoused by the Soviet Union at Glassboro in 1967 and that the Soviet Union has now espoused the then-American doctrine. The question that we should raise today is whether or not this reversal is based upon a full appreciation of the offense-defense interaction.

We have explored strategic defenses for many years though with diminished effort in the latter 1970's. This earlier work focused on the resolution of technical uncertainties. Precision of strategy and force structure were purposefully deferred by policymakers. Unforunately, the current administration has been drawing conclusions about strategy and force structure prior to the resolution of the technical problems. This explains some of the strategic confusion to which General Scowcroft refers. We should understand that restraint and strategic defense have been the necessary bedrock of arms control. In their absence, both sides have incentives further to expand their offensive forces.

Given technological changes since 1972, I think it appropriate to look again at confined defenses—defense confined to the missile fields. I believe that the grandiose scheme for the protection of the public and the cities of the United States is unachievable. We should also recognize that such a scheme would also spur the Soviets in the direction of expanding their offensive forces.

How does this impact strategy?

In the first place, we would face a long transition period, if the President's vision of SDI were to be more feasible. That transition would come at very high cost, as General Scowcroft has indicated, necessitating a draw down of conventional forces. it would also create Soviet concerns about strategic stability in the future which would provide an incentive, if the Soviets are not cautious, for bolder actions on the international scene.

Paul Nitze has described this transition in terms of a shift from offense to defense. The problem with Mr. Nitze's conception, in my judgment, is that it is unachievable—the latter stages of the transition, which feature a United States deployment of strategic defense, preclude the initial phase which he describes as persuading the Soviets to reduce their offensive forces.

Your letter to me, Mr. Chairman, referred to the need for a coherent nuclear strategy. We do not have that at the moment, and Genenal Scowcroft is current in describing current thinking as confused. Confusion today is soundly based.

The reactions of our allies to recent developments are discouraging. The allies will look at the proposal for open laboratories and wonder where they fit in if the Soviets are permitted to have access to our national defense installations.

The President's statements in recent weeks emphasize that the United States will not deploy strategic defenses unless there had been prior negotiations. In a more recent version, it requires a preemptive reduction—I don't think he meant "elimination"—of strategic offensive forces.

But that raises grave questions, it seems to me, not only on the part of the allies but here in the Congress with regard to the level of funding that should be provided to strategic defense.

I conclude with the following observation, Mr. Chairman.

In your letter, you referred to the need to discuss what is technologically feasible in the context of what is strategically desirable and practical. We need research. We cannot afford not to proceed with research.

The grandiose goal that has been laid out for us by the President is not an achievable goal. It was prematurely stated and it should be allowed to become more quiet.

We need to do vigorous work with regard to the more confined defense so that we know whether or not we have an option. All of these things must ultimately be negotiated with the Soviet Union.

I add at the close that there is no escape, Mr. Chairman, from assured destruction. The irony of the strategic defense proposal is that it would anchor us more firmly into assured destruction than we are now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Schlesinger.

Mr. Slocombe.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER SLOCOMBE, PARTNER, KAPLAN AND DRYSDALE, AND FORMER DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY PLANNING AND DIRECTOR OF THE SALT TASK FORCE UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senators, it is an honor to be asked, particularly in this distinguished company, to talk about this subject with the committee. The way the committee has posed the issue is particularly heartening because there is a tendency to define the SDI issue, as General Scowcroft says, essentially as a technical one: Will it work or not?

You cannot even answer the question of whether it will work except in the context of strategy: What is it supposed to work at?

To be charitable, the objectives of the SDI program are still somewhat undefined. The President talks repeatedly about eliminating nuclear weapons, about replacing mutual assured destruction with mutual assured survival.

But most of the serious work and all of the serious prospects technically focus on limited defenses of high value military targets.

The problem for responsible leadership at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue is to avoid letting fantasies divert us from hard facts, hard duties, and hard choices. That is certainly true of advocates of the program, but it is also true of skeptics, because all of us have to acknowledge that what we know about the research possibilities, about what is technically feasible with new technology, is still very uncertain. Honest research with results measured against hardheaded criteria of success or failure and not merely the ability to do a stunt under controlled conditions will bring much greater concreteness to the discussion on all sides.

But much more is required than simply technically honest work. Throughout the process, there has to be a continuing political judgment as to what is worth doing, even if it is feasible.

A fundamental point is that the kinds of limited defenses of military targets that are likely to be what research finds to be feasible technically are not likely to be revolutionary from a strategic point of view, however revolutionary and innovative the technology may be.

This, I think, provides a good way to begin discussion of some specific questions that have to be asked from a policy point of view about SDI.

First, the costs of defense against ballistic missiles must be compared to the cost of achieving the same degree of success in carrying out a given mission by other means. Let us take a specific example. Defending silos, whether by active defense or by something else, is an unquestionably legitimate, stabilizing, important objective of force planning. But active defenses are far from the only way to maintain adequate survivability of strategic forces. Therefore, before deciding that ballistic missile defenses even for this purpose are wise, even if feasible, there has to be a careful examination of the alternative methods of accomplishing the same end. And, in particular, this requires that we spend adequate resources on these alternative means of accomplishing these missions. We must not allow ourselves to be put into the position of having to opt either to deploy ballistic missile defenses or leave such mission unaccomplished because in our fixation on active ballistic missile defenses we have failed to explore alternatives.

Second, and particularly important in an era of flat or even declining real defense budgets, we need to ask what is the priority of the mission which ballistic missile defenses could serve relative to other uses of the funds, for R&D on other subjects, or for any other purpose. We simply must not let the fashionable and the popular crowd out more useful and essential, if less glamorous, military functions.

Third, there are political costs, in terms of alliance relations, relations with the Soviet Union, and the balance of our international programs. These considerations lie at the very center of a strategic approach, because the purpose of strategy is to obtain political goals, not to serve some disembodied military or technical mission.

Fourth is the issue of stability. This is a familiar one, way back to the Safeguard debate, but it still is central. We don't know much about what the research will prove, but I assert one thing about any new ballistic missile defense system and that is that it will work better before than after it is subjected to nuclear attack. This means that the familiar problem of a danger of defenses being destabilizing and producing incentives and pressures to preempt in a crisis cannot be ignored.

Finally, an issue of particular importance to the strategic assessment of whatever SDI produces is whether it would, in fact, be in our interest for both sides to have the ability, with reasonable confidence, to defend against relatively small nuclear attacks aimed at key military targets. It is important in that connection to recognize that it is not the Warsaw Pact, but the NATO alliance, that makes it a central part of its overall doctrine to have the ability to mount highly controlled, selective attacks on the other side's military facilities.

Granted all the problems about this doctrine, all the difficulties of keeping a nuclear conflict limited, is it really in the alliance's interest for us to take the initiative to move into a situation in which both sides, and particularly the Soviet Union, would have defenses that would make such a strategy vastly more difficult if only by requiring that an initial NATO use of nuclear weapons be on a much larger scale?

As Secretary Schlesinger has said, paradoxically, the threat of all-out retaliation against the full range of industrial and military targets would probably remain after defenses were deployed about as terrible and about as credible as it is today. What could be made more problematic is the contribution to broad-scale deterrence of the threat to use nuclear forces in a limited and focused way against critical military targets.

I want to add that in all of this, it is essential that critics of SDI, like myself, recognize that the interest in strategic defenses is not one-sided or unique to the Reagan administration. The fact is that the Soviets, in the secrecy of their system, are and have been very hard at work on the missile defense problem, not to mention their vast investment in air defense.

We do not have the luxury of unilaterally defining whether or not there is going to be a greater emphasis on strategic defense in the future, and research in the West on what is feasible is justified if, for no other reason, than to give the Soviets an incentive to keep their heads down on this particular issue.

These I suggest are the criteria against which the results of SDI and also requests for funding it must be judged. But it will be a long time, a very long time, by the horizons of most political and budget judgments, before we are in a position to make these decisions. For the interim, I believe the necessary conclusion of analysis of these time lags is that the U.S. objective should be to maintain and clarify the ABM Treaty limits in verifiable ways, not to loosen it either deliberately or by legalisms.

It is by no means clear that the Soviets would be genuinely interested in a mutual enhancement of the treaty's limits. However, unless one believes long in advance of knowing the fruits of the research that it is clearly in the West's interests to see the 1972 regime abolished, it should be our objective to establish stronger restraints on testing and development, not to match Soviet avoidance.

A program of agreed interim constraints on defense is fully consistent with a rational approach to research on defense, and it could, if the U.S.S.R. is serious, make possible significant offensive limits. Such an agreement would, in particular, if only for reasons of verifiability, leave plenty of scope for a genuine research program, allowing us to analyze the strategic desirability of full development and eventual deployment of whatever systems research proves workable.

Thank you.

[Mr. Slocombe's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WALTER B. SLOCOMBE

JUDGING SDI BY THE STANDARD OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

I am honored at the opportunity to appear here today to offer my thoughts on the relationship between the proposal to develop ballistic missile defenses and national strategy. The very fact that the Committee wishes to consider the issues in those terms is itself heartening, because too often the SDI is treated as principally a technological question of "Will it work or not?"

Indeed, even that seemingly simple, scientific question cannot, in fact, be answered meaningfully without first knowing what SDI is to work at, what it is supposed to accomplish for our national strategy. There is no question that it is possible to destroy ballistic missile warheads under certain conditions before they reach their targets. The issue is whether those conditions where effective defense is possible -- which will of course be defined by technology, both ours and that of the Soviets, in countermeasures -- are ones that meet our security needs.

There is, of course, no single, simple definition of national strategy against which to measure ballistic missile defense, or any other defense or diplomatic effort. For what makes the task of national strategy hard is that it must serve several objectives at once. We want to protect our continued ability to live in peace and freedom, which critically requires help protecting the freedom and interests of friends and allies as well. We must avoid not only nuclear war, but any large scale use of conventional military force by the USSR if only because such a conventional war is overwhelmingly the most likely breeding ground of nuclear war. And we need to assure that, even in a grave crisis, even a massive conventional war, even in a war in which nuclear weapons have already been used on a limited scale, the Soviet Union could not perceive it it be in its interest -- either out of fear or hope -- to use nuclear weapons preemptively. At the same time, we, rightly I believe, declare that we will use nuclear weapons first rather than acquiesce in Soviet victory.

The task of national strategy of which nuclear strategy is so important a part is therefore two-fold. Not merely avoiding war but avoiding it without giving up things almost equally as valuable as life itself. The very complexity of posing the task as two-fold highlights a fundamental but on reflection an obvious point: The complex horror of nuclear weapons in a world where freedom confronts aggressive totalitarianism has no simple solution. The scale of both horrors makes it not less but more important that we think clearly and realistically about how to prevent it and about claims that there are magic, easy solutions, whether technological or diplomatic.

To attain these objectives we with our allies have relied for 40 years now on a policy of collective security, built on both conventional military power and nuclear deterrence. It is worth stressing in this context of SDI that we have never -- despite many myths to the contrary -- had a national policy of placing primary reliance for deterrence on massive attacks on Soviet cities. Though such attacks have certainly been part of our plans, leaders and analysts alike from the very beginning of the nuclear era have recognized that such a policy lacks credibility and effectiveness, measured against the range of challenges we seek to deter.

For at least the past 15 years, U.S. nuclear doctrine has explicitly sought to deter, not merely by the threat of massive attacks but by the ability to carry out more selective nuclear attacks. In the critical NATO context, this has been our doctrine even longer. To be sure, there is a great debate over the feasibility of keeping a nuclear war, once started, limited. Many people who, like myself, support the policy of deterrence by a range of capabilities also believe that in the event, the pressures to escalate would likely be uncontrollable -- and recognize that this possibility of irrationality itself makes a contribution to deterrence. But that is quite different from regarding "assured destruction" as a preferred policy, as contrasted to an inescapable possibility.

The core argument of the more complex strategy developed over the past two decades is that the United States and its allies cannot afford to rely solely on the Soviet leadership recognizing -- or, rather, predicting -- that aggression by them would inevitably unleash a process that would leave the USSR a ruin. Our strategy, rather, says that in order to deter the full range of threats to which strategic nuclear forces might be relevant, the United States must have not merely a capacity for destroying the totality of Soviet industrial, military, and political targets, but it also must have a sufficiently flexible and enduring force that it is capable of carrying out smaller attacks that would deny the Soviet Union victory in such a war, even without further escalation. It is, in effect, an explicit declaration of a policy of joining to the possibility of general destruction, a threat -- which may well be thought more credible -- of a more focussed response.

This so-called "countervailing" strategy, therefore, is based on combining the restraining effect of two sorts of prospective retaliation: Soviet leaders contemplating aggression will be faced both with a risk of uncontrolled escalation, and a manifest U.S. capacity to prevent Soviet victory even if such escalation did not occur.

The idea is to make the Soviets conclude that some unacceptable U.S. nuclear counterblow is certain if conventional (or nuclear) attacks threaten vital U.S. interests, even though what form it would take could not be predicted with confidence. Facing this prospect, the Soviet leaders should, in their own self interest, recognize that no action of theirs that led to the use of nuclear weapons could produce a meaningful Soviet victory, and therefore they should avoid such action.

Almost equally important as credibility for our threat to use nuclear weapons if necessary is being free of pressures to use them prematurely, out of fear that if we do not strike immediately, we will lose our ability to do so -- and hence our ability to deter and defend our interests. We certainly do not want to be in such a position ourselves -- which is why we should make the survivability of our forces a key criteria of our plans. Moreover, there are real dangers to us if the Soviets feel themselves in such a condition.

Ballistic Missile Defense: Criteria of Decision

Historically, the U.S. has judged that the sort of active defenses against ballistic missiles that are technologically feasible do not make a contribution to attaining our objectives commensurate with their costs, and that we are better off agreeing with the Soviets to abjure significant levels of missile defenses. This judgment has not been the product of a theological devotion to "assured destruction" as a preferred policy -- and still less to an illusion that we have reached an agreement with the Soviets to follow such a policy. Nor is it the result of a judgment that defenses would be utterly useless.

Rather, it is the result of a conclusion that the marginally effective defenses that are technically feasible have costs that outweigh their benefits. These costs are both financial and, more important, in terms of instability of stimulating offensive buildups, making limits on offensive forces impossible, and, in a crisis, adding to pressures and perceived incentives to pre-empt.

Whatever may be said about the future, it is striking how little real question there is that that decision -- made by President Nixon, Secretary Kissinger, and their military and diplomatic advisors in the early 1970s -- was in any way wrong. In all the endless cacophony of debate over ICBM vulnerability, there is, so far as I know, no one who argues that we would be better off had we only built the safeguard ABM system started in 1969 with the proclaimed (and legitimate) mission of protecting our Minuteman ICBMs from the threat of Soviet attack. The ABM Treaty -- whatever its future should be -- at a minimum allowed both the U.S. and USSR to forego deployment of ABM systems then under active construction that would have been very expensive, destabilizing in their effect on both the arms competition and crisis conditions, and yet essentially useless to either side.

Throughout this period, the U.S. has maintained an active ABM research effort, both to deter Soviet breakout (which would be feasible based on their even more extensive ABM R&D effort) and to enable us to review the technical basis for the earlier discussion. The SDI effort represents a major step-up in that continuing effort, but it has not changed the basic question: Will deployment of such defenses as are feasible serve our security needs, weighing both the benefits and the costs?

SDI must be assessed in this context of national policy choices in which costs and benefits are balanced. What is needed is a plan for -- and a commitment to -- judging the fruits of SDI that recognizes that the program will neither be an absolute failure nor an absolute success. Such a plan should permit us all to consider in a responsible way whether there is, as claimed, a useful future role for missile defenses in Western nuclear strategy without in the meantime destroying confidence in deterrence, starving other technological initiatives and defense programs, or forcing us to forego attainable and useful agreements on offensive forces before we know the result of the research.

Real vs. Popular Objectives. In devising such an approach to SDI, one has to begin by being clear what this "SDI" is that we are all debating. SDI's objectives as a program, are, to be charitable, somewhat undefined. Some advocates (and most of the people doing the actual work) stress that improved defenses would only buttress deterrence. By contrast, some very highly placed advocates claim to be confident of finding a technological basis for a fundamental new strategy to replace traditional deterrence. The President's oft-proclaimed hope is that technological developments will make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, replacing mutual assured destruction (not just as a policy but as a reality) with "mutual assured survival."

Nonetheless, most of the serious work -- and all the serious prospects -- focus on limited defenses of high-value military targets. But, neither in the U.S. nor in Alliance public debate, is that what gets most attention. There is a heavy tendency to debate not the most likely, but the most interesting, issue. That is the idea of an invisible plastic shield -- a perfect or nearly perfect defense of cities and population.

For the political secret of SDI is that it appeals to an immensely popular idea. That is the idea of getting rid of nuclear weapons. The realism -- or lack of it -- of an idea as attractive as that has no necessary effect on its popularity. What is striking about the SDI is that it potentially represents for the first time a chance for the effective mobilization of the anti-nuclear impulse by those groups of American politics who traditionally have stressed military confrontation with the Russians. Denouncing deterrence as immoral is no longer the monopoly of the political left. In SDI the idea that somehow we can get rid of the Russians has merged with the idea that somehow we can get rid of nuclear weapons.

The problem for responsible leadership on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue is to avoid letting these fantasies divert us away from hard facts, hard duties, and hard choices. That is certainly true of advocates of the program, but it is also true of skeptics who are critics of SDI but not of deterrence based on unquestionably sufficient military forces. For all, the task is somehow how to figure out how to preserve deterrence -- to which there is not and for all practical purposes never is going to be any alternative -- as well as alliance unity, a balanced --

popularly supported -- defense program, and arms control prospects while coping with the fact that the President of the United States and probably large parts of the American and European public will want to continue to hope there will be a technological fix to the nuclear problem, and while awaiting research results sufficiently concrete to permit decisions.

Research. If it is no panacea, the formula of research is not a bad one as a current position for advocates of deterrence and arms control -- and also for serious-minded supporters of exploring increased emphasis on defenses. First, we may well learn a good deal from honest research. And there is much to learn. There are a few true believers, to be sure, who like to act as if they already have the technological answers. However, most advocates of the SDI are prepared to acknowledge that there are a lot of technical uncertainties. Those of us who oppose SDI also have a responsibility to acknowledge that a lot of the technical criticism of the more detailed points is not much more than very preliminary first approximations.

Honest research, with results measured against hard-headed criteria of success or failure (and not merely the ability to do a stunt under controlled conditions) will bring greater concreteness to the discussion on all sides, especially about effectiveness, cost, and countermeasures.

I am confident also that serious, critical research into what is actually feasible in the face of Soviet countermeasures, and into the costs of effective defenses against reactive threats is not likely, even in the short run, to hurt the case of those of us who argue that deterrence is not going to be replaced by technological miracles, and -- though I assert this with far less certainty -- that the non-miracle treatments are not likely to prove attractive.

The Policy Perspective

However, much more is required than merely technically honest work. Of course, success at the purely technical level is a necessary condition of showing that deployment would be a wise decision, but it is not a sufficient condition. Throughout the process there has to be a continuing political judgment as to what is worth doing even if feasible. A program worth deploying also must meet standards of economic efficiency and of strategic and political utility.

A fundamental point is that the kinds of limited defenses of military targets which are likely to be what research finds to be feasible are not likely to be revolutionary from a strategic point of view, however revolutionary they may be as technology. To defend silos or to defend militarily important NATO facilities like airfields is not to perform a mission different from traditional military missions. Research, honestly conceived and critically evaluated toward this end, is surely useful and justified. But for such partial -- and technically probably feasible -- defenses there are issues of what is in our security interest that do not depend principally on what can be done technically. It is the special responsibility of political leaders, especially in Congress, to raise these nontechnical, policy issues.

Costs of Alternative Ways of Serving the Mission. First, the costs of the defenses must be compared to the costs of achieving the same degree of success in carrying out the mission by other means. For example, defending silos by active defenses is an unquestionably legitimate, stabilizing, and useful objective in the most traditional deterrence terms, for it makes the retaliatory forces lodged in those silos more survivable. But such defenses are far from the only way to maintain adequate survivability of strategic forces. Before deciding that ballistic missile defenses are wise, even if feasible, for that purpose, there has to be a careful examination of alternative methods of accomplishing the same end by such measures as mobility, deceptive basing, or, indeed, reduced reliance on ICBMs compensated by increased capabilities in other parts of the strategic force. Similarly, with respect to the perfectly legitimate military objective of defending NATO airfields and other key military facilities against Soviet missile attack there are alternatives whose cost and relative advantages have to be weighed in the balance. In some cases, there may also be arms control methods of advancing these missions.

If the objective of SDI research in the coming years is to explore the advisability (as well as the narrow technical possibility) of relying on active missile defenses for these more limited purposes, it is necessary for accurate evaluation of results and choices of policy that the overall research program also devote appropriate resources to alternative means of serving these ends. We should not allow ourselves to be put in the position of having to opt for ballistic missile defenses or leave the mission unaccomplished because we have failed to explore alternatives.

Opportunity Costs. Secondly, policy review of an honest research program should consider the alternative uses of the financial, technological, and political resources that would have to be devoted to ballistic missile defenses. We need to ask, not just whether defenses could do a given job at a reasonable cost, but what equivalent funds could do for our security if they were spent on such things as more technologically effective and combat worthy conventional forces, greater capacity to move men, equipment and supplies quickly to where they are needed, or more survivable and enduring strategic forces, especially command and control. That is, cost-effectiveness must be judged not just in terms of a single mission, but of priorities among missions. In a period of very tight military budgets, in the U.S. as well as other Alliance countries, the fashionable must not be allowed to crowd out the useful.

Political Costs. An honest exploration of potential defenses must consider the external costs of missile defenses, i.e., their impact on Soviet behavior, on Alliance solidarity, and on the prospect for arms control. These political considerations, far from being secondary or subordinate to technical ones, lie at the very center of a strategic approach. For the purpose of strategy is to attain political goals, not to serve some disembodied military or technical mission.

Stability. It seems to be in the nature of defenses that their effectiveness is assessed differently by those who possess them and by those who must overcome them. It is therefore important that we take full account of the potential of limited defensive deployments for inducing reactions by the Soviets which are designed to offset their effectiveness -- as conceived by the Soviets, not by us. This question of Soviet reactions (and, indeed, of our own reaction to Soviet defenses) highlights a particularly important aspect of the impact of ballistic missile defense on strategy. Avoiding pressures and incentives to rush to use nuclear weapons -- not because of a deliberate decision that such is necessary to protect our security, but because of a fear that if we do not do so, we will have lost the opportunity -- is a principal task of force planning. Whatever else will be true of any new ballistic missile defense systems each side may develop, one thing is certain -- they will work better before, rather than after being subjected to nuclear attack. The basic agreement -- familiar from the safeguard debates of 1969 and 1970 -- that what one side regards as very limited defenses may not seem so limited to the other -- especially against an attack degraded by a first strike -- and may thereby create incentives for pre-emption remains true today.

Limited Defenses and Flexible Response. Finally, an issue of particular importance to the strategic assessment of whatever SDI produces is whether it would be in NATO's interest for both sides to have the ability, with reasonable confidence, to defend against relatively small nuclear attacks aimed at key military targets. Of course, there can be little doubt that it would be useful for NATO to be able to defend certain high priority military facilities against Soviet missile attacks if that were a unilateral advantage. But there is no reason to assume it would be. The Soviets will be likely at least to match any U.S. defense capability in reasonably short order. Therefore, we have to face the question whether it would be in our interest to move to a world in which both sides have such a capability.

In that connection, it is important to recognize that it is not the Pact but NATO that makes a central part of its overall doctrine the ability to mount highly controlled selective attacks on the other side's military facilities. Granted all the difficulty of keeping limited a nuclear conflict that began with such attacks, is it really in the Alliance's interest to see defenses deployed by the Soviet Union that, if they worked, would make such attacks vastly more difficult if only by requiring that an initial NATO use of nuclear weapons be on a much larger scale, in order to be sure to penetrate defenses and reach its targets? The answer is not obvious -- but, at a minimum, it is a naive -- even self-delusive -- argument for U.S. defenses to say that

Soviet defenses -- presumably using similar technology -- would have no impact on our own attack options.

Continued Reliance on Deterrence. Despite the frequent (though far from unanimous) efforts of high level administration spokesmen to proclaim the overall SDI goal as one of abolishing the need for nuclear deterrence, deterrence by threat of retaliation would continue to be important even in a world in which strategic defenses were widely deployed. The image -- purveyed by some who seek to fit the square of arms control into the round hole of SDI -- of the ultimate goal of agreed elimination of nuclear weapons guaranteed by strategic defenses reminds me of nothing so much as Soviet theories of the withering away of the state used to justify immense concentration of centralized power.

Indeed, paradoxically, the threat of all out retaliation against the full range of industrial and military targets in a society would probably remain about as terrible and about as credible with defenses as it is today. What could be made more problematic is the contribution to broad scale deterrence of the threat to use nuclear forces in a limited and a focused way against critical military targets. Mutual assured destruction as a fact of life in the nuclear age would survive, whatever else changed.

The Soviet Dimension. In all this, it is essential that critics of SDI recognize that the interest in strategic defenses is not one-sided, not unique to the Reagan Administration. Denunciations of the fundamental immorality and war-mongeringness of anybody who is in favor of doing any work on strategic defenses ring false indeed from spokesmen of the Soviet Union. For the USSR question spends today on ballistic missile defense amounts which compare favorably with what General Abramson will have to spend on SDI, even setting aside huge Soviet expenditures on air defense, much of it aimed at the Strategic Air Command. The fact is that the Soviets in the secrecy of their system are and have been very hard at work on the missile defense problem. The United States and its Allies do not have the luxury of unilaterally defining whether or not there is going to be a greater emphasis on strategic defense in the future.

Research in the West on what might work and how it could be dealt with is important to influence Soviet choices in this field. A central argument for a serious U.S. research effort on missile defense is that concern that the U.S. could at least match the Soviets in a defensive race is a major factor in giving the Soviets an incentive to stay under the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Conclusion

These are, I suggest, the criteria against which the results of SDI (and requests for funding it) must be judged. But it will be a long time -- a very long time by the horizons of most political and budget judgments -- before we are in a position to make these decisions.

For the interim, I believe that the necessary conclusion of a serious analysis of the time lags and likely results of BMD research is that, in the near term, the U.S. objective with respect to the ABM Treaty should be to maintain and clarify its limits in verifiable ways, not to loosen it either deliberately or by legalisms. It is not clear that the Soviets would be interested in a genuinely mutual enhancement of the Treaty's limits. Soviet behavior already gives sufficient reason for concern about their willingness to remain at the very low level of permitted ballistic missile defenses established in 1972. However, unless one believes -- long in advance of the fruits of scheduled research -- that it is clearly in the West's interest to see the 1972 regime abolished, it should be our objective to establish stronger restraints on testing and development, not to match Soviet avoidance.

Such a policy would have a further virtue in terms of maintaining public support for U.S. negotiating and modernization efforts. For it would involve meeting Soviet demands that negotiations on all subjects be conditioned on severe new restrictions on ballistic missile defense work (at least by the U.S.), not with trying to persuade the Soviets of the virtues of SDI, but with asking them to agree to a concrete set of specific verifiable measures defining permissible and nonpermissible development work.

Such a program of interim constraints on defenses is fully consistent with a rational approach to defensive research -- and they could, if the USSR is serious, make possible significant offensive limits. Such an agreement would also -- if only for reasons of verifiability -- leave plenty of scope for a genuine research program, allowing us to analyze the strategic desirability of full development and eventual deployment of whatever systems research proves workable.

WALTER B. SLOCOMBE is a member of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered. He was Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning (1979-81) and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (1977-79). He served as a member of the Program Analysis Staff of the National Security Council in 1969-70.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Mr. Slocombe.

I thank all three of the panelists for extraordinary entries into this discussion today. It was succinct and provocative.

Let me initiate the questioning. I will ask unanimous consent that the first round of questions be limited to 10 minutes.

My first question is complex, and if you will, gentlemen, follow along with me through the entirety of the question. I think that you will catch the gist of it fairly early on.

All three of you are familiar with the findings of the Scowcroft Commission, and I would suspect that General Scowcroft has had some cause to review those findings in the past few months.

The Commission's report emphasized that the United States secure retaliatory deterrent depends on the synergistic capabilities of a triad of SLBM's, ICBM's, and long-range bombers. The need to maintain adequately invulnerable retaliatory nuclear forces for decades to come is often cited as a justification for BMD deployment to protect U.S. ICBM silos.

First of all, to what extent is there an ICBM silo vulnerability problem, and to what extent can strategic defenses help redress that problem?

Second, to further reinforce the survivability of the ICBM portion of the triad in future years, the Scowcroft Commission recommended the development of a small, mobile, single warhead ICBM, sometimes termed "Midgetman."

In light of this recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission report, how do you react to the reported administration proposal in Geneva for a ban on mobile missiles? What do you believe motivated the administration to put forward the idea of the mobile ban—a verification concern with regard to Soviet mobiles, or perhaps an increasing concern about a Soviet first-strike threat? Perhaps it was a concern about congressional unwillingness to support the Strategic Modernization Program downstream?

I would ask any of you to respond if you would wish.

Secretary Schlesinger.

Mr. **Schlesinger**. I think I will start with the second half of your question because General Scowcroft may feel somewhat shy about discussing the repudiation of the Scowcroft findings. [Laughter.]

What motivated the administration? I believe that the administration was motivated by the tactical advantages, both in deployment and in bargaining, in the fact that the Soviet Union is ahead of us with respect to the deployability of mobile missiles, and that for the next 4 or 5 years, a restraint on both sides clearly would be advantageous to the United States rather than to the Soviet Union.

That is a tactical advantage that the administration, I believe, clearly sees.

On the other hand, as the Scowcroft Commission clearly indicated, in the long run, it is important for the United States for reasons of the vulnerability of the ICBM force to retain the option of mobility, and if this were seized upon by the Soviet Union, we would forfeit a long-term strategic fallback.

I believe also that this decision was driven by a bubbling up from below of specific concerns of elements of the American governmental structure. The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, has become exceedingly concerned about the verification problem, which would be more severe under a regime of mobile missiles.

Whether or not the issue of verification exceeds in importance the issue of vulnerability and long-term stability of ICBM forces is a question that tends to get disregarded.

The military establishment has placed emphasis on the retention of target coverage as opposed to the importance of moving toward a more stable relationship and reducing vulnerability.

It suggests, I think, that the military establishment has not been entirely persuaded by the emphasis by the civilian leaders of the administration on a future of defense dominance, if the desire is so clearly indicated to maintain target coverage as opposed to reducing vulnerabilities.

General SCOWCROFT. Mr. Chairman, the MX Commission had, among others, two overall goals. In advocating a way to reach those goals, we recognized that we were in an imperfect situation and that if we were to start over again on the MX or strategic forces 10 years ago, we would not start from where we ended up.

Those two overall goals were, first of all, to redress an imbalance in accurate missile warheads between the United States and the Soviet Union. That goes to the heart of notions of deterrence. It was our feeling that, whatever we think about deterrence, the Soviets, not only in their writings, but their force building, the deployment and what we know of their force employment, seemed to have very different notions of deterrence. Therefore, we thought it was dangerous to leave so significant a gap in, if you will, in the jargon, hard-target kill capability.

That was the one goal.

The other goal was to move strategic forces, to the extent possible, on both sides into a posture of greater stability. What do I mean by that? I mean into a posture so that the character of the forces themselves would not militarily produce an incentive to attack in a crisis because neither side could calculate militarily that a first strike would be advantageous. For that reason, we advocated moving to the small missile, both for survivability and to reduce the value of the target.

In a sense, the goal, if you will, was to move, hopefully, toward deMIRV'ing.

We saw that as a logical follow-on to the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy, an accompaniment to the selective strikes in terms of what kind of forces do we want to see out at the end of the century.

My opening remarks were based heavily on what seems to be a sharp change in that goal for strategic forces.

Let me say just one word on the silo vulnerability.

We did not try to define precisely what silo vulnerability was at the time of the report, but we said whatever it is, it will get worse, and in the race between hardness and accuracy, eventually accuracy almost certainly would have to win.

But we argued that for now and for some time in the future, silo vulnerability could be accepted in terms of the other goals and the program which we advocated for a couple of reasons. First, whatever the technical ability of the Soviets in a training situation to put a single warhead on a single target, they have to now and for some time in the future have enormous operational skepticism about their ability to do that with the mass of their forces untested, untried, and with a complexity and a knowledge that it has to work perfectly the first time.

This is far different from the kinds of things you can confidently expect on a test range.

Second, there is now, and at least until the Soviets develop a highly accurate sea launched ballistic missile, a synergism between the bomber forces and the missile forces in that the Soviets cannot attack them both simultaneously. Whichever one they focus on gives warning for the other force and thus helps protect it. That also would have been true even after the Soviets develop accurate forces between the MX and the Midgetman. It would make little sense to go after the MX in silos, to try to destroy our hard target capability, if it were the separate force that they could not destroy whatever they did to the MX.

Mr. **Slocombe**. Senator, I think we are abusing the 10-minute rule, but could I try to answer the one part of your question that I think has not been addressed? That is whether active defenses can help with ICBM vulnerability.

Sure they can help. There is no question that you can shoot down a certain number of attacking ballistic missile warheads, and the easiest way to do that is to do it against missiles attacking silos.

But there are two problems.

One is that there are clear alternatives. If it's going to cost $30 billion, you move the choice of spending that $30 billion on other alternatives—more targets, more submarines, more D–5's, and a variety of other things. I must be the last surviving advocate of the racetrack system, but I still think it is the best solution to the problem.

You can go for various kinds of deceptive basing. I notice that something that sounds a lot like deceptive basing is beginning to have some revived interest.

So there are alternatives. They would have to be considered and analyzed seriously.

The second is the stability problem is not entirely met by announcing it is only a silo defense, at least if by silo defense you mean anything beyond Dick Garwin's stones that fly up the last hundred feet.

We may know it is a silo defense. It is not clear that if the Soviets deployed it and announced it was a silo defense, we would say, "Oh, that's all right, it's just a silo defense, it is no problem, we don't need to increase the offensive force."

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Mr. Slocombe.

Senator Biden.

Senator **Biden**. I would yield to those who were here earlier, but I do want to ask some questions.

The **Chairman**. Very well.

Senator Cranston.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your courtesy and I am delighted to have a chance to listen to the testimony.

I have great respect for the members of this panel and their long experience and wisdom in these matters.

Secretary Weinberger was before us recently, and I asked him if the Soviet response to a prospective SDI would not be to resist any proposals to reduce offensive missiles and would instead be to want more in order to saturate, overwhelm, and penetrate an SDI. He stated, frankly in a way that I did not follow, that this is totally different from ABM, where that would be the logical response; that that would not be the logical response to SDI. Perhaps he was suggesting that it would be so close to 100 percent effective that saturation would just be fruitless.

But I do not believe his reasoning was sound. I am going to try to find out more about his reasoning on that subject.

Can you shed any light on any difference in that respect between an ABM and an SDI?

General SCOWCROFT. I think the administration's view on this, as I understand it, is that with the deployment of an SDI, a number of Soviet offensive systems would be intercepted. The value of those systems, therefore, would decline, the costs would go up, and it would be unremunerative for them to pursue increasing offensive forces.

Now that is a position one can take, but it seems to me, that, aside from cost exchange notions, there is one very fundamental notion and that is that each side must maintain the ability to penetrate defenses. That is not a cost equation, because if you cannot penetrate the defenses effectively, your forces are impotent.

So, regardless of cost, it seems to me the Soviets, or the United States, if the positions were reversed, has to maintain that capability come what may.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The beauty of the SDI being so undefined is, asked a question like you asked, you can assume any desirable characteristics of the system, then say that the characteristics of the system that you have invented are such that it is not fruitful to try to overwhelm it. If you assume it is a boost phase system and it's very effective, then it's not a very good way to beat the boost phase system to just proliferate boosters. There may be other effective ways to do it.

I think a good way to ask that question is to ask Secretary Weinberger if the Soviets develop such a system, how much would you recommend we cut back our offensive forces in response.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. As a matter of fact, there is a direct point of relevance here, Senator Cranston. The Soviets, as we know, have an extended air defense system, and when we attempt to make calculations of tradeoffs between bombers and missiles, we insist that the Soviet Union give us a special concession on bombers, as it were, because of their strategic defenses, that we should have a larger bomber force, relatively speaking, in order to penetrate that defense, and that would apply here.

I was at Rand in the 1960's, Senator, and we were contemplating 50,000 reentry vehicles in order to overcome any number of Soviet interceptors that might be deployed. I do not expect the Soviet Union to be less offense-conservative than Secretary McNamara was in the 1960's. That is not the Soviet style. And Secretary McNamara tended to be prudent about arms issues.

Mr. Slocombe earlier made comments on how defenses will look better before being attacked than after. I would also say that defenses look better on paper before they are deployed than after they are actually deployed, and that the assumptions on cost exchange ratios, referred to by both General Scowcroft and Mr. Slocombe, are merely assumptions.

If the cost exchange ratios have not improved dramatically since the 1970's, then defenses make no sense. Therefore, one has to assume that they have improved dramatically.

Mr. **Slocombe**. May I add one other point?

So that this does not turn into just a general beating up on the Reagan administration, I think you have to take the Soviet argument, that until the United States utterly abandons the SDI, we should not be expected to negotiate about offensive limits, with many, many grains of salt.

First of all, those of us who are opposed to the SDI stress that it will be a long time before you can make decisions. That means it is going to be a lot longer before the Soviets have to make any decisions about responses. These offensive forces really are in the here and now. There are lots of things that could be done to limit and reduce offensive forces in the context of some kind of constraints on ABM development, which supposedly already exist and need to be defined and clarified without now each side permanently and forever deciding on the exact balance of offensive and defensive forces in their posture well out into the next century.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you very much.

Jim, in the final sentence of your general ad libbed opening statement, you said that you felt that SDI would anchor us more firmly than ever into assured destruction if we proceed with it. Is that because of the increasing number of offensive weapons that would be probably created on both sides?

Mr. **Schlesinger**. Mr. Slocombe covered this I thought very eloquently in his statement.

If the Soviet Union deploys a defense, then the United States is denied the possibility of selective intrusion into the Soviet area, and, consequently, the only nuclear attack with which we could respond would be a major nuclear attack, driving us to that level of assured destruction, and, incidentally, weakening deterrence, for the reasons that Mr. Slocombe mentioned.

Senator **Cranston**. If we persist with plans for not only researching but testing and deploying SDI, isn't it very unlikely there can be any agreement reached with the Soviets on a 50-percent cut or any other kind of cut in offensive weapons at the summit or any other place?

Mr. **Schlesinger**. With the qualifications that Mr. Slocombe has indicated, that there is some room, the psychology would be very much against agreement and the Soviet statements to this point have underscored the fact that there must be some constraint—not on research but on testing and deployment of SDI—if they are to proceed with a major cut.

Senator **Cranston**. Since the President's statements at the U.N. and elsewhere, and the general statements about SDI always mention only its capacities, its hoped-for capacities, to deal with ballistic missiles, does it not lead to grave dangers of an escalation and continuing vulnerability to cruise missiles, bombers, ships, with nuclear weaponry?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. If the Soviet Union is offense-conservative and if they believe that strategic defenses work, they must turn to the air breathing vehicles that you mention. This would have the advantage, as supporters of SDI will point out, that it reduces the prompt counterforce capability of the Soviet Union. But I am not sure that the psychology of the American public will be much improved if we have 400 or 500 Soviet submarines with cruise missiles off our shores. I think that this might add to the political tensions, which would be an offset to the reduction of the prompt counterforce capabilities of the Soviets.

Senator CRANSTON. Secretary Weinberger replied to a similar question I put to him by saying "well, we have to perfect and develop our defenses against ballistic missiles and bombers".

Isn't it very unlikely that we can create a reliable defense against all of these different offensive capacities that the Soviet Union has or will develop without also entailing great, great cost?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The best answer to that is we have a real world, living, example of a super power that has spent literally 100 billion dollars trying to make an air defense. That is the Soviet Union and the air defense is essentially no good.

Senator CRANSTON. I have one last question.

Do any of you have any comments to make on the seeming consequences of the Gramm-Rudman approach to defense?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The presidential candidate that I supported last year was committed to real increases in the defense budget. I believe it is important that there be real increases in the defense budget. The presidential candidate that I supported last year recognized that you had to raise taxes to do it. I understand why that is not a very popular approach, especially given what happened to the presidential candidate that I supported last year. [Laughter.]

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, arbitrary, automatic cuts in expenditures will impact seriously the Department of Defense. There is no alternative.

General Scowcroft indicated that we could expect, at best, flat budgets in the outyears. The effect of that automatic approach without tax increases will be a steady erosion of real defense spending.

Senator CRANSTON. Brent, you stressed the need to maintain our conventional military capabilities. The concern many of us have is that what we wind up with is that nuclear capacities may not be cut that much, but that conventional readiness—ammunition, personnel and so forth—will be deeply cut.

General SCOWCROFT. What I am suggesting, Senator, is that the problem may get worse. If, in fact, we focus on strategic defenses, weaken our offensive forces, as perhaps this Midgetman proposal give-up indicates, then we have lost all of our historic capability to use nuclear weapons in place of conventional forces. So their role goes up at the very time that expenditure on them perforce will decrease.

Senator CRANSTON. I thank each of you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cranston.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If at some point we recognize that the SDI umbrella is not going to be feasible and decide to change the orientation of the program, are the technologies that we are currently developing capable of being changed to be more adaptable to protect the missile silos and command centers? Are those technologies at this point useful to us for a different orientation?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think, Senator Kassebaum, that they are, indeed, useful, and I think that the actual program is directed more toward what we can do than the esoterica, as it were, of space capabilities.

The public discourse has been quite different from the budgetary outlays, and therefore the program is reasonably well balanced in regard to the issue that you have raised.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I don't know that the public really understands it at all. It is hard enough for those who try very hard to understand it.

I think Mr. Slocombe touched on that, certainly in his written comments, on the political side of it, it being so very popular to believe that we could have a system that would essentially eliminate nuclear weapons.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. With great respect, Senator, the reason that the public debate is confused is that people are trying to confuse it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, not intentionally.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. When the President of the United States talks about the objective of the program being to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, it is hardly surprising that a lot of people assume that that is what the program is supposed to do. Now, when the people who are actually working on the program come up here, I am sure they say we understand all those problems, and now we are telling you about how we are going to make the Soviet attack more complicated and expensive, not make it impossible.

If the American public got the message that whatever else comes out of this program, it is not going to be an invisible plastic shield that protects Americans in their homes from nuclear attack, the political popularity of this program would plummit.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But I think, again, it is a defensive concept that people relate to, and I guess this is what I was trying to get at. At some point, can we recognize—and I think we will recognize—either that the cost effectiveness is going to be a problem and it is not going to be able to do what in the best of all worlds we would hope, and can we change and utilize those technologies in a defensive system that would be practical for a defense of the silos or centers?

General SCOWCROFT. Senator, I am probably the most sympathetic to the SDI program of the panel here, and without reference to all the varieties of SDI that there are, I think we need to recognize that if we could wave a wand and reconstitute the strategic forces on each side so that they had small, relatively weak offensive forces and very strong strategic defenses, that would be a very stable balance.

One of the real questions is is there any way to get from here to there.

Now, I am very dubious that there is. But it seems to me that one has to look at that aspect and not simply redirecting necessarily the technical goals of SDI. I think there is pursuit of all of them, and I think we do not know yet enough about what kind of SDI would make most sense and, therefore, which ones of the technologies would be the most advantageous.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Do you feel, General Scowcroft, that if we limit the mobile missile program, this makes then the deployment and development of a strategic defense mechanism that much more important for ICBM vulnerability?

General **Scowcroft**. Yes; I think it does.

As Mr. Slocombe said, there are a variety of ways to increase survivability of the missiles. Active defense is clearly one of them. But so is mobility, deception, and so on.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Well, when you speak about active defense—and I was going to ask Mr. Slocombe, because you touched on alternatives, but really have not spelled some of those out—what exactly do you mean?

General **Scowcroft**. What I mean is defending ICBM's or bombers through the deployment of defenses which would destroy incoming missiles. It could be designed to protect silos or even mobile missiles. That is a perfectly rational thing to want to do—clearly stabilizing. The question then is one of cost. Is that the best way to accomplish what is clearly a worthwhile goal?

Senator **Kassebaum**. What other alternatives did you have in mind, Mr. Slocombe?

Mr. **Slocombe**. Well, there are a variety of ways you can do the job. One is to make the missile mobile. The other is a special way to make the missile mobile, which is deceptive basing.

Another is a very special way of making the missile mobile, and it is putting it into a submarine. D-5 is essentially a mini-MX with all the hard target capability of an MX but in a submarine, and therefore mobile.

There is also the argument, which I do not personally favor but which people talk about, of relying on cruise missiles on bombers, which are highly accurate to be able to carry out the hard target mission.

The problem, Senator, is that these are very traditional debates. These issues have been around for a long, long time, and the fact that you can, in some sense, use interceptor missiles—which is what I mean by active defense—to carry it out is not news, and it does not prove you necessarily should do it. You have to look very hard headedly at what the costs are, what the vulnerabilities are.

There is another point. Sometimes it is argued that everything done in SDI would be good for silo defense because it will attack missiles, which may be attacking the silos. If people are saying that say, a space-based system, which will attack the Soviet missiles while they are still in boost phase, would be good for silo defense, could get about 70 percent of the attackers, and then 70 percent, would be killed by subsequent layers of the defenses and so on, that is the kind of system which I think very much has to be looked at very carefully from the point of view of its stability effect. This is because the interceptor, the SDI system, does not know necessarily what are the targets of the missiles it is shooting down.

To be sure, other kinds of silo defenses could be designed to be really good only to defend a very localized area. I have the impression, although I am not an expert on the details, that in fact the money for the terminal defense, that is, defending only the missile field, has been cut back a good deal in the interest of exploring more ambitious technologies.

Senator KASSEBAUM. At what point do you, in a rough estimate, believe we would be able to continue the research that we are doing and not be in collision with the ABM Treaty?

I have heard that many believe it is at least 3 years. Secretary Weinberger the other day said indeed it was much sooner and it was one reason that there evidently has been some questioning on reinterpreting the ABM Treaty.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think that Secretary Weinberger is correct. If one looks literally at the words of the treaty, they preclude testing in any mode other than a firm, stationary, ground-based mode. It precludes testing for a space-based system, for a mobile ground system, for an air-borne system.

If those words are taken literally—and I am not sure whether we will or not—then there would be an early preclusion of testing in the preferred media.

This is, I think, what lies behind the recent attempts to reinterpret the words of the ABM Treaty. But we have had another approach, which is to redefine the meaning of the words, and that preceded the attempts to redefine the treaty as a whole.

General SCOWCROFT. I think it is difficult to put a precise time on it because there is a lot of flexibility in when you decide to test certain components.

If you are interested in preserving the treaty as long as possible, you adjust your program so that you delay tests as far as possible. If you have the contrary interest, then you accelerate the need for testing.

So I would guess that there is not a precise answer to your question.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, more importantly—and I may be out of time—does the ABM Treaty still continue to serve our interests? Should we be looking at a redefinition that better fits the technology of the age that we are in?

General SCOWCROFT. I would certainly have no problem discussing with the Soviets the ABM Treaty and some of the loopholes or ambiguities, if you will, which have appeared now which were not apparent before. But I believe at the present time it clearly serves our interests.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. There is one other point, if I may add it, Mr. Chairman. The technology for antisatellite systems is inherently similar to the technology for strategic defense. We can proceed with technologies that can be useful for strategic defense and say that they are for antisatellite purposes; and as a consequence, we may shift back and forth as a way of making acceptable testing which, if admitted to be for strategic defense, would be contrary to the treaty.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I will yield to Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. What about Senator Sarbanes?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, let me ask Senator Sarbanes, and I apologize to Senator Sarbanes for not seeing him originally.

Senator BIDEN. Well, he came in after me.

Why don't I just go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen, you have discussed the administration's proposal to ban mobile missiles which some might say could strike an objective observer as not only unsound strategically but somewhat hypocritical when assessed, as an arms control proposal I think must be assessed, against the standard of how the proposal would affect the security of both sides.

Now, throughout the entire SALT II debate, which I remember vividly, the dominant complaint by the critics was that SALT II left us with a "window of vulnerability," and because the treaty did not solve the problem of our ICBM silos, we could at least theoretically be subject to a preemptive strike by the Soviet Union—I might add an argument I did not accept, for reasons I will not go into at this moment.

To answer this problem, however, reasonable recommendations have been made, assuming you buy the argument that one-fourth of our force is subject—which it will be—to a first strike within a certain timeframe, and that, in turn, requires certain actions. One of the reasonable answers, General Scowcroft, came from your Commission, which was the Midgetman. Secretary Slocombe in the past has argued the racetrack mode to deal with the vulnerability problem.

Now, however, it seems to me an objective observer might be able to suggest that we have come full circle as a Nation. We face a situation where, with our forthcoming deployment of 5,000 silo-busting Trident II missiles—and I believe that number is correct—we are going to render vulnerable the entire Soviet ICBM force which sits in the ground, in silos, which constitutes a significant portion, a much more significant portion of their total nuclear force than our land based system does, and which simply constitutes the predominance of their deterrent, their nuclear deterrent. And, as they are now beginning to take steps to escape from this vulnerability by deploying SS-24's and SS-25's, we now say, as a Nation, no don't go mobile. In effect, we are asking them to sit still while we subject them to a real, and permanent, window of vulnerability, that same vulnerability that everybody talked about the necessity of closing here.

Now, our proposal, it seems an objective observer might be able to say, may even violate our long-standing philosophy, and I suspect might convey an impression of hypocrisy, and I think helps to confirm the widespread belief—well, my belief; I think it is widespread, but it may not be—my belief that this administration is not serious about arms control.

Secretary Shultz just returned from Moscow, stating his surprise that the Soviets did not understand us.

My question is how are they supposed to understand the proposal that we put forward? Forget SDI, now. It is that we are going to deploy, which I support, 5,000 nuclear warheads on the backs of submarines, all of which have a capacity, theoretically, to be silo-busters, and they have somewhere around 70 percent of their total nuclear force in those silos. And now, when they say they want to go mobile, like we said we wanted to go mobile, we say they are being unreasonable in not understanding that that is not an option that should be available to them as we sit down to negotiate.

Isn't that asking a little bit to much? I would just like you to comment on that, any and all of you, if you would.

General SCOWCROFT. Senator, the United States has gone back and forth on the desirability of mobility several times over the course of arms control.

Senator BIDEN. But, excuse me, General. Has it gone back and forth at all in the last 6 years, since the debate was engaged?

General SCOWCROFT. There was a debate in SALT II on whether or not we still ought to ban mobility. That is the last that I remember.

Senator BIDEN. Right.

General SCOWCROFT. Certainly the MX Commission did come out and say mobility is a major step toward survivability.

In that sense, I think you can say we ought to welcome the Soviet move because if, as we have frequently feared, the Soviets have a first strike mentality, you don't build mobile forces for a first strike. They are very expensive, much more so than other forces, and much more complicated for targeting, so on and so forth, to get accuracy.

So I think it ought to be, in a sense, a good move.

It seems to me our emphasis here is, first of all, a worry about verification, which is a real problem with mobile systems——

Senator BIDEN. Agreed.

General SCOWCROFT [continuing]. But I think we may be overdoing it. I think if we extend our ingenuity, I am not sure we cannot do more than we have. Also I think it reflects an intent to rely on SDI to defend our ICBM's and, therefore, we don't need the mobility.

Let me make just one brief comment about the D-5.

Senator BIDEN. Let me make sure I understand. In fact, we are de facto increasing our mobility. We are drastically increasing our mobility by having 5,000 D-5's—I mean, 5,000 warheads. They are the ultimate mobile weapon that we have, aren't they?

General SCOWCROFT. I would like to suggest that they are not the ultimate mobile weapon as, if you will, a war-fighting weapon, if I may use that term.

Our SLBM force up to now has been the last resort force—the assured destruction force, the secure reserve, if you will. If you move them up to replace the ICBM's in the war-fighting mode, you greatly increase the requirements for two-way communications. You have to know what the status is, you have to know what the target is, and so on.

Senator BIDEN. General, I agree that is the case from our perspective. But from the Soviet perspective, that is the least of their worries right now, isn't it?

General Scowcroft. No, I don't think it is. I think you have to question whether or not the D-5 can ever be an adequate replacement for an ICBM force in that kind of role.

Mr. Schlesinger. Senator, let me make three brief comments.

First, you raise the question of hypocrisy. I don't think that it is hypocrisy, and that is, of course, a strong term. But there is a rich irony, as it were, in the fact that the United States, for a decade or more, through at least four administrations, has been worried about the large, fixed site, accurate, ICBM of the Soviet Union.

Senator Biden. And now they want it kept.

Mr. Schlesinger. And now we say that if they move toward an alternative, that, for some other reason, is more threatening.

That, indeed, is ironical.

Senator Biden. It's not only ironical.

Would a reasonable man not conclude that it is just possible you are not serious when you eliminate any option. You say on the one hand, you beat them to death, that they have these big missiles sitting in the ground, and now they move from that or they talk about it, and you say no, wait, you cannot do that either.

Mr. Schlesinger. The logic is clear, but the diplomatic hassling is somewhat different. The Soviets may conclude that we are very serious because we are bargaining so hard.

Senator Biden. I am hopeful that that is the case, by the way.

Mr. Schlesinger. Now, it should be pointed out that the accuracy of the D-5 depends upon satellites, and not only are we providing an incentive to the Soviet Union to improve their antisatellite capabilities, but, according to our latest proposal, we are going to have cooperative development in the laboratories of both countries to assure that the Soviets are abreast of American technology, if they have fallen behind.

That strikes me as unwise, if, indeed, we are to have our counterforce capabilities dependent upon those forces.

Now, turning the other way, the Soviets are the ones who have initiated this vast development of counterforce capabilities against the protests of the United States, and the Soviets have seen, for a decade or more, the United States with a good deal of restraint moving toward a comparable counterforce capability. The Soviets have a simple solution.

They can bargain at the table to hold the American counterforce capability down if they are prepared to sacrifice their own counterforce capabilities.

Senator Biden. Right.

Mr. Schlesinger. Therefore, the Soviet reaction, if they are reasonable men, should be the last.

Mr. Slocombe. May I make two observations?

One is that I find it interesting that the proposal to ban mobiles is also linked with a proposal to cut sharply back on cruise missiles. Those are two programs that have never been wildly popular in some circles in this administration and in the Pentagon, and I suspect that in the need to get a proposal out, that may have been one of the reasons they were put into the proposal.

On the other hand, we are very much in a negotiation with the Russians, or at least I hope we are. You asked whether the Russians will think we are serious if we put kind of dubious proposals, or proposals, let's say, that we are unlikely to insist on.

Senator **Biden**. I should have rephrased it. If, in fact, we come back without an agreement, having insisted upon the things we now state, would it not be?

Mr. **Slocombe**. But, Senator, that is a very different question.

Senator **Biden**. Well, that is the question I meant to ask, so address yourself to that one.

Mr. **Slocombe**. I do not think we ought to and I do not think we will make it a condition of agreement that the Soviets agree to prohibit mobiles.

If you look at the Soviet proposal, which counts F-4's as the equivalent of SS-18's and so on, putting kind of funny things into an early position is not necessarily a sign of seriousness or lack of it.

Mr. **Schlesinger**. Nor are the Soviets in a position to make an invidious distinction with the United States with regard to putting forward such proposals.

Senator **Biden**. I sincerely believe that this President is best situated of any President in modern history to be able to come forward or come back with a significant, meaningful, and long-lasting approach to arms control that could do more to possibly impact on humanity than any President has been.

I am hopeful that he is as sharp a bargainer and as skillful as he has been domestically. I believe that to be the case. I sincerely hope that is the case.

I am an optimist by nature, and that is an occupational requirement. But if I am wrong, we are in deep trouble.

Thank you very much.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Mathias.

Senator **Mathias**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Slocombe, in San Francisco, in the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, you said that the task is somehow to figure out how to preserve deterrence, to which there is not and for all practical purposes never is going to be a practical alternative, while coping with the fact that the President of the United States and probably large parts of the American and European public will want to continue to hope that there will be a technical fix to the nuclear problem.

Now, I agree with that statement. But, nonetheless, there is still a tendency on the part of a great many people in the world, not just in Washington, to want to debate the morality of deterrence and to raise questions about the morality. I am not sure that morality is the appropriate context in which to talk about this subject in the first place.

Really, my question to you, Mr. Slocombe, and also to Secretary Schlesinger and General Scowcroft is what should be our posture with respect to deterrence?

Mr. **Slocombe**. That, especially since you have raised the moral issue, is a very large question.

Senator **Mathias**. Oh, I did not raise the moral issue.

Mr. **Slocombe**. But you mentioned it as an issue.

I think you cannot distinguish the morality of deterrence by threat from what it is we are trying to protect.

This is not a conflict between two disembodied superpowers that are factors in a computer. I think it is legitimate to use threats of military force and even threats of massive retaliation against the society of the other side as a way of defending ourselves from very real threats by that other side.

It sounds simple-minded, but if they want to avoid the threat, all they have to do is avoid the attacks on us.

The problem, it seems to me, is that nobody likes the idea—nobody, not just President Reagan—nobody likes the idea that people have learned how to make nuclear weapons without having learned how to solve their international problems first.

That is an awful fact, but I just think it is a fact that we are never going to get out of. We know how to make nuclear weapons, and we are going to have to find a way to manage our relationships and also to manage our military forces. This is like telling people any other unpleasant fact. It will not go away.

I did not say in San Francisco but I should say here, that it is not just people who support SDI who dream about miracle fixes for the nuclear problem. Those who dream about technical fixes tend to be mostly on the right. The people mostly on the left tend to dream that if we just show a little more good will or invent some new freeze proposal or new arms control proposal, or realize the Russians must be misunderstood, we will solve the problem. I think that is, if anything, less realistic than the hope of a technological fix. We live in a very difficult world, one of whose difficult features is that we are going to have to live with nuclear weapons essentially forever.

Senator **Mathias**. It does not get any less difficult because you do not face the realities of the time.

Mr. **Slocombe**. No; you are just kidding yourself.

Mr. **Schlesinger**. Senator Mathias, there is no alternative in the foreseeable future to deterrence, to nuclear deterrence, to the threat of the employment of nuclear weapons against a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union.

The survival of the West, of the freedoms of the West, more notably in Western Europe than here, have depended upon nuclear deterrence, as the Europeans are keenly aware. And the survival of the West strikes me as quite moral, for reasons referred to by Mr. Slocombe.

The United States chose in the 1950's to abandon the Lisbon force goals and to move toward a posture of nuclear deterrence which has provided us protection now for better than 30 years. For the United States to discover at this late date that nuclear deterrence is immoral strikes me as hysterically ironical.

Mr. Slocombe referred to different views of these matters. I think there is an advantage, in a sense, that the President has stolen the clothes of the Catholic bishops and that many of the proposals on the left have attritted in the course of the period since the SDI was proposed by the President. But stealing the clothes of the critics of deterrence does not strike me as the same as providing an alternative.

General SCOWCROFT. Senator, I agree with the comments of my colleagues, and would just add one point. I think that casting doubt on the morality of deterrence, while tactically a clever move to steal the thunder from the left, to me is immensely dangerous, because it plays into the hands of an uncertain future. If, for example, SDI proves, even to its advocates, not to be able to do the kinds of things that are proposed for it, then we, in fact, have created a monster by undermining the concept which, however undesirable, is the only one we have.

Senator MATHIAS. Having branded ourselves as immoral, then we have no course but to trod the path of immorality.

Well, carrying that one step further, it has been claimed for SDI that even an imperfect strategic defense would enhance our own security by increasing Soviet uncertainty of a successful first strike. Isn't it logical that if we drive the Soviet Union to a comparable technological level of defensive systems, it would increase the likelihood that they would survive a retaliatory strike, assuming we would be able to deliver one, and that that undermines the same theory of deterrence and the stability, such stability, as we have?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The commonest error in this business is the fallacy of the last move. Obviously if we had defenses and the Russians did not, we would probably be better off, though one could think of exceptions even to that proposition. But, in general, that is certainly true.

Senator MATHIAS. Which, of course, is the root of their concern.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. But they already have a big defense. They spend more on star wars than we do. They don't have a big deployed defense, but they have a big program. They have a defensive tradition. We are right and they are wrong—but they are much more willing than we are to invest in defenses that do not work.

So the idea that we will get unilateral advantage, that we will maintain some permanent technological lead over the Russians, that they won't adopt countermeasures, whether those countermeasures are increasing the size of their force or for other kinds of countermeasures—there are many more complicated and subtle ones—is just naive. We have to look at a defense heavier world on the assumption that both sides have defenses, not just that the United States has them.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator Mathias, uncertainty cuts both ways. I have always envied those who are able to predict precisely the impact of uncertainty. It is true, as indicated, that if one increases the uncertainties associated with a preemptive Soviet first strike, the Soviets would be less likely to indulge in such a first strike. That is, however, not the only problem that we are dealing with.

There are other aspects as well. If the Soviets' uncertainty of being able to penetrate an American defense is increased, the natural Soviet response will be to expand their offensive forces in order to penetrate that defense, to which we would respond. In that respect, uncertainty would not be advantageous to a stable world.

Finally, all of these discussions, to which you refer, take place in an environment abstracted from budget impact. If we deploy a strategic defense, we are going to draw those resources away from our conventional capabilities, and the Soviets may have, under those circumstances, a higher degree of confidence or certainty that they can make moves elsewhere in the world and that the West would be unable to respond to them conventionally.

General SCOWCROFT. I think, Senator, even if one accepts uncritically the proposition that increasing uncertainty adds to deterrence and, more often than not, that is the case, one still has to examine the ancillary effects of using SDI for that, the costs, the other implications, against other ways to comparably increase deterrence.

An example would be to try to use arms control to deMIRV the forces, which would certainly add to stability and deterrence. That is only step one in deciding whether or not it makes sense.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Mathias.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. I want to pursue just briefly the points Senator Mathias raised.

Given the increases in the destructiveness of armaments, would not a conventional exchange be something of a magnitude that the world has not heretofore experienced?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Doesn't the nuclear deterrence serve not only to prevent a nuclear exchange, but to deter a conventional exchange of that order of magnitude?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is absolutely at the core of our national strategy that it should and that it does.

Senator SARBANES. How can a doctrine which causes anxiety and apprehension in lots of people, but which has nevertheless worked now for some 40 years to prevent not only a nuclear exchange but a major conventional exchange as well be termed immoral?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I don't believe it properly can be.

Senator SARBANES. What contribution then toward a realistic understanding on the part of peoples of the world is made by leaders terming that doctrine immoral, particularly when, as best I can perceive it, there is nothing to take its place?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think it is a fundamental mistake to preach that kind of illusion. That is quite distinct from whether you should do research on certain things, whether you want to take one position in arms control or another.

I think it is a fundamental error of statesmanship and leadership to preach the idea that there is going to be some technological fix to nuclear weapons.

One reason it is particularly wrong to do it is, as I am sure the committee knows from talking to General Abrahamson and other people who are working on the program, nobody who is working on the program is working on anything that they advertise is likely to achieve that result.

Senator SARBANES. Do the other panelists want to add anything in that regard?

General SCOWCROFT. I would just say, Senator, that I think there are two aspects to it. One is it is uncomfortable to rely on the rationality of leaders on both sides to prevent the kind of devastation that either side could make on 30 minutes notice. That is unique in world history.

Thus, the searching for something which is more satisfactory and more assuring that the world will continue is not remarkable.

I think that casting doubt on the morality of deterrence, however, is perhaps part of the tactical skillfulness of the administration because it falls in I think with the idea that SDI kills weapons and not people and so on, and it is superficially very attractive.

But, as I suggested in response to Senator Mathias, it could be terribly dangerous if, in fact, it does not work as advertised, and I think it probably will not.

Senator SARBANES. I would like to ask the panel, in broad outlines, would not an agreement, or the framework of an agreement, that, in fact, achieved significant reductions in offensive weaponry—recognizing all the problems we have now with respect to the base the Soviets want to rest that upon which is not acceptable—and included as part of the package a restraint on SDI, be an arrangement in our strong national interest?

General SCOWCROFT. Well, I will take a crack at that. That is very hard to answer in the abstract.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that. But assuming you could define the dimensions in each area in an acceptable way, would that not be a package that would be desirable?

General SCOWCROFT. From what I have seen of the proposals on both sides—and there may be aspects I have not seen—I'm not sure it would be because the kind of reductions I see go little toward increasing stability. Indeed, if one puts force structures to some of them, you end up with a higher ratio of warheads to launchers than we in fact have at the present time.

I do not consider that an advance.

Merely the reductions in numbers of warheads does virtually nothing toward advancing any worthwhile goal that I can see.

On the other hand, SDI, whatever one may think of it, could provide signficant bargaining leverage, either in actuality, by going ahead, or in terms of negotiating an arms control agreement. How much we will not know because I think we still do not have any real idea what the Soviets' true position is.

Senator SARBANES. Well, let me put the question to you this way, General.

Could you look at it and say there is a definition of restraint or reduction on offensive weaponry which, if achievable, is worth restraining SDI?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. There is no question about that. The genius of the SDI proposal is that it created considerable bargaining leverage for the United States which has the potential of bringing greater stability with regard to offensive forces. But in order to exploit that bargaining potential, one must be willing to negotiate.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I want to add the political perspective.

I think we are at an almost unique opportunity. We have an American administration that has 3 years left in office; that, as Senator Biden has said, should have somewhat less difficulty getting its arms control proposals ratified than its predecessor did, to put it mildly. We have a new Soviet leadership. To think that Mikhail Gorbachev, who got where he got by presiding over the triumphs of Soviet agriculture for the last 10 years, is some kind of closet liberal because he can stay awake and answer questions and his wife dresses nicely, is naive, but it is a new leadership that is going to be defining its way of wanting to deal with the West.

I think it is extremely important that the United States use this opportunity, and we will not be able to do that if we take as a given in our negotiating position that it cannot impact on SDI.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Do you believe that the various verification problems can be resolved?

Mr. **Slocombe**. Some of them can be.

I think it is certainly true that the Soviet conduct in the last 6 years on a variety of verification issues means that some of the issues we talked about in SALT II have to be looked at again.

There is a long list of real verification concerns that will have to be addressed in this negotiation that I am talking about. In some ways, the telemetry encryption problem, which gets rather less attention in public than some of the more dramatic things, may be the most serious. But I believe that the historic record is if the Soviets want to reach an agreement, they will be prepared to agree to verification measures that allow us to detect the violations.

One of the things which we have illustrated in the last 6 years is that in some ways it is easier to detect the violations than to know what to do about them after we have detected them.

So, if you want to, we can go through the issues in detail and Secretary Schlesinger in particular is an expert on the verification issues.

But I do not think verification poses an insuperable obstacle to the kind of reductions and the kind of targeted and patterned reductions that General Scowcroft talked about.

General **Scowcroft**. I would agree with that statement.

Senator **Sarbanes** It is asserted that the Soviets and in reality the Soviets have, in fact, engaged in a major program on SDI. My understanding is that that has differed in a significant way from what the administration is now talking about doing with respect to SDI. I wonder how that difference bears on reaching an arms agreement or an understanding, or how you would characterize that difference.

Mr. **Slocombe**. Well, personally, I think one of the reasons we ought to be interested in tightening the ABM Treaty is that not only does SDI give us some negotiating leverage, but we have some real reasons to be concerned about some of the things the Soviets are doing.

They are doing different things because their strategic interests are different. But I think it would clearly be in our interest to clamp down on some of the activities in the ballistic missile defense field that the Soviets have been engaged in in recent years. And that is one of the things we could do in the negotiations.

One should not think of tightening the ABM Treaty as simply a series of give ups by the United States. There are things that we could get out of that process as well in terms of its impact on the Soviet program.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much.

In following up one of Senator Kassebaum's questions, I think it is important that we work on definitions of what we are talking about.

Last week, Secretary Weinberger appeared here and in response to a question he said SDI weapons would be purely defensive. But, surely, a weapon that can destroy a missile within seconds after it is launched in a foreign country could be converted very quickly to offensive purposes.

Should we be talking about the SDI as a purely defensive system?

General **Scowcroft**. Well, there is some notion that one could use it for preboost phase attack. But I think that is rather more difficult, given the power required to penetrate silos and so on. At least in the initial phases, it seems to me it is by and large a defensive system, if you leave out the ASAT part of it.

Mr. **Schlesinger**. I think that question goes to the heart of the difficulty of the interactions between offense and defense. Indeed, it is, as defined, a defensive system, but it has, quite clearly, offensive implications.

When the Soviets introduced weapons into Cuba, there was an extended debate here in the United States about what constitutes an offensive as opposed to defensive weapon. At that time, our vision of that was somewhat different of the Soviets'. I would not be surprised if the Soviet definition in this area of the boundary line between offense and defense would diverge from ours also.

Mr. **Slocombe**. I agree.

I think the effort to define a platonic essence of offensive and defensive systems is a rhetorical exercise and not a strategic exercise.

Senator **Pressler**. Following up on Mr. Slocombe's comments on verification, I suppose that is the key, the heart of the issue of an arms control agreement. When you get into your automobile in the morning to drive to work, you do not have a way to totally verify that there won't be some accident, even if you drive very carefully.

When you get into an aircraft to fly, even if it is a 500-passenger jumbo jet flying under the safest conditions, there might be a crash. So it becomes a question of the degree of verification that is attainable.

What definable standard can there be, because you can never have pure verification?

Mr. **Schlesinger**. It is important to make two distinctions, Senator. The first is to distinguish between verification and compliance. As Mr. Slocombe has indicated, our ability to verify vastly exceeds our ability to compel compliance once we have detected a violation. We are very good at verification—very good.

Now that brings us to the second distinction. The ability to achieve compliance by the Soviet Union in minor respects is frequently cited as a deficiency in verification.

The Soviet Union must not only be able to violate the treaty in a gray area or more than a gray area, it must violate it sufficiently to be able to upset the strategic balance, and the Soviet Union is not in a position to do that, even though we may be unable to detect them in violations in small points and we may not be able to assure compliance even after verification.

General SCOWCROFT. I think Mr. Schlesinger has put his finger on the heart of it.

Verification is designed to prevent clandestine changes in the strategic balance, which could be very, very destabilizing.

There are two ways to do that. One is to increase our capability. The other is to try to design systems such that they would require more significant changes by the Soviet Union in order to produce a strategic change than the systems we have today.

The introduction of only a few highly MIRVd missiles makes quite a difference. If, for example, one has single warhead missiles, though, the numbers you would have to introduce in a clandestine way to make a difference are such that it would be almost impossible to do it in a clandestine fashion.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. If I may pick that up, that goes back to a question that was raised by the chairman. Obviously mobility reduces the assurance of verification. On the other hand, the move to mobility significantly reduces the counterforce capabilities on the other side.

So in that case, until the recent proposal by the administration, we have normally been prepared to pay some price in terms of the assurance of verification in order to reduce the magnitude of the threat against us.

Senator PRESSLER. The budgetary constraints we are facing will be an important factor in determining which of many new weapons or defensive systems we will be able to deploy in the decades ahead. Assuming that the SDI goes forward, if you had to rank in their order of importance to the United States the following systems, how would you rank them: the advanced technology bomber or additional B-1B bombers beyond the 100 now authorized; or additional strategic submarines; or small mobile single warhead ICBM's, that is, Midgetmen; or larger deployment of Peacekeeper MX missile; or the fast track research, development, testing, procurement and deployment of specific BMD systems? If you were forced to prioritize, how would you do it?

Maybe that is more of a question for the record than off the top of your heads.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think it would be premature to prioritize a capability that as yet has not been defined and is merely in the preliminary stages of research. One would have to define what that capability is, and we cannot do that at this time.

You did not include in your list preservation of conventional force deterrence, and I think one should not examine priorities in a strategic or nuclear context exclusively. That is a very high priority in terms of overall deterrence for the West.

Senator PRESSLER. That's right.

Yes, that should be in the list.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, at the risk of looking ridiculous, in order: submarines, advanced technology bombers——

Senator PRESSLER. Just a minute now. How would you do it? You would put submarines first?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, the survivable, penetrable things first. Submarines, the advanced technology bomber, and the Midgetman, because they are the most survivable. Then, and only then, more B-

1's, and finally more MX's, since I assume you mean more MX's in silos.

I agree with Secretary Schlesinger that you cannot talk about where deploying an SDI system would come in that list without knowing what it is. There are some I would put way, way down at the bottom and some that might be higher.

I would add another item to your list, which is what I would put at the very top of the list, which is more survivable and capable command and control, even strictly within the strategic context.

Senator PRESSLER. I am going to have to run and vote, so I will yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

There is a vote on.

Have all Senators who are here now voted?

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I see no Senators have voted.

Senator Dodd, do you want to start your questioning?

Senator DODD. How much time do we have left?

The CHAIRMAN. I think only about 5 minutes.

Senator Pell was coming back and will commence questioning in the event you do not wish to do so now.

Senator DODD. I would like to go to vote and I would also like to ask my questions.

Can the panel wait a few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. If the witnesses will wait, Senator Pell will reappear I am advised momentarily and commence his questioning.

We will recess for the moment.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator MATHIAS [presiding]. The committee will come to order.

Before I recognize Senator Pell, I would like to ask a question which will require a one-word answer.

If we are able to attain what Mr. Slocombe has called the technological fix, or, in the alternative, we were able to obtain an absolutely perfect, verifiable, leak-proof, arms control agreement, abolishing nuclear arms, would the defense budget go up or down.

General SCOWCROFT. Up.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Up.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Up.

Senator MATHIAS. I thought so.

Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I was very struck when a group of us were in Moscow a couple of months ago at the emphasis that Mr. Gorbachev placed upon the test ban. He made two points. He said that if you had a test ban, it would then mean that very few new nuclear weapons could be developed because in order to develop a new weapon system, you have to test it.

He also made the point that even with weapon systems in being, there has to be a systematic testing to them to make sure that they are still reliable, and, as the years go on, if you do not test, you would have an increasing sense of unreliability on your nuclear weapons.

That would mean, if the foregoing is correct, that in two, three, or four decades, if one adhered to no testing, we really might be quite a lot further down the road to a nonnuclear weapon world.

I am curious as to what your own views are, each of you, with regard to moving ahead with a flat test ban on nuclear tests.

First, General Scowcroft.

General SCOWCROFT. Senator, I think at this time I would not move ahead with a test ban. What I would do is move the Limited Test Ban Treaty for ratification, test the verification procedures—the Soviets have indicated that if we ratify, they will talk about further verification—and say that if, in fact, we can verify, we will continually lower the limits and hope eventually for a complete ban.

Theoretically, I am fairly relaxed about a ban on testing because I think our capabilities to simulate are infinitely better than those of the Soviets. For those reasons, I do not think it would have the effect that you think it would.

Senator PELL. When you say "simulate,"what do you mean by that?

General SCOWCROFT. Rather than exploding weapons in any environment, to simulate those explosions. We are increasingly capable of doing more with less actual testing.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I don't think General Scowcroft should be misunderstood. We will always need low-yield testing. We do not necessarily need to have a nuclear yield. But we are going to have to examine the explosive devices continuously that set off a nuclear yield.

Senator MATHIAS. Low yield, below the threshhold?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, below 150 KT, yes, indeed. You can go down to much lower yields and get good information.

I have not been an enthusiast either as Chairman of the AEC or as Secretary of Energy——

Senator PELL. Would you pull the microphone a little bit closer.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I am sorry.

I would correct Mr. Gorbachev. It is not necessary to test new nuclear weapons in order to develop new nuclear capabilities. You can use old weapons designs, and that would be what we would do and what they would do in a test ban environment.

Senator PELL. But with the passage of time, wouldn't the fact that they could not test except at this very low level produce an increasing unreliability or lack of confidence in the reliability of nuclear weapons?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. It would, and one of the concerns that I have—I differ slightly from General Scowcroft here—is our nuclear weapons are more complex than are the Soviet Union's weapons, and, therefore, it would weigh somewhat harder on us than on them in terms of technology, and also the United States and its allies are wholly dependent upon nuclear deterrence. If the unreliability of nuclear capabilities goes too far, we weaken our deterrent posture.

That does not argue, however, against some movement toward additional constraint on tests, Senator.

Senator PELL. What would be your view, Mr. Slocombe?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think the formula which General Scowcroft proposes, of gradually lowering the threshhold, testing out improved verification methods while we do that, is probably the best way to approach this very real concern of what it is not unfair to call the "nuclear Mafia" about the significance and the detectibility of very low nuclear yield tests, the degree to which you could do all the reliability work and, indeed, a lot of the development work, without actually having to have nuclear explosions.

There is, as I am sure you are familiar from years and years of this issue being debated, this concern that at very, very low yields, a few kilotons, we might not be able to detect Soviet tests, that we would not do the tests, and that those tests could be very significant, especially for reliability but also for development perhaps.

It seems to me the answer to those concerns, which are good faith and real concerns, especially from the people who are responsible for reliability and development, if the Soviets are as enthusiastic about a CTB as they say they are, is to go and propose an interim measure of reducing the threshhold drastically, getting the verification systems that they have already agreed to in place, and working on the verification requirements about which there is a fair amount of debate for a lower or zero threshhold.

Senator PELL. My recollection of the CTB discussions is that the Soviets did agree at that time to so-called black boxes and were even talking about on site, challenge inspection. Am I correct?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is accurate, yes.

Senator PELL. So that they might move along.

Now, again, in August of this year, the Soviets began a unilateral ban on nuclear testing and, without getting into a classified area, I believe it caused them a certain amount of pain. But they indicated they would extend their unilateral ban beyond the end of the year if the United States would join in. This would be a finite ban, subject to ending on both sides.

Would your feelings be the same there, or do you think it would be to our advantage, General Scowcroft, to move ahead down this path and leave the ban in being?

General SCOWCROFT. No, I do not.

I do not support the moratorium.

One of the problems is that United States and Soviet procurement cycles usually are out of phase, and whatever pain moratorium may cause the Soviets I suspect they calculate it would cost us seriously more in that we are now in a process of developing new warheads and they probably have finished theirs for the SS-24, SS-25, and others.

So I think it is not a serious and objective kind of proposal.

Senator PELL. So you would not favor a mutual moratorium of finite duration?

General SCOWCROFT. No.

Senator PELL. Dr. Schlesinger.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. In the abstract, without putting it into context, I would agree with General Scowcroft. In the particular circumstances in which the Soviets made this proposal, I think it might have been wise for the United States to accept a moratorium with a defined end in order not to be outdone by the Soviets in the political maneuvering in the run up to the summit.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I agree with Secretary Schlesinger.

Senator PELL. I guess what you all are saying is that you would favor the ratification of the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty. Am I correct in that? Would you favor the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty and the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty for ratification?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes: I would.

Senator PELL. And you would, too, would you not?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Yes.

Senator PELL. Mr. Slocombe.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator PELL. Going back to the point that General Scowcroft made, since our seismic verification has impressed us all in the way they have improved their sensitivity, to what degree, to what threshhold would you drop the 150 kilotons? Would you drop it to one kiloton, a half kiloton?

General SCOWCROFT. What I would do is to ratify the treaty, which is at 150, and then, by agreement with the Soviets make substantial lowerings of the threshhold, and where you would stop would depend on what kinds of increasing verification measures they would agree to.

I would not set a level at this point, but would agree to successive lowerings of the threshhold to the point that both are still comfortable.

Senator PELL. When it comes to verification, were we just as willing to accept on-site verification as the Soviets? Were we just as willing to accept the possibility of on-site verification as the Soviets?

General SCOWCROFT. Theoretically.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. More willing.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We have always kind of worried about the problem of suppose the Soviets announce that they have suspected a nuclear test had taken place under the NSA headquarters or something like that, and how to deal with that problem.

There must be some way to deal with that problem. But in general, the United States consistently has said that it would be in favor of compulsory on-site inspections. The so-called challenge inspection device was intended to be a way around the Soviet refusal to agree to it.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Thank you very much, indeed, gentlemen.

Senator MATHIAS. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. That's good timing.

Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me, if I can, ask a very naive question. Maybe you will think all of these questions are naive.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That's like someone just saying, "I'm just a simple country boy. " [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. Oh, no. Just wait till you hear the question.

Senator MATHIAS. Of course, very often that is the case. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. I know, and it may be in this one, too. [Laughter.]

Given the amount of time thought necessary, the amount of money which is estimated that it will cost, as well as the concern over whether it could ever work, are we running the risk of falling into the "Brer Rabbit" game with the Soviets? They are making such a big case out of SDI, saying how important it is that this be on the table in Geneva. At least this is what they appear to be doing.

Are we being drawn into that "don't throw me into the briar patch syndrome" by them, when there are many more important issues that ought to be resolved in the near future. Are we unwittingly putting too much emphasis on the SDI question prematurely?

There may be a better way of articulating this question, and, as I say, it may be terribly naive, but let me just ask that of all three of you, anyway, beginning with you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, if your question goes to the issue of have we prematurely and excessively focused on the SDI issue, the answer to that is yes. The United States, I believe, has invested more of its political capital, both in dealing with the Soviet Union and in dealing with its allies in the fostering as well as the preservation of SDI than is in our interest. There are other things that we want to do with our allies at the moment. We are devoting much of our time and energy to keeping rather unhappy allies vaguely on board the SDI issue, and at the same time, we are investing most of our capabilities with the Soviet Union in lecturing them on the advantages of strategic defense.

If this is all done as a preliminary to bargaining, and we are trying to extract a higher price, then it makes sense. If not, then I think we are wasting our political capital.

Senator DODD. I appreciate that, and I would ask both the general and you, Mr. Slocombe, to comment.

But first, let me take it a step further.

I realize none of you is in a position to know for sure, but is there any possibility that the Soviets are drawing us into this discussion and making it more of an issue than it should be as a means of complicating negotiations?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think there are two aspects to that.

One is there is a tendency to believe that we must have a lot of leverage out of this because the Russians say it is such an awful idea. Certainly the Russians are concerned about American technology and we do have a certain amount of leverage.

I think, far from being a naive question, it is a very central one. I hesitated in my statement to go into this because it seems to me speculative. But I think there are two things that the SDI Program offers for the Russians that we ought to be very suspicious of. One is that SDI is a wonderful stick to beat the Americans with. They can make the same arguments they make about any American program, but because it is so controversial in the West, those arguments resonate and get much more support. They can run around saying quite sensible things and people kind of have to agree with them—which is never a position we should want to be in and one which they find very attractive.

The second is if you look at it simply in a hard-headed way of what kinds of military missions is it likely that attainable technology can carry out with ballistic missile defense, most of those are missions which are much more important to the Russians than they are to us.

I sometimes think there is a conspiracy of the BMD nuts in both the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, to define the ABM Treaty out of existence.

The Russians have their own parts of it that they want to make dead letters: the people who want to do certain kinds of tests for SDI have certain parts they want to make dead letters.

We make a fundamental mistake if we assume that it is only the United States that could possibly benefit militarily from ballistic missile defense, and the Soviets may see an advantage in being able to go ahead with a limited ballistic missile defense of their own—quite different from what we are talking about—and blame it on the Americans, and say with crocodile tears how unfortunate it is that the Americans forced us into this deployment that we would rather not have done.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Did the Soviets draw us into it? No; we walked into it under our own power. But the Soviets are certainly not going to overlook an opportunity to exploit this area given the divisions between Western Europe and the United States.

I think that they would prefer to impede or constrain American technology, but they recognize if they fail to impede American technology, they have an offsetting and substantial political gain in the propaganda and political world of being able to divide and exploit differences between Europe and the United States.

General SCOWCROFT. I think that is their highest priority. I think that exceeds their interest in negotiations right now, in arms control, with the United States.

Europe remains the prize for them, and I think, as Mr. Slocombe said, SDI is a great stick with which to beat the United States. Soviet rhetoric certainly does not reflect their views about strategic defense, as my colleagues have stated earlier. They have put hundreds of billions of dollars into it in a way we have not.

It is interesting to note that before the President's speech, our greatest strategic fear was of a Soviet ABM breakout.

Senator DODD. You have raised a very interesting point as well, and, again, this may have been covered. If it has, indeed, already been covered, I apologize and will pick up the response later.

I have not seen anything, although I may have missed it, as to what we are saying about European strategic forces in the context of SDI. Is this umbrella going to be extended to them? Have the Europeans asked that they be involved in terms of their credibility, their strategic weapons, or their offensive weapons?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, we are very carefully avoiding and our allies are very carefully avoiding saying anything explicit about it. We are saying things implicitly about it.

The British and French, in particular, were quite disturbed by our initiatives in this direction. A deployment by the United States followed by a deployment by the Soviet Union would vitiate their investments in their independent nuclear capabilities.

Both Mr. Mitterrand and Mrs. Thatcher were, consequently, quite disturbed. President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher reached an agreement at Camp David, and that agreement states that we will support research in this area, but any deployment must be preceded by negotiations.

The European attitude basically has been they will support the United States in the SDI area if and only if this remains a research program.

Senator DODD. If it were what?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. If and only if this remains a research program. At the phase that it threatens deployment, all of the concerns, especially of the British and French, for their independent nuclear capabilities charge to the front.

Senator DODD. Mr. Slocombe.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. For the foreseeable future, the British and French must regard as appalling the idea of the United States allowing the Soviets to deploy a defense. It is a perfect example of a mission that the Soviets have that we do not have. We do not have any use for a defense against the British and French and Chinese forces. The Soviets have a very important use for such a defense.

It is a perfect example of a consequence to us of the Soviet defense that is not in our interest. The British and French I think must be appalled at the prospect.

Senator DODD. Not only that, but let me raise something else that you may or may not have touched on.

It would seem to me that even by the understanding on the research element of this, we have weakened our argument significantly on the whole question of linkage of limits on SDI to reductions in strategic missiles.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, we have gotten ourselves into a trap.

We say now that we are not going to deploy strategic defenses without prior negotiations. I think that, in likelihood, will preclude any deployment. So, by making the commitments to our allies, we have raised questions about the efficacy with which the money is spent on research and the capability for deployment

General SCOWCROFT. I agree.

Senator DODD. Do you agree with that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

It seems to me to be a particularly clear example of the failure to think through this two-sided thing. I think you were not here perhaps when Senator Kassebaum raised the question. If the United States has a defense and the Russians do not, that is no skin off the backs of the British, the French and the Chinese. The Soviets will not design a carbon copy of our defense. They will design even a limited defense, maybe even an agreed limited defense, to serve Soviet missions and not ours. One of those missions is dealing with third country forces.

Senator DODD. I see that my time has expired.

I apologize.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask just one quick question and if I can get a fairly quick answer to it, then I would like to move into a different direction.

Let me pick up on a question that Senator Lugar asked earlier about the point defense, protecting our silos. Is it not a fact that if we moved to a rationale where point defense was the fundamental reason we are pursuing SDI, because of the configuration of our forces versus Soviet forces, the Soviets close a larger window of vulnerability if they deploy a point defense than we do?

Is it not more to their advantage to have it than to ours?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think that there have been studies at the RAND Corp. that have demonstrated that as long as the Soviets have a great excess of throw-weight and offensive force capability, they can overwhelm an equal defense on the part of the United States more easily than we can overwhelm a Soviet defense of equal capability.

Senator KERRY. That leads me to a line of questioning which both Senator Mathias and Senator Sarbanes have already touched on. It is what these hearings are about and what is important about these hearings. We must go beyond "does it work," as a technical matter, beyond tiered levels and terminals and all of those things, and deal with the issue of deterrence and strategy.

Now I think I have heard all of you agree that we are not going to deploy this system without some kind of response from the Soviet Union which would escalate the arms race. Are we all agreed on that? We cannot unilaterally deploy this new system. Is that correct?

General SCOWCROFT. Well, I am not sure that deployment will depend on some Soviet developments, no.

Senator KERRY. What I am saying is if we proceed to deploy it without the Soviets agreeing to a negotiated transition, if we simply go ahead and do it because we think it is a good thing, as Secretary Weinberger, in fact, said right here, the Soviet Union must respond with escalation—correct?

General SCOWCROFT. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator KERRY. In order to achieve the alternative, mutual process of transition and of implementation, wouldn't we have to fundamentally alter the nature of our perceptions of one another as nations? And wouldn't we have to give up the security we have today of knowing that our safety does not depend on trusting the other side.

Let me be more precise.

The doctrine of flexible response is really a doctrine of uncertainty. What fundamentally keeps the peace today is the very truth that Winston Churchill talked about, about the sturdy stepchild of terror and the twin brother of annihilation.

We know that if we do something, they can do it back to us, and if they do something, vice versa. That is what keeps the peace today.

Now, I was a little disturbed in listening to you, Walt, when you said we don't know what Star Wars can produce. Let's make an assumption that it can produce the very best that science knows how to create: push a button and knock down any missile that comes at us. That is the best. Let us assume we can do that. It does not take care of cruise missiles; it does not take care of clandestine placing of nuclear weapons, it does not take care of terrorism, but we can knock down ICBM's. That is the best SDI is supposed to produce.

My question is this. Do we want it if it can do that? It seems to me that, even if it can do that, neither side can conceivably settle for anything less than a continued ability to penetrate, at the end of a process of mutual, agreed upon reductions. If we are going to wind up at the end of the system with some level of reasonably effective defense, we are still going to be left seeking the mutual capacity for penetration. And if we are left seeking the mutual capacity for penetration after this vast expenditure, after all is said and done, aren't we right where we are today?

General SCOWCROFT. I think it could be, Senator, but there may be one way out of it, and that is to look at a progressive and cooperative deployment, if you will, starting, perhaps, with active defense of missile fields on both sides, testing it, seeing whether both sides can have confidence that it is limited to that, and so on and so forth; and if that works, advance to another stage which might be a thin area defense designed to prevent accidents and third country launches—the "mad colonel syndrome;" moving then, if that proves out, into more comprehensive defenses, and then perhaps into offensive force reductions. But that is a long, slow task.

Senator KERRY. I am not sure that that avoids the dilemma that I am articulating.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, in all probability, if it is unnegotiated, you are correct—if such an agreement is unnegotiated. What General Scowcroft points to is that improvements in stability, whether they come about by arms control or by the introduction of ballistic missile defenses, must be through mutuality, and that we cannot achieve mutuality by unilateral actions on our own part.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I also think that that scenario, which is sometimes advocated, had no political reality. If the United States and the Soviet Union are able to agree on that kind of intricately detailed force structure planning for each other, they hardly need the forces, and they ought to spend their time otherwise. It assumes a political understanding. You have to imagine a fundamental revolution in the way the Soviet Union acts for that negotiation to go on.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Both sides may need the forces under those circumstances, but they can negotiate limits on offensive forces that would obviate the need for the strategic defense.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

To take the simplest example, if the two sides are capable of running this negotiation, rather than deploy your system that will knock down all ballistic missiles, why don't they just agree not to have ballistic missiles, since the outcomes are the same?

Senator KERRY. That comes back, I think, to the question. I understand what you are saying. It seems to me that you would all agree you cannot achieve a total neutralization. You are not going to have an SDI system where you both agree that you are both neutralized.

Therefore, if you cannot agree that you are both neutralized, you must seek an agreement as to what level of destructive ability you both have.

Now that is precisely what we are trying to do today, without SDI. My point is if we build SDI, we are left trying to negotiate the exact same relationship afterwards that we are trying to negotiate and are incapable of doing today.

Mr. **Schlesinger**. A similar relationship, but it may well make the task of negotiation harder.

General **Scowcroft**. Almost certainly.

Senator **Kerry**. I would like to have you both articulate that further, why it will be harder, because I agree, but I would like it for the record.

General **Scowcroft**. Thus far, our negotiations have been solely on offensive systems and solely on those parts of offensive systems that we thought we could negotiate. SALT I was much more modest than SALT II. As we learn, we can do more. But they are hardly comprehensive in the sense that introducing issues of strategic defense would make them. That is a quantum leap in complexity for a system which has moved at only a snails pace.

Mr. **Slocombe**. There is also the problem that the capability of a defensive system is not self-defining. The person who runs it, who knows its defects, who knows its problems will assess that capability differently from the person who has to break through it. That is going to make very different negotiations on anything other than the current regime essentially eliminating all but a very localized defense with what now seem essentially rudimentary systems. It is very, very difficult for the two sides even to agree that they have gone about this.

Senator **Kerry**. We talked a moment before about being a "simple country lawyer." I got a letter the other day from an 8-year-old in Massachusetts, who said: "Dear Senator Kerry, I'm 8 years old and I have a reason to not make the star wars plan. See the diagram." He drew a diagram showing the star wars, the United States, Russia, and the Earth, and down here [indicating] he has a laser proof missile, and he says the Russians will make laser proof missiles.

That is a very simple concept, obviously, but I would like to have you comment.

We are already designing counter systems to our own system. Now, 40 years of the arms race seem to have proven some truths if we draw any lessons from them, and I wanted to have you comment on this.

Mr. **Schlesinger**. Mr. Chairman, under these circumstances, countermeasures are inevitable. One must expect the Soviets to move in that direction.

Indeed, one must expect, if we were to deploy an ABM system based upon chemical lasers, that the first thing they would attempt to do would be to harden their missiles, and that will work against chemical lasers, which has led us to go to the next phase, which is, as opposed to chemical lasers, x-ray lasers as a more efficient way of killing Soviet missiles, and therefore we will have to move to a more efficient laser. But the countermeasures are inevitable. Soviet attempts at hardening, particularly if we start with chemical lasers, are unavoidable. They will not create a laser-proof missile, but they will reduce the kill capability of our defensive forces.

Mr. **Slocombe**. Your 8-year old is absolutely right. But one of the other things you can do is this. A lot of these space based systems in particular have immensely expensive, inherently quite vulnerable, components. Football field sized optically perfect mirrors at geosynchronous orbit make lovely targets. The countermeasures may not simply be either hardening the offensive force or adding to the offensive force but attacking the defensive system.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Let me reiterate that if we have open laboratories, we are providing the Soviets with our technology to go after those perfected missiles in geosynchronous orbit.

Senator KERRY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.

A vote is now on again. Let me just ask members of the committee whether they have additional questions. If so, we might continue until we get the buzzer half-way through the vote, and, if that would seem reasonable, we would terminate the agony for our witnesses, with our appreciation at that point.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I have three more questions and I shall submit them for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator PRESSLER. I want to say that this has been one of the finest panels and exchanges that I have seen in this committee for a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. No questions, but I concur with Senator Pressler's thoughts.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, since there are 2 or 3 minutes, I would like to pop one question to them. This is a very high-level panel and we want to get the maximum advantage.

What are the contours of an arms understanding that you think we should be seeking with the Soviets at this point? Assuming that you were defining the American position and playing the American cards, what are the contours of an arms understanding that you think might be achievable, and toward which we should be aiming?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think you hinted at it earlier. The fundamental nature of an arms control agreement in the 1980's is the same as in 1972, and more effectively than in 1972: Restraints on Soviet offensive forces in exchange for restraints on American strategic defense technology. This restraint must be such that it results in a higher level of stability than at the present time. The Soviets must accept a reduction in their real counterforce capabilities for an American willingness to substantially reduce the emphasis upon strategic defense, recognizing that the Soviets cannot be allowed to get away with the charade that they themselves have not been pursuing strategic defense vigorously, if not very effectively.

General SCOWCROFT. I would agree with the broad outlines of that. What we should be seeking is increased stability. I think one of the ways to do that is to seek from the Soviets significant reductions in their highly accurate, highly MIRV'ed systems, for which we ought to be willing to pay a price because it redounds to our benefit.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Push them toward smaller throw-weight, lower yields, less accurate weapons, like mobile missiles.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I agree with that: Reduce the RV's, but reducing RV's in and of itself does not get you much, though it reads well. You have to take account of the fact that there are differences in the kinds of weapons, try to favor mobile, survivable systems relative to high accuracy, vulnerable systems, favor bombers, cruise missiles—in some ways do just the opposite of the U.S. current proposal—favor bombers, cruise missiles, and mobile systems relative to the heavy throw-weight systems; and on the strategic defensive side recognize that we have some things to get out of that, too, put limits on the interface between sophisticated air defense and ballistic missile defense, on the radar support for a system, on the development of mobile or at least transportable ABM systems, maybe abolish the one system, and meanwhile accept limits ourselves which would impact the time in which we would be able to have a development decision on a ballistic missile defense program.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. I have just one quick thing to ask.

I think all of us on the committee, and I am sure all of you on the panel are agreed that as prudent people, we have to be researching at least adequately to prevent Soviet breakout and to protect the interests of this country. Would it be your perception that this need is, in fact, what is guiding the current expenditures of the Congress? If not, how do we get a better handle on what a commensurate level of spending would be with respect to Soviet efforts here?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. That is not amenable to a quick answer, Senator. That is a very complex question.

Our program is certainly not entirely guided by that because we are now indulging in the pursuit of esoteric developments that have a very high public appeal and demonstrations that are probably premature in terms of a longer range, carefully developed and hedged program. Consequently, I think that the budgetary use of the moneys appropriated by the Congress follows the rhetoric which is exaggerated to some extent.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. One of the things I think that the Congress ought to insist on is to recognize that being an enthusiast for the SDI has become a litmus test for being regarded as a loyal person in the administration. I mean, Paul Nitze is regarded as a little questionable on this issue in many circles.

This is a program which is in manifest danger of not being allowed to have any failures.

One of the things which is hardest, which you all know from any other Government program, is to get anybody inside the system to say it isn't working very well, the emperor has no clothes. It is extremely difficult to do, but it is especially difficult when there is such high-level political support requiring the success of the program.

I am pleased that the Chairman has held these hearings because it is critical that people who are not opponents of the administration on other things, who are strong advocates of defense, get recognized as still being able to ask questions.

One of the things which ought to be done is to have some way of forcing the administration to spend some money on figuring out how to beat its own program, red teaming the problem, if you will.

Senator KERRY. Thank you.

I hate to say more because we are getting pressed on this vote.

General **Scowcroft**. I think, Senator, just very briefly, we ought to go beyond the defensive purposes just to find out what the Soviets may know. We are at the threshold of SDI. We ought to explore the technology. There may be things we have not envisioned right now. So I think an aggressive program ought to be supported now, simply because we are still searching here for what it might do. But I would go beyond the defensive program.

Senator **Kerry**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

I thank each one of you.

It was a brilliant panel and we are indebted to you for a great record that I think will be of benefit to our colleagues.

Mr. **Schlesinger**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General **Scowcroft**. Thank you.

Mr. **Slocombe**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

NUCLEAR STRATEGY, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, AND ARMS CONTROL

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1985

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:39 a.m., in room S–116, the Capitol, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Kassebaum, Pell, Cranston, Dodd, and Kerry.

The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Today's hearing is the last in a three-part series devoted to the theme of nuclear strategy, ballistic missile defense, and arms control.

This hearing builds upon the discussion initiated by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger last month and furthered by our discussions last week with Brent Scowcroft, James Schlesinger, and Walter Slocombe, wherein the committee has sought a better understanding of what U.S. nuclear strategy is today, why it has not provided for a ballistic missile defense role in the past, and why the administration now proposes that it should.

The committee has focused its attention not so much on the question of whether the United States could build a BMD system but, rather, on the related question of why the United States should want to build such a system and how capable it would have to be.

In that regard, we have reviewed some of the key principles underlying our current nuclear strategy as well as some of the proposals for altering that strategy.

The committee has also reviewed the various levels of BMD capability that might be available to the United States and the Soviet Union and discussed the various ways in which such capabilities might serve various strategic goals.

Our hearing today seeks to explore some of the possible consequences that ballistic missile defense might have for crisis stability, for arms competition stability, for arms control.

Indeed, arms control has been one measure pursued by the United States to try to enhance crisis stability and arms competition stability.

The administration has emphasized the importance of negotiating with the Soviet Union about the transition to a strategic relationship in which ballistic missile defense plays a significant role.

In recent weeks, there has been considerable controversy over the potential effect of the strategic defense initiative upon the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. It has been generally agreed that the SDI, if carried forward to its fullest extent, would, at some point, run afoul of the ABM Treaty's restrictions unless the parties agree to modify the treaty or the United States were to withdraw from the treaty.

However, any testing and development which might be contrary to the treaty is still several years off.

Nonetheless, the administration concluded last month that a new study of the treaty justified the interpretation that "testing" and "development" of ABM's based upon "new physical principles" is "approved and authorized," rather than banned, by the treaty.

The administration further stated that the review of the negotiating record and the treaty indicates that the Soviet Union never agreed to ban the testing and development of ABM's based on new principles.

Subsequently, however, the administration announced that, while the new interpretation would stand as a matter of law, the more restrictive, traditional interpretation of the treaty would be retained as a matter of policy.

The committee has invited three witnesses this morning to explore with it the interrelationship between ballistic missile defense and force structure issues on the one hand and arms control and the ABM Treaty in particular on the other.

We have divided the witnesses into two panels. The first panel is composed of Ambassador Gerard Smith and Mr. John Rhinelander, major architects of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The committee will then call on Mr. Richard Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

Before calling upon Ambassador Smith and Mr. Rhinelander for their testimony, I would normally at this point ask Senator Pell if he had an opening statement. When Senator Pell appears, we will give him that opportunity. He is necessarily detained at the White House for an important meeting with the President this morning, and so are a number of other members of the committee—thus, the paucity of attendance at this point.

We will be having, from time to time, rollcall votes. This is a busy day in the life of the Senate as certain other matters proceed on the domestic agenda. So I will apologize in advance for all for the interruptions, but we will try to keep these to a minimum.

At this point, I would like to call upon Ambassador Smith and then Mr. Rhinelander for their testimony. If you would try to speak for 10 minutes or so in the beginning, we will have more time for questions as Senators come in, and I know they will want to raise questions with you.

Ambassador Smith.

STATEMENT OF HON. GERARD C. SMITH, PRESIDENT, THE CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.

Ambassador SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a brief statement about the effect of strategic arms control of current efforts to develop and deploy weapons to counter ballistic missiles.

I understand that John Rhinelander will address the meaning of the ABM Treaty's provisions constraining weapons technology based on new physical principles.

The treaty's preamble states "that effective measures to limit antiballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."

That proposition has been partially confirmed by the 1972 interim freeze on offensive weapons and the unratified, but still observed, SALT II Treaty of 1979. It is now being undermined by the administration's position that strategic arms control, far from being helped by limiting ABM systems, is hindered by those limitations and that going ahead with the development of ABM systems is the way to get radical reductions and even total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The question of whether that argument is valid or not is at the heart of the matter. Our country now is faced with a choice reflecting the two possible answers to that question: Should we try for agreed deep reductions in Soviet weapons that threaten us while honoring the limits on ABM's which we agreed to in 1972? Or, should we push on to develop weapons to counter those Soviet systems, even at the cost of losing a present chance to get them sharply reduced by treaty?

We claim that the apparent Soviet new interest in negotiating steep reductions in offensive arsenals is owing to our drive for new ABM weapons, but at the same time we are saying to the Soviets come back in 10 or 20 years when we perhaps may have developed them and we will be ready to negotiate.

The Soviets are now virtually defenseless in the face of our ballistic missiles. I think we should be trying to preserve that state of affairs by strengthening and not weakening the present ABM Treaty constraints. But administration policy wants to change all that. It is based on a hope and an expectation that the Soviets will themselves deploy weapon systems to render our ballistic missiles obsolete and impotent.

We even hear talk of helping the Soviets do just that by sharing our technology with them.

This strikes me as senseless. If both sides remain defenseless against ballistic missiles, I believe that future crises will be somewhat less likely to trigger nuclear hostilities than if one or both sides have weapons to counter such missiles. So-armed with both "swords and shields," a super power might, in extremis, resort to a trial by battle—the climax of crisis instability.

Short of such a horrible scenario would be an era when both sides, having failed to control their nuclear forces by cooperation, feel obliged to compete in efforts to escape the jam they now are in by building more and more efficient weapons—offensive and defensive. This present time may be our last clear chance to avoid such a new period of arms race instability.

It is already clear that not only actual deployment of ballistic missile defenses but even their development is having a prejudicial effect on arms control. Soviet and American moves to develop defenses are threatening the ABM Treaty, which one leading European statesman recently called the Magna Carta of arms control.

Although the administration claims that SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, is quite consistent with the treaty, General Abrahamson has admitted that we will have to depart from the treaty in about 5 years. The recent U.S. revision of the treaty's controls over futuristic technology suggests an awareness of this dilemma and foreshadows a more permissive standard for future treaty observance.

Our new legal view will make it harder to claim Soviet treaty violations.

Strategic defense work also threatens future as well as past arms controls. The Soviets have opposed SDI from the start and they show no sign of that cooperation to make it effective on which we are banking.

It was, I think, a major miscalculation to base future military strategy and weapons programs on the assumption that the Soviets would realize that the era of ballistic missiles was ending and that they had better join us in some sort of mutual security pact based on defense dominance. This novel concept involves a stage which is somewhat blandly called a "transition." Efforts to ascertain the architecture of this stage have been unsuccessful, except that we are told that it will be "tricky."

I think that the Congress has a valuable tool for considering this problem in the recent Office of Technology Assessment Report on BMD technology. I hope it will be given wide attention. It covers in some depth the arms control aspects of BMD.

On the question of the necessary transition to a situation where defenses dominate, it says, "The role of arms control under the SDI approach would be to facilitate a safe transition to a state of highly constrained offenses coupled with highly effective defenses. Such a transition agreement would have to be negotiated before actual deployments began. And it might need to take effect during the research and development stages in order to regulate offensive and defensive deployments. The negotiability of any such agreement," the OTA says, "is very much in question. Nobody has yet suggested how the problems of measuring, comparing, and monitoring disparate strategic forces—problems which have plagued past arms control negotiations—could be satisfactorily resolved in the far more difficult situation where both offensive and defensive forces must be included."

Far from being an incentive for reaching arms control agreements, our strategic defenses programs now appear to be the main obstacle to reducing offensive forces. While working on defenses, both sides, both super powers, are planning to deploy new types of offensive ballistic missiles with life expectancies going deep into the next century.

At the summit, we will be trying to control offensive arms while keeping open the option to decontrol defensive arms. I think that will prove to be impossible.

In short, I would conclude that ballistic missile defense efforts have been bad for past arms controls and even worse for the prospect of new controls.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it does much good to continue to belabor this issue of the treaty's new meaning. The die is cast for the present. The administration has made its judgment. There is no court of appeals—until and unless the executive branch takes action inconsistent with the understanding that the Senate had in 1972, as to the treaty's meaning, when it consented to ratification. Perhaps the spending of funds on a more permissive theory would raise a justiciable question.

Fortunately, the administration has taken course correction measures while the legal issue was still in boost phase. The job now for those who disagree with the new legal version is to try to keep it in its present aborted state while the earlier version survives in the form of the operational policy of the United States.

I suppose the life expectancy of this policy will depend, to some extent, on the outcome of the summit meeting and the views of Congress when the budget is revisited next year.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Smith.

Mr. Rhinelander, would you give your testimony.

STATEMENT OF JOHN B. RHINELANDER, PARTNER, LAW FIRM OF SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS, & TROWBRIDGE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. RHINELANDER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am delighted to be here. This is my first appearance before the committee. I have been in the room before and I am delighted to be with Gerry Smith, whom I admire greatly.

I have prepared a very long statement which I would simply request be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record in full.

Mr. RHINELANDER. I have an outline of five major points I would like to make. If members of the committee would like to ask questions while I am going through it, I would welcome that.

Basically, what I would like to cover briefly is what the treaty means as far as I am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rhinelander, let me suggest this.

We have just had the first of the anticipated stream of rollcall votes. It might be well for members who are here now to simply go up and vote and get it out of the way and then come down and hear your testimony, knowing that we then can hear it in its entirety.

So, with your permission, we will recess the committee for 5 minutes. Members will vote and hopefully will return.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order again, and we will proceed now with the testimony of Mr. Rhinelander.

Thank you for your patience. Please proceed.

Mr. RHINELANDER. Mr. Chairman, what I would propose to do is to cover the five points in my outline and if there are questions as we go through, I would welcome them at the time; or, if you or other members of the committee want to wait, that is fine with me also.

The CHAIRMAN. We will allow you to make your statement in its entirety and then will ask questions.

Mr. RHINELANDER. Thank you.

Let me first of all touch on what the ABM Treaty means with respect to the exotic or the futuristic systems.

Exhibit D to my statement is the pages from a book published in 1974. I wrote that chapter. In effect, it is the standard, unclassified reference in terms of what the ABM Treaty means.

In my statement, on pages 17 and 18, I describe the process where I prepared a series of memoranda on the ABM Treaty. They were 60 to 80 pages long, still classified, and that was shared with all members of the delegation. I think everybody agreed.

But this is the unclassified version. It has been available in the open literature since 1974.

In brief, with respect to the exotics or the future systems, which is the real issue today, research is not limited by the ABM Treaty. It is not even mentioned by the ABM Treaty. It was understood at the time that any limits on research would not be verifiable.

Now, it is important, and I will get to it in a moment, that the Russians and we differ in terms of approaching this. When we got into constraints, they were looking more at intent, but we said no, you had to look at capabilities because you could only monitor by national technical means capabilities. But research is not covered.

With respect to the fixed, land-based systems, development and testing of exotic systems, such as a land-based laser, in particular, which is what the Joint Chiefs were concerned about, is permitted at the ABM test ranges. The deployment is forbidden.

With respect to all other basing modes—land mobile, space, air—the ban is broader. It starts at the development stage, and includes testing and deployment.

With respect to the dividing line between research and development, the Soviets, throughout SALT I—and I think you can see echoes in it now in their current statements—have tended to focus on intent. I think one of their present statements is if research leads to a prohibited purpose, if the intent of it is to develop a space-based program, their current position is even the research is banned. They raised that during SALT I. Our position is clear. It is not prohibited because you cannot verify it. And the only things which are constrained by SALT I and SALT II have to be verifiable, of course.

The basic rule of SALT I was effectively in the laboratory is OK because research cannot be verified, but once it comes out, once it moves to the field testing stage, that is when the prohibition begins.

With respect to the other half of the equation—the issue is what is a component or what is a device that substitutes for a component—my recollection of the SALT I negotiations is that we did not get into that question with the Soviets, talking about future technology. That is a major open issue and one that has to be addressed at some point in time.

Now, my statement on pages 10 through 18 takes you through how we reached the agreements we reached at SALT I. I will not repeat them now, but I believe it is probably the first time it has been laid out chronologically in any public document.

If you wish to pursue the question of some of these interpretation questions which have come up, I would recommend that you do it in closed session and particularly with people formerly on the SALT talks who still have security clearances and get them into the record. I do not now have a clearance, and I want to make clear to members of the committee that I have not reviewed any classified documents since I left SALT in 1972.

What I would propose in this area in terms of the ABM Treaty is set forth in exhibit E. That is a paper that I wrote in July and I think revised in August. It has a series of recommendations in there. I think we need an antisatellite agreement. I would recommend four constructive amendments to the ABM Treaty. Very particularly, I would urge that we need a whole series of agreed statements and common understandings, beginning to deal with these problems in detail which we were unable to do at SALT I because the Russians would not go into detail.

The basic rule, though, has to be that anything be mutual. It has to be specific, and it has to be, of course, verifiable.

Let me give a quick rebuttal to the reinterpretation which the administration has come up with, first on October 6 on Bud McFarlane's television appearance.

As far as I am concerned, the text of the ABM Treaty is clear. We are talking about article II, article III, and article V.

In article II, there are the words "currently consisting of." Those are critically important words. We wanted to make clear that the treaty applied to all technology, and what we described in the remainder of that article II were the current kinds of technology which both sides were deploying—the ABM radars, the ABM interceptor, the launchers, and the ABM missiles.

But it was very clear from the text of the treaty, when we talked about ABM systems or components, we were talking about whatever technology.

When we got to article III, which is the one which permits limited deployment in the originally two deployment areas, now one, we used the particular terms "ABM interceptors," "ABM launchers," and "ABM radars," to make clear that the only kind of technology that either side could deploy was the traditional kind of technology available at that time.

That article is led off by a general ban on deployment "except"—and the purpose of "except" was to make clear you could not deploy in a fixed land-based mode the future technology.

Article V, I think, is clear.

Now, with respect to the negotiating history, I have not reviewed the classified record, as I indicated. My prepared statement takes you through my recollection, which I have checked out with other members of the SALT I delegation now out of Government so, in effect, it reflects my version of a collective judgment as to how we reached the agreement that we did and what the treaty means.

With respect to the ratification process, I agree that there are many statements in the hearings which are not clear. The focus at that time principally was on the fixed land-based because the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to keep open the option of development and testing of the fixed land-based lasers.

Incidentally, our instructions during SALT I were that we could not mention the word "laser." So we had to argue and talk around it when we negotiated with the Soviets.

But I think as blurred as some of the statements were in the ratification process, they are very, very clear when you get over to the Armed Services Committee, the testimony of Secretary Laird, and particularly Johnny Foster in exchanges with Senator Jackson. There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that Senator Jackson, who was the leading expert in terms of the weapons and the constraints of SALT I, knew exactly what we believe the treaty means, and he voted in favor of it.

Now, with respect to the Soviets, in my statement I reviewed the unclassified statements by the Soviets, at least the ones I have been able to find.

They are supportive, I think from "the word go" of what we call now the restrictive interpretation of the agreement. I will agree, though, that in large part their statements are more implicit than explicit, and they are frequently elliptical.

Starting in August 1985, with the Gorbachev interview in Time Magazine, and more recently with the Akhromeyev article, they have become very specific.

I would urge you to include in the record the article by Marshal Akhromeyev which was published, I think, on October 19. It was reprinted in the Washington Post, courtesy of the Soviet Embassy. But I would urge you to get the FBIS translation of it and have a U.S. interpretation of the article. But that is an important statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be made a part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

New York Times, Saturday, October 19, 1985

Soviet Military Chief Accuses U.S. Of Distorting Terms of ABM Pact

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

United Press International

Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev

MOSCOW, Oct. 18 — The Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, in an article to be published Saturday in Pravda, calls recent Reagan Administration interpretations of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty a "deliberate deceit."

In the Soviet Union's first high-level response to recent White House assertions that the treaty does not prohibit the development of defensive weapons in space, Marshal Akhromeyev said the United States was "distorting the essence" of the agreement.

Tass, the official Soviet press agency, published an advance text of Marshal Akhromeyev's article tonight.

The question of whether the ABM treaty bars research, development and testing of a space-based missile defense has become a central issue as the summit meeting between President Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, approaches.

There has also been disagreement in the Administration over the extent to which the treaty limits development of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the American antimissile program popularly called "Star Wars."

The Kremlin has generally disputed Administration interpretations about the ABM treaty in recent months.

Marshal Akhromeyev's article includes the most detailed Soviet response and directly addresses statements by the White House national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, that the treaty permits not only research but also testing and deployment of technologies such as laser and particle-beam weapons.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz assured American allies this week that the United States would nonetheless adhere to a relatively narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty.

In the Pravda article, Marshal Akhromeyev declared, "The treaty absolutely unambiguously bans the development, testing and deployment of ABM systems regardless of whether these systems are based on existing or future technologies."

Any other interpretations, he asserted, "contradict reality."

"The present aim of the United States Administration," Marshal Akhromeyev wrote, "is clear: to prepare a legal base for carrying out all the stages of practical work within the framework of the S.D.I. program, that is, the development, testing and deployment of space-strike weapons."

Marshal Akhromeyev specifically accused Mr. McFarlane of having "distorted the essence of the treaty" by "trying to substantiate the lawfulness of experiments" that would lead to the deployment of space-based weapons.

In the article, Marshal Akhromeyev offered a detailed analysis of the sections of the treaty that deal with the development of missile defense systems based on new technologies.

These sections have become the subject of intense debate, both between Moscow and Washington and among arms control experts in the United States, and are likely to be a key issue when Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev meet next month in Vienna.

Marshal Akhromeyev said the treaty not only prohibits testing, development and deployment of space-based antimissile systems, but also is unambiguous as to how far, and under what conditions, ABM systems based on new technologies can be developed.

The United States has contended that the treaty and joint statements associated with it permit work on missile defenses based on new technologies and other physical principles. But Marshal Akhromeyev said that "research, development and testing of ABM systems or their components based on other physical principles is allowed in areas that are strictly limited by the treaty and defined by it, and only using permanent ground ABM systems."

In addition, he said, "if either side wants to deploy such new systems in these limited areas, it cannot do so without preliminary consultations with the other side and without introducing the appropriate agreed-upon amendments in the treaty."

FBIS DAILY REPORT
CONTENTS

Soviet Union

Vol III No 203 21 October 1985

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Akhromeyev Compares U.S., Soviet Stands on Arms AA 1
Grinevskiy Sees Results of Session as 'Positive' AA 7
U.S. Reaction to Soviet Arms Proposals Viewed AA 8
[Korayavin in IZVESTIYA 9 Oct]
Gen Rogers' Views on 'Total War' Examined AA 9
[Falin in IZVESTIYA 7 Oct]
U.S. Shows 'Willingness' To Violate ABM Treaty AA 11

WORLD & REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Weekly 'International Observers Roundtable' CC 1
Soviet-Intelsat Accord Enters Into Force CC 8
[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 4 Oct]

UNITED STATES & CANADA

Weinberger S. Pacific Military Policy Contested A 1
[Beloshapko]
Shevardnadze Receives U.S. Ambassador 18 Oct A 1
Burlatskiy Urges Progress at U.S.-Soviet Summit A 2

CHINA

Soviet-Chinese Political Consultations Concluded B 1
Report on Talks B 1
[PRAVDA 21 Oct]
Ilichev Departure B 1

NORTHEAST ASIA

Need to Improve Soviet-Japanese Relations Seen C 1
[Dmitriyev]
Removing Barriers to USSR-Japan Trade Necessary C 2
[Alekseyev]

SOUTH ASIA

USSR-Afghan Exchange of Soldiers Reported D 1
[KYODO 19 Oct]
Iran's Support for Afghan 'Brigands' Viewed D 1

AKHROMEYEV COMPARES U.S., SOVIET STANDS ON ARMS

PM211335 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Oct 85 First Edition p 4

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev entitled: "Washington's Claims and the Real Facts"]

[Text] The Soviet Union has advanced concrete proposals at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the complex of problems related to space and nuclear (strategic and medium-range) armaments. These proposals are being examined by the delegations. Their essence was set forth by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in in his statements in Paris. Thus, they are known to the entire world.

These are the proposals for a total ban on space strike weapons and a radical, by 50 percent, reduction of the nuclear armaments of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching each others territories; for concluding agreements on nuclear medium-range systems in Europe and direct talks with France and Britain on the European balance of nuclear forces; for working out an agreement on a range of interim measures designed to facilitate the early and successful completion of the talks in Geneva

Combined with the earlier advanced proposals, these new proposals constitute the Soviet program of realistic and far-reaching measures whose implementation may bring about normalization of the complicated and dangerous international situation. Implementing this program would ensure a substantial advance toward the goal considered most important by all peoples -- that of preventing the militarization of outer space, prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, and saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet initiatives have received broad support from peace-loving public opinion, including Western Europe and the United States. It is recognized everywhere that the program put forward by the Soviet Union contains proposals which may bring the world out of the arms race deadlock and remove the obstacles on the path of achieving accords at the Geneva talks.

Having received the Soviet proposals, the United States now has the opportunity to move forward and try to bring the positions of the sides at the talks closer together. After all, Washington makes daily statements about its readiness and desire for a radical cut in nuclear weapons. The Soviet proposals go out to meet those desires.

But how does the U.S. react to the Soviet proposals? After making an initial assessment (it is impossible to study deeply and evaluate such fundamental proposals in a brief period), many officials from the White House administration, as is now evident, embarked on a path of falsifying and publicly discrediting our initiatives, trying to misinterpret them, presenting them in a spurious light, and belittling their significance. Realizing that it is impossible to reject the Soviet proposals as a whole, they say in Washington that they recognize they "warrant further discussion" and could be accepted as "a starting point at the talks." However, this is said just as a disguise. In actual fact, something quite different is taking place. High-ranking U.S. Administration representatives have in the past few days actively come out against the Soviet proposals. They are letting it be known that such proposals are unacceptable to them and are attempting to discredit and reject, not the details, but the essence, the foundations of the Soviet Union's proposals.

U.S. Administration officials, considering the people's fear of nuclear weapons, declare the U.S. "star wars" program may, allegedly, rid the world of nuclear weapons. They in Washington flatly reject the idea of banning the development [sozdaniye] and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of space strike weapons, while in order to cover up their aggressive designs, they have worked out a false concept of gradual transition from the deployment of nuclear offensive systems to the development and deployment of non-nuclear, so-called "defensive" systems. Its authors' line of argument is as follows: It is necessary to continue the deployment of strategic nuclear armaments, constantly threatening the Soviet Union with their use. Simultaneously, it is necessary to develop a "multitiered ABM' defence." This is how they describe space strike armaments. After the system is developed, "probably, in a few decades," it will be, purportedly, possible to come to an agreement on the reduction and even elimination of nuclear armaments.

It turns out that in order to eliminate nuclear weapons it is ncessary to plunge mankind into an arms race that is hard to even imagine today. The road to nuclear disarmament, according to this inside-out logic, lies in the buildup of nuclear offensive armaments and the militarization of space. It will take tens of years and the cost of innumerable material and other resources of mankind to accumulate the huge piles of weapons. There is no other way, nor can there be any, claims the U.S. Administtation.

Why all this is being done is understood in the Soviet Union. Deceiving peoples, diverting them from immediate measures for the reduction of nuclear arsenals are the aims of these manipulations. Washington transforms, turns upside-down, the objective need for a total elimination of nuclear weapons in order to gain an opportunity for an uncontrolled buildup of nuclear armaments. The United States is implementing this in practice. It is developing first-strike weapons; five new types of strategic delivery vehicles -- two types of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), two types of heavy bombers -- and is also deploying long-range cruise missiles of various basing modes and other systems of nucleararmaments.

If the propaganda is cast a side and the essence of the U.S. "star wars" program is revealed, it pursues the treacherous aim of giving the United States the potential to make a first nuclear strike at the Soviet Union with impunity and deprive it, by creating a national anti-missile defence, of the opportunity to make a retaliatory strike.

The Soviet Union suggested to the U.S. Administration a ban on the development of the two sides' space strike weapons. We are against the spread of the arms race into outer space. If that happens, mankind may find itself facing an unpredictable situation. The risk of war will grow many times. In order to prevent this, the USSR proposes renouncing, once and for all, the development and deployment of space strike armaments.

That is why an accord banning the development of space strike weapons is a key, fundamental questions. If no ban exists, an unchecked arms race will start, both of strategic offensive and space weapons. Such is the objective reality. There should be no misunderstanding on this point. The Soviet Union is far from naive and cannot count only on peaceful assurances by U.S. leaders, which serve as a cover for developing strike weapons in space. If that is continued, nothing will remain for us, but to adopt countermeasures in the field of both offensive and other, not excluding defensive, armaments, including those based in space.

The White House wants to present the Soviet Union with a fait accompli of the deployment of space strike systems which are aimed at it. But Washington underestimates the potentialities of the Soviet Union.

There will be no U.S. monopoly in outer space. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev has declared this with all clarity.

In order to justify the militarization of outer space, Washington alleges that U.S. work on the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), in fact a "star wars" program is "something quite legitimate" and even almost allowed by the 1972 Soviet-American treaty limiting antiballistic missile defences. A "new interpretation" of the treaty has been offered, according to which, it allows, purportedly, the development [razrabatyvet], testing, and creation [sozdavat] of anti-missile weapon systems on the basis of "other physical principles," that is laser, particle-beam, and other types of weaponry, both land- and space-based.

Thus, the presidential assistant for national security affairs R. McFarlane, when appearing on an NBC television program on October 6, distorted the essence of the ABM Treaty. Trying to substantiate the "lawfulness of experiments" within the framework of the ill-famed "Strategic Defense Initiative," he contended that the treaty sanctions tests of any ABM system as long as they are based on other principles of physics." The ABM Treaty is also falsified by the "new confidential study" prepared by the Pentagon and concerning limitations envisaged by the treaty. It is contended in the study that provisions of the treaty supposedly can be applied only to radars and anti-missiles, but not to the development [razrabotka] and testing of "exotic" ABM systems (lasers, bean weapons).

Such "interpretations" of the ABM Treaty, to put it mildly, are deliberate deceit. They contradict reality. Article 5 of the treaty absolutely unambigously bans the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components of space or mobile ground basing and, moreover, regardless of whether these systems are based on existing or "future" technologies.

In accordance with the agreed-upon statement "D" appended to the treaty, to which the administration now refers so often, the conduct of research, development, and testing of ABM systems or their components, based on other physical principles, is allowed in areas that are strictly limited by the treaty, clearly defined by it and use only fixed ground ABM systems (as they are defined in Article 3 of the treaty). Moreover, if either side wants to deploy its new systems in these limited areas, it cannot do so without preliminary consultations with the more side and without introducing the appropriate agreed-upon amendments in the treaty.

Only such and no other interpretation of the key provisions of the ABM Treaty, that was initiated by the United States itself, was worked out and adopted by the two sides in the course of talks on this treaty. The present aim of the U.S. Administration is clear: To prepare a "legal base" for carrying out all stages of practical work within the framework of the SDI program, that is the development [razrabotka] testing, and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of space strike systems.

The ABM Treaty is becoming an obstacle to the United States in the fulfillment of "star wars" plans. In striving to clear the road for the militarization of outer space, the head of the Pentagon Caspar Weinberger, when speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, threw aside the subterfuges of McFarland and others and bluntly stated, "We should study the possibility of really breaking with the ABM Treaty." Such is the actual position of the United States.

The Soviet Union is of a diametrically opposite opinion. The open-ended ABM Treaty is fundamentally important for the entire process of nuclear arms limitation; even more, it is the basis on which strategic stability and international security rest. We are convinced that everybody, including the United States, will stand to lose from a violation of this treaty.

The USSR is strictly observing all commitments under the treaty and is not doing anything that would contradict its provisions.

The Soviet stand on space strike arms was clearly formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev. It is necessary, he stated in the interview for TIME magazine, for a ban to embrace every phase of the inception of this new class of arms. This, however, does not deny the right and possibility of conducing basic research in outer space. But, it is one thing to conduct research and studies in laboratory conditions and quite another when models and prototypes are created and samples of space arms are tested. This is always followed by the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of arms. It is precisely such a line, backing it up accordingly with propaganda, that the U.S. Administration is pursuing as regards the "star wars" program. The USSR views as impermissible any out-of-laboratory work connected with the development and testing of models, pilot samples, separate assemblies, and components. Everything that is being done for the subsequent design and production of space strike systems should be banned.

The Soviet Union's approach is substantiated and realistic also from the point of view that out-of-laboratory work can be verified by national technical means. If this process is cut short at the initial stage of research, the possibility of developing [razrabotka] space strike arms will vanish.

The United States representatives pile up false arguments and distort the Soviet proposal on a very radical cut, by 50 percent, of the nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching each other's territory.

Flowing from Washington is a large stream of contentions that the Soviet proposal puts the United States in an unequal position because it will have to reduce not only the strategic "triad," but also its forward-based systems in Europe and Asia and medium-range missiles that are being deployed in Western Europe. As for the Soviet Union, it is contended account is only taken of strategic nuclear arms while the SS-20 missiles, deployed in the European zone and creating a threat to the West European allies of the United States, are supposedly ignored (taken out of the bracket of reductions).

The United States uses such arguments as a means of avoiding the main issue -- the genuine fact that apart from the strategic nuclear force, the Soviet Union does not have other nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the United States. However, the territory of the Soviet Union is under a dual threat from the U.S. strategic offensive force and U.S. medium-range missiles and forward-based systems deployed around the Soviet Union. We have never held an unconcerned attitude toward this dual threat, nor will we do so.

As for the Soviet SS-20 missiles in the European zone, our proposal is long known: The USSR is prepared to reduce them and leave no more than the number of corresponding missiles in the possession of Britain and France (counting by warheads). If the United States withdraws its medium-range missiles from Europe, the Soviet Union will immediately carry out such a reduction.

On the event of an accord in Europe, the USSR does not intend to deploy additional SS-20 missiles in the east of the country on the understanding that there will be no substantial changes in the strategic situation there and no additional U.S. nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union will be deployed.

Further, the U.S. Administration is trying to present matters as though, according to our proposal, the U.S. side, unlike, the Soviet side, will have to reduce its "triad" by more than 50 percent because, in view of its "allies commitments," the United States, supposedly, cannot renounce its medium-range missiles and forward-based systems.

But the USSR also has allies and corresponding obligations have also been signed between them and the Soviet Union that are being strictly observed. Why, after all, should the United States leave intact its medium-range missiles and forward-based systems that threaten the USSR and its allies? The United States wants to entrench itself with its first-strike systems near the borders of the Warsaw Pact states and thereby secure for itself strategic superiority. This is the crux of the matter.

A version is spreading within U.S. ruling circles, according to which the USSR, after the reduction, will preserve its "most dangerous" and "destabilizing" strategic armaments -- land-based ICBM's. The U.S. Administration has a rule of its own: The systems which are most developed in the USSR and which make up the backbone of its military might are designated as "destabilizing", while those which make up the strength of the United States, for instance, SLBM's, and heavy bombers, each with 20-28 long-range cruise missiles on board are systems of "stability and security". The Soviet Union does not agree with this.

Strategic offensive weapons are now approaching one another in their destructive capabilities. There is no difference as far as combat effectiveness is concerned, between the Soviet ICBM's and the American Trident SLBM's. That is why strategic armaments should be regarded and assessed in their entirety, as a single whole. This has always been the basic principle of negotiations. The new Soviet proposal proceeds from this as well. It stipulates that none of the elements of the strategic triad of each side -- either Soviet ICBM's or American SLBM's -- account for more than 60 percent of the sum total of warheads (6,000 units) remaining after the reduction. This means that, under implementation of our proposal, the reduction would apply to each of the elements of the triad, including the Soviet ICBM's.

In a bid to justify the escalation of war preparations and the Washington-instigated arms race, U.S. leaders are seeking to convince the public that no rough military strategic balance currently exists between the USSR and the United States; that the United States is allegedly "lagging behind" the USSR in strategic offensive armaments. Lately, they have been asserting that the USSR also allegedly leaped forward in the field of developing [sozdaniye] an anti-missile defense of the country's territory. The anti-Soviet propaganda about "Soviet military superiority" is continuing. The arguments are not new. Every thesis they contain is false.

The truth is that a rough balance in strategic armaments does exist between the USSR and the United States. This was verified during the seven years of work on the SALT II Treaty and was officially endorsed by Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter in 1979 during the signing of the treaty. At the present time, the number of strategic delivery vehicles on both sides has not changed in comparison with 1979. The USSR has somewhat more of them than the United States (2,504:2,210), but the United States still has a greater quantity of warheads on them. But, on the whole, there is a rough equality. This is confirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Its report to Congress (1984) notes: "In the present period, there exists an approximate nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union."

The approximate balance will still be preserved after 50 percent reductions in the corresponding nuclear armaments, though of course, at a substantially lower level. Although the number of delivery vehicles possessed by the United States will be somewhat greater than those of the USSR (1,680 and 1,250 respectively), the sides will be left with an identical quantity of warheads -- 6,000 units each, which will ensure approximate strategic equilibrium.

The statements by Washington officials about the USSR's purported three-time super superiority in ICBM's (warheads and their destruct capabilities) are one-sided.

As a matter of fact, the United States has roughly the same superiority in warheads on its SLBM's.

The United States' desire to "rectify" the nuclear armaments balance is aimed, in fact, at altering the rough equality in strategic systems in favour of the United States. It is very indicative that they want to "rectify" the nuclear balance. According to the Pentagon, a nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union existed twenty years ago when the United States had in service more than 1,000 ICBM's, 656 SLBM's, more than 600 heavy bombers, and a considerable number of forward-based nuclear weapon delivery vehicles close to Soviet territory, while the USSR had only 600 strategic delivery vehicles.

In the opinion of the U.S. side, the "imbalance" appeared when the USSR acquired an equivalent capability of replying to a strike against its territory with a strike at the potential aggressor's territory. We got this capability mostly with the development [razvitiye] of Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles. That is why the United States views our ICBM's as the "main source of the problem".

But we do not think the ability to respond equally with a blow to a blow against our territory is an imbalance. On the contrary, this is the foundation of supporting equilibrium in nuclear forces, an important factor of maintaining peace and stability. Rough equality is also the necessary basis for the process of nuclear arms limitation. We know that in the United States some people are still dreaming about returning to the state when the invulnerable "fortress North America" could threaten any state with nuclear annihilation. There is no returning to the past. Neither will there be any unilateral disarmament of the USSR.

It is not difficult to understand what is concealed behind the inventions of the Pentagon and the United States Department of State that the Soviet Union supposedly has all but created an ABM system for the defense of the territory of the country: This is deception of the public. The Soviet Union is not engaged in the development [razrabotca] and, consequently, testing of any models of space arms whatsoever; we do not have programs for creating space strike systems nor plans of "star wars" analogous to the U.S. ones. The USSR is strictly fulfilling the indefinite ABM Treaty of 1972. We suggest that the United States should also join us in this and give up plans of militarizing outer space before it is too late. There are no strike arms in outer space now, and there should be none.

With an eye to the forthcoming Soviet-American summit, the question is being asked throughout the world: What are the Soviet Union and the United States taking to that meeting? The USSR is seriously and thoroughly preparing for it. Having made the proposals on space and nuclear arms it actually covered its half of the road. Moreover, the Soviet Union proceeds from the broad interests of European and international security. It is not seeking any military advantages whatsoever for itself and is pressing only for one thing — just and honest agreements. Its proposals are a good basis for the talks in Geneva. The USSR is going to the summit with a firm desire to reach agreement on joint measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and strengthen security and stability.

What about the other side? There are no signs yet of businesslike and constructive preparations for the meeting on its part. On the contrary, the Soviet position is being distorted, real facts are being presented wrongly and attempts are being made to spread doubts in the world about the sincerity of the Soviet Union's intentions. At the same time, the United States has not made a single positive step, has not made a single constructive proposal. All this intensifies the growing concern of the peaceloving public.

The truth is that there can be no more marking time. Stressing the dangerous processes threatening the very existence of mankind, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said: "As a result, international developments have approached a line which cannot be overcome without making decisions of the highest level of responsibility in order to limit the arms race and halt the slide toward war". The time has come to adopt these decisions. And the world is awaiting these decisions.

Mr. RHINELANDER. Now, with respect to the correct approach, I think, under international law, you have to look not only at the negotiating record, but you also have to look at postratification conduct and statements. My understanding of the administration's reinterpretation is they looked only at the negotiating record and only, obviously, at the U.S. record, which is classified.

What do we do about it?

The rationale of the administration is that the Soviets never agreed at SALT I to what is now called the restrictive interpretation. I disagree. But if that is the rationale, it can be easily cured. A single piece of paper saying we agree with a restrictive interpretation might suffice. In my prepared statement, I have drafted six agreed statements which I think would be more than necessary to lock these issues up. If, in fact, we are prepared to stick with it, there is no doubt in my mind that the Soviets would accept it. I think that was their original position. It certainly is their current position, the current public position.

I would stress that I do not know what their private position is. I do not know what they have been saying at Geneva all these years. It seems to me that is an area of inquiry the committee might want to look into.

Quickly, with respect to some of the other major issues under the ABM Treaty, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be discussed. I think it is a violation. I have said that before. I have said it publicly.

I think the Soviet public statement, which indicated they would be willing to stop construction, is a major step. I will get to the coupling in a moment. It has to go further. The thing has to be dismantled. I think it is a violation. It is an early warning radar in the wrong place, facing in the wrong direction.

Now, with respect to the two U.S. radars, the Thule radar and the Fylingdales one, I simply want to say that the Soviet position is not frivolous. Under the treaty itself and under an agreement statement, agreed statement F, they have a strong position that, while the sites themselves, Thule and Fylingdales, were grandfathered, the treaty and the agreed statement would prohibit the change of technology from the old kinds of radars we had and we still have there to the phased array radars.

I will get into that further in the questions if you would like.

The most difficult question under the ABM Treaty over the short term, as I indicated earlier, is defining what is a component, what is a subcomponent, what is an assembly or a subassembly. That is a very, very difficult issue because you are dealing with developing technology.

With respect to the major issues your letter asked me to address, I can quickly give you my views on this.

I think a deployed "thick" ABM system or ballistic missile defense system would increase instability in times of crisis. That has been the basic position of the U.S. Government from the mid-1960's. I think it still holds.

The analysis basically goes that any kind of system would not be effective against a first strike. It might have some marginal effectiveness against a second strike.

It is clear the Soviets fear star wars or SDI, not in terms of being able to thwart what they could do if they were to strike first, but in terms of being used in conjunction with a U.S. first strike. The converse has been our fear.

Cap Weinberger has made very clear that if the Soviets were to deploy a "thick" ABM defense, we would have the kinds of fears which are reflected, I think, in the U.S. position historically for many years.

Second, I would say that offensive reductions would be impossible if either side deploys ABM defenses or takes major steps toward deploying defenses. That was our position in the mid-1960's. You are familiar with the exchange with Kosygin at the Glassboro summit.

I would make a very firm prediction: there is no way the Soviets are going to agree to reductions unless the U.S. reaffirms and tightens up the ABM Treaty.

I would make a very fundamental point with respect to SDI, that, of course, it is not effective against bombers and not effective against cruise missiles.

I think we have to be concerned. I think limiting cruise missiles, under any circumstances, particularly the SLCM's, the sea-launched cruise missiles, is going to be difficult at best.

We will be vulnerable with our two large, open coastlines to sea-launched cruise missiles. Star wars would have no effect against air breathers, including cruise missiles.

Going, finally, to a different subject matter, I think the goal has to be to reduce the fears of breakout by either side.

Looking at today's newspapers, the Post and the Washington Times have stories on the newest Defense Department studies talking about defense fears of Soviet breakout capability.

SDI in Soviet eyes represents our breakout capability.

I think to constrain defense, this is what has to be focused on fundamentally, and I think we did a good job of it generally, in 1972, but we have to go forward.

I had some closing comments on the summit, but I will leave those, if you wish, and we can go directly to the questions, or I can give you my prognosis.

The **Chairman**. Why don't you proceed with that.

Mr. **Rhinelander**. I think what will come out of this summit is going to be very modest in this field.

At best—and this is important, I will say—we will get an extension of the "no undercut policy" of SALT I and SALT II beyond December 31, which would have been the expiration date of SALT II if it had ever become effective, but without resolving any of the differences in terms of the meaning of the SALT II Treaty.

Second, I would think we would get a political reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, again, without resolving the differences in terms of interpretation.

Three, we might—and this would be a step forward—agree to seek 50-percent reductions on the offensive side, but, again, without defining what kinds of weapons are included and excluded in that 50-percent reduction.

Finally, and I think most importantly, I would hope there would be an agreement to have another summit, maybe a year from now. I personally am quite optimistic that, given another year's time, we might be able to reach the kinds of breakthroughs at the summit which you need before the negotiations in Geneva are really going to be meaningful.

We had that in 1974, with the Vladivostok agreement. We had it during SALT I with what was called the May 20, 1971, understanding. You need that political breakthrough at the top before the delegations can really get down to negotiate hard on the details.

My view is it will take at least a couple of years to negotiate out, even after a political breakthrough, the kinds of details and agreements you will need on both the offensive and defensive sides.

[Mr. Rhinelander's prepared statement with attachments follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN B. RHINELANDER

"EXOTIC SYSTEMS" AND THE ABM TREATY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

My name is John B. Rhinelander. I am currently a partner in the law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge in Washington, D.C. I am also a member of the Board of Directors of the Arms Control Association, a member of the National Advisory Board of the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, and a member of the ABA's Standing Committee on Law and National Security. Previously, I have served as a law clerk to Justice John Marshall Harlan and in five departments in the Executive.

I appear today in my individual capacity. My views do not necessarily represent those of any of the organizations with which I am presently affiliated. My statement represents my best recollection, after discussions with former colleagues on the SALT I delegation who are now out of government and a review of some of the available literature, on the evolution of the ABM Treaty in 1971-72 and its meaning. The SALT I negotiating record is massive and classified. I have not had access to it since 1972 and have never seen the official ACDA history of SALT I which is also classified. I served as the legal adviser to the US SALT I delegation from 1971-72.

The primary issue before the Subcommittee today is whether Article V(1) of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development and testing of space-based and other mobile-type "exotic systems" (e.g., space-based lasers). The secondary issue is whether any of the Treaty's substantive constraints on "ABM systems or components" in Articles I(2), IV, V and IX apply to space-based "exotic systems". The answers are four-fold: (1) the prohibitions are clear from the text of the Treaty, particularly Article V(1) which states, "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based"; (2) the negotiating history, as interpreted in 1972 by the SALT I delegation and the backstopping representatives in Washington, supports the broad ban on space-based "exotic systems" as the only permissible interpretation; (3) this has been the interpretation of the Executive, accepted and relied upon by Congress, since 1972; and (4) any other result is patently absurd and would frustrate the stated premise of this Treaty of indefinite duration -- to prohibit the deployment of nationwide ABM systems or a "base" for such a system.

The Soviets accepted this interpretation during the negotiations, reflected it in their ratification proceedings, and have taken no actions and have not made any official statements inconsistent with this interpretation. This is the only conclusion one can draw from their public statements which sometimes deal with the issue implicitly and elliptically rather than explicitly. The Gorbachev interview with TIME editors includes a specific statement, but without mentioning Article V, before the US "reinterpretation" became known. The TASS statement of October 9, responding to the US "reinterpretation", removes any ambiguity from the Soviet public position. Marshall Akhromeyev's lengthy comments on October 19, 1985 should lay to rest the Soviet public position.

The US delegation in Geneva, and Members of Congress who are advisors, should know whether the Soviets have made their position explicit, and specifically tied to Article V(1), in the Geneva negotiations since 1972, since the President's Star Wars speech in March 1983, and since October 6, 1985.

I.

Based on National Security Advisor McFarlane's comments October 6 on NBC's Meet the Press, subsequent commentary on CBS, the article in the Washington Post on October 9 (attached as Exhibit A) and my telephone conversation that day with Deputy Secretary Taft at the Pentagon, the Administration had concluded that the Soviets never agreed to the US position at

SALT I, the Soviets cannot be held to abide to it today and, therefore, the US is not legally bound. Deputy Secretary Taft told me that the General Counsel of DOD, the Legal Adviser at State, and the Department of Justice had, therefore, concluded that because the US cannot legally hold the Soviets to the historic US interpretation, the US may take the position that the development and testing of sea-based, air-based, space-based and mobile land-based "exotic systems and components" may be developed and tested, but not deployed, consistent with the ABM Treaty.

On October 13, the President decided that he agreed "in principle, but not in practice" with this "reinterpretation". Based on a Presidential directive, Secretary Shultz announced on October 14 in a speech before the thirty-first annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly that "a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified", but SDI "will be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations."

This leaves the US legally free to return to the "reinterpretation" whenever the President's advisors deem advantageous and the President agrees. The story on October 17 in the Washington Post (see Exhibit B) makes this clear. DOD officials do not admit that they have yet lost the argument and stress Secretary Shultz did not state how long the Administration would continue to abide by the new "restrictive interpretation", which represents presidential policy rather than a matter of law.

The legal rationale for the "reinterpretation" revolves around Agreed Statement D. The argument is (1) that Article V(1) constrains only "traditional" ABM technology (ABM missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars), and (2) therefore permits development, testing and deployment of "exotic systems and components", but (3) Agreed Statement D implicitly amends Article V(1) to prohibit deployment only of "exotic" systems and components.

This rationale is absurd as a matter of policy, intent and interpretation. If the Administration sticks with it as the best legal interpretation of the Treaty, then the Administration has effectively repudiated the ABM Treaty as a legal instrument. If the truncated Treaty remains in effect, then both the US and Soviets can develop and test, without quantitative or geographic limits, any sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM system or component provided they are based on "exotic systems and components".

But the result could be even more far reaching. Because the Administration's new interpretation is that Article V(1) and other Articles of the Treaty do not apply to "exotic systems" and Agreed Statement D blocks only their deployment, then the necessary consequences are that the limits on "ABM systems or components" throughout the Treaty do not include "exotic systems". This results in:

(1) the deployment bans on a nation-wide ABM defense, a base for such a defense, and a regional ABM defense (except as

permitted by Article III) in Article I(2), which were fundamental statements of the Treaty's scope, are all limited to "traditional" ABM technology, (i.e., ABM launchers, ABM missiles and ABM radars) and do not apply to "exotic systems";

(2) the words "currently consisting of" in Article II(1), intended to make clear that the Treaty applied to all ABM technologies and not just "traditional" ones, are rendered devoid of meaning;

(3) because Article IV dealing with ABM test ranges explictly refers back to Article III (which authorizes limited deployments of fixed, land-based ABM launchers, ABM missiles and ABM radars), the geographic, quantitative and implicit qualitative limits in Article IV on ABM tests do not apply to tests of any type of mobile or space-based "exotic systems";

(4) Article V does not apply to all or almost all SDI programs, and the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) (which was a kinetic energy test with a single intercept mechanism) could have been tested in a MIRVed configuration; and

(5) the prohibitions in Article IX against transfers of ABM systems or their components to other States, and deployment outside national territories, apply only to "traditional" technology and not to "exotic systems".

The consequences of this "reinterpretation" are dramatic when one considers that the principal US concern has historically been with Soviet "breakout" capability based on "traditional" or "low tech" systems. These remain tightly constrained notwithstanding the "reinterpretation". On the other hand, most of SDI is now "legally" unconstrained by the Treaty.

With particular respect to the Soviets and their emphasis on "traditional" systems: (a) ABM deployment is limited to the one area surrounding Moscow; (b) ABM tests must be limited to their two ABM test ranges; (c) the development, testing and deployment of land-mobile "traditional" ABM systems and components is prohibited; and (d) the ban on the "upgrade" of surface-to-air (SAM) systems remains in full force. However, under the "reinterpretation" the Soviets now legally could place in the field an unlimited number of mobile land-based lasers (the Soviets have an active laser program) across the Soviet Union provided they were labeled for "test" purposes.

With particular respect to the US, it is now free to exploit its own, and Western technology, in the full pursuit of Star Wars. A full-scale, operational orbiting systems, with accompanying ground stations and including as many as 100 to 400 killer satellites and related sensors, could now be "legally" put in place as an extensive "test program" to prove out the new technology in a BMD system configuration. US allies would be free of any Treaty restraints to participate in two-way transfers of most SDI technology, with the only "legal" constraints on "west-west" SDI technology those under the Munitions Control and Export Administration Acts.

This result is absurd. Unbeknownst to the US SALT I delegation, the SALT I backstopping apparatus in Washington, the Nixon Administration and each of its successors, and Congress, the US would now be in the most one-sided Treaty relationship imaginable. Ambassador Smith should be given a retrospective decoration by the Reagan Administration for one of the great feats in American diplomatic history!

Of course, it could not last for a minute. Arms control agreements are viable only as long as they are in the net interests of each party. Secretary Shultz had spoken of the need to "prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty", but Defense Secretary Weinberger, Under Secretary Ikle, and Assistant Secretary Perle have repeatedly stated that they have no use for the ABM Treaty and the sooner the US is without it the better. They momentarily prevailed in a brazen exercise well described in a New York Times editorial by Anthony Lewis (see Exhibit C). Unless the President or Congress repudiate this self-defeating legal "reinterpretation", or the US and Soviets agree on specific Agreed Statements to put it to rest, DOD officials could move the issue again when the moment seems right to them.

The timing of the announcement of the initial "reinterpretation" remains obscure. DOD has known, of course, that under the historic interpretation the evolution of SDI research into development and testing would have to be stopped somewhere between 1988 (as I believe) and 1990 (as even DOD officials had privately conceded) unless either the Soviets agree to amend the Treaty or the US formally withdraws. From a policy and political point of view, six weeks before the Summit, the "reinterpretation" by the US with respect to a legally binding treaty could have been a disaster. The first concrete US response to the Soviet proposal (admittedly lopsided) to cut offensive forces by 50% was to repudiate the ABM Treaty which, both had agreed last January, is interrelated to any offensive limitations.

One of the political reasons for the Administration's initial "reinterpretation" at this time may have been DOD's attempt to encourage more Allies to support SDI by participating in cooperative SDI "research". (The negotations with the UK on a government-to-government agreement may be completed before the Summit and an agreement with the FRG shortly thereafter). Foreign corporations, particularly in the United Kingdom and West Germany, might be encouraged by the "reinterpretation" because cooperation might be extended from ABM "research", which is all that is permitted under the historic US interpretation, to include now "development and testing" with full sharing and two-way transfers.

The actual effect on US Allies was the reverse because the political fallout of this full sharing in SDI technology directly associated with ABM systems or components would have been the implicit or explicit ratification by Allied governments of the repudiation of the ABM Treaty. That is a role that none is prepared to accept or condone, including the United Kingdom. Margaret Thatcher earlier had achieved at Camp David the President's agreement to four basic principles relating to SDI. Compliance with the ABM Treaty was one of them. The political cost in West Germany and the Netherlands (particularly since the latter must make its decision on cruise missile deployments by November 1) might be much higher for their governments and NATO as a whole.

The remainder of my statement sets forth my views on the negotiation and meaning of the ABM Treaty.

II.

In April 1971, while I was serving in Washington as a Deputy Legal Adviser at the Department of State, Ambassador Gerard Smith asked me to come to the fourth negotiating session of SALT I in Vienna and prepare drafts of an ABM Treaty and an Interim Offensive Agreement. In March, the Soviet delegation had tabled a draft ABM Treaty. The US delegation believed it was appropriate to begin to prepare formal texts of agreements on defensive and offensive strategic weapons limitations. I spent most of that session reviewing the record of the negotiations (plenary statements, memoranda of conversations, reporting cables, etc.), familiarizing myself with US position papers and the technical characteristics of the weapons, and in discussions with members of the US delegation. I also prepared rough first drafts of texts. The negotiating session ended in

May 1971, shortly after the "May 20 understanding" between the US and Soviets was announced.

During the remainder of May and in June in Washington, I prepared successive drafts of an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement after input from others. I recollect that the Soviet draft of Article III was permissive - it stated both sides may deploy a single, fixed land-based ABM system with 100 ABM launchers and no limits on ABM radars within the deployment areas. This text was vague, imprecise and, among other things, an invitation to pursue and deploy both stand-alone components, such as long lead-time ABM radars, and ABM systems based on "exotic" technologies. In my drafts, I turned Article III around into the form eventually agreed upon and also tightened it.

Article III, as drafted, prohibited deployment of any ABM system or components except those in the deployment areas and as limited quantitatively, qualitatively and geographically. The text of Article III, standing alone, prohibited the deployment of fixed land-based "exotic" ABM systems and components because only systems utilizing ABM launchers, ABM missiles and ABM radars could be deployed. This raised the "exotic systems" question directly for inter-agency consideration.

The other substantive Articles always referred to "ABM systems" and to "components" to make clear the US position that components were limited and not just entire systems.

The Soviet draft of March 1971 contained prohibitions on testing and deployment of "space-based" in what is now Article V(1), as did my drafts of May-June 1971 which, I believe, added "develop". The gist of this article was derived from the August 4, 1970 proposal by the US for bans on production, testing and deployment of all mobile-type ABM systems.

The drafts of May-June 1971 were reviewed by members of the SALT delegation while in Washington. Some of them had sharply differing views on "exotic systems" and other questions.

III.

The fifth negotiating session began in Helsinki in early July 1971. After taking into account the President's written instructions, the delegation revised my drafts, cabled texts of an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement to Washington, and sought authorization to table them in a plenary session. On the "exotic systems" questions, the delegation was split. Gerard Smith wrote in Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I (Doubleday, 1980), that he and Harold Brown supported a broad ban; Paul Nitze concurred except for sensors; but General Allison and Ambassador Parsons favored no restraints at all on "exotic systems" (pp. 263-65).

The delegation was subsequently authorized to table the text of both agreements, which it did on July 27, but with the article in the ABM Treaty covering space-based systems omitted. The Verification Panel in Washington was still analyzing the "exotic systems" question. Eventually, the President rejected an ABM ban which Ambassador Smith had urged, but about the same time he approved a White House staff compromise to the basic Smith-Brown position on "exotic systems" which would prohibit (1) the deployment of fixed land-based and (2) the development, testing and deployment of all other basing modes. The Joint Chiefs of Staffs were particularly interested in preserving the option to develop and test fixed-land-based lasers. The President's decision preserved this option, as does the ABM Treaty itself. See John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (Holt, Reinhart, 1973), pp. 230-31, 237; Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Brookings Institution, 1985) ch. 5.

The US delegation filled in the blank Article in its ABM Treaty in mid-August 1971. The Soviets initially balked at discussing, let alone agreeing to any limitations on, "exotic systems". They were probably without any instructions on this issue and may have felt the US was on an intelligence-fishing expedition. Progress was soon made nevertheless. Various working groups and a drafting group were set up to seek agreement issue by issue. Joint Draft Texts of the Soviet and US drafts of the Treaty were prepared with disagreed language, which at first was extensive, in brackets.

The Graybeal-Karpov Working Group focused on Article V. (Sid Graybeal was later the US Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Commission. Victor Karpov is currently the head of the Soviet delegation in Geneva.) Before the conclusion of the fifth negotiating session in September 1971, the Graybeal-Karpov working group agreed, ad referendum to the two delegations, that current Article V(1) covered "current" as well as "exotic" technologies. The US delegates agreed that the Americans on this working group (which included Albert Carnesale, now at the Kennedy School at Harvard) had carried out the President's instructions. The brackets around "develop" in that paragraph in Article V in the Joint Draft Text were subsequently removed in the drafting group during the sixth negotiating session after both delegations had noted their approval. The Administration now contends that either the Soviets never agreed with the US interpretation or that the Soviets later modified their agreement or changed their interpretation during negotiations over Agreed Statement D. The US members on this Working Group would sharply differ with this view.

The major sticking point then, and through late into the sixth negotiating session, was on fixed land-based systems. US instructions were to preserve the right to develop and test, but not to deploy, fixed land-based lasers. Accordingly, the US delegation insisted that Article III should authorize deployment of only ABM systems and components which are based on "current" technology. Further, development and testing, whatever the technology, of fixed land-based systems and components could be carried out only at ABM test ranges. The Soviets resisted any limitations on fixed land-based "exotic systems". As John Newhouse, who many believe was given at least some access to NSC files, wrote (Cold Dawn, p. 237):

> Back in the summer, Moscow's attitude, as reflect by its delegation, had been sympathetic. Then, in the autumn, it hardened, probably under pressure from the military bureaucracy. Washington was accused of injecting an entirely new issue. Moscow would not agree to a ban on future defensive systems, except for those that might be space-based, sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based. The U.S. delegation persisted and was rewarded. Land-based exotics would also be banned. The front channel had produced an achievement of incalculable value.

IV.

The Article III issue was not resolved until late in the sixth (Vienna in November 1971 - February 1972) negotiating session. It was handled principally in the Garthoff and Kishilov or Grinevsky working group and also in the Garthoff/Parsons-Kishilov/Grinevsky group (Ray Garthoff and Nicolai Kishilov were the executive secretaries of the respective delegations.) The US proposed the "currently consisting of" phrase which was agreed upon for Article II to make clear that the Treaty was not limited to "traditional" technology. The US proposal for the "except that" formulation for Article III was accepted which made clear that fixed land-based "exotic" systems could not be deployed. The ban against a nationwide defense or "base" for such a defense in

Article I(2), which was a Soviet initiative intended in part to deal with "exotic systems", was agreed. In each case, agreement was ad referendum to the delegations. Together, these textual provisions completed all the key words in the Treaty relating to "exotic systems".

An agreed interpretation tied to Articles I and III was first proposed by Garthoff in mid-December 1971. I distinctly recollect advising that no supplementary interpretation was technically necessary. The US effort, therefore, was to reinforce the clear meaning of the specific Article III and the more general Article I(2).

The US had originally proposed a paragraph for the Treaty in August 1971. It stated: "Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components". Doubletalk, pp. 265, 343-44. The Soviets balked at any Treaty language and, subsequently, the initial US proposals for an agreed interpretation. Eventually the Soviets proposed a counter draft. This was modified several times at US insistence (including the insertion of the opening phrase "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty . . ."). The reference to Article XIV in Agreed Statement D indicated that the Treaty would have to be amended before a fixed land-based "exotic", such as a laser, could be deployed. The final compromise language was proposed by Garthoff to the Soviets in late January 1972 and early in February Kishilov informed Garthoff of Soviet agreement. This was eventually noted in an US plenary statement. Agreed Statement D and the other Agreed Statements were initialed on May 26, 1972 by Ambassadors Smith and Semenov.

Agreed Statement D refers to, and interprets, Article III only, although the references to "other physical principles" and "components capable of substituting for" are equally aplicable to Article V(1). While the language is admittedly opaque, the US has always understood that Agreed Statement D reinforced Articles I(2) and III and reinforced the prohibition on deployment of fixed land-based "exotic systems" unless and until the Treaty is amended. Finally, and most importantly, Agreed Statement D certainly does not diminish or amend Article V(1) and the other substantive Articles such as I(2), IV, V(2) and IX.

V.

During the seventh negotiating session, I prepared detailed memoranda on both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement intended to serve four distinct purposes: (1) inform the delegation on what was agreed with the Soviets and what was not; (2) suggest whether the US should consider seeking one or more Agreed Statements to provide more specific interpretations; (3) indicate what types of weapons programs, current and future, were prohibited and permitted; and (4) serve as the basis for the eventual transmittal documents to Congress and background for the Congressional hearings.

Successive drafts of my memoranda were shared within the delegation. Where there was any doubt that a matter was agreed, the proposition was enclosed in brackets. The brackets were removed only after I, and others on the US delegation, were satisfied. I constantly revised the drafts as issues were reviewed. The draft memoranda were never made "final".

In certain cases the US delegation sought and achieved Agreed Statements. In others it did not seek them. Some matters were judged agreed, while others were not. To the best of my recollection, the US delegation never sought an Agreed Statement confirming that Article V(1) covered "exotic systems". We probably felt that seeking further specific agreement was unnecessary and would not be productive. In any event, I am absolutely certain that my contemporaneous advice to the US delegation on the scope of Articles III and V(1) with respect to "exotic" systems was clear and that none of the delegates nor their advisors (State, ACDA, JCS and OSD) disagreed with that advice. I recall no indication that the Soviets thought otherwise.

VI.

During SALT I the US delegation, and particularly Washington, did not insist on the kind of precision reached in the SALT II Treaty with its 98 Agreed Statements and Common Understandings. The Soviets stubbornly resisted the level of textual detail the US had initially sought at SALT I. Neither the President nor Henry Kissinger cared much for detail. During the final three negotiating sessions, the US delegation made ad hoc decisions on how the Presidential instructions should be sought and recorded on many issues, how hard to push for additional clarity, and what sufficed, but constantly reported to Washington.

In one instance relating to the ABM Treaty ("current" Soviet ABM test ranges), the US delegation identified the two US ABM test ranges and the Soviet test range at Sary Shagan. The Soviet response noted national technical means permitted the identification of test ranges. (The US and Soviet statements are set forth in Common Understanding E . The US delegation noted immediately that the Soviets did not respond to the US identification of Sary Shagan as their ABM test range, but the delegation believed the Soviet response reflected extreme Soviet sensitivity to any discussion of their test range. However, in the mid-1970s the Soviets claimed a second "current" ABM test range at Kamchatka based on the presence of an old radar. Paul Nitze has referred to this negotiating technique as unworthy of bazaar traders. I agree.

The US eventually accepted the Soviet claim in 1978 because there was a factual basis for it, but learned from this example, and particularly from the Moscow Summit negotiations on the Interim Agreement, that explicit agreement and written precision is important. The SALT II documentation reflects this learning.

SALT I, however, did not have this benefit of later-day hindsight indicating the need for precision and detailed Agreed Statements and Common Understandings reflected in the SALT II Treaty. Some of the SALT I underlying understandings are reflected in formal plenary statements, others in the less formal mini-plenary statements, and some in working documents, memoranda of conversations ("memcons") and reporting cables. Agreement was reached ad referendum in one or more working groups, approved by the two delegations, referred to the drafting group, to the interpreters, etc. On many points there will not be simple, clear documentation. In addition, the US government (but not the Soviets) has lost most of its SALT I historical memory.

Some interpretation matters were in 1972, and remain today, ambiguous and need clarification. The dividing line between permitted "research" and prohibited "develop" and "test" is not clear, nor is the related meaning of "component", in the broad prohibitory context of banning "exotic systems" under Article V(1). There is no Agreed Statement on either issue. The former was discussed in a formal statement delivered by Harold Brown and a general understanding, although not a fully documented record, was reached. I do not recall any discussion of the latter with the Soviets.

VII.

The SALT delegation remained in Helsinki until agreement on open points, primarily the Interim Agreement, was reached at the Moscow Summit. When the delegation returned to Washington and the transmittal documents and Congressional statements were being prepared under White House control, Henry Kissinger directed that all "understandings" be culled from the negotiating record and made public to refute criticism of secret agreements. This was the derivation of the SALT I Common Understandings. The search of the files for Common Understandings was limited. It did not cover all the myriad of agreed understandings reached in less formal ways during the negotiations.

The hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and particularly the Senate Armed Services Committee, led to a much fuller public record on many of the nuances. Some of the initial testimony of officials was not clear, but the record was frequently supplemented. This includes the statement for the record of the Senate Armed Services Committee, prepared after inter-agency review of reporting cables, on the difference between research and development for purposes of Article V. It includes explicit confirmations submitted by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Under Secretary for DDR&E John Foster, and Acting Chief of Staff of the Army General Palmer, all to Senator Jackson, that development and testing, as well as deployment, of space-based "exotic systems" were prohibited. Senator Jackson (D, Wash.), who was a sharp critic of SALT I but voted in favor of the ABM Treaty, understood this point clearly. He was probably the most knowledgeable Senator on the impact of SALT I on weapons programs. Finally, Senator James Buckley (R, NY) stated on the Senate floor on August 3, 1972 that he opposed the ABM Treaty and would vote against it largely because of this prohibition. He said:

> Thus the agreement goes so far as to prohibit the development, test or deployment of sea, air or space based ballistic missile defense systems. This clause, in article V of the ABM treaty, would have the effect, for example, of prohibiting the development and testing of a laser type system based in space which could at least in principle provide an extremely reliable and effective system of defenses against ballistic missiles. The technological possibility has been formally excluded by this agreement.

The vote in favor of advice and consent to ratification was 88-2.

VIII.

I resigned from government in June 1972 after the transmittal documents had been sent to Congress and before the hearings. While I later served at HEW as General Counsel and at HUD as Under Secretary between 1973 and 1977, I have had no official role in the SALT process since June 1972. I left behind at ACDA two complete file cabinets of all my working papers which I have not seen since 1972. I understand they were later sent to a warehouse by ACDA and the files cannot now be located although copies of some documents, including at least the last two drafts of my memoranda analyzing the ABM Treaty, were preserved by the JCS and perhaps in some other files.

In 1972-73 while in private practice, I co-edited a book on SALT and wrote chapter 5 on "The SALT I Agreements". I have attached to this statement the pages from that chapter (Willrich and Rhinelander (editors), SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (Free Press, 1974)) on the ABM Treaty (Exhibit D). Pages 128-29 and 134 are directly on point with respect to "exotic systems". They summarize my immediate recollection of the advice I gave to the US delegation which was the basis for the Executive position before, during and after the ratification process. Prior to publication of the book, I informally cleared my chapter with government officials to ensure both accuracy and non-disclosure of sensitive information.

Over the past eight years, I have been informally queried on various issues by officials at the JCS, OSD, State, ACDA and the CIA. One question in the late 1970s was whether there were any deployment limits on fixed land-based "exotic systems". This question had been reopened in OSD, sharply debated with JCS supporting the traditional US position, and then correctly resolved. This question also involved Agreed Statement D, but in this case the OSD argument was that there were no deployment limits under Article III on fixed land-based "exotic systems" and only an obligation to discuss. This is almost the exact reverse of the Reagan Administration's "reinterpretation" which now claims the deployment limits in Agreed Statement D prohibits only deployment of systems referred to in Articles III and V(1).

To the best of my knowledge, the challenge to Article V(1) within the Executive arose only recently although the Heritage Foundation circulated a Backgrounder dated April 4, 1985 rejecting the traditional interpretation. A footnote stated it was authored by an unnamed government official.

This past spring I co-authored with Tom Longstreth and John Pike a booklet on The Impact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty, National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty (March 1985). In April, I testified before a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee and excerpts from my formal statement were reprinted in Arms Control Today (May 1985). In July I presented a paper at a SIPRI conference which sets forth my most recent analyses and recommendations. A copy of the latter, as revised in August, is attached as Exhibit E. These documents reflect my views on the correct interpretations of the ABM Treaty and basic issues raised by current US and Soviet BMD programs.

In my judgment, the FY85 Arms Control Impact Statement prepared by the Reagan Administration correctly states the agreement reached with the Soviets in 1971-72 on the meaning of Article V(1). It provides (pp. 251-52):

> The ABM Treaty bans the development, testing and deployment of all ABM systems and components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based....The ABM Treaty prohibition on development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems, or components for such systems, applies to directed energy technology (or any other technology used for this purpose.) Thus, when such directed energy programs enter the field testing phase they become constrained by these ABM Treaty obligations. [Emphasis added.]

The SDI Report to Congress (April 1985), especially Appendix B, is consistent with this statement.

IX.

In the Soviet parliamentary ratification deliberations, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vasily V. Kuznetsov, "on behalf of the Soviet Government," gave the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet the official Soviet position on the ABM Treaty. He said that, "The sides pledge themselves not to create or develop ABM systems or components emplaced in the sea, the air or space or of a mobile ground type . . . ." He presented this as a clear obligation of the Treaty as a whole. (See Pravda, September 30, 1972, as translated in FBIS, Oct. 3, 1972).

Based on my review of available documents, the Soviets had not explicitly tied this interpretation to "exotic systems" in public until recently although their statements implicitly supported this as the only interpretation of the entire Treaty, including Article V(1). However, General Secretary Gorbachev's written response to TIME states, "In our view, it [SDI] is the first stage of the project to develop a new ABM system prohibited under the Treaty of 1972. See TIME (Sept. 9, 1985), p. 24. [Emphasis added.] (See also Soviet documents printed in Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies (OTA, 1985) pp. 312-15.)

Specific Soviet responses to the US "reinterpretation" which was made first on television and then repeated in the press are contained in FBIS on October 9 and 10. They include the translation of a TASS commentary and an English-language TASS article. The former, as translated by FBIS, includes:

> According to the CBS television company, one of the latest administration reports contains the "conclusion" that the antimissile defense treaty, which strictly restricts the development [sozdaniye] of antimissiles, allegedly does not restrict the development [razrabotka] and testing of "exotic" types of weapons -- laser and beam weapons -- at all. It is quite clear which way such "interpreters" are taking the matter. Having just the other day tested land-based laser installations, the United States is now planning to site a laser weapon on board a spacecraft and test it directly in space.
>
> It would evidentally not be inappropriate to remind some people in Washington yet again that the antimissile defense treaty (Article 5) prohibits both the development [sozdaniey] and testing of space-based antimissile defense systems or components. The treaty provisions relate to any systems designed, as defined by Article 2, for fighting against strategic ballistic missiles or their elements on flight trajectories. Since the antimissile defense components being created within the "star wars" program are designed for precisely this purpose, that is are intended to replace the antimissiles mentioned in the treaty (or to act together with antimissiles), all provisions of the treaty relate to these, regardless of the degree of "exoticness" of their

> principles of operation. It is high time the irresponsible "interpreters" [tolkovateli] from Washington gave up their useless and dangerous occupation, listened to the voice of the world public, which they are trying to delude, and directed their efforts to positive goals. And they do have something to think over: The set of Soviet initiatives offers broad scope for constructivism.

Finally, Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, made lengthy comments in an article in Pravda. He said the ABM Treaty "unambigously bans" the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems. See New York Times, October 19, 1985 (Exhibit F). Marshall Akhromeyev explictly confirms the historic US position of the ban on space-based "exotic systems". The Subcommittee should obtain the full FBIS translation of these comments as soon as they are available and include them in the record of these hearings.

The Administration's justification for its "reinterpretation" is that the Soviets cannot be held to comply with the historic US position. Instead of reinterpretating the clear text of the 1972 Treaty based on a selective review of the classified US negotiating records, the better approach would have been to ask the Soviet negotiators in private in Geneva (and specifically Ambassador Karpov who had a crucial role on this issue at SALT I) whether or not the Soviet Union agrees that Article V(1) bans the development, testing and deployment of "exotic systems". If the private Soviet response had been "no", then the Administration's "reinterpretation" would have been justified.

If the private Soviet response in Geneva were "yes", as one would expect from their public statements since 1972, then the October 6 "reinterpretation" and the October 13 recanting by the Administration would have been unnecessary. Agreed Statements on the basic points could have been quickly negotiated if deemed necessary for clarity.

If a private but positive Soviet response in Geneva were now rejected by the US as "too late" because the US wanted to keep open the option of reasserting its "reinterpretation", then the OSD motive behind the initial change in US position - to erode immediately and eventually destroy the ABM Treaty - would be clear.

X.

As I have testified, written and spoken in various forums in the past two years, the challenge now is to strengthen the ABM Treaty through specific, mutual and verifiable Agreed Statements and Common Understandings. Six former Secretaries of Defense endorsed the importance of the Treaty and the need to strengthen it before this controversy broke (see Exhibit G).

Of course the Soviets must become responsive on the Krasnoyarsk radar which appears to be a clear violation. The booklet I co-authored this spring contains a series of specific recommendations (see Exhibit H) which were intended to start a constructive process consistent with Secretary Shultz's stated goal of reversing the erosion of the ABM Treaty.

In conclusion, let me suggest approaches for three Agreed Statements based upon, and entirely consistent with, my recollection of the SALT I negotiating record which would clarify the overall scope of the ABM Treaty, particularly Article V(1):

(1) First Agreed Statement to Article II(1). As used in this Treaty, "ABM systems", "ABM systems or components", "ABM systems and components" and "ABM systems or their components" include ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars as defined in Article II(1) and any devices based on other physical principles which are capable of substituting for or performing the functions of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars.

(2) First Agreed Statement to Article V(1). Article V(1) applies to ABM components and any devices based on other physical principles which which are capable of substituting for or performing the functions of ABM components, any of which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.

(3) Second Agreed Statement to Article V(1). As used in Article V(1), "develop" refers to that stage of the research and development cycle at which field testing, observable by national technical means, is initiated on ABM components or on any devices which are capable of substituting for or performing the functions of ABM components.

The third suggestion is obviously incomplete. It points out the compelling need to begin the difficult process of resolving some of the ambiguities inherent in the ABM Treaty. The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was established with this as one of its assigned tasks. The SCC has been underutilized. The SCC could easily, and quickly, also review and revise Agreed Statement D to make its intended meaning clearer. A starter in replacing Agreed Statement D could be:

First Agreed Statement to Article III. Article III prohibits the deployment of fixed land-based devices based on other physical principles which are capable of substituting for or performing the functions of fixed land-based ABM systems or components as defined in Article II(1).

First Agreed Statement to Article IV. Fixed land-based devices based on other physical principles which are capable of substituting for or performing the functions of ABM components as defined in Article II(1) may be developed and tested at ABM test ranges described in Article IV.

First Agreed Statement to Article XIV(1). Any obligation in this Treaty may be discussed in accordance with Article XIII and an amendment adopted in accordance with Article XIV.

The six suggested Agreed Statements do not even touch on the question of distinguishing a "component", or device capable of substituting for or performing the function of a component, from a "subcomponent", assembly, adjunct, etc., or the equally difficult question of distinguishing ABM-related space-based sensors from space-based sensors for early warning or for other purposes. Counting rules, presumptions, and *ad hoc* approaches will all be necessary. These challenges will be truly difficult even with the best of intents.

Before constructive steps can start, however, and assuming the Soviets are prepared to negotiate and not just posture, the President should publicly repudiate the legal advice he has recently received from his advisors on a narrow scope of Article V(1) and other critical Articles of the ABM Treaty. Congress could contribute to this result by approving an amendment to the pending DOD appropriations bill which limits fund expenditures to the legal standard in the FY85 Arms Control Impact Statement. This would be a positive step as negotiations continue with the Soviets prior to the Summit.

This whole sorry business could lead to a constructive ending if the US and Soviets were to agree privately in Geneva, before, at or after the Summit, on Agreed Statements along the lines that I have suggested. These should be only the first of many steps needed to avoid further erosion of the ABM Treaty of 1972.

THE WASHINGTON POST WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1985

White House Revises Interpretation of ABM Treaty

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration, reversing the legal interpretations of previous administrations and some of its own past statements, has decided that testing and development of exotic antiballistic missile systems such as those in the "Star Wars" program are permitted under the 1972 ABM treaty.

The administration's new interpretation of the treaty was confirmed yesterday by a senior White House official who briefed reporters on U.S. objections to the recent Soviet offer of a 50 percent cut in certain offensive missiles in return for a ban on Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars. The Soviet offer was described in the briefing as "a place to start" but in its present form one-sided and threatening to U.S. security.

White House national security affairs adviser Robert C. McFarlane volunteered a new interpretation of the 13-year-old Antiballistic Missile Treaty in a television program Sunday. Yesterday the senior White House official, who cannot be identified under the ground rules of the news briefing, confirmed that McFarlane's televised remarks reflected what is now the fixed policy of the administration.

Retired ambassador Gerard Smith, chief U.S. negotiator of the ABM treaty, said the administration's interpretation "makes a dead letter" of the treaty. Smith said he believes it would make possible almost unlimited testing and development under Star Wars, and probably also actual "building" of the space-based antimissile system "so long as you did not deploy."

Administration sources said a new interpretation of the treaty had been under discussion and, at times, intense debate since last summer within the administration's Senior Arms Control Group, or SAC-G.

The administration was moving in the direction indicated by McFarlane in recent weeks—though not to the point of claiming the treaty "authorized and approved" the testing, which were the words McFarlane used Sunday. In administration discussions, sources said, the issue was whether the treaty could be interpreted as permitting such activities. A final decision was "not completely clear" even after McFarlane made his remarks on "Meet the Press," an official said.

One official said the still-secret negotiating record of the ABM treaty is "ambiguous" on the point in question and subject to "a well justified disagreement" within the government. However, this view is disputed by Smith and John Rhinelander, legal counsel to the U.S. delegation that negotiated the ABM treaty.

The nub of the issue is whether an "agreed statement D" between the U.S. and Soviet delegations at the time of the treaty signing on May 26, 1972, gives a broad exemption from the restrictions of the treaty for future types of ABM systems "based on other physical principles" such as lasers and directed-energy weapons. Many elements of the administration's Star Wars research program are based on such exotic technology.

The purpose of agreed statement D, it said, was "to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the treaty," which originally allowed both countries to maintain two conventional ABM systems, based on antimissile missiles.

The agreed statement said that if new ABM systems "based on other physical principles" are created in the future, "specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion . . . and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the treaty"—the article explaining how the treaty could be formally amended.

Until the administration's recent change of mind, that had been interpreted to mean that testing and development of exotic technologies were not legal, except possibly for new versions of fixed, land-based systems that the treaty allowed. Article V of the treaty formally precluded any testing or deployment of "ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based."

Previously the administration's plans for tests of elements of Star Wars have been justified as complying with the ABM treaty on completely different grounds: that these projects were of such low quality, power or reliability that they did not qualify as "components" of an ABM system, or that they could be modified so as not to appear to be part of an illegal system.

Smith and Rhinelander said it was wrong to interpret the "agreed statement" as sanctioning testing of ABM systems or components that are flatly ruled out elsewhere in the treaty. "It is just impossible that an agreed statement supersedes a provision of the treaty," Smith said.

The administration's 1983, 1984 and 1985 Arms Control Impact Statements submitted to Congress by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency took the position that the ABM treaty does put restrictions on ABM programs based on "directed energy technology" or other exotic technology "when such DE programs enter the field testing stage." The 1986 Arms Control Impact Statement, submitted this April, omitted that statement.

The senior official who confirmed the administration's current position said the Soviet Union had never accepted an interpretation of the treaty that banned "research, testing, development of systems based on other physical principles."

The official said there had been "unilateral statements" made that the treaty ought to limit such exotic systems but he added that "never have the Soviets bought that."

The proposed cutbacks in the new Soviet arms control offer are "inappropriately linked" to the demand that the United States stop its Star Wars program, the senior official told reporters yesterday. "It's a precondition that must be dropped," he said.

That the Soviets have made an offer of deep cuts is "a very good development," and a sign that Reagan's policies have paid off, the official said. U.S. negotiators will pursue the details in Geneva, he added.

Most of the White House presentation, though, was centered on objections to the Soviet proposal, especially inclusion of U.S. Euromissiles and "forward based systems" among the strategic weapons to be cut by half. This would produce "highly unequal" forces with great advantages to Moscow, the official said.

These two categories, described as support for U.S. allies, were said to consume 1,149 of the U.S. entitlement of 1,680 strategic nuclear delivery systems under the Soviet plan. The United States would thus have only 531 missiles or bombers left for deterrence against Soviet nuclear attack, and these would be threatened by a much larger number of Soviet weapons.

The White House also said the Soviet proposal might unfairly hamper U.S. military modernization and could have serious verification problems. These aspects of the Soviet proposal have yet to be fully presented in Geneva, it said.



A8 THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1985 THE WASHINGTON POST

Top-Level Fight Led to ABM Policy Shift

Shultz Prevailed in 'Knock-Down, Drag-Out Meeting' on Missile Defense Treaty

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz persuaded President Reagan to preserve key limits of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty in an emotionally charged meeting with a few top officials at the White House last Friday, administration sources said yesterday.

Reagan's decision, announced by Shultz in San Francisco on Monday, partially reversed a shift in policy announced a week earlier by White House national security affairs adviser Robert C. McFarlane and strongly advocated by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger.

Shultz, McFarlane, Weinberger and Director Kenneth L. Adelman of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are reported to have been the only officials present with Reagan when a new ABM policy was formulated in what one administration source called a "knock-down, drag-out meeting."

CBS News reported last night that Shultz won the day after "a subtle threat of resignation" by the secretary of state was conveyed to the White House. A State Department spokesman quoted Shultz as saying the CBS account was "nonsense."

Backing up Shultz's appeal to Reagan, official sources said, were diplomatic messages of sharp concern on the ABM issue from the West German and British governments and the argument of Paul H. Nitze, the U.S. special arms control adviser, that a shift in U.S. policy on the ABM Treaty at this time would cause a storm among U.S. allies and arms control advocates in Congress on the eve of the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting.

The topic at issue was the legal interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which the United States for 13 years has construed as limiting testing and development of antiballistic missile systems based on exotic technologies such as lasers and directed energy weapons. Many elements of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars" program, are based on such exotic technology.

A new Pentagon legal study, endorsed by State Department legal adviser Abraham D. Sofaer, argued that the Soviet negotiators in 1969-72 never accepted the limits on exotic technology as they would apply to Star Wars and that therefore the United States was not bound to do so. This position, which had not yet been formally accepted within the administration, was unexpectedly made public by McFarlane on NBC's "Meet the Press" Oct. 6 and affirmed as administration policy in a White House background briefing two days later.

Retired ambassador Gerard C. Smith, who negotiated the ABM Treaty for the Nixon administration, charged that the new interpretation was erroneous and would make "a dead letter" of the treaty.

Friday's White House meeting took place as Shultz prepared to speak Monday to the San Francisco meeting of legislators from NATO countries, who had sharply questioned NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington and Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson, director of the SDI program, about the ABM shift. Shultz was also preparing to fly from San Francisco to Brussels to see NATO foreign ministers, who were showing signs of dismay about the new ABM stance.

As a result of the White House meeting, Shultz was able to tell both gatherings that Reagan had decided to continue to conduct the SDI program "in accordance with a restrictive interpretation" of the ABM Treaty even though the administration believed the new interpretation advanced by the Pentagon was "fully justified."

In effect, Shultz said that Reagan agreed with the new legal interpretation, which would allow virtually unrestricted testing and development of Star Wars, but would continue to pursue the program under greater restrictions as a measure of voluntary self-restraint.

Shultz did not specify how long the self-restraint would continue, though he suggested it would not end soon. He told a Brussels press conference, for example, that "we have designed our research program to fall within the narrower definition of the ABM Treaty's provisions, and we intend to keep it that way."

Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle, whose office originated the new legal interpretation of the treaty, indicated yesterday that Reagan's decision to abide by the previous restrictive interpretation was temporary.

Perle told reporters that "with respect to the future, it remains to be seen" whether the United States will continue to accept an interpretation of the treaty that rules out full-scale testing and development of space-based antimissile systems.

Asked if the Soviets would be "well within their legal rights" to proceed with research, testing and development of exotic ABMs now that Reagan has decided that restrictions on such activity have no legal standing in the ABM Treaty, Perle replied, "That's correct." When a reporter asked if this were a desirable position from the U.S. standpoint, Perle replied, "It's a realistic position."

New York Times, October 14, 1985

ABROAD AT HOME | Anthony Lewis

Shadow on the Summit

How to kill arms control

BOSTON

It is only a matter of words — a Washington word game, you might say. But the players are after very large stakes. If their gambit works, it will sabotage next month's Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting. And they have an even more ambitious goal: to remove all constraints on the nuclear arms race.

The game, little noticed outside of Washington, is being played with the words of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. For 13 years the treaty has been universally understood to mean what it says: that any ABM system based in space is outlawed. Now the claim is that it means the opposite. Out is in. Down is up.

This amazing proposition was first publicly advanced on television last week by President Reagan's national security adviser, Robert McFarlane. He said the 1972 treaty "approved and authorized" development and testing of space-based ABM systems "involving new physical concepts" such as lasers or directed energy.

In other words, President Reagan's Star Wars program can push ahead without any concern about the ABM treaty. But just last year the Reagan Administration said in a formal statement:

"The ABM treaty prohibition on development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components for such systems applies to directed-energy technology or any other technology used for this purpose. Thus, when such directed-energy programs enter the field-testing phase, they become constrained by these ABM treaty obligations."

How can that plain meaning have been transformed? By an "interpretation" that ought to embarrass the most brazen lawyer in town.

Article 3 of the 1972 treaty allowed a limited number of fixed, land-based ABM's. Article 5 banned the development, testing and deployment of "sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based" systems. Then, in "Agreed Statement D," the parties said they would discuss "specific limitations" on exotic new ABM systems if they were "created in the future."

The claim is that statement D permits new kinds of ABM systems unless the parties now agree to limit them. But the American diplomats who negotiated it say the purpose was the opposite. And statement D itself begins by saying that its purpose is "to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article 3."

An old national security hand, asked about the new "interpretation" of the treaty, said: "You've got to admire their brass. They have interpreted it 180 degrees from its intent. The idea is so preposterous that it would be amusing if it were not so serious."

The serious part is the consequences. The new reading would make the ABM treaty "a dead letter," as its chief negotiator, Gerard Smith, said last week. And it will have been killed in a way that casts doubt on the point of making any arms control agreements with the United States.

Treaties are meant to be serious undertakings. This one was negotiated for a purpose that all the world understood, to limit defensive systems. The United States Senate consented to the treaty by a vote of 88 to 2. Thirteen years later America would be telling the world: "The terms are inconvenient to us now, so on second thought they mean nothing."

The summit meeting would almost certainly be doomed to failure if President Reagan now adopts the new reading of the ABM treaty. That meeting is to focus on arms control, and what would be left to say if the United States had just in effect renounced the main existing arms agreement? Mr. Gorbachev would have a propaganda field day.

For all practical purposes the whole idea of arms control would be dead. With the restraints on defensive systems gone, the Soviet Union would hardly proceed with its recent proposal to cut back on offensive weapons. The impulse would be to an all-out arms race, offensive and defensive.

With consequences so serious, for President Reagan personally and for international security, why would anyone in the Reagan Administration be pushing to read the ABM treaty out of existence? The answer is that the man who surely started this game of words wants the summit to fail and wants all arms control to end.

Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense, is the Administration's principal thinker on these issues — and is utterly opposed to arms control. The rereading of the ABM treaty has the stamp on it of his clever mind, and his ability to get ideas through the bureaucracy. But Secretary of State Shultz has not yet approved this idea, and there is still a chance that he will try to protect the President from this self-inflicted wound. □

NEWS from the
NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO SAVE THE ABM TREATY
1346 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W., SUITE 903, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 463-4213

Gerard C. Smith
Chairman

David Riley
Director

Press Contacts:
David Riley
Carolyn Bluemle

EMBARGOED FOR:
Broadcast: Wed, Oct. 2, 1985, 6PM EDT
Print: Thurs, Oct. 3, 1985, AM

SIX FORMER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE SUPPORT ABM TREATY

Washington, DC, Oct. 3-- Six former Secretaries of Defense, **Harold Brown, Clark M. Clifford, Melvin R. Laird, Robert S. McNamara, Elliot L. Richardson,** and **James R. Schlesinger**, today called on the United States and the Soviet Union to "avoid actions that would undermine the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty."

In a statement released by the **National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty** on the thirteenth anniversary of the Treaty's entering into force, the former Secretaries of Defense expressed their support for the ABM Treaty and urged President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev "to reach agreement in Geneva to negotiate new measures which would prevent further erosion of the Treaty and assure its continued viability."

The statement reads as follows:

> "On the thirteenth anniversary of the entering into force of the ABM Treaty, we reaffirm our view that this international agreement of unlimited duration makes an important contribution to American security and to reducing the risk of nuclear war. As former Secretaries of Defense, we call upon the American and Soviet governments both to avoid actions that would undermine the ABM Treaty and to bring to an end any prior departures from the terms of the Treaty, such as the Krasnoyarsk radar. We urge President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to reach agreement in Geneva to negotiate new measures which would prevent further erosion of the Treaty and assure its continued viability.

--more--

Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Chief Negotiator for the ABM Treaty, is Chairman of the National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty.

Brown, Clifford, Laird, McNamara, Richardson and Schlesinger served as Defense Secretaries for a combined total of over eighteen years. They held office in both Democratic and Republican Administrations under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter.

The ABM Treaty, signed by the US and the USSR in 1972, prohibits both countries from building nationwide defensive systems against ballistic missiles. Since preventing a defensive missile build-up is inextricably linked to limiting offensive weapons, the ABM Treaty is widely considered to be the essential foundation both for the SALT I and SALT II treaties, and for any future treaties limiting offensive weapons.

The National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty is a non-partisan coalition of major national organizations and distinguished individuals including former government officials, military officers, and leading authorities in the arms control and national security field. Campaign Sponsors include former President Jimmy Carter, former Secretaries of State Dean Rusk and Cyrus Vance, and former CIA Directors William Colby and Stansfield Turner.

# # #

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Rhinelander.

The Chair will just observe that we have two panels today, and we will try to wind up the hearing sometime between 12:30 and quarter to 1 so that all Senators can go to their relative party caucuses.

For this reason, I am going to suggest that we have a 5-minute limit on questions for each of the panels. This does not give Senators or panelists much time. But I suspect it is the best we can do in these time constraints that we have.

At this time, I will pass for the moment on my own questioning and recognize Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Five minutes is hard to try to isolate items because there are obviously so many important areas here.

Dealing with the larger issue, I would like to ask both of you, in light of your negotiating experiences, whether either of you can contemplate, either of you, a negotiated future arms control agreement that could guarantee so-called mutual assured survival? Is there such a thing?

If so, I wonder if you could describe it.

Ambassador SMITH. Well, Senator Kerry, if mutual assured survival means that by dint of defenses presumably added to offenses the United States and the Soviet Union could survive and operate as nations after a nuclear exchange, I do not think there is such an arms control agreement.

Senator KERRY. Would you agree with that, Mr. Rhinelander?

Mr. RHINELANDER. Yes; I agree.

I think the question, in another way, is can you conceive of an arms control regime during this period of transition, finally ending up with a defense-dominated one. I cannot. I think you have problems of timing and you have problems of perception. We have difficulty enough negotiating under the present doctrine. I cannot conceive of it happening under those circumstances.

Senator KERRY. Would you agree that there is a discrepancy between the notion of a mutual assured survival, as has been described to the American people, and the SDI Program that is being offered here before committees and in testimony both classified and unclassified?

Ambassador SMITH. Well, I don't know what the classified testimony has been, but it seems from reading the public record that the administration, except for the President's rhetoric, is departing substantially from the concept of March 1983.

What we are hearing now is that well, defenses would complicate the other fellow's problems. To my mind, that is a matter of beefing up deterrence and not substituting for deterrence.

The President says our present strategy is immoral. But this new strategy, a beefed up deterrence, is equally immoral.

Senator KERRY. Pursuing that, it seems to me that the argument right now, the fall-back position, is we are going to deter the Soviet Union from its willingness to undertake a first strike, and this will add to deterrence. Having negotiated for so long, I wonder if you would share with us your thoughts as to what alternatives, other than SDI, might either have the same effect or a better effect in terms of deterring the Soviets from considering a first strike during a grave crisis.

Ambassador **Smith**. First, let me cast my personal doubts that the Soviets have any inclination to have a first strike. I think they and we are about on a par as far as inclination to first strike, because they know they would be completely destroyed.

On the question what could be done, it seems to me if we could get reductions in offensive weapons, especially in those that are most dangerous, like fixed land-based systems, because they are vulnerable, that would tend to reduce this contingency that we are worried about.

If we could get a 50-percent reduction in the Soviet heavy missiles—308 of them—I think that our concerns about being hit would be substantially relieved. That is what we have been trying to do since 1969, to get those heavy missiles reduced. We now have a great opportunity to do it, and apparently we are disposed to let that opportunity pass because the price would be some new constraint on defensive systems development.

Senator **Kerry**. Mr. Rhinelander, you started to say that you thought part of the process might involve a strengthening and a redefining somewhat of the ABM Treaty. I wonder if you would share with us what specific steps we ought to be taking or you would recommend with respect to that strengthening and redefining.

Mr. **Rhinelander**. The first step I would take would be to reaffirm the old interpretation, which was the one that was in existence for 13 years. As I indicated, I think the language is simple to draft, but there is a major policy issue behind the language.

I think we ought to have a separate antisatellite agreement. I think we need that on its own merits. But, in addition, I don't ~~think you~~ can keep an ABM Treaty in force forever as long as both sides can go forward with antisatellite programs. You can test a lot of BMD technology under the guise of ASAT. As you know, some of the SDI programs right now are labeled ASAT or anti-ASAT programs.

I have recommended four amendments to the ABM Treaty, and they are in an exhibit to my statement.

Senator **Kerry**. Let me stop you at that point, if I can.

Is it your assertion simultaneously that tests are specifically so labeled in order to circumvent the ABM Treaty?

Mr. **Rhinelander**. No; I don't think so. I think we are going concurrently with a BMD program and developing ASAT's, both the current generation, and looking at future technology for that purpose.

But the problem you have is that if you have constraints in one area and not in another, then you have the opportunity to put on labels. This is similar to what the Soviets have done. They have labeled Krasnoyarsk as space track radar. It looks like an early warning radar, and it is pointed in the direction of where they have a gap. You open up that whole avenue.

We are going to have to make a decision at some point in time of whether we really want to have tight constraints on the defense—we have quite tight, but not fully tight, ones right now—or whether we are going to leave openings. If you leave openings, then there is a high likelihood they are going to be exploited.

The CHAIRMAN. I will need to break in at this point, unfortunately, and recognize Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Smith, I believe you have stated that you preferred a mobile system to any sort of defensive system in protecting ICBM vulnerability. Is that a correct interpretation of your comments?

Ambassador SMITH. I think a mobile ICBM system would be much less provocative of arms race instability than to go for defenses of silos. Yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Even a type of land-based defensive system?

Ambassador SMITH. No. I am talking about mobile ICBM's, not mobile defenses.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Right.

But you would then, in fact, believe that there should be no emphasis on a technology or on any technologies that would lead us to some type of defensive system?

Ambassador SMITH. I think there ought to be a major research program on strategic defenses for two purposes. One is an insurance policy against Soviet creep-out or breakout from the ABM Treaty. Second is an assistance for our intelligence, our understanding of what the Soviets are doing in defenses. Unless we do this research ourselves, we will be handicapped in understanding what our intelligence tells us about Soviet work.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Both of you, I would guess, would believe, however, that the whole SDI concept has been instrumental in the Soviets really very much wanting to get back to the bargaining table?

Ambassador SMITH. I think the timing is surprising because, although this is a theory that is generally expressed, when the announcement was made about star wars, the Soviets were still at the table and were for many months after that. So, technically, it is hard to say that this brought them back to the table when they were already at the table.

But I would say that I think the Soviet present interest in negotiation has been stimulated by the looming possibility of defenses by the United States.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Mr. Rhinelander, did you have a comment?

Mr. RHINELANDER. I would say that I do not think it brought them back to the table. I think they recognized they looked very foolish when they walked out and that they were hurting themselves in terms of posture and propaganda. It certainly, though, has whetted their appetite to discuss deep reductions, way beyond what they have ever discussed before.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I guess, Ambassador Smith, you believe without some constraints on the defensive concepts, they would really not be prepared to be serious in negotiating any deep restraints on the offensive side?

Ambassador SMITH. That's correct. I cannot conceive that the Soviets, or ourselves, for example, would be willing to reduce our forces in half in the face of a real Soviet threat or a real American threat to render those missiles impotent and obsolete, which is our purpose.

I wonder what our military would say if, when we saw Soviet defenses being deployed, the political side of the house said now is the time for us to reduce our offenses. I don't think we would.

Senator KASSEBAUM. It seems to me that one of the things that could be most beneficial from these talks is something that evidently, Mr. Rhinelander, you feel is not going to happen, and that is clearly defining either the components, as you mentioned, and even the concepts that we are talking about. Sometimes I think we are talking about apples and oranges, rather than apples and apples.

Wouldn't it be very useful, whether we are considering negotiations on a different formula for the ABM or for any discussions, to more clearly define what we are talking about?

Mr. RHINELANDER. I think that is absolutely necessary.

During SALT I, the Soviets basically wanted to deal with things at a high level of generality. We sought much more detail than we were able to get.

During SALT II, and I was not involved in SALT II, there was agreement on detail which was inconceivable to us in SALT I.

We have to go back now and get that kind of detail relating to the ABM Treaty. Some of these questions are genuinely difficult.

I want to stress that the dividing line between research and development, as you apply it to new technology, is not going to be easy, and the details are important. For us to constrain our programs, we have to have detailed provisions which we can apply to the Soviets.

The problem with the Soviet position right now, as they focus on intent, as I mentioned earlier, is they are looking at our public record, they know the purpose of some of our programs, but they do not tell us anything about their programs. Well, we are going to have to deal with this so that we have mutual and specific limits on this.

Now this only becomes relevant if we are willing to back off this reinterpretation, because recognize that with the reinterpretation we are saying legally there are no constraints on development or testing of those space-based systems. The dividing line between research and development and the meaning of subcomponent is relevant only if you go back to the interpretation that used to be in place.

The CHAIRMAN. I will need to intrude at this point.

Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Gentlemen, if I have read your testimony correctly, there are three elements that would be part of any negotiating package if your recommendations were accepted. One would be a commitment not to pursue substantial changes in the ABM Treaty and certainly nothing permitting the testing and deployment of SDI. On the other hand, you would press ahead with efforts to gain reductions in Soviet heavy missiles. I think Ambassador Smith mentioned that if we could get a 50-percent reduction in heavy Soviet land-based systems, that would be an important achievement and lastly, missile mobility was to be encouraged, rather than banned, essentially because mobility would enhance stability.

Now, the construction of this kind of proposal—and this may not do justice to it because of all the nuances—would be of course sharply at variance with the proposal submitted by the administration in Geneva which reflects an emphasis on research into strategic defense and a preferred ban on mobile ICBM's. But I would suppose that you would be in agreement with the administration effort to reduce heavy missiles, although differences may exist over the question of sublimits and counting rules.

Is my characterization of your negotiating preferences roughly accurate?

Mr. RHINELANDER. I would accept it. With respect to "not to develop and test." I would lock in the old interpretation and then deal with what I think is the cutting edge issue, the dividing line between research and development and the components.

Let me make just one comment on the mobile ICBM's. I would support the mobile ICBM's because I think, in terms of strategic stability, it is important.

You have to recognize that there is an arms control cost to it, but in terms of analyzing it through, I would favor the mobile missile.

I would say, however, that from what I know of the costs of the mobile Midgetman, they are going to be very, very high, and I think that is going to be a real problem which the Congress is going to have to deal with. A single mobile missile makes a lot of sense strategically. It gives you a much more stable land-based leg of the triad, but the cost is going to be extremely high.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to the resource costs, the verification problems associated with enhanced mobility could become ever more substantial.

However, several of our witnesses last week suggested that the benefits of increased invulnerability and the consequent enhancement of stability which could flow from greater mobility would outweight the potential verification costs associated with mobile ICBM's. In short, they seemed to be suggesting some kind of tradeoff between verification and stability.

Is that a fair way of posing such a tradeoff and would you favor it?

Mr. RHINELANDER. Well, as I indicated, I would accept the tradeoff. I would stress, and I think Gerry Smith ought to make some comments on it, that during SALT I, we sought a ban on mobile ICBM's. In fact, there is a statement in the record which the Russians would not accept stating the U.S. position very forcefully.

I think, under the current situation, with the increased accuracy of the forces on both sides, I would come out on the side of stability, which means mobility, rather than a ban.

In terms of the verification question, it is more difficult, without question, but we seem to be able to verify the SS-20, which, as you know, is a mobile intermediate one. So, if the Soviet deployment pattern stays about where it has been, where they have areas where they clearly put the missiles, you can verify what has been deployed. You cannot in any of the systems, of course, verify how many spare missiles are in the factories or may be in sheds in different places in countries.

Gerry, I know that you have very strong views on mobiles.

Ambassador SMITH. I think the first thing to recognize is that our views about the advantage of mobile missiles have not been constant. I don't know if it has ever been reflected in formal positions, but I would say the general drift of American opinion has changed about three times as to whether they are good or not good.

There is a basic tension between the invulnerability argument and the verifiability argument.

I think that I would be inclined to say if we had been able to verify the SS-20's with a reasonable amount of confidence, that unverifiability argument should not override the invulnerability side. But it is not an open and shut case by any means.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this question.

To what extent should our views relative to a strategic modernization program or an arms control negotiating package be constrained by the issue of cost? The argument has been made by some that the costs associated with the SDI could be enormous. You have just suggested that a single warhead, mobile ICBM would be very costly.

Secretary Weinberger pointed out last month before the committee that we have no choice but to pay the price of defense, that we simply cannot be found wanting in this respect. But, clearly, part of the Soviet willingness to come back to the negotiating table stems the economic constraints felt in Moscow and some desire to reorder priorities.

To what extent do the economic and other costs of defense play a role in our thinking about arms control negotiations?

Ambassador SMITH. I think that the Soviets historically have been willing to pay whatever price is necessary for what they thought was in the interest of their security. I think we must take the same position.

I think that the Congress is going to face a terrible problem of an explosion of deficits and something has to be done about it. But, basically, it seems to me that we have to find some way to do what is necessary for our security and, at the same time, solve the deficit problem.

So I do not take much comfort out of the argument that the Soviets are going to go bankrupt and we can drive them to the wall. They will go to the wall, and as the Soviets said in SALT I, "We will do what is necessary if we have to go without trousers for 10 years."

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Let me ask Senator Kerry if he has additional questions.

If so, we will have another round of 5 minutes, and then we will need to conclude the first panel.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Part of the approach to SDI has been the frequently asserted notion that there is going to be a period of transition which will be negotiated with the Soviet Union.

Some skeptics raise the issue of the difficulties we currently face in negotiating anything with them and ask how we are going to negotiate something as complex as that.

Both of you have been part of the United States-Soviet negotiating process.

I wonder if you would comment on that from your experience. Is a transition to strategic defenses something we can fairly anticipate is negotiatable with the Soviet Union, and what makes you believe so, if it is?

Ambassador SMITH. Well, as I stated in my prepared testimony, I have grave doubts about the negotiability of this sort of switch from retaliatory policy to a mutual security pact of some sort. I think that the problems of verification are never mentioned when you hear talk about low we would negotiate a transition agreement. I think they would be immense, as you would have to factor in certain levels of defense and factor out certain levels of offense.

So if it can be done, nobody has suggested yet how it could be done. The OTA report, as I quoted from it, suggests that this is a very difficult, if possible, thing.

So I don't think we ought to plan or bank on this being do-able.

We are presently going ahead with what constitutes, what foreshadows, a new military strategy, a radical military strategy, based on technology that is nonexistent and dependent on Soviet cooperation with now an interpretation of a treaty that I think is farfetched.

So I do not see that we are working on what is yet a feasible projection of the future.

Mr. RHINELANDER. Senator, I stated my views earlier, and I don't know how we would negotiate it. I think also the question assumes that the Soviets would want to go the way we might want to go if SDI represents U.S. national policy.

I don't think they would follow us that way. I think they might go with a land-based defensive system, some of it exotic, some of it traditional technology. But I think their emphasis would be on increasing their offensive capability—different systems, more warheads, more penetration aids. You cannot negotiate if you start from different positions and intend to end up in different positions.

But even if you had the same end objective, I still do not know how you would negotiate. You have real problems of timing. You have problems of perception, that the other side may be moving faster than you are. You have real problems of breakout, of reversing, or breaking out of the negotiations entirely.

I think it is a problem which really could not be handled in national negotiations, and it is inherently more complex than the kinds of issues we have been dealing with in the SALT process since 1969.

Senator KERRY. So that I am sure I am coming at this from the right place, let me ask you if you agree with this: that there are only two kinds of status that you could negotiate. One is that if SDI were to work out the way some people say it will, you would be negotiating an effective neutralization of nuclear capabilities on both sides. You would take away the nuclear umbrella, from Europe, and eliminate the ability of both sides to use nuclear weapons for the purpose of detemance. The other is that you would not eliminate nuclean weapons. You would negotiate the very same situation that we have today, which is a continued ability to penetrate by both sides. In this case, after all the trillions of dollars are spent and SDI is created, you would be negotiating the very same relationship of deterrence that we have today.

Is that correct?

Ambassador SMITH. I have not heard much discussion about after defenses have been developed negotiating not to deploy them, though that may be in back of some people's minds. I think with the momentum behind a longterm research and development project, it would be an immense effort to get agreement not to deploy defenses. If that is going to be done, it ought to be done now, before the baby is born.

So I would not put much stock in that as an alternative. I think the true alternative is either to try to get some stop at this point or to defer negotiation 10 or 20 years as to how you would introduce defenses in a fashion that was least destabilizing.

Mr. RHINELANDER. Senator Kerry, I would like to make just one point which has not really come up this morning but is critically important.

There are different kinds of defenses. Most of the questions and certainly the President's speech in March 1983 have focused on defense of people, the broad defense, the "igloo" or the "plastic dome."

I think generally the technical people say that cannot be done, and I agree with that.

You certainly can, though, have a defense of what used to be called the hard point defense, defense of the ICBM's, or other hard targets.

Now that technically can be done and it can complicate the offensive challenge.

The real problem there, though, is to make sure that any kind of hard point defense is unambiguous and is not going to be the base for a regional or a nationwide defense with a quick breakout capability. For instance, anything which is space-based, by definition, is national or worldwide in scope. If you start off with a fixed land-based terminal system, that is the kind of thing which is technically possible.

It is costly. There are other, and I think better, ways of enhancing the deterrent capability, but certainly that is technically a possible solution to the problem, and it is the one which was really preserved by the ABM Treaty. Remember that we had up in 1972 one site in North Dakota, or we had it underway. It became operational, and I think it was shut down within a year because the technology deployed at that time really was not up to the task. But conceptually, that is a way which could be taken.

It could be done, again, if the technology used were unambiguous. It could be done consistent with the basic thrust of the ABM Treaty, although there would have to be some technical amendments.

Ambassador SMITH. Let me say on that score that one of our real problems in SALT I was how you would distinguish between a defense of a few silos and a defense of the Nation. Both sides agreed a defense of the Nation would be bad. But if you have defenses around silos, especially in the Soviet Union, where they stretch over wide areas of the Soviet Union, would we be content if they just put up a sign and said well, these are for defense of silos? We would suspect that it was the basis for or an actual defense of cities.

So it is that ambiguity that John is talking about that, to my mind, is a very difficult hurdle to get over.

The CHAIRMAN. I must intrude at this point and recognize Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I have only one very brief thought, and maybe it is more of a comment than a question.

It seems to me, in analyzing, say, the mobile system on its merits as policy, the debate at this point is almost more politics than policy, because the SDI, in its grandest concept of protecting populations and destroying bombs is one that is very appealing to people, and it is very hard to convince constituencies in our individual states that we would want a mobile system based in, say, Massachusetts, Indiana, or Kansas.

I think at this point it is really a question of an attractive alternative or a debate that is clearly understood and has become very much a political concept and one that people yearn to feel comfortable with, a protection.

I think that is frustrating to those of us who are trying to understand the technology, the alternatives, the debate, and translate it to the public as well.

Ambassador SMITH. This may not be directly responsive to your comment, but there is a direct relationship between this mobile question and the strategic defense initiative, the whole defense question, because there are two ways to consider defending or making ICBM's less vulnerable. One is to protect them with antiballistic missiles. The other is to make them mobile.

So people who are trying to push the strategic defense initiative I think would be inclined to want to ban mobiles because they would be an alternative and having them would make a stronger case for having SDI continue.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask one followup question.

Are you suggesting that if, as part of negotiating strategic defense with the Soviet Union, we were to stake out certain areas for silo defense—I think you suggested signs at the various sites indicating we are defending silos—with the express purpose of enhancing deterrence and stability, then the Soviets might conceivably find such a procedure acceptable?

Mr. RHINELANDER. Mr. Chairman, let me make one comment, and then I will turn it over to Gerry.

The problem is I don't know of any technology which is being explored which would unambiguously be limited to that purpose. It is the breakout problem which Gerry described during SALT I.

Second, the thrust of SDI is at a technology which is not suitable for that purpose. The thrust is at the boost-phase intercept. That is not for defense of silos. That is for missiles going in any direction on the compass.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be true and maybe others would suggest alternative technological avenues with that purpose in mind. But if, in the SDI panoply of ideas, there emerged one of some feasibility focussing on the defense of silos, on the defense of our current deterrent, could this not constitute a positive element in our efforts to enhance stability and negotiate arms control?

Ambassador SMITH. Well, the President, and I think the Secretary of Defense, have categorically said that this is not the purpose of SDI, to protect silos.

I think that there are a lot of serious people who are thinking of trying to develop the SDI technology in ways that would perform this function.

My feeling is that this is manageable to some extent, but if we did go in that direction, I think we would complicate, and not simplify, the stability question, and I hope we do not go in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would we complicate it, Ambassador Smith? Wouldn't we have greater stability if our deterrent were sounder behind those defenses?

Ambassador SMITH. Yes—if. But I think what that sort of program would do would be to lead both sides to go in for better ways to penetrate to make sure. They are not going to let our ICBM's and we are not going to let their ICBM's become invulnerable. I think we will work on pen-aids, I think we will work on more accuracy, we may even work on more missiles. Given enough offensive missiles, I don't think you can defend a given number of ICBM silos.

So it will lead, I think, to pressures for more racing.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rhinelander?

Mr. RHINELANDER. Senator Lugar, I think we have to look at it in terms of both sides of the equation. I think if there were technology which were unambiguously limited to this, this is an option which should be looked at. It has been looked at over the years.

A number of years ago, when the question was the mobile MX basing, you will recall one of the options was to couple it with some kind of terminal defense. The problem is this. If the Soviets go and do similar kinds of things, what are our perceptions going to be?

I would submit to you that our perceptions are probably that it is to breakout, the first step to a nationwide defense.

Today's papers have articles about their antiaircraft systems, their SAM systems, which some of them have been tested now against short-range missiles. The fear is that what the Soviets will do is not limited, but is going to be toward a broad, nationwide defense. I think you have to look at it both ways.

The natural thrust, if the Soviets were to go with a limited kind of one, would be enormous pressure to increase our offense to make sure that we could penetrate it. Our allies would also have troubles, as you know. The British and French, at the moment, have their nuclear deterrent forces and defensive systems. Widespread systems in the Soviet Union, would clearly denigrate their nuclear programs.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your testimony and your forthcoming answers to our questions.

At this point, we will excuse the two of you and ask that the Honorable Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy of the Department of Defense, come to the witness table.

As soon as Secretary Perle has come to the witness table, I am going to call upon the ranking Democratic member, Senator Pell, for an opening statement.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize to Ambassador Smith and Mr. Rhinelander about not being here. I look forward to reading their testimony.

I believe that this hearing that you have called, Mr. Chairman, is a very valuable one. Indeed, as we learn from the experts about why the ABM Treaty is important, we see that if one side starts to erode it, the other side would be left with no alternative other than to do the same.

I think that, for the time being, we have no alternative to mutual deterrence. We hope the day will come when that will not be the case, but for the time being, it is, and I think we have to recognize these facts.

I look forward to hearing Mr. Perle's statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Mr. Perle, if you would give an opening statement, perhaps within a 10-minute time limit, the committee would then like to proceed with questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD PERLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. PERLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee this morning. I think I can be very brief in some opening remarks.

I think it is important in considering strategic defenses generally in the SDI program to recall the logic that was thought to prevail in 1972, when the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Forces were negotiated.

I think it was the general understanding in this country that we would be prepared to give up a potential defense, a defense that had been designed and developed and that was ready for deployment, if the Soviets would obviate the requirement for that defense by accepting significant limitations on the projected growth of their offensive forces.

Indeed, it made a good deal of sense. If the Soviets were going to restrain the offense, it would not be necessary for us to deploy a defense, and we would both be better off.

The phrase that was most commonly used in 1972 to describe what had been agreed on the 26th of May was that we had succeeded in the agreement on offensive forces, an interim agreement that would have expired in 1977, in halting the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup.

There were others who thought at the time that the Soviets had accepted a broader concept, the concept that it is desirable for both sides to remain vulnerable to retaliatory attack.

I think the historical record on that does not support the conclusion that the Soviets accepted that view. I think it is sufficient to explain their willingness to sign the ABM Treaty in terms of their capacity to deploy an ABM system at that time, measured against our demonstrated capacity to deploy such a system.

But, in any case, it is now clear that we did not succeed in halting the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup. The Soviet strategic buildup continued unabated, with the result that some 8,000 or so strategic weapons have been added to the Soviet arsenal since that interim agreement was signed in 1977, fully half of those added to Soviet forces since the SALT II Treaty was signed in 1979.

Not only has the Soviet buildup in offensive forces of all kinds continued; but from 1972 on, the Soviets redoubled their efforts with respect to strategic defenses. While the United States, by contrast, chose not to proceed even with the defenses that it was permitted to build under the treaty, the Soviets greatly increased their investment in research and development on defensive forces. They have made a sustained effort since to upgrade the Moscow ABM system, deploying new interceptors, including above-ground interceptors that can be rather rapidly deployed, developing new radars, including radars that can be rapidly deployed, and filling out a network of large phased array radars, similar in nature to the radars the U.S. had planned to build in 1972, a network that includes a radar at Krasnoyarsk that has been the subject of much discussion because it is our view that this radar constitutes a violation of the ABM Treaty and a rather important violation.

In addition to augmenting the classical sorts of antiballistic missile defense permitted under the treaty, the Soviets have had, for many years, a vigorous research and development program with respect to exotic approaches to strategic defense, approaches that were defined in the ABM Treaty as those based on other physical principles. Many elements of that Soviet program reach back into the 1960's, and they have been sustained throughout the whole of this period.

This leaves us in 1985 with a very large Soviet offensive force, a force that threatens the survivability of major elements of the U.S. strategic deterrent, certainly those portions of our deterrent that are land-based, and a vigorous Soviet program in the defensive area, that includes violations of the ABM Treaty—and, by the way, there have been violations as well of the various agreements on offensive forces, including SALT II.

In my judgment, it does not make much sense for the United States to compete with the Soviet Union in an area where the Soviets are strong and we are weak. It does make sense for us to compete with the Soviet Union in the interest of maintaining a stable strategic balance by exploiting the areas where we are strong.

One of the areas in which I think we are notably weak is the deployment of additional offensive missiles, and, in particular, additional land-based offensive missiles. I think we are weak in this regard for a variety of reasons. We have all seen the difficulty entailed in deploying the MX missile. A number of issues arise when mobile missiles are considered; they have to be placed somewhere and nobody is very keen to accept them. And I think there is a great reluctance in this country to go on deploying offensive missiles.

The Soviets are not troubled by any obvious reluctance to do that. They are, in fact, doing it. They have many times the land area in which it is possible to deploy land-based ballistic missiles, including mobile missiles, and, indeed, they are now in the process of doing precisely that.

So, competing with them in that area seems to me to be a foolish choice of the terms on which a continuing competition is likely to be played out.

We do have some advantages or potential advantages with respect to high technology, and one of the areas in which it may be possible to bring our technological base to bear is the development of strategic defenses which, if successfully deployed, would have the consequence, in the first instance, of diminishing the effective size of the Soviet offensive force, because some fraction of it, hopefully a large fraction, could be intercepted.

So, rather than match the Soviets in offensive weapons, it seems to me to make sense to see whether we can develop defensive weapons exploiting one of our areas of strength, rather than competing with the Soviets where they are strong.

In any case, I believe that the size and magnitude and vigor of the Soviet strategic defense program—and they have one, although they are loath to acknowledge it, has created a situation in which defenses are likely to be developed, and the question that remains is whether they will be developed on one side alone or on both sides.

In this I think we face a situation analogous to the situation faced by President Truman, when he had the difficult decision to make whether to proceed to develop thermonuclear weapons. Many of you will recall that, in that very difficult debate, there was division in the scientific and technical community, rather strikingly like the division that applies today over the question of SDI. Indeed, some of the players are the same.

In those days, Edward Teller argued that we ought to proceed to develop thermonuclear weapons in the belief that the Soviets would do so whether we did or not, and if we did not and they did, they would emerge with a monopoly of those weapons.

Robert Oppenheimer and a large fraction of the scientific community who supported him held the view that we ought not to proceed to the development of thermonuclear weapons because if we did so, the Soviets would surely follow suit and we would be worse off.

We now know that even as President Truman was grappling with that difficult issue, a young physicist named Andrei Sakharov had been drafted by Stalin to initiate work on the Soviet thermonuclear weapon development program, which ultimately succeeded.

I think it is clear that, had Truman listened to Oppenheimer and not Teller, the thing Teller feared most would have come about, that is, the Soviets would have emerged in the early 1950's with a monopoly of thermonuclear weapons.

I think the situation we face today is rather analogous to that. The Soviets, in my judgment, are going to continue their program, both the advanced research associated with the technologies that we subsume under the term strategic defense initiative and steady improvements to defense systems of the more classical sort.

The term "breakout" has been used here this morning, and let me say a word about the concerns we have that the Soviets may, even now, be breaking out of the ABM Treaty.

It was understood in 1972, and a great deal of time was spent negotiating the specifics because of that understanding, that the key to the deployment of a nationwide defense, a territorial defense, based on classical technologies, was the construction of large phased array radars—they were key because they take anywhere from 5 to 7 years to build; they are highly visible and can be observed—while the other elements of a territorial defense can be built and stockpiled and rather rapidly deployed, so one could be surprised by all the elements of a strategic defense except the large phased array radars.

The Soviets have been building these large phased array radars ever since 1972, and they now have in place roughly twice the number the United States anticipated building for the defense that we had in mind in 1972, the Safeguard antiballistic missile system.

One of these radars is the radar at Krasnoyarsk, and that radar essentially completes the comprehensive radar coverage of the Soviet Union of a sort that could be used—I cannot say will be used because I think the evidence is not in—but of a sort that could be used to support a territorial defense which would, itself, be a violation of the ABM Treaty.

In addition to the large phased array radars that take years to deploy, the Soviets have developed smaller radars that can be deployed in a matter of months, and we have no way of knowing to what extent the Soviets may have produced other radars similar to the ones that we have seen, no way of knowing whether they may choose, at some point in the future, to deploy significant numbers of these radars, which would be tied in to the large phased array radars that are already in evidence.

Moreover, the Soviets have, for many years, been experimenting in order to determine the effectiveness of air defense systems used for the purpose of intercepting ballistic missiles. The Soviets have many thousands of these surface-to-air missiles deployed for air defense purposes. They have new ones under development and in the testing phase. And some of these new Soviet air defense weapons have at least some capability to intercept ballistic missiles.

So we are faced with the prospect—and, again, we cannot be definitive because it is simply too soon to say, but it is important to anticipate these developments—that with the large phased array radar complete and the 5- to 7-year lead-time essentially gone, of the addition to that large phased array radar, network, of the other important ABM elements, that the Soviets could deploy rapidly a territorial ABM defense.

This is a matter of significant concern to the administration and to our military planners. It is what we mean when we talk about breakout and it is a matter that is not theoretical, it is here and now.

The only uncertainty that remains is whether what we are seeing is, in fact, evidence that the Soviets are headed in that direction or not. But what we are seeing disturbs us greatly.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would say just a word about the question that has arisen this morning about the inclusion or exclusion of mobile ICBM's in any arms control regime that may be negotiated.

We think there are a number of good reasons why mobile ICBM's ought to be banned. One of them has to do with verification.

The observation has been made this morning that we are able to verify the deployment of the SS-20, and it is sometimes assumed, as a consequence of that fact, that we will be able to verify Soviet deployments of mobile ICBM's.

So, let me be clear about what it is we can verify with respect to the SS-20.

The Soviets have obliged our efforts at verification by associating SS-20 launchers with large and highly visible structures, single bay garages, as we call them. They did not have to deploy the SS-20 in that manner; they chose to do so.

There is no reason to believe that if they were to embark upon a covert program of the deployment of mobile ICBM's, they would ease our verification problem by associating those ICBM's with fixed and highly visible installations. Indeed, the SS-25, a MIRV'd mobile ICBM, is likely to be deployed on railcars, and it is entirely possible that those railcars, containing those SS-25's, will be indistinguishable from railcars conveying ordinary commodities.

So we will have a potentially severe verification problem, leaving us in the dark as to the number of mobile ICBM's that the Soviets might possess over and above any limit agreed upon.

Moreover, we are hoping that in the course of the Geneva negotiations we would be successful in persuading the Soviets to accept the sort of deep reductions that we have in mind. I believe that in a regime for the future, in which deep reductions have been taken, the requirement for a mobile ICBM on our side would be greatly diminished. It is by no means certain, although we are trying to develop it, that we will be successful in developing an effective and survivable mobile ICBM that can be deployed, given all of the constraints that apply to the deployment of such weapons.

So we think that the argument for banning these missiles on both sides is a very powerful one: We face two Soviet mobile ICBM's and the likelihood that there will be variations of those two and possibly even additional mobile ICBM's while we have now on the drawing board a mobile ICBM that under the best of circumstances would be deployed in a rather limited area of our national territory.

So we think the world would be better off without mobile ICBM's, and for that reason the new proposal made by the administration would ban those missiles, solve the verification problem, and reduce one potential source of instability in the future.

Mr. Chairman, I think I can most usefully stop here and leave as much of the remaining time as possible to respond to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Perle.

Once again, the Chair would suggest that we have a 5-minute limit on the questions as we proceed.

I would call now upon Senator Pell for his questions.

Senator PELL: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Perle, as you know, you are generally identified quite publicly as being not an enthusiast for arms control. In this regard, would you tell us what you believe would be the broad outlines of a good arms control agreement that you would support.

Mr. **Perle**. Yes.

I think it might be an agreement that resulted in significant reductions in offensive forces, so that the prospect that the Soviets might initiate an attack and significantly degrade our ability to retaliate. This would obviously entail limitations of a similar nature on our forces. That would be very much in the interests of the United States and I could support that enthusiastically.

Senator **Pell**. But wouldn't that be very much in line with a 50-percent reduction in strategic weapons as has been proposed by the Soviets? Where is the difference?

Mr. **Perle**. It is very much in line with the 50-percent reduction that we have proposed. It is rather far from the 50-percent reduction that the Soviets have proposed.

What the Soviets have done is to define the category of weapons to be reduced in a one-sided and self-serving manner, so that they include among the weapons to be reduced by 50 percent virtually all of our theater weapons, which they know are devoted to the defense of our allies. In this regard, they are seeking to reverse agreements reached in 1972, in which those weapons were not counted as strategic forces and never have been counted as strategic forces. By that method of accounting, you can produce the appearance of a 50-percent reduction. But, it turns out on close examination that it is an inequitable 50-percent reduction.

Senator **Pell**. Speaking of our allies, following up that thought, you obviously do not believe that the British and French weapons should be included in any arms control agreement we reach with the Soviets. But, if the shoe were on the other foot and if, for the sake of argument, the Poles or the Bulgarians had an independent nuclear force, wouldn't we be insistent that they would be included in any overall agreement?

Would you insist?

Mr. **Perle**. I don't know that we would. I think it would depend very much on the nature of those forces, and it depends, of course, on the nature of the alliance.

We do not command and control the British and French forces. I have no doubt that the Soviets would not permit the Poles or anyone else under their authority to maintain an independent deterrent that was beyond their command and control.

So I think we would have to regard any Polish missile as a Soviet missile with Polish markings. That is not the case with the British and French.

Senator **Pell**. I was sort of struck by what Mr. Andropov said to me a couple of years ago when I made the same argument that you did with him, that those missiles are not pointed at Rome, London, or Washington, but they are pointed at Moscow. I think the question is where their potential targets are. Would you not think so?

Mr. **Perle**. I think the Soviets have for a long time taken the view which they have been prepared to set aside in 1972, and again in 1979, and one hopes they will be prepared again to set it aside in 1985, that any weapon that can strike Soviet territory is, by definition, a strategic weapon.

In taking this position, I think they seek to divide the United States from its allies, because under a common ceiling, we cannot both provide for the theater forces necessary to defend our allies and the strategic forces necessary to defend the United States. The Soviets know that full well.

I think the history of this issue is an interesting one in the context of intermediate nuclear forces.

As I understand it, when then-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt discussed the British and French forces with then-Soviet General Secetary Brezhnev, Brezhnev dismissed as inconsequential the British and French forces. I think that reflects a military judgment by the Soviet general staff that differs from the political use they have sought to make of the existence of very small deterrent forces owned by the British and French which I believe they maintain for the sole purpose of responding to an attack on Britain or France.

Senator PELL. Or, as De Gaulle used to call it, the "force de frappe," from his viewpoint.

Let us move on to another area, the idea of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Mr. Gorbachev has advanced the idea that that would be helpful to achieve the President's goal eventually of a nonnuclear world because it would make more difficult the development of new weapons, new nuclear weapons—if they could not be tested—and also would reduce confidence in the reliability of the weapons in being.

Is there any kind of test ban treaty that you could see which you believe would be in the national interest of the United States?

Mr. PERLE. I do not believe that a comprehensive test ban would be in our interest in a period in which we are dependent on safe, reliable, nuclear weapons.

If we got to a point where significant disarmaments had taken place and the role of nuclear weapons had declined significantly, then I think we would want to reexamine that. But we cannot verify a comprehensive test ban. It would be possible, under such a ban, for the Soviets to conduct low-yield tests, very likely sufficient to validate the reliability of their forces. We could not do that under such circumstances, and I think the unreliability that would result, the inability further to develop weapons with a view to safety, security, and survivability would, in fact, reduce the security of the strategic balance and not enhance it.

Senator PELL. What about moving ahead with the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty, which would permit this testing? Is there any reason why we should not go ahead and ratify that?

Mr. PERLE. Well, we are, as you know, abiding by it, even in the absence of its ratification.

Our view here is that——

Senator PELL. Excuse me. When you say "our" is that the administration's view or your personal view?

Mr. PERLE. The administration's.

Our view is that we cannot at present verify compliance with the Threshhold Test Ban. There is evidence that the Soviets have conducted tests in excess of 150 kilotons.

So we have made a proposal to the Soviets that they have thus far not responded positively to, but we continue to hope they will. It is that we get together and negotiate additional verification measures that would give us sufficient confidence so that we would then be justified in ratifying the Threshhold Test Ban. And, as soon as they do that, we are prepared to go forward and ratify the agreement.

The **Chairman**. Let me intrude at this point and call upon Senator Kassebaum for questions.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Mr. Perle, I would gather that you would not agree with those who say if we have SDI in its fullest concept that reductions in offensive missiles would be impossible.

Mr. **Perle**. No, I certainly do not agree with that.

I think SDI would encourage reductions.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Why do you believe it would?

Mr. **Perle**. Let me say that I think the view that SDI and reductions are inconsistent has an implicit assumption that I am not prepared to accept, and that implicit assumption is that the Soviets are bound and determined, independent of cost, to maintain not simply a retaliatory capability, but the very sizeable offensive force that they now possess.

I hope that is not so because if, in fact, they are bound and determined to possess offensive forces of such a character and of such numbers as to threaten the survivability of our deterrent, then I think we face a very dangerous situation.

Now, if we were to deploy an SDI that would, in its earliest manifestations, greatly complicate the problem faced by Soviet planners, reducing the confidence that they might otherwise have that they could successfully execute an attack, then the possibility at least exists that they might be prepared to abandon the thing that we most fear, which is this energy they are devoting to what appear to us to be elements of a first strike capability.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Would not both of us, however, be led to really expanding our cruise missile capability? I would think that we certainly in submarine launched capability have the lead, and we would want obviously to keep that.

It would seem to me that the Soviets would turn their focus to that aspect.

Do you have any comments on that?

Mr. **Perle**. I am under no illusions about the Soviet determination to pay any price in order to have a capacity to retaliate in the event they are attacked. I am quite sure of that.

On this, I agree with Ambassador Smith and with John Rhinelander. They will do whatever they believe necessary in order to have that capability.

The question is how much capability beyond that are they bound and determined to have, and is there some way we can persuade them to relinquish that capability in excess of what they require to retaliate in the event they are attacked?

That seems to me the fundamental question that we are trying to resolve in Geneva and, indeed, in the structuring of our forces in relation to those of the Soviet Union.

Senator **Kassebaum**. How much stock do you put into the importance of confidence and understanding where each other is in this race, or a stable balance concept, and so forth? Is this something that is important to both of us?

If that is the case, is there any merit in just sitting down and laying out our agenda about what both of us are going to do and what we believe is important to do, without trying to say we are going to restrict here and there? Is it better to take the other side of it and just lay it all out?

Mr. **Perle**. I think it is terribly important that we be as forthcoming with one another as possible about our future plans.

The Soviets have access to our future plans of a kind that we do not have with respect to theirs. I think many of the things that we have found it necessary to do in the past we have found necessary to do because of uncertainties about future Soviet planning, while they have, in the main, had the benefit of a pretty clear idea of what we would be doing over a period of 5 to 10 years into the future.

So, any discussion that we can have with them in which the course of development on both sides is predictable I think is important.

Now there are those who believe that the way to make the future predictable is to sign agreements, bilateral agreements, that limit what one can do in the future. I think we can do rather better than that because agreements are never comprehensive enough. There are always avenues for developments outside the agreement, and the SS–20 is a very good example. We did not anticipate the SS–20 at the time the SALT I Treaty was signed. Indeed, I believe that the SS–20 was given impetus at least as a result of the limitations of the 1972 agreement.

The 1972 agreement said you can only have so many launchers for ICBM's with a range of 5,500 kilometers or greater, and in the aftermath of that treaty, the Soviets began a program to deploy ballistic missiles with a range of 5,000 kilometers or thereabouts.

So, in a sense, agreements can sometimes cause a failure of prediction.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Realistically, would there have been a time when the Soviets would have said when we would sit down maybe for an annual analysis of where we are at we are going to start an SS–20 program? I mean, I wonder, for those who have been involved for many years in studying this, if that is feasible?

Mr. **Perle**. Well, it certainly is not feasible in the climate that has prevailed until now. But there are great hopes and expectations that the future is going to be better than the past.

One way in which the future could be made better would be through a much more fulsome dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union about our concerns, our fears, our plans, and our intentions.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Senator Kerry.

Senator **Kerry**. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, in answer to Senator Kassebaum's question a moment ago, I think I heard you say that of course the Soviet Union will have to maintain its retaliatory ability. Is that correct?

Mr. **Perle**. I believe they will.

Senator **Kerry**. Then you would agree that SDI does not render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

Mr. **Perle**. I think clearly SDI is aimed at ballistic missiles and not at the full array of methods by which nuclear weapons can be delivered.

Senator KERRY. Well, then, we really should not be talking about rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, isn't that correct? Doesn't that mislead the American people in a grotesque way?

Mr. PERLE. No, I don't think so.

Senator KERRY. Why not? How do you reconcile those things?

Mr. PERLE. I think there is room in our public discourse for discussion of things that can be accomplished in the short term, but there is also room for a vision of the future, a more hopeful and optimistic vision of the future. I think the President in using that phrase has been seeking to offer such a more hopeful vision of the future. I think we need a national leadership that can do that, however difficult it may be to get from here to there.

Senator KERRY. In terms of getting from here to there, a few years ago, I think you will recall that you were extremely critical of those arms control advocates, both Congress and previous Presidents, who seemed to be putting out mixed messages to the Soviet Union. You said, that mixed messages are really very dangerous in terms of our ability to let the Soviet Union know where we are going.

Wouldn't you say that right now this administration, and specifically yourself and others, are sending very mixed messages on the ABM Treaty, now on the mobile missile, on a number of other details, and important ones, with respect to the arms control environment?

Mr. PERLE. I don't think so.

We are certainly not deliberately mixing our messages. I think the message is clear on both mobile missiles and the ABM Treaty. The President has said—and I don't know of anyone who has contradicted him—that our SDI Program will be conducted within the confines of the ABM Treaty, even though that will impose some inconvenience and cost. And with respect to mobile missiles, it is an administration proposal to ban them if we possibly can in the talks at Geneva.

Senator KERRY. I think you said recently that you thought the Soviet Union would be justified in proceeding ahead with new technology, research, testing, and deployment even.

Mr. PERLE. Not deployment.

Senator KERRY. I beg your pardon—but testing and development.

Mr. PERLE. Testing and development.

I think that flows logically from our interpretation of the treaty. We could hardly insist on an interpretation for us that was more generous than the one imposed on them, although they are quite happy to see a double standard.

Senator KERRY. But there is a duality there.

On the one hand, you are saying they would be quite justified in proceeding ahead with testing and development with the broad interpetration; on the other hand, the administration is saying we are adhering to a narrow one.

It seems to me on the one hand you are advocating one form of behavior but saying another is very permissible.

That is a very mixed message.

Mr. PERLE. A distinction has to be drawn here between administration policy and our understanding of what the treaty requires.

Our understanding of what the treaty requires is that it permits development, testing, and research with respect to systems based on other physical principles. I know this is a matter of controversy, and I will not rehearse the argument unless you wish me to.

Having said that, we can hardly deny that the Soviets are entitled to the same freedom that we think the treaty provides to both sides.

Senator KERRY. Do you think we will be better off with that, that we would both be better off if we both pursued the broader interpretation?

Mr. PERLE. I think the broader interpretation in my view is what was agreed in 1972.

Senator KERRY. That is not my question.

Would we be better off, as a matter of arms control policy, if we both pursued the broader interpretation?

Mr. PERLE. I think the Soviets are likely, given what we have seen thus far of their SDI Program, to conduct such tests as they see fit. One of the questions we had to face up to in reviewing the treaty was the question of whether, if the Soviets were, some years hence, to put a laser in space, for example, as part of an ABM system, and we were to approach them based on a narrow interpretation of the treaty that we think is not valid, to suggest that they were violating the treaty, they would invoke agreed statement D and tell us that they were entirely justified in doing that.

Senator KERRY. I understand and I agree. We would do the same, I am sure, if the Soviets had announced ahead of time, as we now have, that the broader interpretation was justified.

But that is still not really the question.

The question is, as a matter of policy, would we be better off if we pursued what you say they can and what we are refraining from?

Mr. PERLE. Now or in the future?

Senator KERRY. Now, and then in the future.

You know, we are certainly talking about now. We have tests, the BSTS, the airborne optical system, that we funded this year that are going to run right up against this issue. Those tests.

Mr. PERLE. Everything in the current program is within the narrower interpretation of the treaty.

Senator KERRY. Let me phrase it differently.

If we began to find greater success, if something encouraged us to continue on and to carry those tests further in a more clear confrontation with the ABM Treaty, in your terms—I think it is clear now, but in your terms—would you then say both of us would be better off to go ahead and test and develop under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

Mr. PERLE. I think we would be better off in the sense that SDI offers very great promise and to fail to bring that to fruition by inhibiting our program over the long term, accepting a legal requirement that we do not believe is valid, I think that would not be in our long-term interest.

But the issue is moot now because the current program was configured following the President's instruction that we remain within the ABM Treaty on the basis of the only interpretation of the treaty that we had available to us at that point, which was the narrow interpretation that we no longer consider valid.

Nothing that we are now doing is inconsistent with that narrow interpretation of the treaty.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I know that we are running out of time, but may I keep going for a little bit?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, for another question.

Senator KERRY. Are we running tight on the time?

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't I get back to you, John.

Senator KERRY. All right. Thank you.

I wonder if you could help me out a little bit on the subcomponent/component/adjunct issue.

Would you define the terms "component," "subcomponent," "adjunct," and then "prototype of a component?"

Mr. PERLE. Knowing how much time and effort went into answering those questions previously, I think I would prefer to supply that for the record, or I have it in my notes if you want me to find it now.

Senator KERRY. I'd be delighted if you could do that.

Mr. PERLE. The Department of Defense was asked, to be precise, Under Secretary of Defense Hicks was asked at his confirmation hearing by Senator Levin to define those terms. It was in the course of preparing a response to Senator Levin's question that we discovered how many different views there were about what the ABM Treaty entailed and what our legal obligations were.

It was, in fact, that effort to define those terms precisely that led to the research the administration eventually conducted into the ABM Treaty, and that, in turn, lead to the conclusion that the interpretation that had been followed for many years was not, in fact, supported by the negotiating record. It turned out that many of the terms we were asked to define are nowhere to be found in the treaty itself, and so one had to go back and look at the negotiating record to see if it shed any light on terms not in the treaty itself.

It was in the course of that investigation, ironically, that the discovery was made that the earlier interpretation simply was not sustained by the treaty itself or the supporting negotiating record.

Senator KERRY. No doubt, it could not have had anything to do with the difficulties that were envisioned with respect to complying with those terms?

Mr. PERLE. No.

As a matter of fact, Senator—and I am glad you give me the opportunity to say this—when the administration considered the question of how to deal with this new interpretation, one of the arguments for adopting it was that we did not need to adopt it in order to proceed with our program. One could have imagined waiting until it was necessary 5 years from now. But it seemed to many of us that it would look disingenuous if, at the precise moment that we wished to go beyond the narrow interpretation, we developed a new interpretation.

The decision was made in part because it was not necessary.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Perle, I suspect that it may come as a surprise to Senator Levin, as well as to many others, that it was his questions to Mr. Hicks during the latter's confirmation hearing which triggered the administration's reexamination of the ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, for the sake of the historical record, your explanation is a useful one.

Let me ask what the impact has been—past, current, and projected—on U.S. force structure and deployment decisions of continuing American adherence to the ABM Treaty, and what the impact might be of an abrogation of the ABM Treaty or at least adoption of a less restrictive interpretation of the treaty's provisions?

Mr. PERLE. I think for many years following 1972, we lost interest in strategic defense. It is true that we continued a minimal maintenance level program that probably had as much to do with not wishing to close installations as anything else. But it was a languishing program.

This was not true, as I indicated earlier, on the Soviet side, which redoubled its efforts in that period. One result on our force structure is that some 13 years later, the Soviets have an active strategic defense, limited by the terms of the AMB Treaty to 100 interceptors, but capable of rapid expansion in my view, while we have nothing that it is possible to deploy in the near term. So our capability atrophied in a period of relative indifference.

The President's decision in 1983 to reinvigorate our own research and development program has produced, I think, really quite extraordinary results. It is almost like the release of post-war demand for consumer goods. Scientists, engineers, and technicians, who were never given an opportunity to work on defensive programs in the intervening 12 or 13 years after the ABM Treaty, people who might have had ideas but had no place to take them, no source of funding to explore them, have exploded with ideas and enormous creativity. If you visit the people working in the SDI program, there is tremendous enthusiasm, particularly among younger scientists.

I must say that I think this has something to do with a desire to work not on offensive, but on defensive, weapons. So there is tremendous technological ferment and some striking early results, results much faster than anyone had anticipated.

The continuation of the ABM Treaty will raise questions—it must raise questions—about whether, even if we are successful technologically, we will ever make a decision to deploy. That is a price that we are prepared to pay in order to continue the ABM Treaty.

It would not be in our interest to abandon the ABM Treaty now because we have nothing to deploy and the Soviets, in fact, have a great deal that they could deploy in the short term.

For the long term, it will depend on whether these bright scientists and engineers are successful or not in solving the many technical problems that need to be solved.

The CHAIRMAN. News sources indicate that you are a drafter or major author of a report that will be presented to the President shortly, detailing Soviet violations of arms control arrangements and understandings. While this report will supposedly not suggest remedies, it will represent a cataloging of the violations and the nature of them.

If this is the case and you have done this work, what is your judgment about the utility of the ABM Treaty or other treaties? Are they worthwhile for us to participate in? Isn't your argument that arms control treaties are not a good idea?

How would you characterize the importance of this report and how ought it to be interpreted by the President or the public.

Mr. PERLE. Well, it is certainly not my view, nor does the report reflect the view, that arms control treaties are not a good idea. That is like saying that contracts are not a good idea or marriages are not a good idea. It depends on the marriage, the contract, or the treaty.

Let me just say for the record that a great many people were involved in developing this report and I had some coordinating responsibility.

The fact is that there are violations taking place. There has been an increasing pattern of violations, rather more now than a few years ago. They are more serious now than a few years ago, and that has profound implications for the arms control process.

Our hope is that we can fix that problem, that the pattern of violations will come to an end and that incentives can be created to do so.

We certainly do not take the view that we should throw up our hands and abandon the effort to achieve agreements that are stabilizing and verifiable and complied with. But treaties are not self-enforcing. They are voluntary. Compliance is voluntary in nature, and there have to be appropriate incentives to comply.

The CHAIRMAN. So the purpose of this is to blow the whistle, to indicate that we know of Soviet violations, to ask the Soviets if they want to continue such agreements in good faith, and to offer a pattern of remedy, as opposed to proscribing the possibility of these contracts altogether?

Mr. PERLE. The request for this report came from the President in June. At that time, he asked that the Defense Department report to him on a variety of questions, but including responses that we might make proportional to the Soviet violations.

This required an analysis of the violations, their significance, the prospects for the future, as well as a great deal of detailed work on possible proportional responses.

I think the concept of proportionality here is, in itself, instructive. No one is suggesting that agreements be abandoned, which would be a disproportional response, but, rather, that we respond in a measured way appropriate to the sense we have of the scope and significance of the violations.

So, the very mandate to the Department of Defense suggests that it is not administration policy to abandon the process, but, rather, to try to find ways to make it work effectively.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Kassebaum, do you have further questions?

Senator KASSEBAUM. I just have one brief one.

You are very familiar with Congress, Mr. Perle. How are we going to pay for all of this?

I remember Senator Baker one time suggesting, perhaps about 2 years ago, that we have a special tax for defense. That certainly did not seem to get a lot of support. But, obviously, I think we have to be realistic about the costs, and I think everyone is.

On the other hand, we somehow think it is going to be answered in some manner in the future, and I think it is something that we have to be very realistic about right now.

Mr. **Perle**. There is no question that it is a very real problem. It is particularly troubling to defense planners who have not had all their plans approved by the Congress and whose plans were trimmed in the first place consistent with some judgments about what the Congress might be prepared to approve. To then propose that other things be done in order to respond to Soviet violations is not an easy process.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Should we have a special tax for defense?

Mr. **Perle**. Well, I am not an expert on taxation. I do think we have to face up to our responsibilities with respect to these agreements. If we enter into agreements, if they are then violated, and if we do nothing in response, I think, in the long run and probably not the very long run, the process itself will be destroyed.

This has happened before in history, and it could happen again. I do not see how we could ignore violations when they take place. We can appeal to the Soviets, as we have done. We can sit down with them in the various forums available to us and implore them to correct the violations. But, in the end, if they are not prepared to do so and if we fail to respond, I think that is terribly damaging to the whole process and it, of course, leaves them in full possession of whatever advantages they have succeeded in extracting from the regime of, in principle, shared obligations.

Senator **Kassebaum**. There are various ways of responding. I was speaking more of what role cost effectiveness should have in analyzing our systems. I think Ambassador Nitze suggested this, as well as vulnerability, as two criteria that were important in judging SDI. Secretary Weinberger in his testimony the other day did not feel cost effectiveness was necessarily an important criteria.

Mr. **Perle**. I think it is important here to understand what is meant by the term, in this case the precise term, that Ambassador Nitze used, of "cost effectiveness at the margin." I think that the discussion of this issue goes back a long way, in connection with ABM at least as far back as the late 1960's, when the argument was: Should we deploy an ABM system, like the Safeguard ABM system, at a cost of *x* million dollars per intercept if the Soviets, at a cost of one-tenth of *x* million per intercept, can deploy additional reentry vehicles?

Clearly, at that time and in those circumstances, it would not have made sense for us to deploy a system that could be easily, almost casually, overwhelmed at a vastly lower investment.

That is not the kind of defense we are now working on. We are working on defenses that would be relatively insensitive to the number of reentry vehicles deployed by the Soviet Union. So the concept of "cost effectiveness at the margin" is quite different applied in that situation.

No one has suggested, to my knowledge, that "cost effectiveness at the margin" or otherwise should be the only criterion.

If you believe, as I do, that the key question is whether the Soviets will content themselves with something less than movement in the direction of or the acquisition of a first strike capability, then it is entirely possible that the presence of an SDI, even if it would cost them less to overcome it than it cost us to build it, would, nevertheless, cost them so much to overcome it that they might choose to settle for a more modest strategic force, that is, a strategic deterrent but not an offensive capability of the kind they now possess.

So, in those circumstances I would have no difficulty at all in spending more for the defense than the Soviets would, in theory, have to spend for the offense.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know that we are running out of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Dodd, do you have any questions?

Senator DODD. Let Senator Kerry go ahead. I arrived late and I apologize.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, the last time you visited with us you suggested that SDI was going to be able to help us move toward "mutual assured survival." Those were your words.

I wonder if you would describe to us now your definition of "mutual assured survival."

Mr. PERLE. Well, I think, at a very minimum, it begins with a strategic balance in which there are no incentives to strike first, in which the consequences of striking first are no better than the consequences of waiting and striking second. That would produce a high degree of stability.

In theory, one could even imagine a very stable situation in which the side striking first is worse off than the side striking second. One such situation might be one in which defenses were deployed and the side striking first would, in effect, be expending its offensive capability without effect, while the other side would be left with its offensive capability, even after the attack.

So I believe that we can move in the direction of greater stability by a mix of offensive and defensive forces. I think it is largely force of habit and a failure of our concepts to evolve that lead some people to think that it is desirable that we have only offensive weapons in the world.

Senator KERRY. So, as I understand it, mutual assured survival to you does not, as mutual assured destruction does, relate to what happens if you have a confrontation. You are not applying it in a straight analogy.

Mr. PERLE. No.

Senator KERRY. Mutual assured survival has no relationship to what happens if you still have a confrontation, is that correct? You are simply saying it is a different kind of stability?

Mr. PERLE. That's correct.

We all have a tendency to yield to the temptation to come up with slogans to match other slogans.

Senator KERRY. So it is a slogan.

Mr. PERLE. It's a slogan.

Senator KERRY. OK. I appreciate your saying that.

Now, you make one enormous assumption, I think, and I would like to ask you about it. As you arrive at this new stability, you assume that weaponry of counter-kind by the Soviet Union remains essentially what we know it to be today. But never with the introduction of any new system in the history of warfare has that been true.

Why do you make this assumption?

Mr. PERLE. Oh, I don't. I do not assume that it will be true.

Senator KERRY. Well, in answer to Senator Kassebaum's question you talked about how we are designing a system that is essentially geared toward minimizing the effect on vehicles as they come in.

Now, what if that system gets changed and they have counter measures and penetration aids. We are designing counter measures. Suppose the counter measures alter the equation, as one would be fair to assume they may well. Don't your assumptions have to change?

Mr. PERLE. I think we would be foolish indeed to deploy a system—and we are far from that—that could be easily overcome by unanticipated counter measures. It is generally the case in developing weapon systems of all kinds, whether conventional or communications systems or offensive or defensive systems, to make judgments about the potential evolution of counter measures on the other side.

In this regard, I do think it is important that we are quite confident over the long term about the quality of our technological base, about the ability to develop a defense that will be resilient in the face of changes to the Soviet offensive forces.

Whether we are able to achieve success here I think remains to be judged. I certainly would not recommend that we deploy a system that the Soviets could easily overcome.

Senator KERRY. Let me pursue that a little bit, if I can.

I would agree with you. We obviously would not want to do that.

But I wonder if in what you are describing there is any substantive change in the nature of deterrence. Nowhere have I ever heard you describe a system that you believe will be leakproof 100 percent—correct?

Mr. PERLE. That's correct.

Senator KERRY. So you are assuming a system that, absent a fundamental change in relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, which current evidence shows this system is not necessarily going to bring about, absent that fundamental change, we are still going to maintain or try to maintain our mutual ability to penetrate each other, are we not?

Mr. PERLE. I think the answer to that is yes, but it needs to be qualified: penetrate to what degree and for what purpose?

Senator KERRY. Penetrate to a degree sufficient to understand that you are continuing to deter because of your ability to destroy?

Mr. PERLE. But that is very different from maintaining the capability to penetrate defenses and go on to destroy the offenses underlying them.

Senator KERRY. Isn't the end result the same?

Mr. PERLE. No, not necessarily.

Senator KERRY. Why?

Mr. PERLE. Because you could create a situation, we would hope to create a situation, in which the Soviets would conclude that the costs to them of crashing through the defense and going on to destroy our capacity to retaliate is prohibitive, and, therefore, we might come to closure on a regime of real restraint in which they content themselves with less capability than they have today.

Senator KERRY. Now you have spent 6 years building up the offenses of this country and, indeed, our defenses, in response, partially, to Soviet buildup. Wouldn't you say that that is exactly what you have achieved today? Isn't that where we are today? Or is deterrence today based on something different from what you have just described?

Mr. PERLE. No.

In concept——

Senator KERRY. Not "in concept," but in reality—today.

Isn't that precisely what keeps the peace today?

Mr. PERLE. I think deterrence does keep the peace today, and I think that strategic defense can greatly strengthen deterrence.

Senator KERRY. But the very deterrence you just described—I beg your pardon?

Mr. PERLE. I said, I believe that strategic defense can greatly strengthen deterrence.

Senator KERRY. Well, I would like to understand exactly how it is going to strengthen deterrence if the same ultimate risk is what is balancing the peace. You have just described that as the end result. Isn't that exactly what you have today?

Mr. PERLE. Well, I do not believe that we have a deterrent balance today that is either guaranteed for all time or inevitably stable. What I believe we have today is a massive Soviet buildup underway that——

Senator KERRY. Well, be fair. We are also building up. You have just spent 6 years building up.

Mr. PERLE. We are, in the main, replacing older weapons with newer ones, that's right.

Senator KERRY. Well, can't they say they are doing the same thing?

Mr. PERLE. They can say that, but the fact is that they are replacing new weapons with even newer ones for the most part.

Senator KERRY. It's really tautology, is that it? It is very semantic.

Mr. PERLE. No, no.

Senator KERRY. An MX missile is not a new missile? It's not a Minuteman III improvement, is it?

Mr. PERLE. An MX missile is certainly a new missile.

Senator KERRY. OK. So we are doing the same thing, aren't we?

Mr. PERLE. It replaces a missile first built in the 1960's, and fully deployed more than a decade ago.

The Soviets today are deploying new missiles that replace missiles that have been deployed in recent years. In fact, when you compare the delivery vehicles on both sides, something like 70 percent of the delivery vehicles for U.S. weapons today are 15 years old or older.

Senator KERRY. I understand that.

Mr. PERLE. There is an older generation that is inevitably being replaced.

On the Soviet side, something like 70 percent are 5 years old or less.

So there is a significant difference.

The CHAIRMAN. There is time for just one more question, Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. All right. That is fine.

I will hold off.

What I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, if I may, are a couple of things.

First, could I have permission to submit some written questions to the former panel as well as to the Secretary?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may.

Senator KERRY. And may they and the answers also be printed in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator KERRY. Second, could I ask that the descriptions, the specific current descriptions, as a consequence of this study, initiated by Senator Levin's question regarding prototype, component, subcomponent, adjunct, prototype of a component, et cetera, could that be submitted to us and also be included in the record, those definitions?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The information referred to follows:]

[See end of hearing.]

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask Secretary Perle to comply with the portion that he is responsible for and we will ask the other panelists to do the same.

Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My apologies to you and to the committee. This morning happened to be one of those mornings where four committees met simultaneously, and I have not yet figured out how to clone myself in order to get around this predicament.

I appreciate this series of hearings, Mr. Chairman, as I have said. I think it is extremely beneficial and helpful.

Let me just ask a couple of quick questions, if I can, Mr. Secretary. You have been very patient.

If you have already addressed my questions, just say so and I will pick up your answers from the record.

You talked about violations. In the word "violation" I think there is an immediate assumption that what we are talking about is significant. Why the word "significant" comes to mind is because I think that the word "violation" in and of itself draws one to that sort of conclusion.

I wonder if you might characterize, if you can, the kinds of violations that have occurred. Are they serious violations? Or are they open to interpretation? Could you qualify your statement on violations?

If you have already done so, I apologize for asking the question again.

Mr. PERLE. No, I have not, and in this, I would like to give you a personal view if I can because I do not want any misunderstanding about the report that Secretary Weinberger will be sending to the President.

I think a whole range of adjectives could be applied to the violations. Some of them are serious in a military sense, and some of them are not so serious in a military sense. All of them cause us concern.

I, for one, am as concerned about the small violations in some ways as the large ones—not in a military sense, but it does seem to me that if the Soviets are prepared to violate agreements for marginal gains, this has to raise serious questions about how ready they will prove in the future to violate agreements where there are very sizeable military gains.

Having said that, I think that the construction of the radar at Krasnoyarsk and the associated activity that could put the Soviets in a position rapidly to deploy a territorial defense is in violation of the ABM Treaty and is the most serious militarily of the various violations.

Senator DODD. Has that been substantiated? That violation is referred to rather frequently, and I am not as knowledgeable as the other members of this panel are on this subject matter. But from what I have read it seems to be a violation that has been somewhat open to interpretation. Given its alternative use, does it constitute a violation?

Mr. PERLE. I don't think so.

The view has been advanced that because this radar, which would clearly be a violation if it were a ballistic missile early warning radar, can also perform the permitted purpose of tracking objects in space, somehow the permitted purpose ought to cancel the prohibited one.

That is a theory that has profound and profoundly disturbing implications for all of our treaty agreements and obligations.

It is a theory that would not hold up and that no one would wish to apply broadly. But that is the essence of the Soviet argument.

The radar at Krasnoyarsk, from our observations of it, is identical to radars that the Soviets have acknowledged to be ballistic missile early warning radars; and, as a ballistic missile early warning radar, it is located in a place where it should not be. It is not, as the treaty provides, on the periphery of the Soviet Union facing outward. Rather, it is some several hundred kilometers inland, and it faces out over 4,000 kilometers of Soviet territory.

Now, in looking for an explanation of the Soviet decision to deploy that radar there, the explanation that makes the most sense is a military one, and it is that the Soviets desire the very accurate, high capacity tracking capability of that radar, which would feed in to a nationwide system of ballistic missile defenses.

We can find no other plausible explanation for building that radar in that location in violation of the agreement.

It is true that the radar is also capable of tracking objects in space. But it is a very poor radar for that purpose, and an absurdly expensive radar for that purpose, and redundant with other radars that perform that purpose far better.

It happens to be ideally suited for the much more troubling purpose of completing the comprehensive radar coverage of the Soviet Union for antiballistic missile defense purposes. That is why it concerns us greatly.

But to argue that because it can track objects in space we should ignore the fact that it is a ballistic missile early warning radar seems to me an awfully weak argument.

By the way, any ABM radar can track objects in space. So it would be a license to deploy them without limit.

Senator Dodd. Is that the most serious violation?

Mr. Perle. I think militarily that is the most serious, although it is hard to know how one should judge another prominent violation, which is the deployment of a second new type of ICBM.

One can argue that, in the absence of a treaty, they would have had a second new type of ICBM anyway and, therefore, one cannot attribute all of the benefits of a second new ICBM to the benefits of violating the agreement. But they have deployed a second new ICBM while the SALT II Treaty permits them only one, and it is entirely possible that we will see still other Soviet ICBM's beyond the two that they now have in violation of the SALT II Treaty, which allows only one new tape.

A third violation that is generic in nature has to do with the encryption of telemetry from Soviet missile flight tests; that is, the data that is sent back from a flight test. Under the terms of the SALT II Treaty, the Soviets undertook not to encrypt telemetry in a manner that would impede national technical means of verification.

They are now doing so, and in some cases the practice of encryption, which barely existed before the 1972 treaty, has now become almost complete with respect to several Soviet weapon systems, and it troubles us greatly.

The prospect of that greatly troubled this committee as well. In its deliberations on the SALT II agreement in 1979, the committee went out of its way to say that a violation of the limitations on encryption would be so serious as to raise fundamental questions about the continuing validity of the treaty.

I could give you the exact statement for the record. I think it was quite right to say that in 1979, and I think it is imperative, not least of all because it was said, that we not now ignore this continuing violation.

It is a long list and I could go on, but that gives you the flavor of the violations.

Senator Dodd. It might be helpful. I, for one, would like to see that list because it is so often discussed. Also, you have described several of the ones that I believe are the better known allegations of violations.

I would ask, Mr. Chairman, if it is permissible, that we be given that list. I think it would help if, in addition to the list, you give some explanation, such as the one you have given on the radar system, as to why the conclusion has been drawn that they constitute violations. It would be very helpful.

The **Chairman**. Secretary Perle, would you make that list available for the record of this hearing?

Mr. **Perle**. Yes; I would be glad to do that.

[The information referred to follows:]

[See end of hearing.]

Senator **Dodd**. The last question I have is this. It relates to the question Senator Kassebaum raised. I raised it with Secretary Weinberger, and, although it goes a bit afield from the specific title of these hearings, it deserves to be discussed.

The question has to do with the Gramm-Rudman proposal.

Secretary Weinberger left me with the impression that he did not like the proposal. I wonder if you might share with the committee your views, if you have any, on the wisdom and the efficacy of the Gramm-Rudman proposal in light of these other suggestions you have made. Obviously SDI, with whatever numbers you would want to accept, does raise substantially the cost. I wonder whether or not you have any specific opinions on that proposal.

Mr. **Perle**. This is an issue for which, thankfully, I have no formal responsibilities.

I would only make the observation that Gramm-Rudman seems to be evolving. It changes from one day to the next. I think anyone who says anything that is going to appear in the record about it had better attach to it its status at that time and what it means at that time.

I think we have been concerned about some of the directions in which it has changed, at the very least.

I am not an expert on that. Frankly, I do not understand exactly how it would work.

Senator **Dodd**. Well, I am not going to press you on that because I am fearful you would not find many people totally convinced on how it is going to work.

Again, Mr. Chairman, my apologies for being late, and I thank you and the Secretary for his responses this morning.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

[The following information was subsequently submitted for the record:]

MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & McCLOY
INTERNATIONAL SQUARE BUILDING
1825 EYE STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

(202) 835-7500
CABLE: MILTWEED WASHINGTON
RAPIFAX 1500:835-7586
I. T. T. 440667
W. U. 89-2591

1 CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

ALEXANDRA HOUSE
16 CHATER ROAD
HONG KONG

1 COLLEGE HILL
LONDON EC4R 2RA, ENGLAND

NIPPON PRESS CENTER BUILDING
2-1 UCHISAIWAI-CHO 2-CHOME
CHIYODA-KU, TOKYO 100

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
PARTNER
DIRECT DIAL NUMBER
(202) 835-7534

November 21, 1985

Hon. Richard G. Lugar, Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
440 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Dick:

I was pleased to see that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings last week on the very important issue of the recent re-interpretation of the ABM Treaty. I have joined with three other lawyers and former government officials in expressing our deep concern about the arms control and legal implications of the Administration's action.

On behalf of the other signatories, I am writing to request that you include our enclosed statement in the printed record of these hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Thank you for your attention to our request. Please let me know if we can be of any further assistance to your Committee in considering these crucial issues.

Sincerely,

Elliot L. Richardson

November 12, 1985

Statement on the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty by four lawyers and former government officials submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

We are deeply concerned about the Reagan Administration's recent reinterpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which is the most significant treaty limiting the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. By banning nation-wide defenses against ballistic missiles, the Treaty was the cornerstone of the SALT agreements and is equally crucial to present efforts to reduce the dangerous and wasteful nuclear arms race between the two superpowers.

The Administration's new interpretation would permit not just research but also development and testing of exotic space-based defense systems, such as those contemplated by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Under this view, the treaty banning anti-ballistic missile systems would end up allowing the development and testing of such systems on a scale that would dwarf anything the two sides have considered building until now. As Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Chief Negotiator for the ABM Treaty, has said, the new interpretation would make "a dead letter" out of the ABM Treaty.

We are gratified that in the face of strong opposition from our Allies and members of Congress, the Administration has stepped back somewhat from this new interpretation, claiming that since SDI involves only research, the new interpretation allowing SDI to proceed beyond research is a "moot" point. This view postpones the issue but does not resolve it, particularly since the Administration says that it continues to adhere to the new interpretation "in principle."

Having devoted our careers to the rule of law, we are concerned about not only the arms control implications of the Administration's action, but also the procedure by which it was taken.

The ABM Treaty, like all treaties, is legally recognized as the supreme law of the land. When the Senate approved ratification of the Treaty without qualification by a vote of 88-2, it acted on the clear understanding presented by the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief Negotiator that the Treaty banned the development and testing of all space-based ABM systems and components, including "exotic systems" based on new physical principles. This view of the Treaty was understood by all, including critics like Sen. Jackson, who voted for the Treaty, and Sen. Buckley, who voted against it.

The Reagan Administration's new interpretation would amend the Treaty beyond recognition by eliminating a major constraint that has uniformly been regarded as an essential part of the Treaty since its ratification. For thirteen years every Administration, including the present one until now, has confirmed the view that the ABM Treaty prohibits the development and testing of all space-based ABM systems.

The law is clear in requiring Senate approval of amendments that modify treaties. But this major modification of the ABM Treaty has been worked out by a few appointed officials, without consultation with the Congress (or our allies for whom the Treaty is of major importance). This new modification renders the Treaty virtually meaningless -- solely through internal administrative action.

The Administration argues that its new interpretation is justified by ambiguities in the Treaty and the secret US negotiating record. The Treaty wisely established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) for the specific purpose of resolving such ambiguities, and the SCC has successfully done so many times since 1972. The Soviets have accepted the historic US interpretation. Assuming good faith on both sides, the SCC could quickly resolve this non-dispute.

The Administration's view of the secret negotiating record is adamantly disputed by Ambassador Smith and others who conducted the Treaty negotiations. In any case, negotiating records that were not presented to the Senate cannot override the understanding of the Treaty which was the basis of the Senate's approval of the Treaty.

A treaty that has made such a major contribution to our national security should be complied with in good faith, and ambiguities in the Treaty should be resolved under the procedures provided for in the Treaty. Unilateral repudiation of the settled interpretation of this Treaty in order to facilitate new weapons schemes undermines the rule of law on which the international system is based.

Hon. Erwin N. Griswold
Hon. Shirley M. Hufstedler
Hon. Elliot L. Richardson
Hon. Cyrus R. Vance

Note: Erwin Griswold is former US Solicitor General and Harvard Law School Dean; Shirley Hufstedler, former US Court of Appeals Judge and Secretary of Education; Elliot Richardson, former US Attorney General and Secretary of Defense; and Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY PERLE TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR KERRY

Question. Would you define the terms "component," "subcomponent," "adjunct," and then "prototype of a component?".

Answer. "ABM components" are ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars and described in Article II of the Treaty. Devices capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars also are treated as ABM components under the Treaty.

For a "prototype to be limited by the ABM Treaty it must be a prototype of an ABM system or components. Regardless of whether a device is labeled "prototype," "breadboard," "test bed," or "preproduction model," or any other term of art, the determination of what treaty restrictions apply is based on whether it constitutes an ABM component under the Treaty, or is capable of substituting for an ABM component. Finally, the word "adjunct" is not used in the ABM Treaty. In the ABM Treaty negotiating record, the term "adjunct" is referred to as a device that could be used in conjunction with an ABM component, but that could not perform all the functions of, or substitute for, the component.

Neither the Treaty nor the relevant negotiating record refer to the term subcomponent.

It should also be noted that ABM systems based on other physical principles including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars are covered only in Agreed Statement G. This statement permits development and testing of such systems and components, but their deployment would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

Soviet Violations

Issue	Finding
ABM Treaty	
1. Krasnoyarsk Radar	Violation
2. Mobility of ABM System Components	Potential violation
3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components	Probable violation
4. ABM Capabilities of Modern SAM Systems	Evidence insufficient to assess/ ambiguous
5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers	Ambiguous/ serious concern
6. ABM Territorial Defense	May be preparing prohibited defense
SALT II Treaty	
1. SS-25 ICBM	Violation
2. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Limits	Violation
3. SS-16 ICBM Deployment	Probable violation/ indications of removal
4. BACKFIRE Bomber Intercontinental Operating Capability	Inconsistent with political commitment
5. BACKFIRE Bomber Production Rate	Ambiguous/ Slightly above 30 until 1984/ decreased to slightly below 30 since then
6. Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry	Violation
7. Concealment of the Association Between an ICBM and Its Launcher	Violation
SALT I Interim Agreement: Use of "Remaining Facilities" at Former SS-7 Sites	Violation
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol: Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons	Violation
Limited Test Ban Treaty: Underground Nuclear Test Venting	Violation
Threshold Test Ban Treaty: Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton Limit	Likely violation
Helsinki Final Act: Notification of Military Exercises	Violation

The **Chairman**. I thank you, also, Secretary Perle, for coming, for offering a very important statement, and for your answers, as well as your additional promises of answers to questions that have been raised by Senators today.

Mr. **Perle**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

○